

OTTOMAN ADMINISTRATIVE PRIORITIES: TWO CASE STUDIES OF KARAHİSAR-I ŞARKİ (ŞEBİNKARAHİSAR) AND GİRESUN

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INTRODUCTION

This paper examines the Ottoman priorities and preoccupations in the provincial administration during the 15th and 16th centuries. By studying the local and global conditions on one hand and the priorities and the policies of the Ottoman administration on the other, it aims to contribute towards a better understanding of the workings of the Ottoman administrative mechanism. The main sources for this study are the Ottoman tax registers, widely known as *tahrir defters*, from the 15th and 16th century.

The view of modern researchers concerning Ottoman institutions and bureaucracy is shaped by the accounts of classical western sources, which inculcated in their mind unchanging institutional forms and highly regularised bureaucratic procedures. These institutions were also regarded by them as rigidly constructed models, intolerant of any deviation from a given norm.¹ Under the strong influence of these views, some scholars studying the Ottoman central administration disregard its connection with the provinces and the larger social, economic and geographical environment. Other scholars doing regional studies on the provinces ignore the regions' connection with the centre. Based mainly on *tahrir defters*, the latter group of studies, usually concentrating on a single *sancak*, create a kind of self-contained universe, disconnected from the surrounding areas and, most importantly, from the central administration. Any interaction and relationship between the central

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¹ Rhoads Murphey, Ottoman Census Methods in the Mid-Sixteenth Century: Three Case Histories, in: *Studia Islamica*, LXXI (1990), p. 117.

administration and the provinces is ignored.² Only recently has this started to change. The realisation that there was some sort of flexibility and dynamism in the central decision making and the provincial administration of the Empire led some scholars to study the nature of this process.³

It is now widely accepted that the Ottoman State was a dynamic system, which consisted of living organisational entities, each with an evolutionary history linked to conditions in particular ages and in particular areas of the empire, rather than existing as static forms.⁴ These studies are however, limited in scope and employ mainly random as opposed to statistical evidence. I believe that it requires a more systematic and consistent approach supported by statistical evidence to understand properly how the Ottoman political/administrative system functioned and changed.

In this paper, an approach well known in political science, called systems approach, is adopted.⁵ This approach allows one to study patterns of relationships or interactions and interdependence between parts that compose a whole. Based on this approach, I developed a conceptual framework to examine the Ottoman administrative mechanism. The advantage of this framework is that one can study an Ottoman institution without losing sight of its relations with other institutions and, more importantly, with its environment. This framework is described in detail elsewhere.⁶

² Murphey, *ibid.*

³ Suraiya Faruqi studied the petition process that Ottoman taxpayers used to bring their demands to the ears of the Sultan, and the reaction of the Sultan's administration. Political Activity Among Ottoman Taxpayers and the Problem of Sultanate Legitimation (1570-1650), in: *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient*, XXXIV (1992), pp. 1-39. Reprinted in, *Coping with the State, Political Conflict and Crime in the Ottoman Empire 1550-1720*, İstanbul, The Isis Press, 1995, pp.13-41. See also her Political Initiatives 'From the Bottom Up' in the Sixteenth- and Seventeenth-Century Ottoman Empire: Some Evidence for their Existence, in: *Coping with the State, Political Conflict and Crime in the Ottoman Empire 1550-1720*, İstanbul, The Isis Press, 1995, pp.1-11.

⁴ Murphey, *ibid.*, pp. 117-118.

⁵ Systems approach to political life was initiated by David Easton who developed a flow chart of the political system: *A Framework for Political Analysis*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1965, pp. 110,112. See also his *A System Analysis of Political Life*, U.S.A., 1965.

⁶ Fatma Acun, *Ottoman Administration in the Sancak of Karahisar-ı Şarki (1485-15699): An Analysis Based on Tahrir Defters*, Ph.D. thesis, The University of Birmingham, 1993. See also Fatma Acun, A Systems Approach to Study the Ottoman Provincial Administration: A Case Study of the Province of Karahisar-ı Şarki in North-Central Anatolia, to be published in the proceedings of the II. International Congress on the Historical Sources of Eurasian and North African Civilisations: Computer Approaches, 2-6 June 1998, Moscow.

Since the main sources for this study are the Ottoman tax registers or *tahrir* defters of the 15th and 16th centuries, a brief description of the nature of these documents is in order.

SOURCES

The series of *tahrir defters* of Giresun and Karahisar examined for this study spans nearly a century, in Giresun from 1486 to 1583, (MM 828 of 1486, TT 52 of 1515, TT 288 of 1554 and TT 43 of 1583) and in Karahisar from 1485 to 1569, (TT 37 of 1485, TT 387 of 1520, TT 255 of 1547 and TT 478 of 1569). This series of registers taken as a whole, comprised the reigns of Mehmed the Conqueror, Bayezid II, Selim I, Süleyman the Magnificent and Selim II successively.

After five decades of research, we still can not say that studies of the *tahrir defters* have moved towards a systematic analysis of their problems and towards reliable methods of processing data contained in them.⁷ Rather, the studies have tended to concentrate on some specific problems or on a regional study. In these studies, various methods were applied ranging from textual criticism to highly advanced statistics, which resulted in broadening and enriching our knowledge of the *tahrir defters*, but, at the same time, caused some confusion about the assessment of the function and value of the *defters* and accordingly about the methods and techniques to study them.⁸ This led researchers at the beginning to regard *defters* as population censuses. The applicability of the *defters* as censuses was criticised later on by a second generation of researchers who saw *defters* as essentially tax registers. Considerations of the *defters*' content divorced from the Ottoman adminis-

⁷ One contribution has emerged in this area, which may potentially improve the quality and the scope of *tahrir* studies significantly. This is a database, called *tahrir database*, which is designed to store and process the data in *defters* in their entirety. More information about this database can be found in R. Acun, *Modelling and Retrieval of Historical Data*, Ph.D. thesis, The University of Birmingham, October 1994 and R. Acun, R. Anane and S. Laflin, Database Design for Ottoman Tax Registers, in: Marker and Pagh (eds.), *Yesterday, Proceedings from the 6th International Conference of the Association of History and Computing*, Odense 1991, Odense, 1994, pp. 109-122.

⁸ For an excellent critique of *tahrir* studies see Colin Heywood, Critical Studies Between Historical Myth and 'Mythohistory': The Limits of Ottoman History, in: *Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies*, vol. 12, (1988), pp. 315-345. The following works can be given as examples of specific problems and regional studies: Heath Lowry, *The Ottoman Tahrir Defters as a Source for Urban Demographic History: The Case Study of Trabzon ca. 1486-1583*, Ph.D. thesis, The University of California at Los Angeles, 1977; Mehmet Öz, *Population Taxation and Regional Economy in the District of Canik (According to Ottoman Tahrir Defters, 1455-1576)*, Ph.D. thesis, The University of Cambridge, 1990.

trative context in which they were created led to some seriously distorted views of the contents of the *tahrir defters*.

Considering primarily the need for undertaking surveys and the practical use of the *defters* by the Ottomans, it is thought that the ultimate purpose of drawing up the *defters* was to make decisions on the collection and distribution of revenues in order to administer an area. This necessitated, first, a definition of the *defters* as *records of revenue collection and distribution*. Further, they are viewed as the tools of an administrative apparatus on which the bureaucracy largely depended for making military, administrative, economic and social regulations concerning the areas where the *timar* system was applied. Thus, the *tahrir defters* were a means of collecting information from the provinces for the central bureaucracy in Istanbul which used this information in deciding upon the economic, social, military and administrative policies, some of which are also recorded in the *defters*. Therefore, the stated purpose of the *tahrir defters* make them most useful for studying the policy-making mechanism of the Ottoman State. Moreover, the purpose oriented approach to the *defters* pushes us away from ideological definitions and descriptions of the *defters* as well as the regional approach to studying *defters*, allowing us to concentrate on the practical use of them by the Ottomans.

The Ottoman administrative practice, i.e. the policy-making mechanism, is still an imperfectly understood dimension of Ottoman historical studies. While the *tahrir defters* provide us with an ample amount of evidence of both a statistical and a textual nature for studying the Ottoman administrative practice, it is unfortunate that they are the least exploited materials. This paper aims to make a small contribution to this much-neglected field of Ottoman administrative history by focusing on its operational aspects.

OTTOMAN OBJECTIVES CONCERNING PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATION

It will be useful to start with some introductory remarks on the concepts that shaped the minds of the Sultans and statesmen who were the decision makers, and the objectives which affected the decision making process in governing the provinces. These will help us to determine the state priorities and preoccupations in the administration of the provinces.

The Ottomans had a strong sense of world order, *nizam-ı alem*, which also had become their ultimate ideal in the administration of the empire. In this Islamic concept of world order, the human world was divided into two parts: "the house of Islam" (*dar al-Islam*) and "the house of war" (*dar al-harb*). The former was the Islamic world while the latter was the non-Islamic world,

or the lands where Islamic law had not yet prevailed. In the Islamic view of the world, some day the house of war would be incorporated into the house of Islam by means of a holy war (*gaza*) launched by the Muslims. Ideologically, the concept of world order was based on the principle of universality and unity of the whole world under Muslim domination. In reality, the political unity of the Islamic world, let alone the whole world, was never realised. Yet the principle of universality and unity remained intact and was passed down throughout the ages.⁹ The Ottomans adopted this principle, and thus, the maintenance of world order, however idealistic, became their ideal.

The ideal of maintaining the world order justified their expansionist policies. Thus, in just one and a half centuries, the Ottoman principality developed into an empire absorbing vast territories in the Balkans, Anatolia, the Arabian Peninsula and North Africa. In these territories they found societies at various stages of development, divergent in their economic systems and belonging to diverse cultures. It was, therefore, essential for the Ottomans to find some kind of balance of both theoretical and practical centralisation, which would allow for a useful adjustment to local conditions without compromising the consolidation of their power and authority. This adjustment led to the creation of several types of provincial organisation and local administration, as well as economic and social life within the empire. The Ottomans sought to engineer the emergence of an ideal society, encompassing all these diversities and allowing them to work in harmony. We may therefore conclude that the *creation of an ideal society* was the first and foremost objective of the Ottomans. The above mentioned ideal of maintaining the world order was possible only through the creation of an ideal society. The Ottoman Empire managed to achieve what we call an "ideal society". In so doing, it became more than just a state in the Islamic world, it also took on the characteristic of a world empire. The Ottomans developed various social, economic and administrative policies and programs in order to create that ideal society, all of which are among the concerns of this study.

The creation of an ideal society and the maintenance of social order and peace in this society required the successful running of the state by the Sultan. Accordingly, the Ottoman philosophy of government was formulated in order to consolidate and extend the power and the authority of the Sultan. The only way to achieve this was to obtain rich sources of revenue. This, in turn, depended on the condition of making the productive classes prosper-

⁹ Suzuki Tadashi, *The Governance Structures of the Ottoman Empire: A Comparative Historical Analysis*, in: *Japanese Civilisation in the Modern World*, Tadao Umesao, D., Eleanor Westney and Masatake Matsubara eds., Osaka, 1989, p. 135.

ous.¹⁰ In this cyclical philosophy, also called the circle of justice (*daire-i adliye*), the Sultan's power and authority depended on the material as well as moral support he received from his subjects. Related to this philosophy, the notion of justice (*adalet*) had particular meaning in the system of government. It is defined as the prevention and elimination of oppressive acts by those who exercised power in the name of the ruler. Long historical experience showed that oppressive government might cause an impairment of the productive capacity of the taxpaying masses and a decrease in the state's revenues. The alternative policy was to protect the *reaya* against the abuse of power by state officials.¹¹ The main issue was, then, how to increase the state revenues without impairing the prosperity of the taxpayers and causing discontent among the *reaya*. Therefore, the *maximisation of revenue* was one of the Ottomans' primary objectives because this was necessary for the successful running of the state by the Sultan. In order to achieve this objective, the Ottomans developed strategies of revenue raising. They also had to take problems into consideration when administering an area, which had to be dealt with in a particular order, because some were more important than the others. Some of the Ottomans' priorities in provincial administration will be examined in this paper.

From the above discussion we may thus set out the creation of an ideal society and revenue maximisation as the ultimate administrative objectives of the Ottomans. The Ottomans tried to achieve these objectives by following a particular course of action in which some of their concerns took priority over others. By studying these prior concerns we will be able to see whether the Ottomans organised their priorities in a way that helped them to achieve their objectives in the long term.

OTTOMAN PRIORITIES CONCERNING THE CREATION OF AN IDEAL SOCIETY IN GİRESUN

The process of development of the fortress of Giresun into a full-fledged city is very interesting to observe in terms of the Ottoman policies and priorities towards creating an ideal urban society.

Situated on the Black Sea coast, Giresun was a natural harbour for ships sailing to and from Trabzon. The surrounding areas of the fortress of Giresun

had long been in the hands of Çepni Turcomans. The fortress itself was captured during Mehmed II's Trabzon expedition in 1461. It was attached to the *sancak* (a chief administrative unit in the Ottoman Empire) of Trabzon, which was divided into a number of *timars* (fiefs) and castle-holdings, one of which was the fortress of Giresun.¹² Thereafter, the fortress was organised in a pattern typical of late 15th century practice: the small garrison, which was placed inside the fortress, was not made up of local troops. As a security measure, they were recruited from such distant parts of the empire as Sofya, Tırhala, Kefe, Niğbolu, Üsküb, Manastır and Semendire.¹³ Again, for the same reason they were allocated *timars* from as far away as Akçaabad and Sürmene, which were the *nahiyes* (a subdivision of *kaza* in the Ottoman administrative system) of Trabzon.¹⁴ The Ottomans were very much concerned with the settlement of Turkish people in the newly conquered lands and fortresses. It is also a well known fact that in the city of Trabzon, which is close to Giresun and which was inhabited predominantly by a Christian population, Mehmed II introduced Muslim elements to the city while deporting some of the Christian natives in order to reduce their number.¹⁵ However, his policy does not seem to have extended to the Giresun area since we see no deportation of Muslims or Christians to or from the fortress up to at least 1487. The only newcomers to the fortress were the appointed guards and four Muslim households. All of these post-conquest arrangements dealt with the administration and the security of the area.

The Ottomans' initial strategy towards the inhabitants of the fortress was a careful balancing of incentives and duties which ultimately aimed at obtaining their faithfulness and support: the inhabitants were exempted from all the usual taxes, such as *harac* (tribute paid by non-Muslims), *ispence* (the equivalent of *çift resmi* for non-Muslims), *öşr* (tithe) and customs dues for the grain as well as domestically consumed wine. In return, they were re-

¹⁰ Halil İnalcık, The Ottoman Economic Mind and Aspects of Ottoman Economy, in: *Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East from the Rise of Islam to the Present Day*, ed. by M.A.Cook, London, 1970, p. 217.

¹¹ Halil İnalcık, State and Ideology under Sultan Süleyman I, in: *The Middle East and the Balkans Under Ottoman Rule, Essays on Economy and Society*, Bloomington, 1993, p. 71.

¹² I have made extensive use of the following article by Feridun Emecen, especially in cross-checking the data I found in the relevant *tahrir defters*. XV ve XVI. Asırlarda Giresun ve Yöresine Dair Bazı Bilgiler, in: *19 Mayıs Üniversitesi Eğitim Fakültesi Dergisi*, 4 (Aralık 1990), pp. 157-166.

¹³ The majority of the fortress soldiers (*hisar erleri*) in Anatolia were recruited from the Balkans. On this, see Halil İnalcık, Ottoman Methods of Conquest, in: *Studia Islamica*, II (1954), p. 107.

¹⁴ MM 828, pp. 596-617.

¹⁵ Heath W. Lowry, "From Lesser Wars to the Mightiest Wars": The Ottoman Conquest and Transformation of Byzantine Urban Centres in the Fifteenth Century, in: *Continuity and Change in Late Byzantine and Early Ottoman Society*, ed. by Anthony Bryer and Heath Lowry, Birmingham-Washington, 1986, p. 332.

quired to navigate the ships sailing between Trabzon and Samsun, and to take care of the fortress in which they were living.¹⁶

Subsequently, around 1515 the policy of internal migration was pursued in order to create an ethnic-religious blend among the inhabitants: 33 Muslims (28 *hane* (households) and 5 *mücerred* (bachelors) and 140 Christians (123 *hane*, 3 *bive* (widow head of household) and 14 *mücerred*) were introduced to the fortress. Roughly half of the newly migrated Christians, or 60 households, were drawn from the nearby region of Trabzon, and were employed to serve the native Christian inhabitants of the fortress whose number amounted to 179 persons (103 *hane*, 36 *mücerred* and 40 *bive*).¹⁷ The fact that quite a large group of people was employed as servants is very interesting in terms of revealing the Ottomans' protective attitude towards the natives. Among the Christian population of the fortress had been 22 widows previously recorded as heads of household. Their number rose to 40 in 1515. The unusually high number of widows was probably due to the fact that their

¹⁶ The entries from MM 828, p. 37 and 38 read as follows: "Cemaat-i Kala-ı Giresun zimmiyan ellerinde sultan Mehmed hükmü vardır ki, haracdan ve ispençeden ve ulakdan ve öşürden ve zahireden ve cerahordan ve Öksün kalası hizmetinden ve gayrisinden kendüleri yemek için getürdikleri hububatdan gümrük ve resimlerden muaf ve müsellemler olalar ol kala-ı Öksün'ü görüb gözedüb hifz ideler Trabzon ve Samsundan gelüb geçen gemileri, gemileriyle getürüb alırlar eyle olsa şimdiki halde ol vilayet yazılıb yeni defter olıcak mezburin zımmilerin ellerinde olan berat-ı hümayunların mukarrer dutub ki yed-i berat sadaka olundı esamilerin budur ki zikr olunur". "Ve kendüler evlerinde içtikleri hamırdan evvelden gümrük viregelmemişler imiş şimdi dahi yazılmadı ve dul avratlarından ispençe alına gelmemiş girü alınmaya diyü yazıldı".

¹⁷ The entries from TT 52 concerning the communities settled in the fortress read as follows: "Cemaat-i Müslümanan ki der nef-i Kala-ı Giresun sakindir". 26 *hane*, 2 *mütekaid sipahi*, 5 *mücerred* (pp. 603-604).

"Cemaat-i gebran-ı kadim der nef-i Kala-ı Giresun ki ispençe maa öşr ve sair rüsum fermude şud tımar-ı mezkurin an merdan-ı Kala-ı Giresun". 103 *hane*, 36 *mücerred*, 40 *bive* (pp. 604-606).

"Cemaat-i gebran der nef-i Kala-ı Giresun ki ez haric amed mütemekkindir raiyyet fermude şud beray-ı merdan-ı Kala-ı Giresun". 63 *hane*, 3 *bive*, 14 *mücerred*. "Zikr olan kafirler haricden gelüb nef-i Giresunda mütemekkin oldukları sebebeden Giresun hisarı erlerine raiyyet emr olundı haricden sipahi ve gayri bunlara dahl idüb ispençe ve sair rüsum taleb olunmaya asıl vatanlarında mülkleri var ise tasarruf iden kimesneden mücerred öşrün taleb ideler deyü emr olunmağın defter-i cedid-i sultaniye kayd olundı" (pp. 606-607). "Cemaat-i hizmetkaran-ı gebran nef-i Kala-ı Giresun ki ez haric amed. der nef-i Giresunda şakindir raiyyet fermude şud beray-ı merdan-ı Kala-ı Giresun". 55 *hane*, 5 *müslüman-ı nev* (p. 607). "Mezkur kafirler haricden gelüb Giresun Kalasının kadimi kafirlerine hizmet idüb mütemekkin olmuşlar şimdiki halde Giresun kalası mustahfızlarına raiyyet emr olundı haricden sipahi ve gayri bunlara dahl ispençe ve sair rüsum taleb olunmaya asıl vatanlarında mülkleri var ise tasarruf iden kimesneden mücerred öşrün taleb ideler deyü emr olunmağın defter-i cedid-i sultaniye kayd olundı" (p. 608).

husbands were engaged in the risky work of navigating ships with their boats (*sandal ile ulak hizmeti*) and carrying goods by sea, both of which required working day and night in all weather conditions, and which caused the death of more than one person in the event of an accident. The families of those who lost their lives would therefore be in need of assistance for their daily needs, which was provided by the newly appointed servants.

One of the Ottoman priorities in the region was to revitalise the local economy. To achieve this, they drew upon material as well as human resources from the local environment. While migration unquestionably played a decisive role in the development of Giresun, we must not overlook the fact that non-exploited natural resources provided the newcomers with a unique opportunity to gain material wealth as well as to settle in peace and security. The information provided in the *tahrir defters* is scant as to the occupations of the newcomers. However, the taxes they were obliged to pay, raises the possibility that they were professionals, rather than ordinary peasants.¹⁸ The newcomers introduced such new industries as ship and boat building, dye and textile production, and marketing activities, all of which contributed to the development of the fortress from a small settlement into an urban centre by providing technical and professional expertise and work force. These industrial and marketing activities certainly required investment and protection by the state. The existing economic activities of fishing, wine production and agriculture were continued at a greater scale. The road between Giresun and Karahisar also became an intensive trade route through which the alum and other goods from the hinterland were transported. This obviously contributed to the development of both areas by allowing both the exchange and marketing of goods. The activities the fortress population engaged in at this date show clearly that, however small, we are dealing with an urban society.¹⁹

¹⁸ Some of the taxes recorded in TT 52, p. 608 are; Mukataa-ı boyahane; Resm-i isfertina (/asfertina) ki keştiha-ı nev bina gerde ber vech-i tapu ber muceb-i adet-i kadim an Siferdos ila serhdd-i Bayramlı ama zikr olunan hududdan taşra gemi yapılsa resm taleb olunmaya, Resm an fūruht-ı keştiha; Resm-i dalyan; Resm-i Limon; Resm-i gümrük; Resm-i fuç; Resm-i bac an kirbas ketan ve gayrihi; Resm-i bac an rah-ı Karahisar-ı Şarkı; Resm-i dekaikin; Mukataa-ı ihtisab; Resm-i bac-ı ganem; Adet an himl-ı Kala-ı Giresun; Öşr-i kendir.

¹⁹ Despite the presence of taxes related to urban activities, the population of the fortress, which numbered 351 households, had not yet reached the limit of 400 taxpayers set by Faruqi to be called a small size town. Therefore, by the population criteria alone the fortress of Giresun can not be qualified as a town yet. On this see Suraiya Faruqi, *Towns and Townsmen of Anatolia - Trade, Crafts and Food Production in an Urban Setting 1520-1600*, Cambridge, 1984, pp. 9-11.

When the population increased to a certain level, the policy of tax exemption was deemed no longer appropriate, and consequently the generous tax immunities initially granted to the non-Muslim natives of the fortress were now reduced to the extraordinary taxes and to the grain reserved for home consumption. In return for these exemptions the whole non-Muslim community of the fortress was obliged to continue to serve as navigators. The nearby fortress of Tirebolu set the example for lifting the exemptions.²⁰ On the other hand, there are examples of tax immunities granted to Muslims living in the nearby villages in return for serving in the mosque and repairing the fortress.²¹ Another arrangement was the diversion of the revenues derived from the fortress to the timars of the fortress guards. The revenues were previously allocated to the *hass* (a revenue grant with annual value of more than 100,000 *akçes*-silver coin) of the *mirliya* (governor of a subprovince) of Trabzon.²²

The organisation of the fortress population around some communities and the new arrangements made in the revenue collection and allocation are certainly indications of the fact that the state was giving priority to the social and economic development of the area. The allocation of revenues to the fortress guards may show the state's concern for the administration of the for-

treass, since the guards were local officials through whom the state could tighten its control over the area.

The fortress population remained stable until around 1554. At this date, the number of individually registered males was 356 (it was 351 in the previous registration). The activities they engaged in and the amount of taxes they paid remained, surprisingly, the same as in 1515. The previously granted tax-exempted status of the village men in the vicinity of the fortress was also confirmed.²³ One significant arrangement concerning administration was the organisation of the fortress and surrounding 65 villages under a *kaza* (a subdivision of a *sancak*) unit during the re-structuring of the *sancak* of Trabzon to which the fortress was attached. Thus, the fortress of Giresun became the centre of this *kaza* and a *kadı* (a judge and a chief administrator of a *kaza*) was appointed.²⁴ This re-organisation might have had the purpose of providing a more efficient administration. It may also be seen as a part of a series of initiatives taken by the state to develop the area in general and the fortress in particular.

Towards 1583, one of the Ottomans' main concerns seems to have been the establishment of an ethnic-religious balance among the fortress inhabitants. As we can see, 66 Muslim households were introduced to the fortress, which contributed to a rise in the number of their co-religionists.²⁵ The numbers of Muslim and Christian males now reached the number of 281 and 345 respectively. With a total of 626 heads (513 *hane* and 113 *mücered*), the fortress can now be considered a small sized town. The formation of quarters, which were populated exclusively by the Christians, further strengthened its identity as an urban settlement.²⁶

The most significant arrangement made at this date by the Ottomans was the appointment of 41 Christian inhabitants to perform some services, such as the navigation and transfer of people over the nearby Öksun river whenever it

²⁰ The entry from TT 52, p. 609 about lifting the exemptions reads as follows: "Bundan evvel Giresun Kalası sakinleri harac ve ispençe vermeyüb avarızdan emin olub Giresunun aşağı hisarın hıfz idüp sandal ile ulak hizmetin iderler idi ve gemileriyle getürdükleri gallatdan kendü mekulatları için resmin vermeyüb baki kalan gallatdan adet-i kadim üzere gümrüklerin virürlermiş. Şimdiki halde Trabzon vilayeti tahrir-i defter olunub arz olduğu mahalde emr-i şerif şol vechle sadır oldu ki Tirebolu ve Görele kalesi kafirleri dahi hemçünan Giresun kalesi kafirleri gibi sandal ile ulak hizmetin idüp ve hisarların hıfz idüp mücerred harac vermeyüb ispençe öşr ve rüsüm virürler imiş eyle olsa hizmette tefavüt olmamağın Giresun Kalası kafirlerine dahi ispençe öşr ve rüsüm emr olunub Giresun Kalası mustahfizlarına raiyyet olunmak emr olundu ve gemileriyle getürdikleri gallatdan dahi ulak hizmetine kadir olanlar için mekulat alı konulub baki gallatlarının olgelen adet ve kanun üzere gümrüklerin vermek emr olduğu sebebden vech-i meşruh üzere defter-i cedid-i sultaniye kayd olundu ve haricden gelüb mütemekkin olan kafirler dahi ulak hizmetin kadimi kafirler ile beraber hizmet ideler deyü emr olundu ulaklık hizmeti bedel-i avarızdır niza olunmıya".

²¹ Some of the entries from TT 52, p. 597, 600 and 630 respectively read as follows: "Mezkur Ahmed Fakih hüdavendigar hazretlerinin Giresunda olan camiinde ser-mahfil olmağın avarızdan ve sair tekalifattan muaf oluna deyü emr olundu"; "Mezkur karye (karye-i Kayadibi) halkı Giresun Kalasının sarnıcı ve anbarları ve tophaneleri haraba müteveccih olub mezkur karye halkı meremmete iltizam ettiği sebebden meremmetci tayin olunub meremmete muhtac oldukda meremmet ideler bunlara avarız teklif olunmıya deyü emr olundu"; "Mezkur karye (karye-i Kasırcalı) halkı Giresun camiine meremmetci tayin olunub avarız teklif olunmıya deyü emr olundu".

²² The entry from TT 52, p. 603 about the allocation of *tumar* to the fortress guards reads as follows: "Hisar erlerine hisar kurbünde *tumar* tayin idesiz deyü emr olunmağın zikr olunan *tumar* hisar kurbünde olduğu sebebden emr-i ali mucibince hisar erlerine tayin olundu".

²³ One of the entries from TT 288, p. 727 concerning tax-exemption reads as follows: "Kala-i Giresun sarnıcı ve anbarları ve tophaneleri haraba müteveccih olub karye-i mezkure halkı meremmetine iltizam gösterdikleri sebebden meremmetci tayin olunub meremmete muhtac oldukça meremmet ideler bunlara avarız teklif olunmıya deyü emr olundu".

²⁴ These administrative arrangements were part of the re-organisation of the old Eyalet of Rum. On this, see Tayyib Gökbilgin, XVI. Yüzyıl Başlarında Trabzon Livası ve Doğu Karadeniz Bölgesi, in: *Belleten*, XXVI (1962), pp. 293-294. See also by the same author, 15. ve 16. Asırlarda Eyalet-i Rum, in: *Vakıflar Dergisi*, 6 (1965), pp. 53-54.

²⁵ The entry from TT 43, p. 139b about the new coming Muslims reads as follows: "Cemaat-i Müslümanan ki ez haric amede".

²⁶ Six quarters were founded in the town of Giresun which were inhabited exclusively by Christians. The Muslims had not formed a quarter yet and were recorded under the title of community (*cemaat*). See TT 43, pp. 140a-141b.

overflowed.²⁷ The previous appointments of people from the nearby villages were confirmed at this date with extended immunities. Sometimes a whole village population was appointed to maintain and repair the fortress and the mosque and in return they were exempted from the *avarız* (extraordinary taxes) and *tekalif-i örfiye* (customary duties).²⁸

The employment of a large group of people for the various needs of the fortress and its inhabitants clearly shows the Ottomans' concern for the welfare and security of the inhabitants. These exemptions obviously meant a reduced amount of revenue to be collected for the state. In other words, the state left an increasing amount of the income in the area by not collecting it at all. This clearly was a contribution to the economic well-being of the people of the area. In the meantime, industrial, commercial and agricultural activities grew in volume and output. The exploitation of potential resources, the mobilisation of the people to meet various needs of the fortress, and the organisation of the fortress society around the town may be seen as steps taken by the state to develop Giresun into a small industrial and maritime city and a centre of commerce for its hinterland.

REVENUE MAXIMISATION IN THE KARAHISAR-I ŞARKI PROVINCE

Taken over some ten years before the first survey (1485), the Karahisar region presented the Ottomans with many difficulties and challenges as well as opportunities. It was a high mountainous plateau with average altitudes of 1500 to 2000 meters and a severe climate. There were very few possibilities for intensive agriculture, but the ground was rich in terms of mineral depos-

²⁷ "Giresun Kalası kafirleri öşür ve rüsümların ve haracların eda eyledikten sonra aşağı hisarın hıfz idüp sandal ile ulaklık hizmetin iderler imiş ber vech-i defter-i atik hala Giresun kurbünde vaki Öksun dimekle maruf nehir tuğyan eylediği zaman at parmağı yapıp ayende ve revendeyi sudan geçirmeye iltizam gösterdikleri sebepten der-i devlete arz olundukta zıkr olunan hizmetleri bittemam eda ettikten sonra avarız-ı divaniyye ve tekalif-i örfiyeden muaf olmak üzere defter-i atikte mukayyed olmağın sahib-i tımara hukuk-i şeriye ve rüsum-ı örfiyelerin eda idüb mademki hizmette kusur itmeyeler hizmetleri mukabelesinde üslub-ı sabık üzere muaf kayd olundu" (TT 43, p. 140a).

²⁸ There are a number of entries in the TT 43 concerning tax immunities in return for performing certain services. In one of them, p.146b, Karye-i Alınyoma, 36 persons were exempted from the *avarız* and *tekalif-i örfiye* taxes. The entry about it runs as follows: "Cemaat-ı Müslümanan-ı Alınyoma Giresun Kalasının sarnıcına ve anbarlarına ve camii şerife meremmetci tayin olan Kayadibi ahalisi iktiza itmeyüb bir iki köy halkı dahi ilhak olunmak lazım itdüğün kadısı i'lam itmegin zıkr olunan karye-i Alınyoma ve cemaat-ı Müslümanan-ı karye-i Alınyoma dahi Giresun kal'asının sarnıcına ve kuyusuna ve anbarlarına ve camii şerife meremmetci tayin olundular mademki hizmet-i lazımların bıkusur eda edeler avarız ve sair tekalif-i örfiye teklif olunmamak için deftere kayd olundu".

its, especially alum. For in Karahisar, they had a mine with the best quality alum ore in the world in the Middle Ages.²⁹

It was an area exposed to constant skirmishes since the time of the Turcoman Principalities. The Ottoman-Akkoyunlu rivalry caused further damage to the area and made the people suffer a great deal. These conditions contributed to the development of a border society, which was ready to move in the event of a disturbance. This was, in fact, what happened in the aftermath of the Ottoman conquest; 38% of the villages and 45% of the *mezraas* (uninhabited arable land) were empty or deserted.³⁰ However, no desertion was seen in the town of Karahisar, which consisted of a centre (*nefs*) and eleven mining villages.³¹ The reason for this was that the predominantly Christian population of the central town of Karahisar and the mining villages surrendered without fighting.³² The immediate priority of the Ottomans in the administration of the area was, therefore, to resettle the deserted villages and *mezraas* and to operate the alum mine in the most beneficial way for the state. Their strategy was, therefore, to levy taxes at much lower rates than

²⁹ Anthony Bryer, The Question of Byzantine Mines in the Pontos: Chalybian Iron, Chaldian Silver, Koloneian Alum and the Mummy of Cheriana, in: *Anatolian Studies*, 32 (1982), p. 148.

³⁰ A higher rate of desertion is seen in the neighbouring *sancaks* of Bayburd and Kemah where 42.9% and 67.7% of the villages were deserted. The main cause for this scale of desertion was the wars between the Ottomans and the Akkoyunlus, and the Ottomans and the Safavids. On this see İsmet Miroğlu, *16. yüzyılda Bayburd Sancağı*, İstanbul, 1975, pp. 29-35; İsmet Miroğlu, *Kemah sancağı ve Erzincan Kazası (1520-1566)*, Ankara, 1990, pp. 34-37. A similar phenomenon at a lower scale has been observed in the nearby *sancak* of Harput where out of 164 villages 24 were deserted (*viran, halî*). Mehmet Ali Ünal, *XVI Yüzyılda Harput Sancağı (1518-1566)*, Ankara, 1989, p. 67, table 9.

³¹ The mining villages were recorded as having a permanent population at the end of TT 37, pp. 883-888, under the title of *Kuray-ı Şebhane-i Karahisar*. No desertion was seen among these villages and *mezraas*. The situation was the same for the fortress of Karahisar-ı Şarki. See TT 37, pp. 818-820.

³² Kemal Paşazade makes the following statement on the capture of Karahisar: "Hisar içinde olan Türkmanlar ol hal-i müsibet meali ki gördüler, mecalleri kalmayub avaze-i "el-aman"i dervaze-i asumana ırgördiler, kal'ayı amanla teslim idüb haşem-i hışm-ı sultan-ı zamandan emin oldular" (İbn Kemal, *Tevarih-i Al-i Osman, VII Defter*, edited by Şerafettin Turan, Ankara, 1957, p. 367). Colin Imber gives the following quotation about the capture of Karahisar: "On Wednesday 24 August we, the Ottomans, marched to (Şebîn) Karahisar. When we set up the canon and began to destroy the fortifications ... (the governor) Dara Bey came out, seeking peaceful surrender (...). We did not remove the existing townspeople, but we left there one-thousands of our men with abundant supplies. We removed garrisons, taking them with us" (*The Ottoman Empire 1300-1481*, İstanbul, The Isis Press, 1990, p. 217).

usual and to grant very generous tax immunities to those who were already living there.³³

Another Ottoman policy through which they made their rule acceptable and appealing to the locals was to acknowledge and to confirm the previous statuses and the rights of the local interest groups such as the freeholders, *vakıfs* (pious foundations) and *müsellems* (peasant soldiers).³⁴

As for the strategies the Ottomans developed to secure the peaceful surrender of the local mining community, the state allowed them to continue mining as they had been doing since antiquity. The employment of local Christians in the mining is a typical example of the Ottoman policy of adopting to local practices at the initial, uncertain stages of the conquest. The adoption of this policy secured the uninterrupted production of alum, and hence, income. The Ottomans were realistic enough not to directly oppose the established tradition in the newly conquered areas. The local mining community was granted such generous immunities as the exemption from the *cizye* (head-tax), *ispençe*, *behre ve rüsum-ı saire* (share and other miscellaneous dues), *avarız*, *tekalif-i örfiye*, *kürekçi* (being called away for the performance as oarsmen for the fleet) and *acemi oğlanı* (child recruitment levies) in return for working in the mine and producing alum.³⁵

The alum mined in Karahisar was the best quality and was used mainly for textiles in the dyeing process and in the manufacture of leather. It was also used by pharmacists and goldsmiths. After the Ottoman takeover, the export of alum by Genoese merchants was disrupted and channelled to fulfill the demands of the internal market.³⁶ From its conquest until the 1570s the alum mine was operated directly by the state, and after that it was farmed out

³³ The mining community, *müsellems* and various groups and individuals were granted tax exemptions. The taxes due to be paid by the *reaya* of the villages cultivated by outsiders (*haricden*) and the villages with low population were also calculated in lump sums, which were lower than usual taxation rates. These are examples of wide spread tax exemptions and the generosity of the state at this initial period of conquest. See Acun, *Ottoman Administration*, pp. 92-96, 104. Granting tax immunities was, in fact, a typical Ottoman policy aimed at securing faithfulness of the native peoples. However, such privileges were not granted permanently and could be withdrawn by the Sultan at his pleasure. See Halil İnalcık, *Ottoman Methods of Conquest*, in: *Studia Islamica*, II (1954), pp. 107-108.

³⁴ About 10 % of the population of the area was made up of *müsellems*, freeholders and *vakıf* beneficiaries who had pre-Ottoman roots. Their previous status was confirmed by the state, and in the case of *müsellems*, who constituted 9% of the recorded population, they were exempted from regular taxes altogether in return for waging war. Fatma Acun, *Ottoman Administration*, pp. 92-93.

³⁵ See Appendix.

³⁶ Suraiya Faroqhi, *Alum Production and Alum Trade in the Ottoman Empire (About 1560-1830)*, in: *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes*, vol. 71 (1979), pp. 152-153.

to various individuals.³⁷ The reason the state ran the mine may have to do with the state's concern for the local mining community at the initial stages of the conquest. The estimation of the amount of revenue which was to be derived from the mine might also have been difficult at these early stages. There might also have been prospects to improve the mining activities, and thus increase the revenues. All of these factors may have contributed to the state's decision to run the mine. At this initial stage, around 1485, the income from the alum mine, which was 150,500 *akçes*, was the highest income source in the area, and was assigned to the *mirliva* of Karahisar as *hass*.³⁸

Thirty-five years later, around 1520, the most important change in the empire's general circumstances was the sudden expansion of territory in the Asian provinces of the empire, which translated into a 76% increase in land during the short reign of Sultan Selim I.³⁹ Accordingly, with the conquest of the neighbouring territories, the region became a hinterland and thus safer. After the initial uncertainty of the conquest, the previously empty or deserted settlements were now either inhabited or abandoned, and new ones were also established. Now, in the state's view, fiscal matters took precedence over administrative and other matters and the state channelled the highest revenue source of the region directly to itself: the amount of income from the mine tripled, reaching 459,000 *akçes* and was diverted from the *hass* of the *mirliva* to the imperial domains of the Sultan.⁴⁰

The Ottomans allowed the local Christians to have a monopoly on the mining business, and their population increased sharply in subsequent surveys. The number of miners increased from 161 males (*nefer*) around 1485 to 771 males in 1547 and to 1300 males in 1569.⁴¹ This increase was so great that by 1569, one of the mining villages, Maden Görece, recorded 423 males

³⁷ Possession and control of mines was of critical importance to the state, as they supplied metals for the military and industry, as well as being a source of wealth and prosperity. The operation and administration of mines in the empire were, therefore, under the close control of the state. Depending on the source of the capital invested to operate a mine, the mining activity was organised mainly by the state or private sector. The state administration of mines was generally applied to the unused mines or to those requiring a higher level of investment to render them profitable, whereas operating mines with a yearly regular production were farmed out to private investors. Rhoads Murphey, Ma'din, in: *EI*, second edition, 5 (1984), pp. 974-975.

³⁸ The entry from TT 37, p. 888 reads as follows: "Mahsul-i Şebhane der nahiye-i mezbure hassa-ı mirliva-ı Karahisar fi sene 150,500".

³⁹ Murphey, *Conceptual and Pragmatic Uses*, p. 114.

⁴⁰ The entry from TT 387, p. 576 reads as follows: "Hasha-ı padişah-ı alempenah der kaza-ı Karahisar. Mahsul-i Şebhane fi sene-i kamile: 459,000; sab men 14,500; nakden: 16,000; beher men fi 20".

⁴¹ TT 37, pp. 883-888; TT 255, pp. 23-32; TT 478, pp. 48-64.

(of these 246 were *mücerred* and 177 were *hane*).⁴² The increase in the number of miners was accompanied by an increase in the number of villages (the number of mining villages was 11, 17 and 23 in 1485, 1547 and 1569 respectively). The concentration of the Christian population around the mining villages was probably a result of the Ottoman policy of lower taxation and the special protection given to the mining community. The influx of population to the mining villages seems to have been from the nearby Christian villages, rather than caused by any form of deportation.

The constant increase in the number of miners secured an adequate work force for alum mining. However, not all miners were absorbed by the work in the mine: at the beginning of the period (1485), there were four alum pits and 161 households in the mining villages. At the end of the period, i.e. in 1569, the number of pits rose to six whereas the miner population increased, much faster, to 1300 households.

Such an overcrowding in the mining villages seems to have led the Ottoman officials to revoke the policy of lower taxation, since this policy was now causing loss of revenue for the treasury, including the loss of revenue from the head-tax (*cizye*). The state's own financial concerns now became more prominent and a priority was given to resource extraction.

Thus, the state decided to re-organise labour in a way that was thought to be more profitable. The Ottomans started to operate the mine with paid labourers (*ırgad*) and to collect the usual taxes for the treasury. The new arrangement caused some degree of unemployment and certainly a great deal of dissatisfaction among the miners. Only two years later, two inspectors of the tax-farms of Arz-ı Rum, Sefer Bey and Mehmed Bey, and the treasury inspector (*müfettiş-i emval-i hassa*) who was also the judge of Arz-ı Rum, Mevlana Muslihiddin, sent a report to Istanbul stating that the land around the Şebhane villages was too infertile and that there was little space for agriculture in the area. It was, therefore, very difficult to make a living as a full-time farmer and still bear the usual tax load. These officials also informed Istanbul that some of the locals had already left the area, while others were dispersed. In order to overcome the difficulties, so ran the report, the locals

⁴² In 1547, the same village of Maden Görece had a population of 120 males which was made up of 62 *bennak*, 34 *caba* and 24 *mücerred*. Notice the high number of bachelors and people without land (*caba*). A similar phenomenon is observed in the village of Hacı (modern Gümüşhacıköy) in Amasya where 320 males (*nefer*) were recorded, of this, 108 were landless, 187 were bachelors and only 25 had land in form of land-tracts (*zemin*). It therefore seems that these young and landless inhabitants supplied the silver mine in the village with the necessary workforce. Oktay Özel, *Changes in Settlement Patterns, Population and Society in Rural Anatolia: A Case Study of Amasya (1576-1642)*, Ph.D. thesis, The University of Manchester, 1993, p. 85, footnote 80.

opened up two more mine pits in the nearby villages, with 24 ovens operating in each pit during both the winter and summer seasons. The administrative officials proposed that the locals process and provide 24 ovens of alum in each of the pits, they were paid 3 *akçes* per person for each *men*⁴³ from the half of the alum produced and, in accordance with the previous decision, they were granted tax immunity. The officials stated that the production of alum in the proposed way was also profitable to the state. Upon receiving the report, a Sultan's order was sent to the surveyor during the registration asking whether it was possible to sell the 144 ovens of alum for cash, or if it was more profitable to the state to operate the mine with paid labourers and collect the usual taxes for the treasury. The surveyor was asked to find out which one of these ways was more profitable to the state and record it accordingly in the new register. An investigation was then conducted into the case. In the end it was found out that in the last two years 180 households had left the area and their whereabouts were not known. Also, the remaining villagers were refusing to work in the mine as paid labourers. Another concern was the possible loss of revenue if the mine had to be operated by non-professional, inexperienced miners. As a result, the previous system was re-introduced and it was decided that the miners would produce 144 pits of alum each year and be exempted from the usual taxes.⁴⁴

The correspondence between the central government and the local officials is very indicative of the fact that revenue maximisation was the Ottoman's highest priority. Accordingly they sought the ways that would bring more benefit to the central treasury. However, they did not try to increase their incomes at the expense of the local mining community. Thus, revenue maximisation, without impairing prosperity of the locals, was the Ottomans' main principle in the administration of the area.

CONCLUSION

As we stated at the beginning, the creation of an ideal society and the maximisation of revenue were the Ottomans' primary objectives concerning provincial administration. The above examination of the two areas with dif-

⁴³ *Men* is a unit of measurement for weighing heavy goods such as spices, meat and iron. In much of Eastern Anatolia, a 'heavy *men*' was in use, which corresponded to about 7.5 kg. On the varieties of *men* used in the Ottoman Empire and in the various countries of the Islamic Near East, see Walther Hinz, *Islamische Masse und Gewichte ungerechnet ins metrische System*, in: *Handbuch der Orientalistik*, 1. Abt., I/1, ed. Bertold Spuler, Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1955, pp. 16-23.

⁴⁴ See Appendix.

ferent social-economic and geographical conditions, shows that the Ottomans sought to achieve these objectives by adopting various measures depending on the region and its conditions. For instance, the initial toleration of the Christian population and the gradual integration of a Muslim community in the area demonstrates the Ottomans' primary objective of creation of an ideal society, securing the region into a central province of the empire, "*darü'l-İslam*". Similarly, as we have seen with the alum mining community of Karahisar, the Ottomans pursued the second main policy of revenue maximising, whether this meant recognising the traditional rules and customs of the pre-Ottoman mining community or, in the later centuries, changing the methods of its administration. Moreover, in both cases migration and the granting of tax exemptions were applied as a way of re-settlement which would lead to the revitalisation of the local economy and, in turn, increase the potential for revenue collection. Administrative re-structuring and the creation of ethnic and religious balance were the two other methods used specifically in the Giresun region. As has been seen, the Ottomans tried to achieve their objectives by following a particular course of action during which some of their concerns took priority over others. They were successful in organising their priorities in a way that helped them to achieve their objectives in the long term. All these may be seen as proof of the specific flexibility of the Ottoman administrative system.

This study has also shown that the *tahrir defters* are very effective sources for demonstrating the policies and preoccupations of the Ottomans in the administration of an area. Further studies on areas with different ethnic-religious, geographic and socio-economic characteristics will provide us with a deeper understanding of the Ottoman administrative system and its workings.

APPENDIX

The long text from TT 478, pp. 63-64 concerning the miners reads as follows: "Zikr olan yirmi üç pare kura ve mezari reayası kaza-ı mezburede olan dört kıta şab madenlerinde cizye ve ispençe ve behre ve rüsum-ı saire ve acemi oğlanı ve avarız ve kürekçi ve tekalif-i örfiyeden muafiyetle kadimden şab işlerler iken şabhaneler ırgadla işlenüb kuray-ı mezbure keferesin dahi harac ve ispençeleri ve behreleri ve rüsum-ı saireleri ve avarızları miri için zabt olunmak ferman olunub iki yıldan ziyade maden-i mezbure ırgadla işlenüb reya-ı mezburenin mahsulatı zabt olunduktan sonra Arz-ı Rum muakaatı nazırları Sefer Bey ve Mehmed Bey ve müfettiş-i emval-i hassa Arz-ı Rum kadısı Mevlana Muslihiddin dergah-ı muallaya arz gönderüb şabhane köyleri sengistan olub ziraat ve hırasete kabil yerleri cüzi olub maişetleri

temam müzayaka üzere iken harac ve ispençe ve sair rüsüm edasına kudretleri olmamağla bazısı celay-ı vatan idüb sairleri perakende olmak üzere oldukları ecilden kuray-ı mezbure keferesi kadimden işleyü geldikleri dört kıta şab madenlerinden gayri Çorak ve Kelice Kahta nam karyeler kurbünde iki kıta şab madeni dahi ihdas idüb seyf ve şitada battal komayub beher madende yirmi dörder fırın şab zahiresi ihrak idüb ve yirmi dörder kuyu şab virüb ve olgeldüğü üzere hasıl eyledikleri şabın nisfından beher mennine hisse-i rencberan üçer akçe virülüb ber karar-ı sabıka muafiyetle şab işledükleri mal-ı miriye enfadır deyü arz eyledükleri ecilden bu bendelerine sene 976 Ramazanının yirminci günü (1569) tarihiyle müverrah emir şerif varid olub göresin iki maden dahi ihdas olunub cümle altı maden yüz kırk dört kuyu şab işlenüb ve işlenen şab anbarda kalmayub fûruht ve nakd olması kabilimdir yohsa bilfiil işlendiği üzere şab madenleri ücret ile işlenüb ve kuray-ı mezbure keferesin harac ve ispençe ve sair rüsumları ve avarız ve kürekçileri ve acemi oğlanı alınmak miriye enfadır tamam aslı ve hakikati ile malum idinüb kangısı malıma enfa ise ana göre defter-i cedide kayd idesin deyü ferman olunmağın husus-ı mezbur ehl-i vukufdan tefahhus olunub ve kuray-ı mezbure reayası yoklandıkda iki yıldan beri yüzseksen hane celay-ı vatan idüb kanda gitdükleri malum olmayub harac ve ispençeleri ve rüsum-ı sairelerinden nesne hasıl olmayub maden-i mezbur ber karar-ı sabık muafiyetle madenciler olmadıkları takdirce sairleri dahi perakende olduklarından sonra madenleri işletmeye ırgada dahi müzayaka iktiza idüb madenci olmayan keferi şab işlemeye kadir olmayub mal-ı miriye külli zarar olmak muhakkak olduğu malum olmağın vech-i meşruh üzre kuray-ı şabhane reayası sabıkdan mamul olan dört madenden maada iki maden dahi ihdas idüb yılda her bir madende yirmi dörder fırın şab zahiresi ihrak ve müheyya idüb beher onbeş günde bir kuyu şab derdikleri maden-i mezbure ihyasına ve mal-ı miriye enfa olub madenci reayası dahi her senede vech-i mezbur üzere yüz kırkdört kuyu şab dermeği kabul eyledikleri ve ber karar-ı evvel muafiyetleri defter-i cedide kayd olundu".