

READING CLOCKS,  
*Alla Turca*

TIME AND SOCIETY IN THE LATE OTTOMAN EMPIRE



AVNER WISHNITZER

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AVNER WISHNITZER

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*To Yael Kimron,  
who taught me history,  
wide and deep*



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## NOTE ON TERMS, NAMES, AND TRANSLITERATION

Ottoman Turkish words have been transliterated according to the modern Turkish standards. In cases where the Ottoman words are no longer used in modern Turkish, they were transliterated according to the Redhouse Turkish/Ottoman-English Dictionary (1968). Arabic and Hebrew words were transliterated based on the style adopted by the *International Journal of Middle East Studies*. Arabic and Turkish terms usually appear in the singular form and are italicized and explained on the first appearance. Whenever the plural form of such terms is required, a romanized “s” is added to them. Extracts from poetry that had been transliterated by other scholars and incorporated into the current study follows the original transliteration. All translations are mine, if not otherwise indicated. Names of places commonly known to readers of English have been written in their usual forms (therefore, Istanbul, not İstanbul; Jerusalem, not Yerushalayim or al-Quds). For names of authors who wrote in Ottoman-Turkish, Turkish transliteration was applied (hence Hasan Hamid and not Ḥasan Ḥamid). In cases in which there are several common transliterations in modern Turkish, I chose the one closer to the Ottoman source (hence Ahmed Midhat and not Ahmet Mithat). However, in titles of Ottoman publications that have been reprinted in modern Turkish, the names of authors appear as transliterated by the publisher. Inconsistency between text and references in some places is therefore unavoidable.

The most commonly used hour system in the Ottoman Empire throughout the nineteenth century counted hours from sunset to sunset (*gurub*), hence the term *gurubi saat*, which was at least as common in official correspondence as the now better-known *alla turca saat*. This latter term, which literally means Turkish-style clock or Turkish-style hour, began to be widely used only during the second half of the nineteenth century to distinguish the indigenous hour system from the European one (known as *alla franga saat*). It is therefore slightly anachronistic to use the phrase *alla turca* for earlier periods, and yet for the sake of clarity I use it throughout this study. In keeping with the transliteration principles explained above, both the indigenous and the European hour

systems are written throughout the study in their modern Turkish form, *alaturka* and *alafranga saat*, rather than in their original Italian form, *alla turca* and *alla franga*. This is not only a matter consistency. The use of the Turkish form signifies that—just like mechanical clocks—these imported terms were used and interpreted in ways that were uniquely Ottoman.

## INTRODUCTION

On December 31, 1877, at the end of a rather long session of deliberations, the chair of the first Ottoman Parliament tried to set the convening time for the following day. As the record suggests, this proved to be a rather difficult task:

CHAIR: At what hour shall we meet tomorrow?

ALL (UMUM): At seven.

SADIK PAŞA (MEMBER FOR ISTANBUL): The days are getting longer.

It would be impossible to set an hour in this way. I wonder, how about coming one hour before noon, *alafranga*?

Head of the quilters' guild (ISTANBUL), AHMED EFENDI: We don't know the *alafranga* [system] and we don't have watches.

SADIK PAŞA: The hour twelve *alafranga* is always noontime. What I mean is that we shall come every day one hour before noon.

CHAIR: We should note that there are many people who live in remote places. It would be hard for them to arrive like that, at four and a half or five.

A DEPUTY: We used to complain about state officials; we used to say that they don't do their jobs; now, if we start so late we would be doing the same.<sup>1</sup>

Most readers would probably find this exchange rather weird, if not utterly absurd. It is hard to understand, for example, why all the representatives would want to convene at seven; and is that seven in the morning or evening? Moreover, how would they know it is seven if at least some of them did not have watches? Why should the lengthening of the days complicate the fixing of the convention hour? Even knowing that *alafranga* refers to European (i.e., mean) time doesn't help: how was the hour of eleven o'clock mean time converted to "four and a half or five," and why did the chair think that it would be hard for the deputies to arrive at that time? The difficulties we face in trying to make sense of the practicalities of the situation echo the problems that the members of Parliament themselves were confronting. But beyond the trouble of converting back and forth between different hour systems, this story hints at issues of deeper import. Does the quilters' guild representative express some sort of class resentment when he says that "we don't have watches"? What lay behind the

statement made by the anonymous deputy that state officials report late to their offices? What was the standard against which their arrival time was judged to be late? What does this conversation tell us about working hours, commuting patterns, and prevailing understandings of punctuality and regularity?

Such complexities largely escaped the eyes of contemporary foreign observers. European travelers of the nineteenth century often found the Ottomans to be merely “indifferent of time” or lacking a “sense of time,” attributes that were sometimes associated with the alleged backwardness of their culture. “Oh, the Turkish Time!” exclaims the British travel author John Foster Fraser (d. 1936), before explaining to his readers how clocks are used in the Ottoman Empire. “There or thereabouts,” he adds, “is sufficiently good for the Turk. The very fact that the Turks are satisfied with a method of recording time which cannot be sure unless all watches are changed every day, shows how they have missed one of the essentials of what we call civilization.” The folklorist Lucy Garnett (d. 1934), to take another example, notes that “punctuality is not a virtue cultivated by the Oriental,” and the British colonial administrator and politician Lawrence Dundas (d. 1961) associates the Ottoman time-reckoning system with the “atmosphere . . . of the East.” Annoyed by the belated departure of his train, he comments that “punctuality is at a discount when the world of Islam keeps high fast.”<sup>2</sup>

It is my purpose here to examine time organization in the Ottoman Empire not through European eyes, but in terms of the conventions and needs of the Ottomans themselves. I aim to demonstrate how an indigenous system of time-related practices, conventions, and ideas that served the sociopolitical order down to the end of the eighteenth century changed over the following decades, not due to colonization or industrial capitalism, as was the case in some other parts of the world, but due to a series of state-led reforms and the resulting struggles for power and hegemony. The study thus shows how temporality structures the everyday lives, worldviews, and political choices of particular actors in specific historical contexts, and how it is in itself transformed and re-shaped through interaction between these actors.

### *Modern Times: A Brief Review of the Scholarship*

The study of time in the Ottoman Empire is still in its infancy. Until quite recently, the little that has been published focused mostly on various aspects of time-telling, including sundials, clocks, clock-making, and clock towers.<sup>3</sup> Relatively little attention has been paid to social time and the way it was organized, and only a handful of studies have addressed temporality as an important di-

mension of Ottoman social and political life.<sup>4</sup> To date, not a single extensive study has been devoted to Ottoman temporality.

To the extent that changes in Ottoman temporal practices have been dealt with, they have usually been discussed in teleological terms, as if they were bound to happen. The actors behind the changes, their worldviews and agendas, and the circumstances in which they acted have too often been neglected. The general narrative that is implicit in many of the existing accounts is one of a grand transition from irrational time, reduced to its religious dimension, to a similarly uniform, one-dimensional “modern” time.<sup>5</sup> Mechanical clocks, allegedly the representatives of secular, empty, and homogenous time, are usually identified with the latter. According to most accounts, they remained somewhat alien to indigenous culture before the second half of the nineteenth century, and attracted interest mainly as gadgets or as symbols of power and status.<sup>6</sup> The general view seems to be that prior to the second half of the nineteenth century, the Ottomans did not use clocks to organize time, or that they did not use them correctly. This view, in turn, is premised on the assumption that there is one correct way to use clocks, that is, the way they were supposedly used in Europe.<sup>7</sup> Any other usage is a deviation from and perhaps even a corruption of the original.

The tendency to discuss Ottoman temporality in contradistinction to the modern draws to some extent on wider discussions of the interrelations between time and modernity. One of these discussions aims at characterizing modern modes of time organization on the quotidian level and explaining how they developed. Although the exploration of these issues began much earlier, it was E. P. Thompson’s seminal article from 1967 that set the agenda for many years to come.<sup>8</sup> Thompson argued that the transition to industrialism brought about fundamental changes in the “notation of time.” While not denying early modern developments and the importance of the “Protestant ethic” in this context, Thompson’s approach was much closer to the Marxist intellectual tradition. Whereas Weber stressed the rationalization of time, Marx and Engels emphasized its commodification under industrial capitalism and drew attention to the tyrannical aspects of the process.<sup>9</sup>

In line with these ideas, Thompson argued that large-scale industrial manufacture relied on a steady working rhythm that could only be regulated by mechanical clocks. Only time-disciplined workers could be expected to report to their machines at a preset hour and remain there all day long, maintaining a stable working tempo until their shift has come to an end. Preindustrial working patterns, on the other hand, were inattentive to clock time and were not prem-

ised on the perception of time as a resource. “Task-orientation,” as Thompson referred to the preindustrial mode of work, was characterized by the intermingling of labor and social intercourse and by its irregular tempo.<sup>10</sup> Through the imposition of sanctions and penalties, then, the first generation of factory workers was forced by their employers to develop an acute sense of time. This process of time-disciplining was complemented by institutions such as the modern school and by a widespread discourse led by middle-class moralists, which targeted the disorganized working habits of the lower classes.

Thompson’s contrasted picture of the modern and the premodern was premised on accentuating two partly overlapping dichotomies. The first dividing line was drawn on the historical axis, between industrial and preindustrial societies. In order to demonstrate the hazy time sense which, presumably, had been prevalent in preindustrial England, Thompson turned to anthropological works, such as Evans-Pritchard’s study of the Sudanese Nuer and Bourdieu’s work on the Algerian Kabyle peasant. Other authors, too, tried to fill historical gaps in the pictures they were painting, with plaster taken from contemporary anthropological works, all in an attempt to highlight the radically different nature of modern time consciousness.<sup>11</sup> Thus, the second dividing line was drawn geographically, separating the West from the rest.

The dichotomies on both the geographical and historical axes rested on the approach, by then well established in social science, that different societies may develop fundamentally different concepts of time. Durkheim was among the first to argue that time and space can only be conceived through representations generated by society, and therefore that time and space cognition was mediated by the social structure of particular societies.<sup>12</sup> Many scholars in various disciplines followed Durkheim’s lead and tried to prove not only that time indications and reckonings are culturally relative, but that the concept of time itself is as well. Armed with this theoretical approach, sociologists, anthropologists, and historians produced studies that emphasized the allegedly fundamental differences between the time concepts of historical and contemporary societies. In a nutshell, the abstract, linear concept of time in the modern West, that was considered quantitative, quantifiable, and suitable for rational organization, was contrasted with the hazy, mostly qualitative and sometimes cyclic concepts of time that supposedly characterized premodern or non-Western societies.<sup>13</sup>

More recent research has begun to question the supposed contrast between preindustrial and industrial, Western and non-Western modes of time organization. Several studies have shown that minute time consciousness, punctuality, and even time discipline of various kinds existed in both urban and agrarian societies long before the emergence of the modern factory.<sup>14</sup> Thompson’s ideas

concerning the modern/Western “final product” of the modernization of time organization have also been seriously challenged and modified by subsequent research. Barbara Adam, for example, showed that temporality in Western industrial societies cannot be reduced to that of rational, abstract clock time, and that the dichotomous perspective in itself obstructs our understanding of the myriad of times that exist in all human societies.<sup>15</sup>

As postcolonial criticism widened in scope during the 1970s, scholars began to turn their attention from the temporalities of the (non-European) observed to that of the (modern Western) observer. It was shown that the idea of progress that began to spread in Europe during the eighteenth century, and the linear notion of historical time on which this idea was based, were ideological constructs that served the national and colonial projects. Put in the crudest terms, the notion of progress presupposed a universal timeline, a temporal axis along which different human groups progress towards their future. Modernity was conceptualized as the most anterior temporal location along that timeline. Differences between civilizations, nations, and even different groups within the same society were increasingly conceptualized in terms of temporal distance. By branding others within and overseas as “backward” or “retarded,” hegemonic discourse in Europe denied their place in the present and relegated them to the past; they became remnants of a different era, relics of supposedly archaic modes of life that were destined to perish. Exaggerating the otherness of non-Western and non-modern temporalities thus legitimized European claims for dominance as the most advanced civilization.<sup>16</sup>

Recent historical studies have shown that during the nineteenth century, non-European “others” also adopted the notion of progress along with the linear conceptualization of historical time. Under unprecedented European hegemony, middle-class groups in particular were calculating how far they were “behind” Europe, what were the reasons for this retardation, and how the “backward” groups in their societies could be “advanced.” Identifying themselves with the modern, they stressed their break with the past and situated themselves as the most competent to lead society forward. The very distinction between past and present was thus drawn in dichotomist terms of modern and traditional, civilized and primitive.<sup>17</sup> Taken together, these studies show that the very notion of modernity, the idea of a new age that is fundamentally different from its predecessors, is inseparable from the conceptualization of time as a timeline. By exposing its historical origins, we clearly see the temporality of modernity as an ideological construct that had been universalized and naturalized to the point that it became a transparent, taken-for-granted axiom of human existence.

This critical approach is in keeping with a wider scholarly current that approaches modernity not merely as the sum of structural, economic, and social processes, but also as a discursively created concept of a “new era.” This idea did not remain limited to the realm of letters; the break with the past was acted out in every aspect of daily life. Christopher Bayly, for instance, shows modernization to be a worldwide trend toward uniformity that was not limited to the institutional level; it was apparent in the way people dressed, ate, spoke, spent their leisure time, and conducted social and familial interaction. An important feature of this self-aware modern lifestyle was clock-based time consciousness.<sup>18</sup> Living by clock time and organizing one’s day according to schedules served to distinguish the modern from the primitive, the advanced from the backward. Recent studies show how notions and practices of linear time served urban middle-class groups in their attempts to formulate a consciously modern, national collective identity in which they would play a leading role.<sup>19</sup> Thus, European temporality is shown to have been appropriated on both the historical and the quotidian level. The adoption of the basic temporal construct of modernity as a temporal location at the most anterior tip of history was accompanied by the adoption of originally European practices of time organization that were premised on a similar understanding of time as an abstract, empty, linear and measurable entity, which can be rationally divided and organized.<sup>20</sup>

However, the new studies about European colonization of indigenous time around the world obscure earlier phases of modernization and restore the dichotomies between modern and premodern, West and non-West. Since clocks are almost universally associated with linear time, and because the spread of “modern” clock time throughout the non-European world is generally associated with European colonization, the transition from the premodern to the modern is often discussed in terms of before and after colonization. The result is often a narrative of conflict between the modern time consciousness introduced by the West and the local classes that appropriated its ideas, and the indigenous premodern temporalities of other social groups, be they aristocrats, villagers, urban commoners, or nomads. The modernization of time thus appears to be synonymous with the European colonization of indigenous time, and the adoption of linear notions of time on the quotidian and historical level seems inseparable.

With its geography divided between three continents and its history stretching from the late middle ages to the modern era, the Ottoman Empire quite literally transcended the boundaries posited between premodern and modern, between the West and the rest. Neither European nor fully colonized by Europe, an integral part of the industrializing world economy but in itself still

agrarian, the Ottoman Empire cannot be easily placed in any of the existing categories. In fact, it offers an interesting example by which to examine the very validity and relevance of these categories.

### *The Transformation of Ottoman Temporal Culture*

In what follows I argue that, contrary to the view common in the existing literature, by the late eighteenth century clocks were already an integral part of Ottoman temporal culture, and that it is only within this wider context that their use can be correctly assessed. The term “temporal culture” is here used to denote a historically created system of time-related practices, conventions, values, and emotions that structures the temporal dimension of social life and fills it with meaning. The way the Ottomans used clocks conformed to the inner logic of their temporal culture and did not disturb its coherence. However, this fabric of practice and meaning, which until the late eighteenth century served to stabilize the sociopolitical order, began to change rather dramatically during the nineteenth century, as the Ottoman Empire was increasingly assimilated into the European-dominated global economy and the project of modern state-building began to gather momentum. In their attempt to attain better surveillance capabilities and higher levels of regularity and efficiency, various organs of the reforming Ottoman state developed elaborate temporal constructs in which clocks played an increasingly important role.<sup>21</sup>

As the reform movement spread beyond the government apparatus over the second half of the nineteenth century, emerging groups of officers, bureaucrats, and urban professionals in the capital and the provinces incorporated novel time-related ideas, values, and behaviors into their self-consciously modern outlook and lifestyle. Acculturated in the highly regimented environment of schools and barracks, they came to identify efficiency and temporal regularity with progress. These individuals mustered new media, new genres, and new sources of authoritative knowledge, and set out to combat temporal patterns they associated with the old political order. Some of them eventually turned against the indigenous *alaturka* hour system, which they perceived as emblematic of all that was obsolete about the Ottoman Empire. Far from being a mere reflection of processes that unfolded in other fields, Ottoman temporal culture is thus shown to be in itself a major arena in which social groups competed for legitimacy, delineated their identities, and put forward their ideologies; it was a medium through which the very concept of modernity was defined and alternative visions of modernization were expressed and challenged.

With the main thesis of the book thus formulated, it should be clear that my intention here is not to typify *the* Ottoman concept, notion, or perception of

time, since such an endeavor would inevitably prove to be a wild-goose chase. When dealing with concepts of time, Nigel Thrift notes, the result often portrays a presupposed uniform idea of time which is either cyclic or linear, religious or secular, quantitative or qualitative.<sup>22</sup> Such uniform portrayals obscure the complexity of temporalities that coexist in any given society, sector of society, or even within one and the same person.

This study of Ottoman temporal culture indeed problematizes the longtime scholarly distinction between physical and social time and the rather sharp contrast posited between mechanical clocks and natural rhythms.<sup>23</sup> It builds on recent critiques of these binaries, but moves beyond them.<sup>24</sup> Rather than maintaining that Ottoman temporal culture blended clock time with natural time, or social with supposedly divine temporalities, the current analysis in fact shows that before the nineteenth century, none of these times had a separate, independent existence.<sup>25</sup> Thus, rather than aiming at a reconstruction of one uniform concept of time, I demonstrate the existence of a myriad of practices and meanings which together formed a relatively coherent temporal culture in which clocks and natural rhythms, cyclic and linear images of time, and religious and mundane sources of authority were inseparable. For the early modern Ottomans, time was a dense, whole entity that was embedded in a supposedly divine order and could not be dissociated from it. As a result of the accelerated changes of the nineteenth century, ruptures were created within this ensemble and its coherence was lost.

Just as late eighteenth-century temporal culture combined supposedly mutually exclusive elements, its transformation during the nineteenth century was infinitely more complex than a movement toward a European-type, secular, homogenous, and empty time. It was a process in which the early modern and the “fully” modern, the imported and the indigenous, the religious and the profane were intertwined. For decades this transformation was largely limited to the practical, quotidian plane. Ottomans officials found new ways to organize time without directly undermining the religious and cosmological assumptions in which this time was embedded. It was only during the second half of the nineteenth century, under unprecedented Western hegemony, that mundane aspects of time organization became entangled in a more elaborate vision of modernity that drew its inspiration from Europe. Time was gradually detached from the cosmos and turned into an object of human reform. Yet it was only after the 1908 Young Turk Revolution that the new leadership of the empire took a more decisive approach against old temporal practices and notions, in the name of their vision of progress and modernity. Even these efforts, however, were not enough to eliminate old temporal traditions, and many practices, in-

cluding the *alaturka* hour system, persisted down to the dissolution of the empire and beyond.

In order to explain this persistence, I suggest, we must go beyond mechanisms of domination and struggles for hegemony. One of my aims here is thus to illuminate the complex connections between time and emotions. In different points throughout the analysis I deliberately wander into those little-charted lands, trying to explain not what people thought about time but how they *felt* about it. More precisely, I seek to uncover the different ways through which temporal conventions interact with socially constructed emotional scripts.<sup>26</sup> Emotions, I argue, are integral to and inseparable from the ensemble I call “temporal culture,” and it is thus essential to examine the ways they were enacted in the process of change analyzed here.

### *Framing*

This study focuses on the long nineteenth century, here defined as the period that begins with the reforms initiated by the ambitious Sultan Selim III (r. 1789–1807) and ends with the demise of the Ottoman Empire in the aftermath of World War I. During this period the Ottoman Empire was drawn more powerfully than ever before into to the emerging world economy dominated by European powers. These trends, along with related internal processes, created immense pressures on the Ottoman state and ushered a period of more or less continuous reform, aimed at creating a more centralized and effective state apparatus that would be able to cope with internal challenges and a rapidly changing outside world.<sup>27</sup> It was a period of intense economic, social, political, and cultural changes, all of which greatly affected the transformation of Ottoman temporal culture.

However, the transformation of Ottoman temporal culture cannot be reduced to a story of state-led modernization. More recent scholarship about Ottoman modernity has begun to move away from the imperial center in Istanbul and from state-centered narratives of change.<sup>28</sup> Ottoman modernization is no longer understood as a process which was exclusively driven by foreign powers or the imperial center, but rather as one that developed between center and provinces and was not limited to the old ruling elite. As Stefan Weber has succinctly put it, “We need to abandon the concept of Ottoman society changing only due to Ottoman reform decrees, issued by high officials. Societies in the provinces of the Ottoman Empire were changing and not only being changed.”<sup>29</sup> Special attention has been paid to the role played by urban groups of middling background in shaping late Ottoman realities.<sup>30</sup> Of particular relevance for this study is the way these groups competed for hegemony by claim-

ing their own modernity and hence their ability to lead society.<sup>31</sup> In what follows, the transformation of Ottoman temporal culture in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries is shown to be intricately connected with the discourses of modernity, reform, and productivity promoted by these groups. In fact, I argue that examining these discourses from the perspective of time exposes some of the fundamental assumptions on which these discourses relied.

If it is clearer now how the transformation of Ottoman temporal culture is time-framed and contextualized, it makes sense to ask what was Ottoman about it. On the most basic level, “Ottoman” here designates the geographic boundaries of the analysis.<sup>32</sup> Within that vast territory, this study focuses almost exclusively on urban centers which were traditionally not only economic hubs but the nodes of the Ottoman power network as well. The ruling elite, like all commercial and governmental institutions, concentrated in the cities, and it was these larger centers that were more dramatically affected by the large and rapid changes of the long nineteenth century. The focal point of the study is Istanbul, the political and cultural center of the empire, but examples from provincial cities are provided as well. It is also shown that even the rural areas did not remain completely unaffected by the process here discussed.

Clearly, even within Ottoman cities, time-related practices and ideas varied between social classes, religious groups, vocations, and geographic areas.<sup>33</sup> This work, however, only touches upon this multiplicity of temporalities. Its main focus is the temporal common ground created by the Ottomans; it centers on the shared ensemble of practice and meaning which made possible social interaction across social and religious barriers, and at the same time, legitimized the Ottoman claim for power over this heterogeneous social order. In other words, the term Ottoman here represents more than the geography ruled by the sultans; Ottoman temporal culture is understood as an integral part of hegemonic power. It follows that the further away from the nodes of the Ottoman power network, the lesser the influence of imperial temporal culture.

### *Chapter Overview*

The structure of the book generally follows the shift in the role assigned to time, from a stabilizing tool serving the *ancien regime*, to an ordering device used by the reforming Ottoman state, to a weapon in the hands of much more radical groups that sought to transform the political order in the name of (their vision of) modernity. Chapter 1 examines eighteenth-century temporal patterns in Ottoman urban centers, and argues that by claiming correlation with divine rhythms, hegemonic temporal culture served to legitimize and reaffirm the very mundane social order presided over by the Ottomans.

The rest of the study shows how this ensemble of practice and meaning changed over the long nineteenth century. Discussion in chapters 2, 3, and 4 progresses chronologically from the reign of Sultan Mahmud II (1808–1839) through the “reform period” (1839–1876) and the long reign of Abdülhamid II (the Hamidian era, 1876–1908), and on to the Second Constitutional Era (1908–1918). These chapters are mainly devoted to analyzing the relationship between the modern state-building process and the transformation of Ottoman temporal culture. As the Ottoman reform project was largely conceived of in terms of imposing order (*tanzim*, pl. *tanzimat*), the clock emerged as an important organizing device, but also as a powerful symbol of a new order that drew much of its legitimacy from its alleged modernity.

Chapter 2 focuses on the administrative system and shows that already in the late eighteenth century, high-ranking officials tried to attain better efficiency in handling state affairs by defining the length of the workday in the bureaus in terms of clock hours rather than prayer times. The emerging temporal construct became increasingly more elaborate, but just as some elements of the patrimonial tradition survived the reforms, some time-related practices that were part of this tradition, such as unequal enforcement of time discipline, persisted down to the last years of the empire.

In chapter 3, I argue that reforming military time organization was necessary in order to create a competent army following the eradication of the Janissaries in 1826. Already in the first years following the establishment of the new Ottoman army, new methods of time organization were devised, and these gradually took the place of older practices, which were no longer suitable for the managing of a complex army capable of waging highly coordinated warfare. For example, the Ottoman army adopted timed maneuvers, timetables, and toward the end of the period under discussion, the mean-time system as well. I further argue that within the rising elite of educated officers, these complex techniques of time organization gradually developed into a comprehensive mindset, one that stressed the centrality of efficiency, punctuality, and regularity for the future of the Ottoman state.

Chapter 4 discusses the role of the Ottoman education system in the transformation of the indigenous temporal culture. Throughout the nineteenth century, modern practices and concepts of time organization gradually came to regulate Ottoman school life. Blending imported techniques with indigenous practices, the emerging temporal constructs were increasingly more regular, punctual and comprehensive. The very same practices and the related values of punctuality, productivity, and time thrift were incorporated into instruction programs and taught to schoolboys and girls from a very young age. Through

the mutually reinforcing effect of form and content, the Ottoman education system contributed to the formation of a new urban middle class that identified temporal order with progress, patriotism, and modernity. Yet from the perspective of the Hamidian regime, teaching “the value of time” had somewhat unexpected outcomes, as many graduates of Ottoman schools measured the government against the standards they were taught and found it inefficient, indolent, and thus “retarded.” For them, modernization depended on extermination of these defects. In short, by raising young students on the interrelated ideology of progress and the value of time, the Hamidian regime hastened its own end.

By the final third of the nineteenth century, clocks and clock-based temporal constructs were no longer limited to foreign enterprises and governmental bureaus, military compounds, and schools. Chapter 5 examines the weaving of urban time webs as the result of a complex interaction between humans and machines, in specific urban settings but also as part of wider processes that unfolded on the imperial and global levels. It is demonstrated that technological infrastructures cannot be reduced to mere tools in the hands of European, Istanbul-based, or provincial reformers, as these systems were in themselves complex ensembles of humans and hardware that were affected by the physical and social environment at least as much as they affected it. The analysis demonstrates that the remaking of Ottoman urban time was the result of practical and ideological needs of the state, and of the classes that could manipulate its power to serve their needs.

In chapter 6, I argue that particularly within circles of educated officials, officers, and urban professionals, both in the center and in the provinces, novel time-related ideas, ideals, and behaviors became inseparable from their vision of modernity and an important feature of their collective identity. Among these groups, which formed the backbone of the Young Turk movement, Ottoman modernization was increasingly perceived as a race in which every second counted. In order to “close the gap” with the West, then, “the value of time” was repeatedly emphasized, as if it were possible to strike the minutes saved in efficient work off the accumulated temporal distance that had opened between the Europeans and the Ottomans. For these circles, the temporal arrangements of the nineteenth century, in themselves innovative combinations of old and new, foreign and indigenous, were backward, outdated remains of a past era that had to be eradicated. It was in this context that some of the more radical among the reform-oriented groups sought to abolish the indigenous hour system. These people promoted a “scientific” time, empty of religious meanings, a time that would no longer be determined by the men of religion. It was to be a time fit for progress and civilization and therefore for the new order they sought

to establish. These trends, however, dialectically produced their opposition, and *alaturka* time emerged as a focal point of a more conservative Ottoman-Muslim identity that appealed to large parts of the population.

### *Sources*

No matter what the topic, locating the relevant evidence in various archives and libraries is often like finding a needle in a haystack. When working on time-related topics, the haystack is bigger and the needle is smaller. The haystack is bigger since all aspects of human life have a temporal dimension. Time organization is crucial for agricultural production and for the managing of markets; it is indispensable for the conduct of state affairs and central in religious practice. It is important when waging war and when turning to diplomacy. Collections of documents pertaining to any of these fields, and many others, may thus be relevant for the study of temporality. On the other hand, issues concerning time organization were often taken for granted and were thus discussed only in passing, if at all. References to time are thus scattered across different collections and registers, and it is difficult to guess in advance where they might appear.

In a sense, then, time is everywhere and nowhere, or at least nowhere particular. Therefore, in order to build a solid corpus of sources, I turned to many different collections, which together allow a wide perspective despite the difficulties mentioned above. The archival materials allow us to examine changes in time organization within the state apparatus and to assess the difficulties with which the new measures were met. They are often less instructive when it comes to the universe of meanings attached to time-related practices and behaviors. Therefore, in order to complement the organizational perspective, I turned to other types of historical sources for evidence. These include chronicles, military manuals and periodicals, schoolbooks, and contemporary publications of various kinds. In order somewhat to balance the inclination towards state-produced documents, I turned to more personal sources such as poetry collections (*divans*), diaries, memoirs, novels, and travel accounts composed by Ottomans and foreigners alike. Altogether, I believe, this body of sources forms a sufficient base for the study of Ottoman temporal culture throughout the period under discussion.

### *Back in Session*

Everything said thus far does not explain the rather enigmatic parliamentary discussion that opened this introduction; not yet. Clearly, this discussion and the complex reality that it reflects can only be fully understood by

delving deeper into the ocean of Ottoman temporality. However, I feel I owe those who would prefer to stay on shore at least a cursory explanation. As discussed in greater detail in the following chapters, there were different ways of reading clocks in the nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire. First, there was the old scheme of “seasonal hours,” which was based on sundials. According to this system, the day and the night were each divided into twelve units that stretched and contracted as the relation of day and night changed throughout the year. According to this scheme, for example, high noon is always six o’clock and sunset is always twelve o’clock, but in summer every day hour would be longer than a night hour.

As mechanical clocks became more widespread and accurate in the eighteenth century, people within the elite began to rely on the equal hours of their timepieces in preference to the old seasonal hours. Clocks would be set every day at sunset and run two circles of twelve hours until sunset the following day. It was this system of clock hours counted from sunset that came to be known as “Turkish time,” or *alaturka saat* (lit. Turkish clock or hour). It is important to note that the shift to equal hours was slow and gradual, and that for reasons discussed below, the system of seasonal hours had not disappeared by the end of the century and even beyond. For many people seasonal hours continued to form the most important frame of reference and mechanical clocks were therefore only rough indicators of the “real time.” Around the midcentury, a third way of reading clocks began to spread, especially in commercial circles, among minority communities, and in some governmental agencies. This was the European mean-time system, according to which two rounds of equal hours were counted from noon until noon the following day. This system came to be known as “European time,” or *alafranga saat* in Ottoman Turkish.<sup>34</sup>

It appears that most representatives wanted to convene at seven, since seven was approximately one hour after the call to the noon prayer, which always falls at the end of the sixth temporal hour. As Ahmed Efendi clearly stated, many deputies did not have watches and without these, there was no other way to fix a time that everyone could observe. The previous reference point offered by the prayer cycle, the morning prayer, was irrelevant since it occurs too early in the day.<sup>35</sup> Therefore, seven, in the early afternoon, was almost automatically chosen.

Sadık Paşa, a high-ranking bureaucrat who obviously owned a timepiece, noted that “it would be impossible to set an hour.” His concern was probably that in late December, the gap between his mechanical watch and the seventh seasonal hour was significant.<sup>36</sup> In any case, it seems clear that both Sadık Paşa and the unnamed representative thought that convening one hour after solar noon would mean losing the precious hours of the morning. That is why Sadık




FIGURE 1. “At what hour shall we meet tomorrow?”  
*The first Ottoman Parliament in session, March 1877.*

Paşa offered an earlier time that relied on the mean-time (*alafranga*) system. This system had been spreading gradually since the middle of the nineteenth century, and was applied in specific governmental agencies (such as the Imperial Observatory and the Foreign Office) alongside the indigenous system.<sup>37</sup> However, beyond these organs, the system was hardly used by Muslims in 1877, and in any case, it was inapplicable without mechanical timepieces. That was exactly the objection raised by Ahmed Efendi. Sadık Paşa then explained the basic principles of the mean-time system, but when the chair tried to convert the *alafranga* hour to temporal terms that would be intelligible to all deputies, eleven o'clock in the morning became “four and a half or five.” In the process of conversion, that relatively well-defined time was stretched and widened, its frame dissolved. Precision was lost in translation.

The matter was left undecided and the chair had to raise it again toward the end of the session. Some unnamed deputy reminded the assembly of Sadık Paşa’s suggestion and explained once again the difference between the two hour systems. At this point, so it seems, everybody was too tired to argue. After a few more exchanges that concerned other matters, Deputy Yusuf Paşa said that “it is eleven o'clock [*alaturka*; an hour before sunset]. A session cannot go on for so long.” The deputies apparently felt the same, as they quickly decided to leave the last point on the agenda for another day. The assembly thus adjourned, probably leaving the deputies not entirely sure about the convening hour of the next session.<sup>38</sup>



I } READING CLOCKS, *Alaturka*

*That clockmaker's boy stole his lovers' reason.  
The wound of his scorpion-hand curl works its way from the case of the skin  
inwards.*

. . . . .

*Would it be too much if the dancer-sphere, with affection for that sun,  
Should dance all night and make the bell of heaven's wheel ring?*

. . . . .

*When the sun of his beauty is in the Scorpio of his lovelock, everyone in the world is  
a customer.  
The demand [and] profit of union with him increases by the hour.*

*With a cadence he bound me to the chain of his lovelock.  
My plaint and sigh broke out every second because of him.*

*If I say "the tears in my eyes are a flood," he [just] polishes a watch coquettishly.  
He does not make it difficult for his lovers to mount and dismount.*

*I said: "[How about] a repeating clock? He said: "Why not a Prior [watch]?"  
I'll wait and perhaps he'll pass on a road in the Vefa [faithfulness] neighborhood.*

. . . . .

*To the ocean-hearted lover he acts [as if it were] all buying and selling,  
With the young men he sets [the time] playfully with his sandglass.*

*If he should make it ring at a cadence of every quarter hour, I'd still play Refi (high)  
The elevation of the summit of his beauty is so very great Kalayi.<sup>1</sup>*

Apparently addressed to an attractive apprentice in one of the clock shops in Istanbul, this *gazel* by Refi-i Kalayi (d. 1822) can be read as a poem about time and time-measuring devices, but also as a highly erotic love poem written for the seller of such devices. Intentionally condensed and multilay-

ered, Kalayi's *gazel* is emblematic of Ottoman temporal culture during the eighteenth century. In what follows I demonstrate the complexity and inner logic of this culture, which bound together heaven and earth, society and nature, and the fate of humans with the course of planets. Yet despite first appearances, eighteenth-century temporal culture was far from "natural." In fact, my main argument here is that by claiming correlation with divine rhythms, hegemonic temporal culture served to legitimize and reaffirm the very mundane social order presided over by the Ottomans. Mechanical clocks did not conflict with this system but were subject to it, conforming to its norms rather than upsetting them. It is my hope that as we progress in exploring this system, Kalayi's verses and the world which they evoked will become somewhat more intelligible.

### *Condensed Calendars*

The yearly cycle of the earth around the sun and its partition into seasons is fundamental for any human society, and it was even more so in the largely agricultural societies of the early modern world. Fernand Braudel drew attention to the way the seasons dictated economic and social patterns in different areas of the Mediterranean. In general, the winter was a season of decreased agricultural activity, of reduced levels of maritime commerce, lower volumes of traffic on the roads, and limited warfare. Summer accelerated the tempo in all these realms: agricultural work peaked, and fishermen and sailors took to the sea; merchant caravans once again pumped life into the land arteries, and newly assembled armies moved to the front for another round of summer hostilities. Along with the increased traffic, and the heat, came summer epidemics and the ensuing havoc in urban centers across the region.<sup>2</sup>

These patterns were clearly characteristic of most of the Mediterranean world. It was the mechanisms that organized time and regulated social life according to it that distinguished the temporal culture of the Ottomans from that of their neighbors. Calendars were one such device.<sup>3</sup> Ottoman calendars translated a world of cosmological, religious, and political concepts into practical data that not only structured and coordinated different annual cycles but also gave these cycles meaning. They placed human society within a divinely sanctioned cosmic order, thus serving to legitimize authority and social hierarchies.

The Ottomans used the Islamic calendar for determining their religious festivals and dating their official documents. Since the Islamic calendar counts the years from the *hijra* (Turkish: *hicret*), or the migration of the Prophet from Mecca to al-Madina, it is usually referred to as the *Hijri* (or *Hicri* in Turkish) calendar. This calendar, which was devised in the early years of Islam, is a pure

lunar calendar without any intercalation mechanism to compensate for the gap between the lunar and the solar years. As the lunar year is eleven days shorter than the solar one, the Muslim months shift each year relative to the seasons, cycling over a period of about thirty years to get back to the same point.<sup>4</sup> That is why, for most social purposes, solar calendars were far more important than the *Hijri* one.

Agriculturalists, by far the largest segment of Ottoman societies, kept various calendars which maintained a correlation between the months and the seasons, a correlation that was obviously crucial for the performance of all agricultural works on time. Planting, for example, must be done by calendar, anticipating the change of seasons, rather than reacting to them. Since commerce, warfare, and tax collection were similarly dependent on the seasons, a pure lunar calendar was inappropriate for the needs of the state as well.<sup>5</sup> Like earlier Muslim states, then, the Ottomans were forced to employ a solar calendar for regulating tax collection and other fiscal matters. The *mali* (financial, fiscal) calendar, as it came to be known, relied on the solar Julian calendar, but the years were counted from the *hicret*, as in the Islamic lunar calendar. It is important to bear in mind that beside these two official calendars and the agricultural calendars, religious minorities and communities of foreigners lived by their own calendars.<sup>6</sup>

The official calendars produced at court allowed for the correlation of the *Hijri* year with the solar one. However, far from being mere calibration devices, these calendars tied the yearly cycles of social life to imperial culture and stamped them with the authority of the sultan.<sup>7</sup> The production of those calendars was the responsibility of the *müneccimbaşı*, the chief astrologer/astronomer of the palace. Every year, on the 21st of March, the *müneccimbaşı* would submit to the sultan the calendar for the upcoming year.<sup>8</sup>

The date was not incidental. The *Nevruz* (lit. “New Year” in Persian), as that day was known, was the date of the vernal equinox which marked the entrance of the sun to the zodiacal sign Aries, the commencement of the new solar year, and the beginning of spring. The *Nevruz* was celebrated across the Ottoman Middle East and beyond, and was commonly associated with blossom, growth, and regeneration. As the herald of spring, the *Nevruz* also marked the beginning of many seasonal sociocultural practices. For example, in eighteenth-century Istanbul people would start moving to their summer houses along the Golden Horn and the Bosphorus following the *Nevruz*. This trend was led by the palace but was not limited to the elites. The very same seasonal patterns would still be intact in the early twentieth century, affecting working and commuting

routines.<sup>9</sup> The spring was also the season of the nocturnal *meclis*, a convivial gathering of friends that usually took place in the private gardens or courtyards. This form of night-time recreation replaced the *helva söhbetleri* (lit., halvah conversations), an indoor form of nocturnal socialization that was associated with the long and cold nights of the winter.<sup>10</sup> Being the synchronous beginning and end of the astronomical, astrological, seasonal, agricultural, recreational, and fiscal yearly cycles, the Nevruz is but one example of the multilayered nature of Ottoman temporal culture.

The official calendars produced by the *müneccimbaşı* traditionally included a section which specified the months and days of both the *Hijri* and the solar year (*rakam takvimi*) and a section that included the astrological predictions of the *müneccimbaşı* for the different days of the new year (*ahkâm takvimi*). Usually rather vague in their formulation, these predictions allowed the selection of auspicious days for important events, such as the accession of a new sultan to the throne, the nomination ceremony of a new grand vizier, or the launching of a military campaign. When such events were nearing, the *müneccimbaşı* would normally calculate not only the appropriate date, but the most auspicious time of the day.

The calculation of auspicious (and inauspicious) hours was based on a scheme that divided each day of the week into cycles of seven hours. Each hour was believed to be governed by a different celestial body, and the controlling luminary of the first hour of the day was also thought to exert its influence over the entire day. Thus, every single moment in the life of an individual was thought to be affected by the controlling luminaries of both the hour and the day.<sup>11</sup>

These astrological notions relied on the geocentric model of Ptolemaic astronomy which was the basis of Ottoman cosmology down to the nineteenth century. According to this model, the earth is surrounded by nine spheres that are constantly revolving. Each of the first seven spheres holds a different planetary body (including the sun and the moon), and the outer-most spheres hold the stationary stars and the zodiacal signs (*çarh-ı atlas*).<sup>12</sup> In Ottoman literature, the revolution of the zodiac, the spheres, and the planets is often hard to distinguish from the time they measure, and from its supposedly auspicious or inauspicious nature. These circular movements therefore do not exert influence *over* time; their effect is understood as integral to time itself. This is evident in the multiple meanings of many of the words that relate to the cosmos. For example, the word *sipîhr* means a sphere, but also time and fate. The word *felek* similarly denotes both a sphere and destiny. *Tali'* is an ascending heavenly body and also the good fortune of an individual (which allows him to rise). The word *devr* denotes the revolution of celestial bodies, the time measured by this revo-

lution (as in *devr-i zaman*), and also a reign or epoch of dynastic rule (which is affected by this revolution). All these words convey the prevalent notion that the turning of spheres and celestial bodies, time, and the fate of humans are inseparable.<sup>13</sup>

Such cosmological beliefs are reflected in Kalayî's poem. "When the sun of his beauty is in the Scorpio of his lovelock, everyone in the world is a customer (*müşteri*) / The demand and profit of union with him increases by the hour." The beauty of the boy shines like the sun, and the many patrons flock to the clock shop not for the clocks but for their young seller. Hence the rise in demand and profit. But his beauty also carries the danger of heartbreak for the poet. The boy's lovelock, a common trope for the beauty of the beloved in Ottoman poetry, is here described as the dangerous tail of the scorpion (*ak-reb* in Turkish), which is also the word used to designate the hour hand of the mechanical clock. The clock's arm measures mundane time, but that in turn is affected by the constellations of celestial bodies. The word for a customer, *müşteri*, also signifies the planet Jupiter, to which the conventions of Ottoman poetry assign the role of a justice in the court of the heavens. The sultan of that court is the sun.<sup>14</sup> According to Ottoman astrology, the time when the sun is in the House of Scorpio is inauspicious.<sup>15</sup> As "customers" of the beauty of the boy flock to the shop, the poet's chances of winning his heart decrease. The court of the heavens has sentenced the poet to heartbreak and devastation.

Not everybody believed the stars. Some sultans are known to have ignored the recommendations of their court astrologers. At times, even astrologers lost their faith in their own trade. Skeptics aside, it is clear that belief in power of the stars to affect human life was widespread and was certainly not limited to the palace or even to the elites. Consulting astrologers about various daily decisions seems to have been widespread across the Ottoman social spectrum into the nineteenth century.<sup>16</sup>

The belief in auspicious dates and hours reflected a qualitative differentiation between intervals, quite similar to the perceived qualitative difference between the Nevruz and other days, or between Ramadan and other months. This argument may require some clarification. It is often asserted that the predominant perception of time in the capitalist world is quantitative in nature. In modern societies, so the argument goes, time is mostly perceived as a physical entity that is uniform, continuous, and homogenous. This entity is measured and quantified by standard units of duration. The standardization of time units allows for the creation of rational temporal constructs based on timetables, and most importantly, the "commodification of time," or in other words, its conversion into money. Historians and social theorists have generally attributed

the spread of this quantifiable time to the development of reliable mechanical clocks and the rise of capitalism. Its predominance is commonly seen as a distinct feature of modernity.<sup>17</sup>

Nonetheless, the sociological study of temporality has drawn attention to the fact that even in the modern world people do not perceive time only as a “physio-mathematical” entity. Rather, for most people, different times still have different meanings.<sup>18</sup> Such qualitative differentiation was even more pronounced in early modern Ottoman temporal culture. Ottoman calendars fulfilled such basic functions as the temporal regulation of the yearly cycle and the calibration of the solar and the lunar systems. But whereas time was indeed broken into units of uniform length (such as months, weeks and days), those units were believed to be essentially different from one another. Ottoman calendars were therefore not neutral receptacles of empty and homogenous time. They were boards of meaning, imbuing the time they measured and organized with significance.

### *Time and “The Order of the World”*

The intrinsic connection between time, fate, and the heavens was fundamental to Ottoman temporal culture, and it prevailed not only in calendars but also in Sufi tradition and Ottoman poetry, which was heavily influenced by Sufism. In Sufi thought, the turning of the spheres, the revolution of celestial bodies, the passing of years, seasons, and days all punctuate the passing of mundane time, which is often described as a destructive force that corrupts everything. Reaching union with God means breaking out of these cycles and ascending to the ultimate divine time (*an-ı daim*), a time that is stagnant and eternal.<sup>19</sup>

An argument may be made about the affinity of circular images of time (such as *devr-i zaman*) and some of the most prevalent themes in Ottoman historiography and political thought. Writing about the etymology of the word “revolution” in European languages, Reinhart Koselleck notes that during the early modern period, the word usually signified circulation or a return to the point of departure, and was closely connected to the circular orbits of planets and the cycle of constitutions discussed by different classical writers. According to this doctrine, there were a limited number of modes of rule which replaced one another in endless repetition. It was only after 1789 that revolution gradually assumed its modern meaning of sudden interruption of an old order, and the beginning of “a new era” for which history can hardly serve as a guide.<sup>20</sup>

Ottoman imagining of historical time in the early modern era was not dissimilar. Drawing from the same ancient Greek sources (alongside Turko-Mongol, Arabic, and Persian ones), Ottoman writers often linked the great corrupting

power of time and its cyclic patterns with the rise and fall of dynasties. These notions were closely associated with the idea of “the [right] order of the world” (*nizam-i alem*) according to which the social structure was part of a larger cosmic order. Gottfried Hagen notes that the term *nizam-i alem* was not a timeless ideal; rather, it represented a set of concepts promoted by different intellectuals over several centuries. The understanding of the term thus changed over time and between different writers. What all authors shared was the notion that the “order of the world” was “a law of nature which could be observed but not influenced.” Since the social structure was understood as part of a larger, divine order, the only alternative to it was chaos, not a different order.<sup>21</sup>

The order of the world was often represented by yet another cycle, usually known as the “cycle of equity” (*daire-i adalet*). The dissolution of this order was conventionally considered to be the reason for the decline of empires in general, and of the Ottoman Empire in particular.<sup>22</sup> In keeping with these notions, most reform projects suggested and executed by the Ottomans before the eighteenth century were formulated in terms of returning to the old order and imposing it more rigorously.<sup>23</sup> While certainly not a transparent reflection of historical realities, the discourse of decline was a powerful and lasting one. As Karen Barkey has recently suggested, we need to consider the effect of this discourse on historical actors regardless of its basis in reality, since it permeated their mentality and narrowed their options.<sup>24</sup>

It is only by considering the cyclic images of time that we can make sense of the fundamental idea underlying all notions of decline, that the key for the future is to be found in the past. As the last chapter of this study shows, the cyclic images of time were superseded in the nineteenth century by the notion of progress or history as a timeline, which was essentially future-oriented and therefore better served the ideological needs of the Tanzimat reformers.<sup>25</sup>

Despite the importance of circular images of time, however, it would be misleading to argue that the Ottoman notion of time was simply circular.<sup>26</sup> It is enough to consider the *Hijri* year-numbering system in order to refute such claims. Alongside circular notions of time there was always a linear understanding of time which was manifested not only in the more mundane sphere of everyday life, but also in political writing and poetry.<sup>27</sup> It is therefore important to note once again that reducing the world of Ottoman temporality to a single concept of time that is either linear or circular, religious or profane, natural or social is counterproductive. Early modern Ottoman calendars reflected all these notions, compressing them into usable devices that not only organized the yearly cycle but subjected it to religious and worldly authority. The daily sequence of prayers did the same for everyday time.

### *The Prayer Cycle*

It was the daily cycle of prayers, rather than any system of hours, that regulated the rhythms of early modern Ottoman institutions. Markets, for example, were usually opened right after the morning prayer and closed before the evening prayer.<sup>28</sup> Work routine in the bureaus of the central administration was no different. In the eighteenth century, to give just one example, grand viziers held the *İkindi Divanı*, a regular council named after the afternoon prayer which marked its beginning time. Daily routines in religious colleges (sing. *medrese*), libraries, public bathhouses (sing. *hamam*), and a host of other institutions were likewise governed by the prayer cycle.<sup>29</sup>

These institutions “radiated” hegemonic temporal order and structured everyday life in line with it. All those entitled to a meal at the local public kitchen (*imaret*), for example, had to know the time it was being served. They had to align themselves with the temporal construct of that public kitchen in order to benefit from it. Indeed, the prayer cycle functioned as a kind of a public clock, and the prayer names were used to denote the different times of the day. The expression *vakt-i zuhr*, for example, which literally means “noontime,” could signify the time of the midday prayer itself or more generally the interval in which it was performed. Military codes from the second quarter of the nineteenth century still included expressions such as *yatsı nöbeti*, which means “the night-prayer shift” or simply the night shift.<sup>30</sup> The name of the fifth daily prayer, *ikindi*, is still used in present-day Turkish to signify the hours of midafternoon regardless of the religious connotation of the term, just as English people use the term teatime whether they drink tea or not.

Eighteenth-century chronicles reveal that the prayer cycle was used not only as a mechanism for regulating daily routines in institutions and organizations, but also for locating events in time. It appears that before the second half of the eighteenth century, people of different social standing throughout the Ottoman domains rarely referred to the time of the day in terms of specific hours.<sup>31</sup> To give just one example out of many, one of the Ottoman chroniclers writes that the fire that broke out in Azapkapı on the seventieth day of Muharrem 1127 (23 January 1715) began sometime between the noon and the afternoon prayers.<sup>32</sup> So prevalent was the use of prayer times for temporal orientation that it became an inherent, taken-for-granted part of established order. At times, the authorities even attempted to impose attendance of communal prayers as means of social control.<sup>33</sup> Disregarding or defying prayer times was thus an act that could possibly carry subversive implications.

In Ottoman literature, ignoring the prayer often evokes states of intoxication with love or wine or both, states which imply a being out of mundane time.

Walter Andrews and Mehmet Kalpaklı offer a fascinating story about an Ottoman magistrate (*kadi*) who falls desperately in love with a young boy of a much humbler social background. When the two finally meet, the boy describes to the magistrate the extraordinary night of poetry, wine, and lust they are about to have and concludes the very graphic description by saying:

Should you be troubled by the lack of pillow or bolster, we'll let my silver-skinned forearm be your bolster, and my musky locks your soft cushion, and you'll let me serve you until morn by stroking your hands and feet. Finally we will slumber, holding each other tight and keeping one another warm. Let us pay no heed to the muezzin morning cry, nor listen to anything but the voice of the nightingale. Let us grow into oneness, let our spirits mingle one with the other, let us add sweet to sweet.”<sup>34</sup>

The description clearly echoes mystical notions of spiritual union, and indeed, discomfort with the unspontaneous nature of the orthodox prayer rituals was a long-standing theme in heterodox Sufi orders. Specifically, the rigid timing of the prayers and the ritualistic body movements seemed to suppress the spiritual aspect of prayer sought by some mystical groups.<sup>35</sup> And yet such deviances from the established order merely go to show the pervasiveness, the almost inescapable nature, of that order.

#### “*Muvakkithanes at Every Step*”

If the prayer cycle was a public clock of sorts, the *muvaḳḳit* (lit. time-setter) was its technician. *Muvaḳḳits* were employed in Ottoman mosques from the early days of the empire and were charged with calculating time, most notably prayer and fast times, with the utmost precision.<sup>36</sup> The calculations of these times depended on observing celestial bodies and mathematical computation based on detailed astronomical tables. On the surface, then, the *muvaḳḳit* was in charge of maintaining what David King called “synchrony with the heavens.”<sup>37</sup> The *muvaḳḳits* throughout the Ottoman Empire operated under the authority of the chief astrologer (*müneccimbaşı*) of the imperial court, the same official who composed official calendars. Moreover, as we shall see next, the *muvaḳḳithanes* (time-setter lodges) were built and maintained by sultans and high officials and served to advertise their might.<sup>38</sup> The time calculated by the *muvaḳḳits* was thus not only in synchrony with the heavens, but also with the more easily identifiable power structure on earth.

The endowment of *muvaḳḳithanes* was well within a long tradition of Ottoman-Islamic philanthropy. Through their philanthropic activity, Ottoman grandees displayed their piety, their benevolence, and their concern for the wel-

fare of the people. Philanthropy thus served to reaffirm their position at the top of the social ladder, and at the same time, to score points in the constant intra-elite struggles for power and influence.<sup>39</sup> Since the timing of prayers was regarded as extremely important, building *muvačkithanes* was considered a pious act that benefitted the public.<sup>40</sup> Both sultans and high state officials thus undertook the construction of such time-setter houses in ever-increasing numbers, especially over the late eighteenth and nineteenth century.<sup>41</sup>

Eighteenth century Istanbul witnessed a significant intensification of construction and renovation work, and the building of *muvačkithanes* in the city was thus part of a wider trend. Shirine Hamadeh notes that this building boom was coupled by an unprecedented increase in the numbers of chronogram poems (*tarih*) composed to commemorate the construction or renovation of specific buildings. For the sultans and high officials who initiated and financed the works, such poems carried the obvious benefit of publicizing their benevolence and piety through the extremely important medium of poetry.<sup>42</sup> In some cases, chronograms were inscribed on the buildings themselves and served to further popularize that message. Similar chronograms were inscribed on the walls of some *muvačkithanes*, a tradition that continued down to the end of the nineteenth century.<sup>43</sup>

In Ottoman chronograms, each letter of the last line has a known numeral value, and when these values are added together they produce a date, typically the year of the construction or renovation of the building for which the chronogram was composed. Chronograms written to commemorate the construction of *muvačkithanes* may help to explain the relation between political power and the time measured and advertised by the *muvačkıt*.

The following chronogram was composed by Keçecizade İzzet Molla (d. 1829), to celebrate the construction of the *muvačkithane* at the Beylerberyi mosque in Istanbul. The *muvačkithane* was endowed by Sultan Mahmud II (r. 1808–1839) in 1820, in honor of his father, Sultan Abdülhamid I (r. 1774–1789), who had built the mosque some forty two years earlier.

His Excellency Mahmud commemorated his father's soul  
By renovating his pious work in the best manner.

With the passing of time, the axis of the world was broken.  
He renewed it now [and built it] on iron foundations.

The time and hour of the *muvačkithane* has come now.  
It made preferable the determination of the time according to fame-resounding  
clockwork.

It takes its eminence from the moon on its elevated arch.  
It sets its clock to the sun in the fourth sphere.

That ruler made the center of the thread of the shari'a be found.  
May his shadow be extended over the flock of believers.

With stars İzzet adorned the zodiacal sign/fortress of his chronogram.  
The *muvakkithane* became the duplicate of the spheres on earth.<sup>44</sup>

This chronogram reflects the unique fusion of mundane and divine authority, of natural, social, and mechanical rhythms that together formed imperial temporal culture in the late eighteenth century. The chronogram opens with mention of the ruler and his benevolence as manifested in the construction of the *muvakkithane*. It then moves on to place the *muvakkithane* in the interface between the earth and the heavens. The circular movement of the clock hands, measuring time on earth, is here likened to the revolution of the spheres, with which it was supposed to accord. As shown below, one of the main tasks that *muvakkits* regularly performed was the setting of mechanical clocks according to celestial rhythms. The middle couplets thus reflect the practicalities of the profession. But if the *muvakkit* was the technician in charge of maintaining “synchrony with the heavens,” it was clearly the sultan that oversaw the work. It is no wonder, then, that the clocks of the *muvakkithane* which the sultan endowed “resound his fame.”

Indeed, the last couplets return us to the realm of authority and legitimacy by once again evoking the name of the ruler, this time explicitly tying him to God. The fifth couplet echoes the notion that the sultan, in his capacity as the Caliph, is the shadow of God on earth, and that he is responsible for upholding the Islamic shari'a throughout his domains. The connection seems quite clear: by building a *muvakkithane*, the sultan facilitates the fixing of prayer times in accord with the word of God. The sultan is the link between heaven and earth. Just as his *muvakkithane* is a duplicate of the spheres, the temporal order presided over by the sultan is a reflection of a divine scheme. These notions were in keeping with hegemonic notions of order. As Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar has observed, in *divan* poetry, everything revolves around the monarch.<sup>45</sup> This applies to time itself.

Yet despite such rhetoric, eighteenth-century sultans were not all-powerful rulers. It is true that in theory, the entire Ottoman state was conceived of as the patrimonial household of the sultan. This meant, in the most general sense, that all men serving the Ottoman state/dynasty were considered members of that household, or in other words, the personal servants of the sultan. Over

time, however, the sultan’s delegation of power and benefits to his servants enabled them to establish households of their own, typically modeled—*mutatis mutandis*—after that of the sultan. These “slave grandees” formed intricate networks of clients within the state apparatus and constantly contested for office, power, and status.<sup>46</sup>

Patronage patterns of *muvaḳḳithanes* reflected these realities. Far from being the monopoly of the sultan, construction and renovation of time-setter lodges was a means for lesser power brokers to advertise their own role in the maintenance of the temporal (and social) order. The intricate ways in which the institution of the *muvaḳḳit* bound time with political power and religious authority is clearly reflected in a chronogram written by Refi-i Kalayi, another of whose poems was quoted above. The chronogram was written to commemorate the renovation of the *muvaḳḳithane* at the Bayezid mosque compound in Istanbul, originally built in the late fifteenth century.<sup>47</sup> The chronogram was dedicated to the son of Mustafa ‘Aṣir Efendi (1729–1804), who served as Şeyhülislam at the close of the eighteenth century and sponsored the renovation works.

His Excellency ‘Aṣir efendi is the seal of *fetva* for whom  
 Even the brightest moon is a moth revolving around the candle of his virtues.

His pure offspring, his excellency Molla efendi the honorable;  
 Observe his disposition, it is always the center of knowledge.

May the rising of his sun never see a setting  
 For as the heavens turn his patronage remains generous.

He noticed that the *muvaḳḳithane* of sultan Bayezid was out of place.  
 It is that stranger who ends up on the margins [of the gathering], like the horizons.

Now the building found its place in the world,  
 Unique in its centrality, like the point of the East.  
 . . . . .

In it is the axis of sultan Bayezid’s patronage;  
 It is such a palace that brings together the whole of the skies.

He/it makes the dancer of the spheres dance with the sun as a tambourine in his hand  
 He/it plays a melody in the five-bit *makam* (*peñcâh*), so what is your problem,  
     fanatic stickler (*sofu*)?  
 . . . . .

Without paying full attention

The gift of my chronogram it is a libertine compilation, just like a pre-fixed hour  
[would be without the same careful attention].

The jewels of your chronogram hang like a chandelier from the wheel of heavens;  
A *muvačkithane* which is in the center of the four corners of the universe.<sup>48</sup>

The recurring theme throughout the whole poem is the circular movements around a center: of spheres and celestial bodies, of dancers, of a moth around a candle. Molla Efendi and his *muvačkithane* are at the center of all these circular orbits. These images were embedded in centuries-old metaphors of power. As in earlier Islamic polities, the Ottomans conceptualized power relations not so much in vertical terms of higher and lower, but in horizontal terms of center and periphery. Authority was understood to be residing “within,” and it was proximity to the center, not to the top, that best represented power.<sup>49</sup> Using the kind of hyperbole that was typical, indeed required, in Ottoman poetry, Kalayi has planets and spheres revolve around Molla Efendi. Moreover, the patron appears to control these revolutions, making the spheres whirl. Even the sun, conventionally considered the sultan of the universe, is but a tambourine in his hand. These images connect the concentric imagery of mundane power to the eternal cycles of the cosmic order that were discussed above.<sup>50</sup> Patrimonial power produced a patrimonial temporal culture. Patrimonial temporal culture supported patrimonial power.

Similar images of center and periphery are used to describe the *muvačkithane* itself. The poor shape of the *muvačkithane* prior to the renovation is described in terms of being “out of place” (*bi-câdır*), or being pushed to the margins of the horizon. The renovation work was in essence returning the *muvačkithane* to the center of the horizon. The east point (*nokta-i maşrik*) is a point on the celestial horizon that is exactly 90 degrees from the north. On the two equinoxes, the sun rises from this point. By using an image that builds on the terminology and tools used by *muvačkits*, the poet expresses the authority of the *muvačkithane* (and of its builder). The poet then adds another layer which similarly conveys authority and power by evoking the name of sultan Bayezid, who had endowed the mosque in which the *muvačkithane* was built. As in Keçecizade İzzet’s chronogram, the sultan is described as the link between the divine and the mundane. It is his virtue as a “pole” (*kutb*), and his power as a ruler (as implied by the use of “palace”) that renders the *muvačkithane* the center of the universe.

In this way, the poet locates Molla Efendi within several hierarchical schemes that are mutually supportive: the patron is an actor in the divine order of the

universe, turning spheres and planets; he is personally tied to religious authority and knowledge (as personified by his father) and to the political authority of the Ottomans, as he supports an edifice of a deceased sultan with his charity. The very function of the *muvakkithane* is woven into this fabric of religious and political authority. The timing of the five mandatory prayers is implied here by the “five-bit rhythm” that the patron plays. The tambourine-sun in his hand sets the rhythm since the *muvakkits* used to determine prayer times according to the apparent position of the sun in the sky. The religious precisian (*sofu*), who would probably disapprove of this music and dancing scene (which is taken from the world of the *meclis*), should therefore keep quiet, as it is this dance of the spheres that allows the timing of prayers.<sup>51</sup> The founder of the *muvakkithane* is thus credited with allowing the believers to tune in to the sublime rhythms, even with setting these rhythms himself. With celestial bodies revolving around humans, and the fate of humans determined by the revolution of celestial bodies, the natural and the social order converge, the former reaffirming the latter. Dominance and servility are thus naturalized, that is, they are depicted as integral part of the natural world, which is in turn structured according to a divine scheme.

### *Divine Rhythms, Mechanical Clocks*

Clocks were not considered inherently incompatible with this scheme, but were rather quite easily absorbed into it. As mechanical timepieces became more widespread during the eighteenth century, *muvakkits* throughout the empire began employing them alongside their traditional tools.<sup>52</sup> In addition to their training in Islamic astronomy, many *muvakkits* acquired expertise in horology and became skilled clock repairers. But as the calculation of prayer time and the Ottoman hour system was bound to the revolution of celestial bodies, mechanical clocks remained subordinate to traditional methods of time reckoning. The *muvakkits* continued to perform their duty, relying on their traditional instruments of celestial observation and setting the mechanical clocks in the *muvakkithane* accordingly.

With the spread of personal time pieces from the late eighteenth century onward, it became customary to set one’s watch according to the clocks at the *muvakkithane*.<sup>53</sup> The famous Turkish writer and critic Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar (d. 1962) described this practice, which he no doubt remembered from his childhood, in his novel *The Time Regulation Institute* (1954). Although the description refers to the early twentieth century, that is, long after the period covered in this chapter, it brilliantly captures the complex functioning of the *muvakkithane* and is therefore well worth citing:



FIGURE 2. A *muvakkithane* in Khanya, Crete. Note the two the clocks in the windows, one for each hour system. Reprinted from *Servet-i Fünun* 191 (15 *Teşrin-i Evvel* 1310/27 October 1894).

There were *muvakkithanes* at every step. However much in a hurry people were, they would halt in front of the *muvakkithane* windows, and pronouncing the *bismele*, take out their watches of all shapes and sizes, depending on their wealth, their age and their stature: gold watches, silver watches, niello watches, with chain, without chain, sometimes slim, sometimes as plump as a pin cushion or a baby tortoise, and proceed to adjust and set it, with a prayer that the time it measured be auspicious for themselves and for their families. Then they would hold it to their ears as if listening to good news of near and distant times. . . . It had unique qualities extending in both dimensions of life. On the one hand it guided one's present and one's duties, and on the other opened the pure and faultless roads to the eternal happiness one sought.<sup>54</sup>

Tanpınar's text demonstrates the crucial role played by *muvakkits* in the interface between the physiotemporal and the sociotemporal orders, and between religious and social life. In fact, it was the inseparability of these realms that the *muvakkit* reflected more than anything else. The *muvakkit* was charged with the calibration of social time to the rhythms of nature, but it was more than just that. The *muvakkit* was the connecting link between cosmography and daily life, between the world of the learned and that of laymen, between the mosque

and the bazaar, between the literate elites and the *reaya* (flock). By determining prayer times and setting timepieces, the *muvaqqit* disseminated hegemonic temporal culture and translated it into “usable” time, time that could be used to structure daily routines.

### *Reading Clocks, Alaturka*

The oldest hour system still in use in the Ottoman Empire during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was an adjustment of an originally Babylonian method that relied on sundials for establishing the exact position of the sun in the sky.<sup>55</sup> According to this system, the day (*ruz*) and the night (*şeb*) were each divided into a set of twelve units. Daytime hours were counted from sunrise to sunset and nighttime hours, from sunset to sunrise. It is readily understood that the length of these units, usually referred to as “temporal” or “seasonal” hours, changed as the relation between day and night varied throughout the year. The first hour of daytime, for example, was one-twelfth of the entire length of daylight at a specific date and latitude, measured from sunrise. High noon according to that scheme was always at the end of the sixth hour.<sup>56</sup>

While on the popular level the use of seasonal hours continued into the twentieth century, the Ottoman tradition of astronomical timekeeping relied first and foremost on equinoctial hours (*al-mustawiya*), which by their very definition were of *equal* length.<sup>57</sup> According to the system devised by Ottoman astronomers, two sets of twelve equal hours were counted from sunset, which was reckoned as twelve o’clock. This scheme appears already in fifteenth-century tables, composed to allow *muvaqqits* in different localities throughout the empire to precisely calculate prayer and fast times. Tables produced by Ottoman astronomers in later centuries continued to specify prayer times in terms of equal hours and minutes (often alongside seasonal hours).<sup>58</sup> Since sunset (*gurub*) was the baseline of this unique arrangement, the Ottoman system was commonly known as *gurubi saat* (or *ezani saat*), and in the late nineteenth century, also as *alaturka saat*. While maintaining the importance of sunset, the *alaturka* hour system did not regard sunrise as a second zero-point, and the correlation between each of the two twelve-hour cycles and daylight or night time was lost. The two sets of twelve hours were still widely referred to as *şeb* and *ruz*, respectively, but at least in official use, one in the morning *alaturka*, meant twelve clock hours from sunset, plus one hour, regardless of the hour of sunrise.

The Ottoman preference for equinoctial hours may have been connected to the spread of mechanical clocks in the Empire. The first mechanical clocks reached the Ottoman court in the late fifteenth century, and during the next century they were sold in ever growing numbers, gradually spreading beyond

palace circles.<sup>59</sup> It seems safe to assume that by the second half of the eighteenth century, thousands of timepieces were marketed throughout the Ottoman domains every year.<sup>60</sup> During the same time, the construction of *muvakkithanes* and clock towers increased significantly.<sup>61</sup>

In contrast to the nonuniform seasonal hours, equinoctial hours were fully compatible with the standard hours of the mechanical clock. The need to adjust all clocks and watches to show twelve at sunset, however, was somewhat problematic, as the frequent setting wore down their mechanisms quickly.<sup>62</sup> It has to be emphasized that the calculation of equinoctial hours required mathematical and astronomical knowledge, and that without the help of mechanical clocks the system could not be widely used. Since *muvakkits* who possessed that type of knowledge were mainly employed in the bigger cities, and because even in the late eighteenth century mechanical clocks were beyond the reach of the majority of people, the *alaturka saat* could not establish its dominance in the rural reaches of the empire. Away from the nodes of the government system, the use of seasonal hours remained common (and was sometimes known as “Arabic time”).<sup>63</sup>

Yet different sources show that by the late eighteenth century, the use of the *alaturka* system had already spread beyond professional circles of astronomers and *muvakkits* and had come to predominate over seasonal hours, at least in official use. For example, decrees issued in the last decades of the eighteenth century subjected work in the offices of the central administration to clock hours. Increasing use of clock hours is also evident in eighteenth-century chronicles.<sup>64</sup> Other sources show that this trend intensified in the first half of the nineteenth century, with the use of clock hours spreading beyond government or even elite circles. For example, in a set of reports known as *havadis jurnalları* which were compiled for the authorities in the early 1840s by a network of agents, exact hours were very often indicated.<sup>65</sup>

The spread of clocks is also reflected in contemporary poetry. The following lines from a poem by Sabit (d. 1712) still treat the clock as a disturbing oddity:

The watch has become close (*mukarreb olmuş*) to that sultan of beauty.  
Is it any wonder that it is nicknamed scorpion? the watch.

. . . . .

Chiming every hour in the abode of Islam,  
It saddens so many Muslims, the watch.

It creeps to the pocket of the beloved like an arachnid (*kejdüm*),  
Is it any wonder that to me it looks like a scorpion, the watch?<sup>66</sup>

The first hemistich of the poem can also be read as follows: “The watch has been offered as a present to that sultan of beauty.” This is clearly a reference to the practice adopted by representatives of foreign governments as early as the late fifteenth century of bringing clocks as presents to Ottoman sultans and high officials.<sup>67</sup> The remoteness of the clock’s homeland, and thus its foreignness, stands in clear contrast to the level of closeness it achieves with the beloved, typically referred to as a sultan.<sup>68</sup> But it may also be the real sultan here. The reference to the sadness that the hourly chiming of the clock brings to the hearts of Muslims clearly evokes the sound of church bell towers. It is thus not inconceivable to understand this envy on a more general level; it may express suspicion toward that powerful device that was able to captivate the heart of the beloved sultan, and toward the intentions of the foreigners who created it. While the foreignness of the clock is explicitly emphasized, on a more implicit level the image of the clock is woven into some of the most familiar themes of Ottoman *gazel* poetry. One such theme, for example, was the wish to be near the beloved at all times and envy toward others who seem to enjoy such closeness.<sup>69</sup> Here we have a pocket watch, which, due to its proximity to the heart of the beloved, is the metaphorical object of such envy. Playing on the Turkish word for the hour hand of the clock (*akreb*, that is, scorpion), the poet warns against the dangers of this proximity.

Nothing of the sense of suspicion towards clocks evident in Sabit’s poem is to be found in Kalayi’s clock-shop boy poem, written approximately a century later. Kalayi plays with his clocks, setting them according to well-established Ottoman poetic conventions. Thus, for example, the beloved in Kalayi’s poem remains indifferent to the pain of the lover-poet.<sup>70</sup> Although the boy plays hard to get, the poet clearly considers him available, as he does not make it difficult for his lovers “to mount and dismount” (*İndirip bindirmede uğşakımı çekmez güce*). Undisturbed by the poet’s “flood of tears,” he continues to polish clocks “coquettishly.” When the poet asks for a repeating clock (*basma bir saat*), which can also be read roughly as “one hour of screwing,” the apprentice, once again in keeping with convention, does not comply. Instead, he offers a Prior watch, which was a well-known brand in the Ottoman Empire during the eighteenth century.<sup>71</sup> Since the English name Prior is spelled as it was pronounced in Ottoman-Turkish (Piryol or Biryol), the apprentice’s reply can also be read to mean “Why not some time?” or “Why not at some road?” (*bir yol olmaz mı*).<sup>72</sup> To this the poet answers with yet another pun: “I will wait, maybe he shall pass by in some road in the neighborhood of faithfulness.” Playing on the name of the Vefa (lit. faithfulness) neighborhood in Istanbul, which was possibly the location of the clock shop,<sup>73</sup> the poet displays his willingness to wait and endure, de-



FIGURE 3. A table clock made for Sultan Ahmet III by Ottoman clockmaker İbrahim of Edirne, early eighteenth century. Topkapı Palace Collection, courtesy of Şule Gürbüz of the Dolma Bahçe Clock Museum.




FIGURE 4. A wall clock by Ottoman clockmaker Mustafa of Vidin. Topkapı Palace Collection, courtesy of Şule Gürbüz of the Dolma Bahçe Clock Museum.



FIGURE 5. “Why not a Prior?”  
*A repeater watch designed for the Ottoman market around the turn of the eighteenth century by English clockmaker George Prior. It was probably a watch like this that the clock-shop boy offered in Refi-i Kalayi’s poem. Topkapı Palace Collection, courtesy of Şule Gürbüz of the Dolma Bahçe Clock Museum.*

spite the uncommitted, light-headed response of the beloved. In short, clocks here measure the agonized wait of the lover, a well-known theme in classical Ottoman poetry.

Much is said in the following section about the meaning of this willingness to wait. At this point, it is important to note the extent to which clocks are skillfully used in this poem to play with age-old themes, and that there is no trace of the foreignness with which they were associated in Sabit’s poem. Furthermore, in Kalayi’s poem—as in some other contemporary poems—it is not just some general idea of a clock that is evoked, but very specific, real clocks.<sup>74</sup> Even the foreign name of a brand becomes the object for a play on words, which invests the object with an additional, very local layer of meaning. It should also be noted that clocks in this poem are very ordinary. Here we find no allusions

to the palace, nor do we marvel at the miraculous nature of clocks. In Kalayi's poem, clocks are merely goods sold in the bazaar.

The way clocks were incorporated into long-established poetic traditions shows that mechanical clocks were not only widely used but that they were assimilated in a more substantial level. Rather than conflict with existing practices and notions, timepieces were made to serve them. Like the social order and power relations, then, mechanical clocks too were "naturalized," and that in two ways. First, they were fused into a conceptual scheme which constantly based itself on natural rhythms. Second, mediated by means of familiar notions, these potentially disturbing machines were contained and absorbed. Far from being alien, then, clocks had become a natural, integral part of Ottoman temporal culture by the eighteenth century. But while clocks were without doubt more commonly and naturally used, the time they measured was not severed from the natural world and the religious and cosmological notions that mediated it, nor was it freed from the patrimonial power structures that created it.

### *Indefinite Waits*

Patrimonial power constructed time not only on the symbolic or representational level. It also shaped the ways quotidian time was organized and allocated. These patterns were poorly understood by contemporary foreign observers. European travelers to the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century often commented on the natives' indifference to time and their willingness to wait, almost indefinitely. Within the European middle-class discourse of progress-through-time-thrift, instances of idle waiting were often brought as implicit or explicit explanation for the "backwardness" of the Ottomans. For example, the Englishman Charles MacFarlane noted in the mid-nineteenth century that "every great man had his regular and crowded levee; and one was sometimes kept to wait and shiver among a strange motley crowd in a cold saloon or antechamber."<sup>75</sup> In MacFarlane's narrative, descriptions of Ottoman grandees' antechambers, crowded with household members and fueled by *bakshish* were supposed to reflect the poor condition of the empire and the inefficiency of its systems.

Waiting, however, was not simply a by-product of inaccurate timing and ineptitude, but a meaningful social ritual that reflected and reaffirmed power relations. For high-ranking officials, inflicting long waits (and haste) on their dependents served as an explicit act of domination. The dependents, on their side, were expected to demonstrate their servility and utter devotion to their master by enduring the wait, that is, by giving away control of their own time. A

reservoir of images and conventions that was shared by the serving elites of the Ottoman Empire gave meaning to these patterns, thereby contributing to their perpetuation. Using contemporary poetry we can tap into that reservoir and decipher the cultural codes that structured rituals of waiting, scripted conventional behaviors, and rendered them meaningful to all participants.

The sociologist Eviatar Zerubavel observes that in modern societies, time is one of the major dimensions along which boundaries are drawn between the private and the public, between a person and his role. In modern working environments this boundary is institutionalized through the definition of working hours, breaks, and vacations. During our private time, we can legitimately be inaccessible to our boss and colleagues, even if we are physically at the working place. As a result of what Zerubavel terms “the bureaucratization of professional commitments,” the worker in modern societies is subordinate to her boss only during the period institutionalized as “work time.”<sup>76</sup> Within this work time, clocks serve as an external standard that applies, even if not equally, to both superiors and subalterns. This does not mean that hierarchies are erased, but rather that the authority of those at the top is checked by “egalitarian” conventions. For example, a boss may keep her subaltern waiting for an interview for some time after the preset hour has elapsed. Yet this wait would have limits beyond which the boss’s behavior would be interpreted as disrespectful and even abusive.

Things were clearly very different in the early modern Ottoman Empire. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, high-ranking officials moved their households outside the palace, and their dwellings became the new loci of administrative and political power. The house of the grand vizier, known as the Sublime Porte (*bab-ı âli*), emerged as the center of the Ottoman administrative system. The residence of the chief treasurer (*bab-ı defteri*) became the core of the financial mechanism, and the seat of the grand mufti, (*bab-ı meşihat*) became the heart of the legal-religious apparatus. Each of these complexes housed the grandee and his family along with his personal retinue and executives, who were considered his personal dependents. As official business was handled in the private residences of the administrators, the private was hardly distinguished from the public.<sup>77</sup>

Since state officials were generally considered the servants of their master, their availability to him was not limited. This was true in the center and in the provinces. Ahmed Jezzar Paşa, the governor of Sidon and Damascus in the late eighteenth century, may serve as an example.<sup>78</sup> Jezzar’s provincial government depended on his strong household, whose members were, as Haim Gerber ob-

serves, completely subordinate to the will and whims of their master. Though not necessarily slaves in their legal status, they were nevertheless considered his personal servants. "They were 'his men' during working hours as much as afterwards. In fact, probably no such separation existed in practice."<sup>79</sup>

Whether in the center or in the provinces, the vertical, personal bonds of dependency that were characteristic of the patrimonial tradition created administrative patterns that were largely "irrational" in Weberian terms.<sup>80</sup> Recruitment and promotion were dependent first and foremost on such incalculable factors as the favor of the patron or the lack thereof. An official could rise to the highest position at the whim of the sultan and be dismissed just as easily, often losing his property or even his head in the process. Şerif Mardin called this unpredictable pattern of promotion "Aladdin's lamp mobility," and Carter Findley preferred the "wheel of fortune mobility."<sup>81</sup> This last term is probably closer to the way this reality was understood by the contemporaries. As already noted, the rise and fall of an individual was often explained in terms of fortune, as determined by the movements of celestial bodies. The fascination with astrology, noted above, can thus be partly explained by the measure of predictability it promised in a world of extreme insecurity.<sup>82</sup>

Based as it was on human interaction, survival and promotion within the system relied not on compliance with written regulations but on adherence to a certain cultural code. In this code, as Ehud Toledano argues, obedience and conformity were believed to win reward and promotion and were thus symbolically codified and ritualized.<sup>83</sup> Such rituals of servility served in a sense as a safeguard against the arbitrary and insecure nature of office holding. By acting out these rituals, subordinates constantly reaffirmed their inferiority, but received in return more predictable responses from their superiors. As Toledano has shown in the Ottoman-Egyptian context, one of the most explicit acts of grandee domination took place in the antechambers of high officials. Waiting for an audience with a superior whose help was needed, lower-ranking officials received a good indication of their positions vis-à-vis the grandee.

Although the use of clocks increased significantly over the second half of the eighteenth century, high officials would not normally set hours for interviews with their subalterns. Rather, the dependent would be summoned and kept waiting in the antechamber. The attendant of the high official would announce to his master each arrival and receive a hint as to how long the individual should wait before he would be admitted. Keeping someone waiting for a long time was a clear indication of his falling from favor.<sup>84</sup> The length of the wait, especially when measured against the waiting of peers (and rivals) sitting in the same antechamber, was a clear indication of status and proximity to the

master.<sup>85</sup> The power to decide when the interview would start, and how long it would last, rested solely in the hands of the superior official.<sup>86</sup>

The flip side of wait was haste. Just as the subordinate was expected to willingly give up any measure of control over his time, so he was expected not to keep his superior waiting. The immediacy with which a servant had to respond to the handclap of his master was clearly a reflection of this notion.<sup>87</sup> In this context, waiting *for* the master was often synonymous with waiting *on* the master and responding to his commands immediately. The servants, wrote the Earl of Sandwich around the mid-eighteenth century, “stand always with their hands crossed before them, observing every motion of their master, and by their obsequiousness almost preventing his desires.”<sup>88</sup> When the servants were not physically present, the master sometimes had to explicitly remind them of the immediacy expected of them. Sultan Murad IV ends a decree he issued in 1631 by warning the addressees that they should not “lose a minute in executing the order that I have proclaimed in this matter.”<sup>89</sup>

Ottoman lyric poetry was never far from the world of household politics. Like all other members of the Ottoman serving elite, poets competed with each other over the protection and support of powerful patrons. Their poetry was their most important asset in this contest. Moreover, poets were crucial in inter-elite struggles over reputation and public image. They wrote poems of praise for their benefactors and poems of defamation against their benefactors’ rivals. Being thus embedded in patrimonial power structures, it is not at all surprising that Ottoman lyric poetry reflected the waiting patterns created by vertical patronage relations. Moreover, the poetry imbued these practices with additional layers of meaning and thus served to reaffirm them. A *gazel* by Antepi Ayni (d. 1837) may serve as an example:

My eye-spring of bewilderment (*hayret*) became the source of the seas of waiting/  
anticipation (*intizar*)

The waves stirred by the storm of my tears are the pearl scatterers of waiting.

Thinking about the down on your cheek on the banks of the stream of the eye  
Every stem of my eyelashes became the meadow place of waiting.

As I sighed and cried with the thought of the mole of the beloved  
Every single drop of my tears turned into the sparks of waiting.

With the fire of desire for your cheek onto the needle of my eyelash of longing  
My every glance is a flaming thread of waiting.

The flood of my tears demolished the house of [my] life and soul  
And trashed the home of my body, [because of] the devastation of waiting.

May the skirt of hopelessness and the despair of the time/wind (*rüzgar*) of waiting  
not

Extinguish anyone's candle of hope.

Oh Ayni, in the dominion of love of that sultan

I have been the possessor of the realm of endurance (*tahammül*), content with  
waiting.<sup>90</sup>

In order to make sense of this *gazel*, we have to keep in mind that Ottoman poetry weaves together several layers, or voices that speak simultaneously, each echoing the others. For the sake of this discussion, I follow the approach of Walter Andrews and refer separately to three major dimensions: the mystical-religious dimension, the dimension of power and authority, and the emotional dimension.<sup>91</sup> As Antepi Ayni was, like many of his fellow poets, a state official, and since he was apparently affiliated with several Sufi orders, all three dimensions would have been personally meaningful to him.<sup>92</sup>

The first couplets are meant to express, in myriad ways, the torture of waiting for the beloved. Playing on the word *intizar*—derived from an Arabic root which designates looking, seeing, or watching—the poet emphasizes eyes and eyesight to convey the agony of longing from afar (as opposed to touching). From a mystical perspective, the separation of lover and beloved is a reflection of the separation of humans from God. This world is thus a place of loneliness, misery, and pain, and the poet, assuming the conventional role of a lover, is constantly seeking (re)union (*vahdet*) with God, the ultimate beloved.<sup>93</sup> In this context, waiting and enduring the agony of this world proves the devotion of the believer.

As noted by many scholars, in Ottoman poetry the divine is not clearly separated from the profane, and the mystical voice is hardly distinguishable from the world of politics and patronage and the sphere of love and emotions. It has been demonstrated that the courting patterns and amorous relationships of Ottoman elites during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were modeled after patronage relations. Servitude and dominance, in turn, were conceptualized in terms of love and affection.<sup>94</sup> In classical Ottoman poetry, God, patron, and beloved are all powerful masters, whose hearts must be won over by the lover-poet, always in the role of slave or servant. But since mundane love is but a pathway to pure, divine love, it cannot be fully satisfied in this base world. This-worldly love is thus an illness without cure, inflicting a kind of noble suffering on the lover. This suffering is often described in terms of anxious, endless waiting for the beloved to appear.<sup>95</sup> Such distressed, indefinite waits are meant to convey the powerlessness of the lover, but also his devotion to his master/be-

loved. In Ayni's poem, the lover's powerlessness and lack of control is expressed by images like floods and waves that threaten to drown the lover with agony.

By contrast, the beloved, like the patron, usually assumes the role of a powerful monarch that remains remote and silent, seemingly unmoved by the distressed courting of the lover. This is often conveyed by analogies such as the rose, which attracts the nightingale by virtue of its beauty, but remains indifferent to the bird's (i.e., the poet's) singing. The silence of the beloved forces the lover to observe every little jest, every facial expression which may indicate his feelings and reassure the suitor.<sup>96</sup> The lover is expected to be patient, to endure, and in this way to express both his servility and his loyalty. In Ayni's poem, it is the last couplets that give meaning to the suffering involved in waiting. Here we have imagery clearly taken from the world of patrimonial domination. Being in the dominion of "that sultan," the poet's time is not his own. He possesses only endurance and the willingness to wait, without ever losing hope of winning the affection of the beloved/patron.

In Ottoman poetry, the power of the beloved over the suitor is expressed not only by remote, silent passivity, but often by displays of coquettish behavior (*naz*) toward the anguish of his admirer. Having the suitor wait is one way of acting out *naz*. Take for example the following lines by Şeyh Galip (d. 1799):

Oh God, what is this waiting?  
How this time does not pass,  
This is all pain and distress.  
If only I could understand what kind of coquette she is.  
Does she not have the slightest wish for union?<sup>97</sup>

The clock-shop apprentice in Refi-i Kalayi's poem is similarly playing it hard to get. Undisturbed by the poet's suffering, he continues to polish clocks "coquettishly." The poet responds to the boy's coquetry by declaring his willingness to wait. Faithful waiting was all the more important given the competitive nature of courting both lovers and patrons.<sup>98</sup> In Kalayi's poem the many suitors of the clock-shop boy are presented as customers (*müşteri*) of his beauty. Although he clearly knows what they are after, the young apprentice pretends it is strictly business: "To the ocean-hearted lover he acts [as if it were] all buying and selling / With the young men he sets [the time] playfully, with his sandglass." Whereas the "ocean heart" of the lovers knows no temporal boundaries, the coquettish apprentice times the attention he pays to each of them with a sandglass.<sup>99</sup> Nobody can win his heart wholly. As in Ayni's poem, the beloved is the lord of his lovers' anxious waits, exercising absolute power over their time.

Indefinite waits and frantic haste were therefore expressions of domination

and servility in a system that stabilized authority through the cultivation of personal dependency. Just as this domination was largely unmediated by written rules, time-allocation patterns were mostly independent of clocks. The master had total and direct control over the time of his dependents, and they simply had to wait and endure. Clocks could measure the length of the wait but could not mark its end, since ending the wait was in the hands of the master and a master answers to no clock. These patterns remained intact even when the use of clocks became more widespread in the second half of the eighteenth century. To use Ottoman phraseology, the clocks were always slaves, never masters. They remained subjected to personal authority, never serving as independent standards to which both superiors and subalterns had to respond.

To conclude, Ottoman temporal culture in the eighteenth century was embedded in patrimonial power relations and served to reaffirm them. Underlying this culture was a network that sent its threads from the palace outwards. Imperial mosques served as the nodes of the network, infusing the entire urban fabric with the time of state and religion. This network, however, was far from being a telegraph-style, fully integrated and centralized system that could convey the will of the center with minimal friction. Rather, the temporal order reflected the acknowledged preeminence of the sultan over a conglomerate that by the eighteenth century was in fact rather diffused and localized.

On the quotidian, local level, time organization was centered in the mosque complex (*küllüye*), with the *muvaqqit* setting the times for prayers, which in turn punctuated the daily routines of the entire urban population. Even as mechanical clocks became more widespread during the eighteenth century, they did not obliterate this system but were rather incorporated into it. The *muvaqqits* thus retained their function long into the nineteenth century, facilitating the coordination of sociotemporal with physiotemporal rhythms, and imbuing time with religious, political, and cultural substance. The *alaturka* hour system, which reflected the blending of all these dimensions, was thus the core of Ottoman temporal culture from the eighteenth century onwards.

The temporal culture of the late eighteenth century was soon to be altered by the comprehensive changes of the nineteenth century. The appearance of new institutions, the dissemination of new types of knowledge, the development of new literary genres, and ultimately the emergence of new elites who were educated away from the nodes of the old temporal order, gradually brought about the transformation which forms the subject matter of this study. The beginnings of that process were first evident in the administrative system, and it is therefore to the bureaus of the central government that the discussion turns next.

## 2 } CLERK WORK

During the nineteenth century the Ottoman administration underwent a major reform process, unprecedented in both scope and consequences. Within a period of roughly one hundred thirty years, a relatively small and simple scribal service evolved into an elaborate bureaucratic system, which facilitated previously unknown levels of centralization and surveillance.<sup>1</sup> This process entailed a parallel elaboration, rationalization, and centralization of time organization within the administrative system. My intention in this chapter is to follow that process of change and at the same time to document and analyze the resilience of inherited temporal patterns.

In what follows I argue that the emerging practices of time organization reflected the curious combination of legal-rational regulation and patrimonial traditions that characterized nineteenth-century Ottoman administration. The growing dependence on clock time was part of the wider trend toward legal rationalism. Clock-based temporal constructs, like the rationally devised laws and regulations that gradually came to cover nearly every aspect of bureaucratic life, were intended to serve as a standard external to the system and applied equally to all individuals within it. Like the laws and regulations, however, the newly created temporal constructs never did acquire that lofty status and were often abused by the very people who created them, or by those who were supposed to enforce their application. Yet, despite uneven application, the reforms in time organization did bring about many changes in work routines and eventually contributed to the formation of a time-conscious bureaucratic elite that emphasized the importance of time thrift, regularity, and punctuality for Ottoman modernization.

Clearly, bureaucratic reform in the Ottoman Empire did not start in the nineteenth century and was far from “complete” when the Empire disintegrated.<sup>2</sup> Yet the reform project of the nineteenth century was unique both in its comprehensiveness and in its new emphasis on legal rationalism. Hence, I follow Carter Findley and begin my discussion in the late eighteenth century, when these new trends began to emerge more clearly. It is by no means incidental that it is in the same period that we find the first systematic attempts to regulate official working hours. The extent to which these measures were successful will not be as-

sessed against some ideal-type models of rational bureaucracy, but rather with regard to the expectations of the leaders of the bureaucratic reform.

### *Regulating the Workday*

In chapter 1, I demonstrated the extent to which the temporal dimension of interaction within the early modern Ottoman administration was subject to patrimonial authority. Yet time organization within the system was by no means capricious. Some patterns were clearly evident, and these corresponded closely to temporal arrangement outside the bureaus. Most importantly, working routines were framed by daylight and punctuated by the prayers.<sup>3</sup> The calls for prayers, easily heard all around, served as reference points which divided the day into clearly defined periods. Thus, for example, regular councils held in court, and later in the Sublime Porte, would be scheduled to begin after one of the three diurnal prayers (morning, noon, or afternoon). This manner of scheduling the regular meetings of councils persisted long into the nineteenth century.<sup>4</sup> Other activities in the bureaus were also scheduled in a similar manner. In 1826, for example, Arabic and Persian lessons given to the clerks of the Porte began right after the noon and the afternoon prayers, respectively.<sup>5</sup> Being framed by daylight and subdivided by the daily prayers, both the overall length of the workday and the length of each section of it changed rather significantly throughout the year. These practices had a negative effect on the regularity and swiftness with which official affairs were being handled.

Efficiency was further reduced by the working conditions in the bureaus of the Porte. Most offices were overstaffed and many of the officials, especially on the lower levels, possessed questionable qualifications. Since the bureaus were not spatially differentiated, work was carried out in relatively large spaces, amidst a constant commotion caused by the crowd of visitors that frequented the offices in large numbers. Messengers of various kinds, interpreters of foreign embassies, peddlers and even beggars, regularly entered the offices without interference, and constantly obstructed work routine. The clerks themselves were often busy with a host of leisure activities, rather than with their assigned duties.<sup>6</sup> Under these conditions, discipline was anything but strict, and productivity must have been relatively low.

The difficulties in handling the growing volume of official business raised concerns within ruling circles and sparked discussions about the efficiency of the administration.<sup>7</sup> Ottoman statesmen realized the need to establish official discipline and devise ways to enforce it. This gave birth to a long process of bureaucratization and rationalization which intensified as the administrative system grew larger and more complex. It is against this background of early ex-

periments aimed at higher administrative efficiency that we should interpret the first attempts to regulate office hours. The leaders of the scribal service did not contemplate the nature of time as they knew it; neither did they question the religious and cosmological assumptions on which it rested.<sup>8</sup> They had a set of problems that needed to be addressed and clocks promised to solve at least some of them.

Some aspects of the reforms in bureaucratic time organization have already been touched upon. Findley examined a number of decrees concerning working hours in official bureaus, most of which were issued around the middle of the nineteenth century. Based on these, he concluded that the emphasis on efficiency and regularity in the conduct of government affairs that was embodied in these regulations should be interpreted within the context of the Tanzimat. “Reflecting the spirit of the Gülhane Decree [the 1839 reform edict], then,” Findley wrote, “the disciplinary rulings asserted the demand for a new regularity in administration, and even, in an inchoate way, for respect of public interest.”<sup>9</sup> This assertion should be read in the context of Findley’s overall narrative, which contrasted the traits of the traditional scribal service with those of the evolving *mülkiye*, or civil service, of the Tanzimat period. In fact, as we shall see now, similar regulations were issued long before the Gülhane edict was even considered, and should thus be contextualized and explained otherwise.

The earliest working-hours decree I could locate was issued in December 1786 by the grand vizier and addressed to the chief scribe (*reisülküttab*). The decree made it clear that all officials were required to come “early” to their offices, and to complete all their duties by ten o’clock (*alaturka*). They were to handle the “important and urgent affairs” (*umur-ı mühimme-i müsta’cele*) and the affairs of the subjects (*umur-ı ibad*) without delays. This, however, was not what was actually happening. Most of the officials, it was explained, arrived at five or six (*alaturka*, that is, around noon) and left just a few hours later. This way, important and urgent affairs were being postponed.<sup>10</sup> The decree, in short, made a direct connection between the low productivity of the bureaus and the tardiness and neglect of the officials. Regulating and imposing clearly defined office hours was thus a means of increasing bureaucratic output.

The decree further pointed out that delays in conducting work caused losses to people who came from the provinces on business (*taşradan gelen erbab-ı mesalih*), since they had to remain in the Porte during the time their matters were being handled. This concern may suggest that the effort to raise productivity had another dimension. Subjects who arrived at the capital from the provinces were considered a threat to the urban social order and their stay in the city was therefore limited. According to established practice, people entering

the capital in order to handle their affairs could only remain in the city for three days, and only if they had someone to vouch for them.<sup>11</sup> It is thus possible that the attempt to speed up the handling of paperwork was also driven by the effort to secure public order in Istanbul, clearly a major concern of the government in the second half of the eighteenth century.<sup>12</sup>

The connection between administrative efficiency and public order remains a speculation, but what is beyond doubt is that the volume of work that was piling up needed to be addressed. Decrees issued early in the nineteenth century often specifically referred to the amount of “important and urgent” affairs that needed to be handled as the reason for the regulation of working hours. The clerks were frequently ordered to speed up work and “not to leave today’s work for the morrow.”<sup>13</sup> If the general time frame of the workday was defined in terms of hours, time organization within that framework still relied directly on the daily prayers as the most important reference points. As the duration between daily prayers fluctuated significantly throughout the year, the inner organization of the workday changed accordingly. For example, in summer the afternoon prayer (*vakt-i asır*) was something of a midday break whereas in the winter, it often signaled the unofficial end of the workday.<sup>14</sup>

A decree dating from 1819 may serve to better illuminate both the problem and the intended solution. It reminded the chief scribe that it had already been stipulated that all officials in the Porte should be in their offices at two and shall not leave before ten (*alaturka*). And yet the officials were not arriving at their offices on time (*bivakit gelip*) and were leaving just before the afternoon prayer.<sup>15</sup> It is worth noting in passing that the afternoon prayer (*ikindi*) marked the end of the day in Ottoman Koran schools (*mekteps*), the beginning of the second session in colleges (*medreses*), and the closing of shops in the markets. Put more generally, the *ikindi* prayer signaled the beginning of the last phase of the day.<sup>16</sup> Leaving work before the *ikindi* prayer was thus in line with the daily rhythms that punctuated social life outside the bureaus. The frequently issued memos were meant to separate the routine in the bureaus from the outside world by creating an alternative time frame that would not rely on prayers, thus insuring a longer workday and a higher level of regularity.

The memos represented an attempt to draw clear boundaries between work and non-work in terms of both time and space: within the delineated time frame officials were expected to remain in their offices. It was emphasized time and again that that working hours applied always (*her bar, daiman*) and to all officials. Many specifically referred not only to scribes and clerks (*hulefa, ketebe*) but to functionaries of higher status such as purse-bearers (*kisedar*), examining

clerks (*mümeyyiz*), reporting clerks (*ilamcı*), and master clerks (*hacegân*), suggesting that the habit of arriving late and leaving early was not limited to the lower echelons of the system. It seems that an attempt was also being made to impose similar regulations not only at the offices of the Porte, but at the offices of the treasury (*bab-ı defteri*) as well.<sup>17</sup>

Carter Findley has argued that in the old scribal service, documents were compiled on the basis of extremely elaborate procedures, but with little regard to how these documents related to each other or to the outside world.<sup>18</sup> The decrees here quoted demonstrate growing awareness of efficiency and are more concerned with work output than with the display of scribal expertise. Furthermore, the attempt to impose general regulations in all offices, at all times, and upon all officials, suggests growing awareness of standardization as well. Similar efforts to speed up work were evident in other governmental organs, most importantly in the courts.<sup>19</sup> All this implies that the rationalization of time organization was already well under way by the first quarter of the nineteenth century. This is significant because it shows that the reforms in time organization, at least in the administration, had their origins in the so-called traditional order rather than in the supposedly modernizing/westernizing context of the Tanzimat. In fact, in light of this evidence, any clear-cut distinction between two supposedly separated periods seems rather questionable.

While the early regulations did reflect a growing dependence on clocks, they were often somewhat vague concerning actual working hours. The 1786 decree quoted above instructed all officials to remain at work until ten, but other than demanding that they report to their offices “early” (*erkençe*), no specific hour was given for the beginning of the workday. Later decrees did give a starting hour but these were not given in very exact terms. A decree dating from 1815, for example, instructed all officials to be in their offices “at two—two and a half, at the latest” (*saat ikide nihayet saat iki buçukta*).<sup>20</sup> The early decrees were similarly vague concerning the measures to be taken against those who abused working hours. For example, the 1786 decree stipulated that if the handling of affairs was delayed without a valid reason, the responsible officials were to be disciplined (*te’dib*). It is clear from the text, however, that no severe punishments were intended. Rather, the attention of the responsible officials was to be “kindly” drawn to the matter (*hoşça ilka ile*).<sup>21</sup> Later decrees often warned more clearly that those who abuse office hours would be punished, rather than scolded. However, none of these memos specified the nature of these punishments.<sup>22</sup> Since a penal code for the bureaucracy was issued only in 1838, and considering the fact that the higher-ranking officials tended to arrive late to

work just like their subordinates, it seems highly improbable that any sanctions were actually applied. The fact that no improvement was felt in the following decades further supports this assumption.<sup>23</sup>

### *Long Day at the Office? Time-Framing Work*

Dozens of decrees issued throughout the nineteenth century to sanction working hours in the bureaus of the central administration allow us to draw a few conclusions regarding the working routines envisioned by the leaders of the system and the extent to which they were implemented.<sup>24</sup> Throughout most of the nineteenth century, the length of the workday in the bureaus was defined in terms of a starting hour and an ending hour (rather than in terms of a total number of hours), and these definitions were amended as the length of the day changed throughout the year.<sup>25</sup> If we group together, in keeping with this practice, all decrees issued between March to September, it appears that the length of the workday varied between five and half and nine hours, the mean being seven hours. During winter, total working time ranged between five and seven hours, the mean being six hours. The workday always ended between one to two hours before sunset, probably in order to allow the clerks to return to their homes before nightfall. It is thus clear that behind the new practice of defining working time in terms of clock hours lay the very old distinction between day and night, which was central to early modern Ottoman temporal culture.<sup>26</sup> Working arrangements remained in agreement with these old patterns into the second half of the nineteenth century.

The hours mentioned in the decrees referred to the *alaturka* time in Istanbul, which was apparently set by the *muvakkit* of the Yeni Cami mosque in Eminönü.<sup>27</sup> The authoritative status of this *muvakkithane* was firmly established by the end of the nineteenth century, but it is not at all clear when it acquired this status.<sup>28</sup> The *muvakkithane* at the Yeni Cami mosque was constructed in 1813 by Sultan Mahmud II, who seems to have been particularly interested in time and time organization. This is evident not only from the proliferation of time-related decrees issued during his long reign, but also in the construction of *muvakkithanes* and, later on, clock towers. Other than the *muvakkithane* at the Yeni Cami, Mahmud endowed at least three other similar buildings, and another three *muvakkithanes* were built in Istanbul alone by members of the ruling elite. During the same period, at least five clock towers were built across the empire.<sup>29</sup> It is thus not unreasonable to surmise that it was during Mahmud's reign that the Yeni Cami *muvakkithane* became the "official clock" of the central administration, according to which all officials were supposed to set their watches.

In the second half of the 1830s, the Ottoman central administration under-

went a series of changes, the most significant of which was the foundation of ministries, modeled along European lines. Another significant innovation was the drafting of special penal codes for state officials. The pace of change was further accelerated after the Gülhane reform edict was published in 1839. With a new reform-oriented elite now leading the state mechanism from the Porte, Ottoman administration entered a new phase of regulation and rationalization.<sup>30</sup> Regardless of all these changes, decrees concerning office hours continued to appear regularly with only slight variations, suggesting that the patterns of time organization, and the problems that accompanied them, remained pretty much the same.

Some changes were nevertheless apparent. There were several attempts to regulate the weekly work schedule by defining an official rest day. However, it seems that many officials took more than one day off and the efforts to limit days off did not yield the expected result.<sup>31</sup> Nil Birol has argued that efforts were also made to ensure the timely arrival of officials using a host of new methods. For example, the government acted to secure regular transportation for its officials and tried to influence their traveling preferences by manipulating their travel allowances.<sup>32</sup> Another marked innovation was a conscious effort to enforce stricter discipline. Ali Akıldız lists a number of measures, all of which were intended to do away with the abuse of office hours through monitoring procedures. Among these measures was the recording in a special log of all late-comers, along with the reason for their tardiness and a decision with regard to whether or not this reason was lawful.<sup>33</sup>

This demand for a lawful reason was to echo in countless memos and decrees issued in the following years. The rarely changed formula used in these documents strictly prohibited delays and absences as long as there was no “lawful hindrance and a valid excuse” (*bir gûne men-i şer’i ve özr-i hakikî olmadıkça*).<sup>34</sup> A measure introduced in 1845 stipulated that on the basis of the records mentioned above, money would be deducted from salaries of officials who failed to arrive to their workplaces for several days without obtaining permission from their superiors and without a “lawful excuse.” This money was to be redistributed among the hard-working officials as a reward for their efforts. Chronic absentees were to be fired.<sup>35</sup> It is worth noting that at this point, the threat of pay deduction was aimed not at officials who reported late in their offices, but rather at ones who did not report at all. Indeed, when compared with absenteeism, late arrivals must have seemed of lesser importance and did not entail such severe sanctions.

The new measures reveal the basic logic of the emerging time regime. Prior to the regulation effort, it was a rather porous and elastic “temporal frontier,”

in which what was considered “on time” and “acceptably late” was not clearly distinguished.<sup>36</sup> Now clearly delineated time borders were drawn, and anyone crossing these borders would immediately be regarded a trespasser and punished accordingly. The familiarity of the old office, in which the supervisor “kindly” draws the attention of the clerk to his tardiness, was to give way to a much less personal system in which little was left to be resolved through direct social interaction. As the grey territories were narrowed down by regulations, wandering about the frontier was supposedly harder.

Similar attention was paid to the internal organization of the workday. As already noted, even when Ottoman bureaucrats were finally in their offices, they were often busy with a host of activities that had little to do with official paperwork. It was common, for example, to write petitions for some extra income, to drink coffee, smoke, and converse, or to wander outside the office.<sup>37</sup> Official business and social interaction were hardly distinguishable. One of the goals of midcentury time regulation was to assign clearly designated spaces and times for leisure during the workday. In keeping with this logic, a recess was set and then merged into the noon prayer break. These regulations joined earlier decrees which limited drinking tea and smoking to specific areas in the bureaus, designated as break rooms.<sup>38</sup>

The new regulations represented a desire to push the rationalization of time organization one step farther. If in the early stages of the process, attempts were made to distinguish working hours from other parts of the day by creating a clearly defined time frame, these new measures were meant to draw new boundaries between work and non-work within the workday itself. To use Timothy Mitchell’s terms, life in the offices was to be broken into its components, each of which was then allocated its time and space “container.”<sup>39</sup> Eating was to be separated from working by allowing it to occur only within the time container designated for it, that is, break time. It was permitted only in its assigned space containers, namely the dining hall or the break rooms. Allocating specific spaces for clearly defined activities was by then a rather old trend in the central administration. The policy of spatial differentiation within the Porte, which started to gain momentum in the late eighteenth century, was indicative of the functional differentiation that the system had witnessed.<sup>40</sup> Coupled with the new practices of temporal differentiation, this method of “dividing and containing” promised better control of the officials, and thus higher levels of regularity and efficiency.<sup>41</sup>

The trend toward a more meticulous time construct intensified in the following years. New regulations issued in the early 1870s placed certain bureaucratic procedures within clear time frames, with clearly defined sanctions against time

discipline offenders.<sup>42</sup> The increasing awareness of the importance of time organization evident in these regulations was further promoted by the increasing use of the telegraph in the everyday work of the administration.<sup>43</sup> The telegraph was first introduced into Ottoman domains during the Crimean War (1853–1856). The technology was quickly integrated into the daily working of the growing bureaucracy and enabled Istanbul to maintain an unprecedented level of surveillance over its servants, scattered as they were throughout the vast empire. By providing instant communication between center and provinces, the telegraph promoted the centralization of the bureaucracy. Directions from Istanbul were dispatched with great speed, and reports (*journals*) from the periphery were sent to the center with just the same ease. The telegraph added a new dimension of immediacy to the working of the government and brought about higher awareness of efficiency and speed.

The introduction of the telegraph injected a sense of urgency not only into diplomatic correspondence, as Roderic Davison has noted, but also to the everyday working of the bureaucracy.<sup>44</sup> Going through contemporary official correspondence, one can easily notice the stepped-up pace with which state affairs were being carried out. In many cases, telegrams received from the farthest provinces of the empire were answered within a few days. It is most probably the immediacy introduced by the telegraph that accounts for the fact that starting in the early 1860s, officials were made to remain at the office even after the sanctioned hours. According to the new procedure, supervisors were to take turns and await the departure of the ministers in order to “immediately” (*derhal*) attend to any urgent affair that may arise.<sup>45</sup> The general picture that arises is therefore one of growing efficiency under an increasingly strict regime of time discipline. Yet it appears that the time frames defined were usually meant and understood to have wide margins, which served to undermine their efficiency as an ordering device.

#### *“At Around Eight O’Clock”*

In notices issued by the administration well into the Tanzimat years, and even in some official orders, hours were often designated loosely. For example, decrees issued in order to define working hours early in the century ordered the clerks to report in their bureaus at such approximations as 2:30–3:00 or 3:30–4:00 (*alaturka*).<sup>46</sup> To take another example, the official Ottoman gazette, the *Takvim-i Vekayi*, informed its readers in 1851 that under a decree issued by the sultan, one of the ferries of the Imperial Shipyards (*Tersane-i Amire*) would be assigned to carry regular transportation along the Bosphorus. The ferry, it was said, would depart from the Golden Horn “at approximately eleven o’clock, just

before nightfall” (*akşam üzeri saat on bir sularında*).<sup>47</sup> A similar phrase was used in a note sent to some of the cabinet members in late July 1857 informing them that a certain meeting was to take place on Friday, “around eight o’clock (*saat sekiz raderinde*).”<sup>48</sup> How are we to understand these rather flexible designations of clock hours?

It has been suggested that prior to the spread of modern clock time and schedules, punctuality and belatedness could not be clearly determined. It was only the standard set by clock and schedule that could define a delay as a delay. This approach draws on Timothy Mitchell’s claim that against the standard of new colonial abstractions of time and space, Egyptian realities emerged as “disorderly.”<sup>49</sup> Yet the notion of disorder, of things being out of place or out of time, was clearly not a colonial innovation. In the context of early modern Ottoman temporal culture, disorder would be measured against the “world order.” Being on time would mean being calibrated with heavenly rhythms of this order as mediated through the time-keeping mechanisms discussed in chapter 1. Being late would mean to be out of sync with these rhythms.

Indeed, the very notion of punctuality was not a nineteenth-century invention. As noted in the previous chapter, the calculation of prayer and fast times was the most important task of the *muvaḳḳit*, and lateness could be measured against these times.<sup>50</sup> Mechanical clocks too were set according to the exact time of sunset, as determined by such calculations. The punctuality of a clock, in turn, would be assessed not by its ability to keep steady movement for the longest possible duration, but rather by the extent to which it was tuned to the sun.<sup>51</sup> In short, while the mechanical clock was certainly a simpler arbiter of punctuality and lateness, it did not create these notions.

However, the spread of mechanical clocks allowed for individual timekeeping, which by necessity created multiplicity. While all these clocks remained subjected to the standard of real solar time as determined by *muvaḳḳits*, in actuality, the need to set all clocks and watches on a daily basis necessarily created inconsistencies. It is not hard to imagine how gaps between different timepieces opened up quickly if for any reason they were not set on time for a few days.<sup>52</sup> The consequence was that, as one observer noted, “nobody is ever sure of the time.”<sup>53</sup> Whereas prayer and fast times were sanctified and their margins were kept narrow by religious dictums, designated times in other fields of social life were usually meant and understood with much wider margins. This was true whether the designated time referred to the prayer cycle (“the council will convene following the noon prayer”), or to clock hours (“the council will convene at approximately eight o’clock”). In short, framing office work in terms of clock hours did not necessarily ensure higher levels of time discipline and punctuality.

This is even more true since sanctioned hours were not merely liberally interpreted. Often they were simply ignored.

### *Evading Time Discipline*

Many decrees dating from the middle decades of the century and later specifically referred to the low level of compliance to working hours and warned against further violations.<sup>54</sup> From the functionaries' point of view, the time discipline measures must have seemed like a violation of their unwritten working conditions. Unable to oppose the orders directly, they simply evaded compliance by providing explanations of various kinds, just as the new regulations demanded.

Writing in the late nineteenth century, Gaston des Godins de Souhesmes noted cynically that once Ottoman officials take their positions, they

begin arriving at their offices as and when it suits them. The bosses do not dare reprimand them since they act in exactly the same way. However, some of them do intervene if the breach is too flagrant. The offender would thus be setting Péra or Galata time against Stamboul time [that is, *alaturka* time]. He would protest that the Yéni-Djami clock which marks the official time was not working, or that he did not pass in front of that mosque, or that he had to wait a long time for a free place on the tram, or that his watch was wrong or use some other excuse pulled from the same hat. From time to time, the grand vizier would demand more precision; but it is a waste of his time. The clocks continue to run slow for those arriving at the office and run fast for those leaving.<sup>55</sup>

It is clear that Des Souhesmes refers to the repertoire of excuses made by Ottoman officials in order to ridicule the Ottoman system. The absurd picture he draws may thus be exaggerated. Yet further evidence supports this picture of chronic tardiness. The protocols of the first Ottoman Parliament, convened in late 1877, reveals the irregular nature of the deliberations. In one of the discussions, it was proposed that the assembly would convene around noon the following day. An unknown deputy, who was angered by the late convening hour, responded by saying: "We used to complain about the officials; we used to say that they don't do their jobs; now, if we start so late we would be doing the same."<sup>56</sup>

The diary of Said Bey, a mid-ranking official in the central administration around the turn of the twentieth century, corroborates this picture of short and irregular working hours that were dedicated to socializing at least as much as they were devoted to paper work.<sup>57</sup> This clearly does not mean that there were

no fully committed Ottoman officials.<sup>58</sup> Rather, the overall picture was one of low levels of time discipline and blurred boundaries between work and leisure.<sup>59</sup>

Above I noted that designated hours were usually liberally interpreted, not least because it was difficult to keep clocks in agreement. Yet even considering that a certain degree of unpunctuality was agreed upon, the Parliament minutes quoted above and the dozens of decrees cited throughout this chapter show that officials were still expected to observe their sanctioned hours, and their failure to do so evidently frustrated those expectations. How can this chronic tardiness be explained?

Findley has already pointed out that the low levels of discipline within the administration may be at least partly explained by the poor and irregular compensation and the unequal enforcement of punitive measures which was customary in the Ottoman state apparatus throughout the nineteenth century.<sup>60</sup> I would like to add to this explanation by arguing that the low levels of time discipline in the Ottoman administration should be interpreted within the context of the patrimonial tradition. This tradition persisted under the newly created layer of legal-rational temporal arrangements and constantly undermined them.

Sadık Rifat Paşa, the former mentor and ally of early Tanzimat leader, Reşid Paşa, wrote in the late 1830s that due to the insecurity of their tenure, officials try to deceive the state in order to pursue their personal benefit, thereby crippling the administration of the country. The solution to this problem, according to Rifat Paşa, was the subjugation of executives at all levels to laws, rules, and regulations that would “determine the limits of the permissible in a way that would preclude the exercise of personal whims.”<sup>61</sup> The leaders of the Tanzimat indeed pushed for regulation, but at the same time continued to promote their interests within the system, relying on their households.<sup>62</sup> Admission into the system and promotion within it remained dependent on personal and familial affiliations. The protection of high officials was enough to shield lower-ranking clerks from sanctions, no matter what the regulations stipulated.

If the stick of sanctions was almost useless, what about carrots? Drawing on the insights of Mike Savage, On Barak has noted that one of the most effective ways of increasing efficiency and productivity is by offering employees the prospect of a “career,” that is, a merit-based, predictable course of promotion in the workplace. The incentives of promotion replace external disciplinary measures such as fines with self-discipline that is ultimately more cost-effective.<sup>63</sup> However, many Ottoman officials felt that their way up the hierarchy was barred regardless of their performance. Their high hopes of meritocratic promotion, fueled by the trend toward rational regulation, were frustrated by the reality of nepotism, favoritism, and household-based loyalties and animosities.<sup>64</sup> Under

such conditions, commitment to one's job and self-subjugation to time discipline could hardly be expected. Carrying a rather small stick, and having little in the way of carrots, the top bureaucrats stopped short of remolding the way their subordinates related to office hours.

To sum up, the second third of the nineteenth century did not witness a break from earlier practices. Rather, slow and relatively minor changes were introduced into the existing system, the accumulative result of which was a gradual expansion of time regulation. However, a significant breach remained between directives and their implementation, regulations and practice. Throughout the period under discussion, time discipline was not strictly enforced, never mind internalized, and working hours were still largely dedicated to a combination of official business and leisure activities. These realities were the result of the unique combination of legal-rational measures and longtime patrimonial tradition, a combination that persisted into the Hamidian era.

### *The Hamidian Time; or, Indefinite Waits, Still*

As the power of Sultan Abdülhamid II became more established in the early 1880s, the center of political and administrative gravity shifted from the Porte to Yıldız Palace. It was here that all directions were issued, and it was here that all reports were addressed; it was in Yıldız that all telegraph lines ended, and it was here that all high officials had to report. This was, quite literally, the center of the highly centralized Hamidian order. This new power structure was reflected not only geographically, but in the temporal patterns of the higher echelons of the state mechanism as well. Osman Nuri's detailed description of daily life in the palace clearly demonstrates to what extent the sultan's daily schedule dictated the working rhythms in Yıldız. Abdülhamid's tendency to start his working day late, for example, and to extend it long into the night, determined the working hours of the entire palace mechanism.<sup>65</sup>

As power came to reside behind the walls of Yıldız, it was before the gates of the compound and in the anteroom of the palace secretariat (*mabeyn-i hümayun*) that high officials and foreign visitors had to do their waiting. Anyone visiting the palace would have to wait at the gate for permission, and once permission was granted, his entrance and departure hours were registered in a log, which was submitted every night to the inspection of the sultan.<sup>66</sup> Rational procedures of time organization thus became yet another measure in the intricate security system surrounding the sultan. Both the procedure and the rationality it conveyed would have been unthinkable before the reforms in time organization.

However, these practices did not mean that patrimonialism gave way to im-

personal rationality. On the contrary, as Findley has pointed out, the Hamidian regime employed legal-rational methods in order to sustain a system which was to a large extent patrimonial in nature.<sup>67</sup> It was now the word of the sultan—the master of the household—on whom everybody had to wait, not only metaphorically but quite literally too. Packed in the palace secretariat, in which there were never enough chairs, visitors to Yıldız were kept waiting for hours.<sup>68</sup> İzzet Paşa, the powerful second secretary in the secretariat, would often dismiss visitors with a mere nod of the head, signaling that there was no point in waiting any longer.<sup>69</sup> The utter arbitrariness with which people’s time was consumed, often for nothing, served to demonstrate their position vis-à-vis the sultan. Ottoman and foreigners alike were reminded of their total helplessness in the face of sultanic omnipotence.

Far from being an agenda or a schedule in the modern sense, the Yıldız log was one more measure of control in the hand of the master. Just as he was not subject to the regulations he imposed on his officials, he did not answer to the clock which he increasingly forced upon them. The same patterns repeated themselves down the hierarchy. For high state officials, the clock was another tool to extract higher levels of bureaucratic productivity from their subordinates. They did not think, however, that the same standards applied to them, or to their protégés.

Other sources support the argument that the violation of working-hours regulations were closely related to the patrimonial tradition. Under the title *The Duties of Governmental Officials*, a late nineteenth-century textbook on morals (*ahlak*) used in Ottoman schools explained that one of the praiseworthy qualities of an official is to always be at work on time. The text addressed the students as future officials and stressed that “when we are absent from work, the matters we were supposed to handle remain unattended and state business is impeded and delayed.”<sup>70</sup> It is our responsibility, the text went on, not to permit such faults, and this responsibility cannot be thrown at others. If a clerk does not report on time because he is angry with his supervisor (*mümeyyiz*), it is the clerk who is responsible. Since he is not the personal servant (*hizmetçi*) of the supervisor but rather the servitor (*hadim*) of the state, it is the state that is hurt by his slackness.<sup>71</sup>

The text implies that the violation of prescribed office hours may have been conceived, at least by some, as an act against one’s superior. Apparently thinking that office work was the responsibility of the supervisor, the imaginary tardy clerk saw the impeding of work as harming the interests of his superior. Arriving late was thus his weapon against the boss, a kind of a personal strike. Despite decades of attempts to impose impersonal, unanimous standards, it was still the

rather flexible, negotiable temporal conventions that served as currency in most social interaction even within the state apparatus. That is why the author found it worthy of reminder that all officials serve the state, or in other words, that it was the time of the state that was being wasted.

The connections between patronage and the low levels of time discipline in the Hamidian bureaucracy were clearly reflected in a highly critical article written by Ismail Subhi in the *Yevmi Servet-i Fünun* shortly after the 1908 revolution. The article was quite clearly written to ridicule yet another aspect of the period of “despotism” (*istibdad*), as the Hamidian period was now referred to, and should be read cautiously. Yet the phenomena it described are corroborated by the other evidence cited above, and its bitterness demonstrates the antagonism these phenomena must have caused among the public. The article describes an imaginary, supposedly typical young boy who is admitted into a good bureau without ever completing his education. Very quickly he learns that there is no real need to work, but he does find time to cultivate his connections with high officials. Subhi argues that such clerks are found not only in the Porte, but in the municipality, the police, and a host of other departments:

I don't know what high schools they were expelled from, but by fawning and flattering, their parents managed to secure them an office post. From morning till noon they languor in boorish prattle at the neighborhood cafe, and until nine or ten o'clock [*alaturka*] they doodle at the office; after that, they set about carousing in debauched revelry at *meyhane* and houses of ill repute.”<sup>72</sup>

In short, from the highest echelons of the system down to the clerks, patrimonial authority and related modes of patronage crippled the legal-rational logic of regulations and office hours alike, and sapped the declared goal of creating a more efficient bureaucracy. When the Hamidian system was finally overthrown following the 1908 Young Turk Revolution, these practices became once again the object of intense regulation, which was no longer limited to the central administration. It is to these attempts to centralize provincial time organization that we now turn.

### *Standardizing Time Organization Throughout the Empire*

The Second Constitutional Era (*İkinci Meşrutiyet Dönemi*, 1908–1918) represented a new phase in the process of rationalization and centralization, one that was also clearly manifested in the organization of time.<sup>73</sup> The revolution catapulted a group of relatively young officers and to a lesser extent bureaucrats to the highest positions of the Ottoman state. These young men, who grew

up on timetables in modern military and civilian schools, were taught to admire such values as order and efficiency. Once in power, this new elite placed strong emphasis on efficiency, regularity, and punctuality in practically all branches of the government including, naturally, the bureaucracy. But centralizing time organization proved to be a difficult task.

In late August 1909, following a cabinet decision, the Ministry of the Interior (*Dahiliye Nezareti*) issued a decree ordering provincial governors to apply Istanbul working hours in all bureaus in their respective provinces.<sup>74</sup> It was explained that in order to secure the interests of the state, the safety of the nation, and the smooth running of affairs, officials had to “work according to a set program” (*müretteb bir programa tevfikân, devam ve ikdam etmeleri*). Thus from that point on, officials in the provinces were expected, “like the ones in the central departments,” to work from two until four thirty, to take a break of one and a half hours, and then to work from six until ten thirty (*alaturka*). Those who would not abide by the regulations, it was said, would suffer salary deductions.<sup>75</sup>

In a sense, this was merely another phase in the general trend towards standardization of working hours evident at least since the late eighteenth century. Yet the Dahiliye was not content with simply fixing the workday length and leaving the opening and closing hours of the bureaus to be decided locally. Working hours from now on were to be dictated by the center, and a clear threat of penalty was added for those who would violate the dictate. Istanbul was no doubt trying to tighten its grip on the provinces.

Judging by the barrage of replies received from the provinces, the new regulations were not readily implemented. It seems that governors were reluctant to give up local arrangements and to conform to the new standard set by the center, possibly since the new standard represented an increase in working hours.<sup>76</sup> The governor (*vali*) of Tripoli, in today’s Libya, sent a memo to the ministry requesting that he be allowed to maintain previous working arrangements. He attached an internal printed document of the province, which included a table specifying the customary working hour for every season.<sup>77</sup> Following the introduction of yet another arrangement of working hours shortly thereafter, the governor of Basra wrote that the new regulations could not be implemented during the summer in the province of Basra, known for its difficult weather conditions.<sup>78</sup> The governor was quick to add, however, that the overall length of the workday would be kept. A very similar response was received from Medina, in today’s Saudi Arabia.<sup>79</sup> The governor of San’a, in Yemen, was similarly uncomfortable with the new regulations. Here, he wrote to the ministry, day and night were of equal length, and so there was no need to change the working hours ac-

ording to the season. The governor therefore asked, like his colleagues, for a permission to maintain previous arrangements.<sup>80</sup>

The frequent reference made by governors to local traditions, customs, or circumstances was not incidental. The need to balance between local and central authorities by decentralizing some aspects of provincial government was a matter of an ongoing discussion in bureaucratic circles during the post-Hamidian era.<sup>81</sup> Probably echoing these discussions, the governor of Diyarbakır in southern Anatolia also questioned the new regulations on the ground of unique local conditions. In a memo he sent to the Dahiliye, the governor wrote that office hours in his province corresponded to the ones specified in the new regulations with one exception: the noon break in Diyarbakır was two hours rather than one, as the ministry had demanded. Because there were no restaurants in the vicinity of the government bureaus, explained the governor, officials were forced to go home to eat. A one-hour break was thus not long enough, and the governor requested permission to prolong it to two hours. He suggested that the officials would finish their workday one hour later, thus keeping its sanctioned length.<sup>82</sup>

It seems that what had been seen earlier as natural diversity of working hours between localities was understood by the new regime as breaching the integrity and uniformity of a system that need be more tightly controlled. In the name of order, such discord between center and periphery had to be rectified by imposing the uniform standards of the center upon the provinces. However, the standardization attempt was clearly resisted and even aroused resentment in the provinces.<sup>83</sup> Thus, in spite of the original pretension, and possibly reflecting the above-mentioned ideas of decentralization, the Dahiliye eventually acknowledged the need to consider local conditions and traditions. In most cases, governors were allowed to keep previous arrangements as long as the total length of the workday was in line with the standard set by the center.<sup>84</sup>

To a certain extent, this correspondence demonstrates yet another phase in the centuries-old tension between the opposing trends of centralization and decentralization. Less than a century earlier, governors in many provinces were much more autonomous, owing to their distance from Istanbul and to the support of powerful local households. I have already noted in the previous chapter that within these households, high-ranking officials enjoyed nearly total control of their subordinates. By the early twentieth century, however, this type of unregulated patrimonial relationship was no longer common. Throughout the nineteenth century, household administration slowly gave way to practices of modern bureaucracy, and working hours were more clearly defined in an

attempt to create a clear-cut line between work and leisure, between private and public. The new type of clerk was to be subordinate to his superior during work hours only. Furthermore, the nature of the relationship between the provincial governors and the center was also fundamentally different. Although twentieth-century governors were just as remote from Istanbul in purely geographic terms, this distance was now bridged by new lines of communication and transportation which brought the eye and word of Istanbul to an alarming proximity. Gone was the autonomy of the past.

The governors themselves were of a different breed. At least in the Anatolian and Arab provinces discussed above, the localized administrators of the late eighteenth century were gradually replaced by trained bureaucrats who served as the direct representatives of the center's will in the provinces. These provincial governors were "men of the system" in the full sense of the term, subjected to the constant surveillance and evaluation of their superiors in the center.<sup>85</sup> Now, even changing lunchtime required permission from Istanbul.

Standardization of working hours was met with additional problems. Shortly after the Dahiliye ordered all provinces to adopt the working hours of the center, several governors wrote in response that the officials of the Ministry of Justice (*Adliye*) were not subjected to the new arrangement and worked shorter hours. They requested that the ministry be notified about the need to instruct its officials to abide by the same working hours as all other officials.<sup>86</sup> The governor of Edirne in eastern Thrace, for example, wrote to the ministry that the shorter working hours of the Adliye officials caused much resentment among the rest of the officials, since they were incompatible with the principle of equality.<sup>87</sup> Like his colleagues, he too asked that the same standard be imposed on the employees of the Ministry of Justice.

The Ministry of the Interior took up the matter immediately after receiving the first responses from the provinces and promptly issued a memo to the Ministry of Justice stressing that the prescribed working hours were binding on all officials in the provinces, without exception. The Ministry of Justice was to notify its men about this new policy.<sup>88</sup> However, the matter was not settled, and owing to additional complaints from the provinces,<sup>89</sup> it was finally brought to the cabinet. A memo issued by the grand vizier following the deliberations stated that in order to organize the conduct of state affairs, it was necessary that working hours in all departments be standardized. This would make things easier for those in need of service, he added.<sup>90</sup>

The correspondence concerning the Adliye working hours, then, reveals another inconsistency that called for the attention of the bureaucrats. This was not

just another case of disagreement between center and provinces, but rather a case of incoherence between two organs of the state. With the notion of equality before the law becoming more prevalent, clock hours, like regulations, had to be applied unanimously.

### *Out of Sync: Time Inside and Outside the Bureaus*

In late October 1909, the Dahiliye once again redefined working hours in the provinces, following the implementation of a similar arrangement in the center.<sup>91</sup> As in the regulations issued in August, work time was defined not in *alaturka* hours as before, but rather in terms of hours before and after noon-time. According to the new measure, officials were to arrive at their offices three hours before noon and work until noontime. They were then to take a one hour break, and then resume work and carry it out for another three and a half hours.<sup>92</sup> This method of defining working hours was still connected to real solar time, but rather than taking sunset as baseline, it took noontime to be the main reference point. This was one step closer to the European hour system, in which midday and, later, midnight were the reference points.

At the exact same time the new regulation was being formulated, the Foreign Ministry asked its representatives in Berlin, London, Paris, and Vienna to send reports concerning the working-hours arrangements in the bureaucratic systems of the countries in which they were stationed. Their replies arrived on October 23, one day before the new regulations were issued.<sup>93</sup> It is unlikely that the new regulations issued by the Dahiliye were in any way connected to these reports, and it remains unclear why the ministry introduced the new arrangement both at the center and in the provinces. In any case, the fact that both ministries were concerned about working-hours arrangements at the same time clearly testifies to the growing discomfort with the old practices of time organization. The new arrangements probably reflected ideas prevailing in Young Turk circles about the need to adopt mean time. However, the new arrangement also caused problems, producing yet another flurry of negative responses from the provinces.

A memo written by the governor of Edirne clearly indicated that the change was introduced to meet the needs of the central administration and was not appropriate for the provinces. For example, the governor noted that in the midst of winter, the newly enforced working hours left almost no daylight time before or after office hours. His officials, therefore, found it difficult to get their groceries from the market.<sup>94</sup> Market opening hours, it is worth noting, depended on daylight hours as they always had, and daylight continued to ebb and flow

with the seasons. Office hours were no longer in line with the conventions of the old temporal culture in which sunset and sunrise were more significant than high noon for the regulation of social life.

The incompatibility of bureaucratic working hours with other sectors of society had other dimensions. According to the governor, the Constitution required the reliability and speed of administrative work to be manifested in the provinces too. If a villager needed to come to the center of the district from his village, the governor continued, this might take him four or five hours. If he happens to arrive at the time of noon break, he would have to wait for the officials to get back to work. Thus, he would most probably not be able to complete his business and return to his village before nightfall. He would therefore be forced to pass the night in some place in the district's center, which would cause him further expenditure and loss.

This explanation is strikingly similar to the reasoning of the late eighteenth-century decree quoted at the beginning of this chapter. Rather than "people with business" coming from the provinces to the Porte, we have villagers coming to the provincial capital. The most significant difference is that the governor appears to be sensitive to every hour lost by his villagers, never mind days. His wording expresses awareness of his role as a civil servant, serving the general population rather than the sultan. He understood that the time of his villagers too was, quite literally, worth money. This new awareness added another dimension to bureaucratic time organization, one which was not as pronounced in earlier generations. As the Ottoman administration was gradually acquiring the features of a modern civil service, office hours had to agree not only with the whims of the center but with the needs of the public too.

The Edirne officials shopping for groceries, the Diarbakır administrators eating at home, and the Thracian villagers going in and out of the provincial governmental offices, all physically crossed the conceptual boundary between state and society. However, the discrepancies between the temporal orders in and outside the bureaus rendered the boundary tangible. As one entered the realm of the state, he was entering a distinctive time order. But despite the obvious differences, the temporal order in Ottoman bureaus was still bound to the temporal patterns of the rest of society. Still closely related to natural rhythms and embedded in religious practice and patrimonial power relations, these patterns had their coherence and inner logic, even if this logic was very different from Weberian rationalism.

This may further explain the endurance of some of the inherited temporal practices, and of the Ottoman hour system with which they were so intimately involved. Unlike the army, which was generally secluded in its bases (at least

until 1908), Ottoman administrators were in continuous and intensive interaction with the public.<sup>95</sup> If the new elite of Ottoman officers came to define itself vis-à-vis civilian society, which did not adhere to their distinctive temporal order, the civil servants of the early twentieth century were part and parcel of this society. Therefore, the temporal order applied in the bureaus could not be completely dissociated from the practices that organized time outside the offices. Even if the Ottoman administration was attaining some of the characteristics of that abstract Weberian “governmental machine,” this machine was made of people who, at the end of the day, had to make it to the market just before it was closed.

### *New Measures, a New Discourse*

The correspondence concerning the implementation of standard office hours in the provinces further shows that by that time, a relatively elaborate system of surveillance was devised to enforce time discipline within the bureaucracy. Memos sent from the provinces reveal that officials had to sign in upon arrival and a record of their working hours was being regularly kept.<sup>96</sup> It seems that printed forms were issued for reporting working hours, suggesting that surveillance was by now fully systematized.<sup>97</sup> Officials were now ordered to receive permission from their superiors in advance for any justified absence, and to provide proof for their claims.<sup>98</sup> The use of standardized forms was in itself indicative of the new impersonal and rational nature of time organization. As James Beniger notes, filling out ready-made forms, rather than composing nuanced descriptions, limits the flow of unnecessary information and facilitates a more efficient processing of essential data.<sup>99</sup> Furthermore, strict surveillance was meant to prevent violations of working hours, and indeed, much more attention than ever before was directed at deterring abuses by clear definitions of fines and other penalties.<sup>100</sup> Arriving late or leaving early now had a clear price tag.

This does not mean that the violation of office hours ended.<sup>101</sup> Ottoman bureaucrats continued to defy regulations, and memos concerning the issue continued to circulate well into the second decade of the new century. Yet, although abuse of office hours remained a problem of Ottoman administration down to the very end of the empire, the Young Turk regime did effect a change, not only by taking concrete measures of the sort discussed above, but also by promoting a new discourse about time thrift and bureaucratic efficiency. The journal *Mülkiye*, published beginning in February 1909 by the alumni society of the School of Civil Service (*Mektep-i Mülkiye*), provides us with some insights into this discourse.<sup>102</sup>

The efficiency of the Ottoman administration, or rather its inefficiency, was clearly one of the issues that occupied the minds of the contributors to *Mülkiye*. Time-disciplined from a young age and raised on the “value of time,” these young bureaucrats were displeased with the conditions they found in the bureaus. Writers generally tended to attribute the defects of the administration to the Hamidian regime, and saw its removal as an opportunity for comprehensive change.<sup>103</sup> Some writers offered practical measures in order to increase the efficiency of administrative work. Badi‘ Nuri, for example, pointed out that one of the worst legacies of the Hamidian period was paperwork. The enormous number of documents that were generated in the various bureaus rendered even the simplest administrative task extremely cumbersome. Nuri thus offered new procedures that would help eliminate unnecessary correspondence between different governmental organs, and especially between the provinces and the central administration. In this way, argued Nuri, officials would be able to devote all their time to the much needed reforms, rather than waste it on excessive paperwork.<sup>104</sup> Similarly concerned with efficiency and temporal regularity, another contributor to *Mülkiye* suggested that the Gregorian calendar and the mean-time hour system be implemented instead of the indigenous calendars and hour system.<sup>105</sup>

*Mülkiye* makes explicit the rationale that guided many of the reform measures taken after the 1908 revolution. It reminds us that the changes in bureaucratic time organization did not happen in a void. The bureaucrats were exposed to and took an active part in a wider discourse that tied time thrift, punctuality, and regularity to notions of progress and modernity. As shown in chapter 6, some of the early contributors to this discourse were veterans of the bureaus. Thus, the bureaucracy was at the same time one of the sources of this reformist discourse and one of its objects.

In the previous chapter, I showed that Ottoman temporal culture in the eighteenth century maintained close correlation with natural cycles that were perceived as part of a divine scheme. This correlation with heavenly rhythms served to legitimize the sociopolitical order. Within the temporal culture, mechanical clocks were subjected to natural cycles, or more accurately, to political and religious authorities that mediated and allowed for the exact reckoning of these cycles. The early reforms in time organization were grounded in this world and were meant to serve it. The reforms were borne out of the need to regulate administrative work in order to cope with the growing demands of an expanding state apparatus. The leaders of the system clearly understood that devising more elaborate mechanisms to control scribes by harnessing their work to clocks was essential for raising productivity and ensuring regularity. They were

not concerned with time as such but rather used it instrumentally to achieve these goals. Their understanding of the nature of time probably differed little from that of their grandparents. For the majority of officials, into the second half of the nineteenth century, time remained inseparable from a divinely created geocentric cosmos, which also determined the fate of humans.<sup>106</sup>

Within this scheme, the leaders of the reforms gradually created a level of “bureaucratic time” that was removed from the prayer cycle and could be more effectively manipulated as a means of bureaucratic control. In the last analysis, however, bureaucratic time remained bound to the sociocultural fabric, significantly affected by natural rhythms, religious practice, and patrimonial power structures. It was only the much more ambitious and authoritarian regime of the Turkish Republic, and the far-reaching social transformation it brought about, which finally managed to break down this nexus and deliver a more decisive blow to the temporal culture that relied on it.

### 3 } MILITARY TIME

In 1806, Sultan Selim III (r. 1789–1807) commissioned a pamphlet to defend his New Order (*Nizam-i Cedid*) regiments in the face of fierce opposition, especially within Janissary circles. The text was composed by Koca Sekbanbaşı, also known as Çelebi Efendi, himself apparently a veteran of the Janissary corps.<sup>1</sup> The author of this fascinating document takes up accusations leveled at the New Order army and refutes them one by one. The pamphlet discusses the reasons for the formation of the new corps and describes at length the efficiency and outstanding order with which soldiers disciplined along European lines perform their maneuvers. This aptitude is contrasted with the confusion, disorder, and utter incompetence of the Janissaries:

Our old forces, when in presence of the enemy, do not remain drawn up in a line, but stand confusedly and promiscuously like a crowd in a place of diversion. Some load their muskets, and fire once, some twice, or oftener, just as they think proper, whilst others being at their wits' end, and not knowing what they are about, turn from side to side like fabulous story-tellers. . . . But the new troops remain drawn up in a line, as if at prayers, the rear ranks being exactly parallel with the front, and consisting of the same number of companies, neither more nor less, so that, when it is necessary, they turn with as much precision as a watch.<sup>2</sup>

Alluding to machines, the author wishes to stress that such human faults as fatigue, inattentiveness, or individual will are not to be found among these disciplined soldiers. The watch, the complex mechanism of which was without parallel at the time, represented not only exactitude but intricate synchronization. Already by the time of Sultan Selim's New Order, then, the clock served as a metaphor for military coordination and organization.

Çelebi Efendi's images of order and power did not persuade the Janissaries, and they finally revolted on 29 May 1807, demanding that the New Order corps be abolished. The sultan capitulated and terminated the first attempt to promote large-scale reforms in the military. It was Selim's successor, Sultan Mahmud II, who finally crushed the Janissary opposition and legally abolished the old corps on 17 June 1826. In its stead, he established a whole new army under

the name *Muallem Asakir-i Mansure-i Muhammediye*, or the Trained Victorious Muslim Troops. The new army was a conscious attempt to adopt modern organizational and tactical models in order to ensure internal security and meet the challenges that European armies posed to the Ottoman state.<sup>3</sup>

The operational and organizational principles of the new army necessitated novel methods of time organization in various fields of military activity. While the early decades were characterized by the grafting of new practices onto existing ones, toward the end of the century older patterns were gradually abandoned, making room for more meticulous, time-tabled temporal constructs. Clock hours gradually replaced prayer times as temporal references, and in the last third of the century, mean time began to be used alongside the indigenous system. The officer elite of the late nineteenth century, which had absorbed these changes during their long years of training, came to identify minute time organization and related ideals of punctuality and efficiency with a more comprehensive vision of progress. Upon their rise to power following the 1908 Young Turk Revolution, they consciously sought to realize their agenda and to convey their notions of time thrift and progress to Ottoman society as a whole.

### *Synchronization*

In order to understand how the fighting methods adopted by Mahmud's new army brought about the use of more intricate methods of time organization, I must first characterize these originally European methods and contextualize their adoption by the Ottomans. The European battlefield had changed dramatically since the heyday of the Janissaries in the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries. The innovation most relevant for the sake of this discussion was synchronized infantry fighting. The use of well-coordinated tactical formations spread throughout Europe during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and was gradually supplemented by the use of portable firearms.<sup>4</sup> In order to overcome the inaccuracy and the slow firing rate of the musket, close-formation tactics were further developed and new drills were devised. These drills were based on the formation of shooting lines, each of which would step forward in turn and shoot simultaneously, thus maintaining a continuous hail of fire. The volley fire technique required disciplined and well-trained soldiers capable of swift and orderly maneuvers, since it depended on the ability of whole tactical units to act in a coordinated manner.<sup>5</sup>

In light of the growing complexity of the battlefield and the high level of coordination within tactical units and between them, the irregular militias of the early modern period were no longer adequate. Large-scale standing armies, the

soldiers of which were regularly drilled, became the new standard. According to some scholars, the innovations in the battlefield and the overall transformation which they entailed tilted the balance of power in favor of the rising European states as early as the seventeenth century.<sup>6</sup>

The effect of these profound technological, tactical, and organizational changes on the Ottomans is still debated, but it is quite clear that by the second half of the eighteenth century, at the latest, they were already lagging behind.<sup>7</sup> It seems that the Ottomans themselves realized that they could not compete with modern efficiency and so, time and again throughout the eighteenth century, they initiated reforms based on European models. Sultan Selim III's New Order was the most ambitious of these early reform projects.<sup>8</sup> Although pathbreaking in several respects, the New Order was after all a short-lived experiment, and despite the hopes of its founders, did not become the nucleus of a modern Ottoman army. According to Virginia Aksan, "the Ottomans started their long march to a disciplined army, from the *Asakir-i Mansure* of 1826."<sup>9</sup> Hence, the formation of Mahmud II's new army becomes the natural starting point for the discussion offered here.

The implementation of modern practices of time organization in the Ottoman army was part of the effort to create a highly disciplined fighting force, capable of orderly warfare. The connection between close-formation tactics and enhanced levels of discipline has long been noted by scholars. Max Weber placed this connection at the center of his discussion of discipline.<sup>10</sup> Michel Foucault analyzed the nature of what he called "disciplines," namely, elaborate techniques of control and surveillance devised to produce "subjected and practiced bodies, 'docile' bodies." One of the most prominent "projects of docility" was that of producing strictly disciplined soldiers. Foucault pointed to a wide range of disciplinary techniques employed by the European armies during the eighteenth century to impose docility on their soldiers. Among these were the enclosure of soldiers in separated barracks, their subjugation to continuous surveillance, the imposition of meticulous daily routines, and rigorous exercise according to prearranged, highly elaborate drills. It was through this constant exercise that the body itself was disciplined and made capable of acting with the utmost efficiency and in synchrony with other bodies.<sup>11</sup>

Foucault's insights were picked up by historians of the Middle East and opened the way for discussion of modern ordering techniques and disciplinary processes in nineteenth-century Egypt.<sup>12</sup> The following pages draw on these earlier accounts, and yet as we proceed, we shall see that the developments in military time organization cannot be explained solely in terms of disciplinary

measures. They must also be discussed in light of the growing complexity of the battlefield and the more elaborate coordination tools it called for. Discussion therefore focuses on several disciplinary and tactical aspects in which time organization was deemed important, such as close-formation maneuvers, daily routines, and the control of large-scale military movements. As the examination of all these aspects shows, the Ottoman army was not simply another arena within which European techniques of time organization were blindly enforced. Modern methods were indeed imported but were fused with local traditions to create a curious mixture.

*“As One Unified Body”*

The establishment of the new army after 1826 proved to be a difficult task. Adapting to the new military methods meant the separation of soldiers from society and their subjection to a rigorous regime of training and strict discipline in the barracks.<sup>13</sup> At first, however, none of this could be accomplished. Existing barracks were ill suited for the growing number of soldiers, and well-trained officers and skilled drillmasters were in short supply. Instruction books in Ottoman Turkish were missing altogether. For various reasons, instruction in these early years was mostly conducted by a collection of mercenaries and soldiers of fortune from all over Europe.<sup>14</sup>

Despite all the difficulties, the Ottoman leadership was determined to acquire modern fighting abilities and to employ new methods of drill in order to achieve that. During the years following the establishment of the regular army, numerous manuals for the instruction of officers in the principles of these methods were made available in Ottoman Turkish. These manuals were aimed at producing military units capable of highly regulated and synchronized fighting. Order was valued above all.

One of these early manuals, probably dating from the late 1820s, entitled *Assorted Information Concerning Military Formations*, emphasized the importance of order right at the beginning. “Soldiers in a company formation, when either standing or walking, shall not confuse its order but [be] as one unified body (*yekpare bir vücut gibi*).” Detailed instructions followed: how to form lines and rows, how to keep the distances in lines and between them. Order was to reach such a level that if one looked at the line from one of its ends, he would only be able to see the first soldier. The same level of order was to be kept when marching and turning, and therefore great attention was paid to the strict regulation of movement.<sup>15</sup> The text, set up as a series of questions and answers, includes a number of questions concerning marching pace:

Question: How many steps per minute should well-trained soldiers take when the order “ordinary march” is sounded? Answer: The soldiers, in order for the company to cover the required distance in ordinary walk, should take twenty-four steps per minute as far as speed goes.<sup>16</sup>

Other paces, such as “journey walk” and “rapid walk,” were also defined in similar terms.<sup>17</sup> Definitions of paces and the prescribed number of steps per minute varied between manuals, but the principle of defining a set number of steps per minute seems to have been the standard technique for regulating marching pace.<sup>18</sup>

Foucault has shown how maneuver drills break down motion into its elements and define for each movement the position of the body, its direction and duration. In this way “time penetrates the body and with it all the meticulous controls of power.”<sup>19</sup> Here we have a similar logic at work: the spectrum between standing and sprinting was broken into well-defined divisions, all framed within time. These definitions could later be used to coordinate the pace between soldiers in formation and better control the pace of the unit as a whole. These attempts to define speed in order to regulate movement and produce swift maneuvers already demonstrated keen awareness of time.

We do not know how these manuals were put to use or to what extent the detailed drills were actually followed. However, we get a general impression from the observation of Charles MacFarlane, a Scotsman who witnessed the Mansure soldiers several times as they were drilled in their barracks in 1828. According to MacFarlane, the most advanced soldiers he saw performed evolutions with a rapidity that “astonished” him. Yet the maneuvers were not performed symmetrically or neatly, and discipline during drills was loose. It was not uncommon for soldiers to treat their commanding officers with great familiarity: “For instance, a fellow in the lines would call or make a sign to his officer, and on his approach, whisper in his ear, or talk and laugh with him aloud; and this I have seen many times during drills.”<sup>20</sup> After a visit to one of the barracks in Istanbul, some twenty years later, the same MacFarlane wrote that a drill he had witnessed “was slow and slovenly work, but conducted with great calmness and good humor.”<sup>21</sup>

Helmuth von Moltke, a young officer at the time, witnessed Ottoman performance against the Russians in 1828–1829. Moltke wrote that in the Ottoman army, “the spirit of European tactics had made little progress.” The Ottomans, he added, gave up their old offensive methods but found it difficult to impose the discipline required by modern tactics. “What was good in barbarian warfare was lost without gaining much benefit from the resources of civilization.”<sup>22</sup> A

few years later, as a member of the Prussian military mission to the empire, he wrote to his mother that “this is the country of cozy laziness, the whole nation is in cogs.”<sup>23</sup> Moltke was obviously frustrated by the attempt to enforce Prussian discipline on Ottoman soldiers. It was as if the Ottomans, with their alleged laziness and their lax movements, resisted the strict movements dictated by the maneuver manuals and the drillmasters. It is important to note, however, that both Moltke and MacFarlane recorded more positive impressions on several other occasions, and the emerging picture is thus rather confused.<sup>24</sup>

What is certain is that when the new Ottoman army was tested on the battlefield, it often demonstrated poor maneuvering abilities. Its performance in the battle of Konya in 1832, against the smaller but more thoroughly modernized Ottoman-Egyptian army, was completely disorganized and ended in a humiliating defeat.<sup>25</sup> According to Avigdor Levy, Ottoman capacity for open field maneuvers remained poor throughout the 1830s. The Ottoman command was aware of the problem, and in 1839, as another decisive clash with the Ottoman-Egyptian army approached, the Ottoman commander was ordered to avoid open field battles. When the two armies met in Nizib in June 1839, the Ottoman imperial soldiers were once again outmaneuvered by their adversaries. Their movement was apparently slow and disorganized, which led to their defeat.<sup>26</sup> In the early years of the new Ottoman army, maneuvering with the precision of a watch remained an ideal at best. Yet gradually, over the second half of the nineteenth century, clocks would become indispensable not only on the drill grounds but also for the reorganization of daily routines. What was the goal of the efforts to codify camp life, and what was the nature of the temporal construct devised in the new codes in order to achieve this goal?

### *Codified Camp Routines*

The first regulatory text of Mahmud’s new army, titled *Asakir-i Nizamiye Nizamnamesi* (Regular Army Code), was a detailed document covering various structural and organizational aspects of the new corps.<sup>27</sup> The text was a compilation of codes which were issued for the various units of the new army starting in July 1826, shortly after the Janissary corps was abolished, and thus represents the early phases of military reform. If the maneuver manuals illustrate the new military vision of highly regulated, well-synchronized, machine-like operation, in the Regular Army Code, such exactitude and efficiency were nowhere to be found. The code was concerned, first and foremost, with the need to keep the soldiers busy throughout the day. “Whether in the barracks or in fortresses and police stations, attention shall be paid to the defense task, and to keeping [the soldiers] busy with studying and exercising so that [they] do not stand idle.” The

same attempt to occupy the soldiers at all times is evident in the description of their exercise. In the cavalry regiment, for example, out of supposedly 1,581 soldiers and officers, only 200 could participate in mounted maneuvers every week. The other soldiers “should be drilled by their officers as if they had horses although they are on foot, so that they do not stand idle.”<sup>28</sup>

Idleness, so it seems, was considered an enemy of order even beyond the military context. As Betül Başaran demonstrates, Selim III’s urban reforms largely stemmed from a sense of threat to the social order, a threat which was identified with such groups as migrants, beggars, and bachelors. Many of the decrees issued by Selim III specifically referred to people “who roam the streets in idleness” and subjected them to intensive surveillance measures.<sup>29</sup> If civilian bums were a menace, soldiers with too much free time on their hands were clear and present danger to public order, as the Ottomans knew well. Much like premodern European armies, the Janissaries and Sekban units were unruly social elements and would often take to arms to express their discontent.<sup>30</sup> Although supposedly segregated in their barracks, the New Order soldiers also spent at least some of their time robbing civilians and molesting peasants. The commanders of Selim III’s army considered the idleness of the soldiers as the main cause of these infringements. The solution was to allow the soldiers to engage in trade under restricted conditions.<sup>31</sup> Although its regulations resembled Selim III’s in some respects,<sup>32</sup> Mahmud’s regular army adopted a different approach to dealing with the perils of idleness, regulating the daily sequence of military activities so that the soldiers would be kept busy from sunrise to sunset.

However, while the code often referred to months, weeks, and days of the week, shorter, clearly defined time frames were nearly absent from the text, and daily routine was described with very few references to clear time indications. Note for example the daily teaching program in the barrack schools. The morning prayer was to be followed by a lesson on the Koran, followed by studying religious issues (*mesail-i diniye*), catechism (*ilm-i hal*), and a sermon. Although subjects and their sequence were specified, no hours were given, and the duration of each lesson was likewise missing. Similarly, the two daily meals for which even the menu was prescribed were to be served simply “in the morning” and “in the evening.” Hours were left out altogether.<sup>33</sup>

If time indications were provided, they mainly related to the position of the sun. In some places, for instance, it was stipulated that Koran lessons were expected to begin every day at dawn (*ala al-sabah*). The regulations of the Imperial Arsenal, which form part of the Regular Army Code, determined that “every day at dawn” (*her gün sabahleyin*) a hundred soldiers and a captain shall

be sent from the barracks to the arsenal. Other than that, no specific time was given.<sup>34</sup> Thus, in the absence of specific clock hours, the course of the sun provided the general daily time frame.

This time frame was further elaborated employing the five daily prayers, in keeping with the practice that prevailed throughout Ottoman society. The code emphasized repeatedly that all five prayers should be performed communally on a daily basis.<sup>35</sup> The prayers were an integral part of the disciplinary process which was supposed to include, as already indicated, intensive religious education. But the prayers served the disciplinary process regardless of their content. Mandatory communal performance of all five prayers renders praying an integral part of daily military routine, similar in its function to the roll call. Frequent prayers not only kept the soldiers busy; they also allowed for the keeping of soldiers under constant surveillance.<sup>36</sup> As regular components of daily routine, the prayers provided reference points throughout the day, and these in turn divided the day into clearly defined periods. These reference points could then be used to set the succession of actions by stipulating that a given task was to be performed after a certain prayer. It is significant that since prayers were timed with reference to the position of the sun, the intervals between them fluctuated as the length of the days changed throughout the year. The daily time frame of military routine was thus a very flexible one, worthy of its name only for want of a better term that would capture its elasticity.

Another good example for the floating time definitions in the Regular Army Code is the daily horse care routine in the cavalry regiment. According to the code, soldiers charged with looking after the horses were to start their day's work after performing the morning prayer together. Here, however, another element was added: trumpets were used to signal the timing of every action from that point on. The soldiers responsible for the horses were to leave the dormitories only after the first trumpet call was sounded. They were to get to the horses and wait for the second call. This signaled the putting of nose bags on the horses' heads, and with the third call, the soldiers were to begin brushing the horses and were not to stop until the officer ordered another trumpet call.<sup>37</sup> It was specifically ordered that the food for the horses should be prepared beforehand, so that it could be given simultaneously to all horses. Here we see the only well defined duration in the whole process. According to the code, the nose bags were to remain on the horses' heads for a full hour (*tamam bir saat*). The wing commander or one of his deputies was supposed see that these tasks were performed well, and on time.

Two conclusions should be drawn from this description: the first is that this

is a rather detailed daily routine; the second is that it is very different from a schedule. Different actions are indeed listed in their consecutive order and trumpet calls are used to signal the conclusion of one phase and the beginning of the next one. However, the fact that the whole process is performed with no reference to specific hours or to any other time indication leaves the officer in charge as the supreme regulator of the activity. The absence of any higher time grid to which the officer must refer places great power in his hands. The only two restrictions imposed on him by the code are that he cannot start performing the tasks before the morning prayer, and that the horses shall be given the opportunity to eat for a whole hour.

This mode of structuring activity is much more concerned with tasks than with their exact timing. It is a daily routine composed in prose, formulated as a kind of a recipe which lists the actions in a consecutive order rather than squeezing them into a chart which sets clear time boundaries for all actions. With the daily routine thus structured, performing “on time” had no meaning. The soldiers are not expected to time their actions themselves, but rather to respond to the trumpet once it had been blown and then proceed to the next phase of the routine.

In later years, daily routines were gradually elaborated but the general temporal construct based on the same time indications remained virtually the same. Another military code, apparently written not long after the first regulation, may serve as an example.<sup>38</sup> The daily routine prescribed in this code is much more detailed. The soldiers stationed on guard duty, for example, were to be awakened every day by a trumpet call one hour before sunrise and report for morning inspection. Again we see that the text specifies only a starting point, marked in this case by a trumpet call. From that point on, every task is to be performed after the previous one had been completed, without specific hours or clear definitions of the duration that should be assigned to each activity. Cleaning the dormitories, for instance, was to be performed upon the completion of the morning inspection (*yoklama tekmil olduktan sonra*).<sup>39</sup>

The next clear time indication mentioned in the code anchored the first meal in the general time framework. The trumpet calling the soldiers to eat was to be sounded one-and-a-half hours before the noon prayer. One hour before noon, upon yet another trumpet call, the sentries who were supposed to start their shift would be assembled for another inspection. The evening meal was to be served one hour before sunset. The following trumpet call would be sounded at an unspecified time to signal the beginning of the night shift (*yatsı nöbeti*). Since *yatsı* is the Turkish name of the night prayer, it is plausible that it was the

prayer that marked the beginning of this shift. At that time, all soldiers and petty officers were to be in the barracks. Half an hour later, the evening inspection was supposed to begin upon yet another trumpet call. The exact timing of the last call of the day, which signaled lights out, was to be determined by the colonel and enforced by the officer on duty.<sup>40</sup>

The differences between this daily routine and the ones given in the Regular Army Code are significant. First, this daily routine is a comprehensive one in terms of its span. It begins early in the morning and does not end before the lights-out call has been sounded. No part of the day is left out of the grid, and the soldiers can hardly escape it even in their sleep. Second, the grid itself is much denser: more activities throughout the day are imposed and anchored within the time frame by specific time indications such as sunset, noontime, or the like. Third, the basic time frame, which as in the Regular Army Code relies on the position of the sun and the prayers, here supports a more elaborate system of time indications. Activities are placed within the basic time frame by setting fixed durations defined in terms of hours, before or after a clear time anchor. The noon prayer, for instance, serves as such an anchor and the morning meal is positioned with reference to it. This leads us straight to the fourth point: in contrast to the original regulations, the routine as it is detailed in this code is dependent on the use of some kind of a clock, most probably a mechanical one.

Although daily routines in the Ottoman army of the early reform period were certainly part of a disciplinary system, they were fundamentally different from daily schedules as usually discussed in Foucauldian discourse. In the routines examined thus far, the execution of military tasks is not governed by any higher level of abstract time. Their authors are much more concerned with the tasks and their sequence than with their timing, and so the term “task management” often seems more appropriate than “time management.”

### *Timetabled Camp Routines*

In the second half of the nineteenth century, daily routines became more elaborate, and their different components were placed with greater precision within the general time frame.<sup>41</sup> Gradually, new practices were adopted in order to facilitate better organization and allocation of time. A code issued in 1874 introduced timetables to organize daily routine for the first time. According to the code, every colonel was to draw a timetable (*cetvel*) for daily tasks and have it placed in the sentries' post and in the barracks. In case changes were needed in the scheduling of exercise, study, and other tasks, a new timetable was to be drawn up.<sup>42</sup>

The timetable divides a supposedly uniform, homogenous, and neutral time into clearly defined durations, creating “time containers” in each of which a different action can be placed.<sup>43</sup> For the people drawing the timetables, it allows the planning of time allocation and increases control over the implementation of the plan. For those following the timetable it would usually mean greater haste, since they have to complete each of their assigned tasks before the time sanctioned for it in the timetable has elapsed. The timetable represents a new phase in the military organization of time since it is more than an ordering device.<sup>44</sup> It is a mindset.

The timetable is in a sense a radical break from the older task-oriented traditions of time organization, based as they were on rather simple and loose temporal constructs.<sup>45</sup> However, the shift between the two modes was slow and gradual. The daily routine as determined in the 1874 code is a curious combination of these older traditions and the innovative mode of the timetable. A few examples will suffice to demonstrate this combination. The basic structure of the time framework was still based on the position of the sun and the prayer cycle, though these no longer had the same significance. Inspections have taken the prayers’ place as reference points, creating time divisions within the day. The routine stipulated that three inspections should be executed every day: the evening inspection was to be performed one hour before sunset, whereas the night inspection was to take place after the night prayer, in accordance with the daily task table of the sentries. For the morning inspection no exact timing is given. Thus, the prayer was still used to anchor the inspection to the time framework, but the specific time of the inspection was set according to a table composed by the commanding officers. The different stages of the inspection were marked as before by trumpet and horn calls, and it seems that this method has developed into a system of audio signals.<sup>46</sup>

As boundaries between different divisions of the day became more pronounced, clearer definitions of each division became necessary. Not only exercise and inspection time had to be defined; recess too was to be given its slot in the table. The need to rest during exercise was not new of course. An early manual stipulated that it is best not to prolong exercise so that the soldiers would not get tired. When exercise was extended, giving breaks was recommended, but no definitions of durations or hours were given.<sup>47</sup> With timetables dictating daily routine, it became essential to determine under which rubric each activity (or inactivity) fell. The table does not allow anything to be left in between rubrics. Thus, the 1874 code determines that “the duration of every training session is two hours, not including recesses and the time spent walking to the exercise court.”<sup>48</sup>




FIGURE 6. Attention: Ottoman soldiers posing by Nusretiye clock tower, erected in 1848, in the courtyard of the Imperial Arsenal. Photo from the 1880s. Library of Congress.

It is clear then that even recess time cannot be seen as outside the timetable. The *Piyade Talimnamesi* of 1891 specifically states that standing at attention (*Hazır Ol*) for a long duration might tire the soldiers. It thus recommends breaks from time to time during exercise, and introduces the order *Yerinde Rahat* (At Ease). However, break time is not devoid of action. During recess, the soldiers are supposed to fulfill various minor tasks such as tidying up their uniforms, wiping away perspiration, and straightening the lines. This is to make

the soldiers ‘benefit from the recess time so as to make up for the time and distance which was lost [because of the recess].’<sup>49</sup> Even during the breaks, time should not be wasted. Even when “at ease,” soldiers are not really at ease. The grid becomes ever denser.

A program for the training of reserve soldiers issued in 1912 provides another good example of this trend. The program covers one month, and is organized according to the duration of every single training session. Take for example the first day of the program:

THE FIRST WEEK

In the yard: the first day

Before noon (with 20 minutes recess)

Minute

15 How to carry a weapon on the shoulder . . .

15 When the weapon is on the shoulder:

lowering the weapon for attack . . .

15 Turning on the spot: considering that the weapon

is on the shoulder: to the right, to the left, a backward turn.

[separately and together].<sup>50</sup>

And so it goes on, day by day, a whole month cut into short periods of between five and eighty minutes. The program thus makes rather tedious reading and must have had even worse implications for the poor reserve soldiers, if it was actually carried out. Indeed, as far as time planning is concerned, this was a very ambitious program. It expressed a very modern mindset, one that seeks to prearrange as much as possible and maintain the standards of accuracy it sets on paper. The plan also demonstrates a concept of efficiency, an aspect which was not evident in earlier routines. The goal is not simply to keep the soldiers busy, but rather to shorten their training time so as to produce skilled soldiers within a month.<sup>51</sup> This relatively developed concept of efficiency was the result of a long process of internalizing intricate practices of time organization beyond the concerns of daily routines. By the last third of the nineteenth century, stricter time organization was becoming an integral part of nearly every aspect of military life.

*Efficiency and Punctuality:*

*Time Organization in the Hamidian Era*

The defeat in the 1877–1878 war against Russia ushered in another period of intensive change in the Ottoman army. During the 1880s and 1890s, signifi-

cant reforms were carried out in the organization of the army, its operational modes, and its armament. These reforms increased the awareness of the officer corps of the importance of meticulous planning and allocation of time.

The military reforms of the Hamidian era were lead by a new German mission that began its operation in 1882. The most significant aspect of the reforms in the context of this discussion was the expansion and improvement of the military education system. Much to the growing anxiety of the reigning sultan, a new elite of professional officers was gradually forming.<sup>52</sup> These officers, who came to be known as *mektepli* (that is, school graduates), started to compete for positions with the older type of officers who were not schooled, and who rose through the ranks following more traditional patterns of apprenticeship. These officers, who were known as *alaylı* (of the ranks), were still a large majority during the late 1870s, but their percentage in the officer corps slowly declined, as more and more graduates of the military education system entered the service.<sup>53</sup>

With the increase in the number of schooled officers, more professional materials for informing and educating this group were made available in Ottoman Turkish. The periodical *Fünun-ı Askeriye* (Military Sciences), which was published in the 1880s by the Ministry of War, was one of these publications. Some of the articles published in the journal were written by Ottoman officers and others were translated from European languages by Ottoman officers. Many articles discuss the armies of Germany, France, England, and Russia, demonstrating the widespread interest among the Ottoman officer corps in military developments in Europe. Significantly, these articles often refer to mean time rather than to *alaturka* hours, demonstrating growing familiarity with the foreign hour system within the circles of schooled officers, familiarity that may be attributed to the influence of the German military mission.<sup>54</sup> However, for the mass majority of soldiers and unschooled officers, this system would have been alien. Thus, the army continued to rely on the prayer cycle and on *alaturka* hours, but mean time was increasingly used alongside it, and was often preferred by the officers, certainly in their theoretical writings.<sup>55</sup>

One of the recurrent issues in these writings was large-scale maneuvers during war. The importance of the issue stemmed from the magnitude and complexity of modern armies, which rendered careful synchronization of their components absolutely crucial.<sup>56</sup> Large-scale maneuvers were thus discussed in military circles all over Europe. The Prussian general, Colmar Von Der Goltz, one of the most renowned military thinkers of his time, dealt with the issue at length. For the Ottoman officers of the Hamidian era, Goltz was not just another European strategist; he was an object of admiration and a role model.<sup>57</sup>

Goltz arrived at Istanbul in 1883 as part of the German military mission and

began teaching at the War Academy. He was soon nominated inspector of the Ottoman military schools and became one of the most dominant figures in the Ottoman military of the Hamidian era and after.<sup>58</sup> His most influential book, *Das Volk in Waffen* (The Nation in Arms), was translated into Ottoman Turkish in 1885 and recommended by the Ministry of War for all cadets of the War Academy.<sup>59</sup> Goltz devoted a chapter in this book to “Maneuver and Battle” and emphasized that the solution to the complexity of large-scale maneuvers is discipline, based on punctuality, among other things.<sup>60</sup>

Goltz’s recommendations were highly relevant for the Ottoman armed forces of the 1880s. In the disastrous war against Russia in 1877, the Ottoman army had 276 thousand officers and soldiers in active service, out of a population of about 17 million.<sup>61</sup> Ottoman officers were therefore preoccupied with problems of movement and large-scale maneuvers just like their European or Japanese colleagues, and much of their professional writing was devoted to that issue. By this time, it was not just marching itself that was subject to strict regulation. The writings of the 1880s reveal an ambition to attain efficiency and regularity in all levels of military activity through meticulous time organization.

An article entitled “An Explanation of the French Wartime Regulations,” published in 1883, may help explain the importance of time organization for large-scale maneuvers. It discussed at length the French method of organizing a large military force for the march so that the whole force would be able to move as swiftly as possible. The article explained how much space every unit should occupy in the column and how much distance should be kept between the different units.<sup>62</sup> If all units are up and ready at the same time, the author explained, most soldiers would have to wait for a very long time. This “futile standing” tires the soldiers, who should be allowed to rest as much as possible. A section of the article was thus devoted to calculating the embarking time of every single unit.<sup>63</sup>

Careful attention to time is evident also in texts composed by Ottoman officers as tactical guides for their own army. Many of these articles demonstrate that thinking about time as a resource which can be either gained or lost seems to have been widespread by that time. Reading through contemporary military materials, one frequently comes across expressions conveying this idea.<sup>64</sup> A long article by Captain Ibrahim Muhyiddin entitled “Marching and Movement Arrangements” demonstrates how the idea of employing time efficiently was translated into organizational measures. The author states that “time during battle is very valuable,” and therefore, various steps must be taken to ensure the “swiftness of movement.” One of the main concerns of the author is thus to organize the tasks during times of repose so that the men and animals would get

the longest possible rest and, on the other hand, would be ready for movement in the shortest time possible.

Upon arriving at the camping site, many tasks are to be performed to allow the force to regain its readiness. In order to be prepared to go at any given time, all the equipment that has been unloaded must be packed and loaded back on the wagons; soldiers and beasts must be fed, guns cleaned and information concerning the morrow's route must be gathered. If everything is ready in advance, the soldiers can be awakened only 45 minutes before the hour set for departure the next morning. Taking all these measures right after stopping reduces the time spent getting ready for movement and increases hours for repose and rest. This, claims the author, is extremely important, since sleep is crucial for the well being of the soldiers at war: "Every half hour of sleep, even a quarter of an hour, which is added or subtracted is important."<sup>65</sup>

### *Falling Behind Schedule*

Devising procedures for rapid movement is one thing; carrying them out is another. The straight lines and exact hours of the departure tables must not fool us. In reality things were not nearly as neat. The most intricate practices of time organization cannot assure that the planned schedule would be kept. It is the interaction between the plan and various factors in the real world which determines the actual pace of the advancing column. The weather, the terrain, or the condition of the road might frustrate any attempt to keep up with the plan.

Above all, it must be remembered that the most sophisticated methods of time organization have to be carried out, at the end of the day, by humans. A view from inside the marching column which illuminates this human dimension is provided by Yehuda Burla. A Jewish Jerusalemite of Sephardic origin, Burla enlisted in the Ottoman army and joined the first expedition force to the Suez Canal in early 1915. Although Burla's war stories are not memoirs but rather fiction, they were nevertheless written either during the war or shortly thereafter and are no doubt based on the author's personal experience.

The expedition force to the canal, numbering some twenty thousand troops under the command of a German officer, left Bir al-Sab' in mid-January in two columns. Five thousand camels were carrying drinking water.<sup>66</sup> The journey through the desert was to take ten days, and as Burla relates, "the whole army sorely knew this." He describes in passing some of the practices of time organization which facilitated the conducting of the marching column. These practices correspond to the ones discussed thus far.<sup>67</sup> Burla elaborates a little more on the difficulties of the soldiers who were subjected to these procedures during the long night marches:

Hundreds of horses, mules and camels pricked up their ears now and again, dashing forward at once. The crowd followed hastily, inspired and hopeful: Is it a distant voice that the beasts have heard? Is it a human scent they have detected from afar? But after a short while, thirsty and fatigued, their heads dropped and their strides grew longer and slower—realizing they were wrong and disheartened once more.

The army captains on horseback cracked their whips on the backs of the faltering soldiers, thrashing the tired and the barefooted over and over. Day after day passed in strenuous walking, in anxious anticipation of stumbling upon a Bedouin tent, in yearning hope of finally sighting some ruins or a cave, but no hope came. It weighed down the hearts of each of the thousands of soldiers in every corner of the camp, and then dispersed through the vast, silent desert, as if blown away.<sup>68</sup>

This passage illustrates how pace fluctuates despite all attempts to impose regularity upon it. The soldiers' physical abilities, their morale and their individual will—or rather, lack thereof—might have subverted the implementation of even the most intricate practices of time organization. Even the animals' pace was hard to control as the hope of finding water spurred them and the disappointment discouraged them. Under these circumstances, the implicit violence of the military practices of time organization, which is usually concealed behind the neat lines of timetables and departure charts, is revealed in the merciless lashing of the soldiers who fail to keep up with the sanctioned pace. They are quite literally forced to close the gap between them and the rest of the battalion, between plan and its implementation.

Even when soldiers are whipped to keep up, just like animals, they still command human consciousness and are able to employ it to assess their situation:

We rested there for about an hour. [People] asked as usual what's the time, how much we have walked and how much is still left for us to go. . . . 'Abd kept looking at the signals of the sky and said: "about one hour before midnight . . . so . . ." I looked at my watch and indeed it was a few minutes before the hour eleven.<sup>69</sup>

In the long strenuous march, time has become important not only for the officers who lead the column and monitored its pace; knowing the hour was crucial for the weary soldiers who tried, "as usual," to calculate how much longer they would have to march. That was indeed, very human.

Since people, even when in uniform, are not nearly as docile as their officers would expect them to be; since the officers themselves are human beings; since

the slopes are always steeper than they appear on the map; since weather conditions are always not as favorable as they should have been; since reality tends to remain much more chaotic than planners of all kinds would have us believe, it is important to note that the minute time organization of the advancing column is merely a blueprint, a declaration of intents, an aspiration. In this sense, it is not dissimilar to the pretentious schedule of reserve soldiers' training, mentioned above. It is an abstract construct forced upon reality, always with great pain.

### *Timetabled Minds*

Thus far, I have tried to demonstrate the extent to which modern practices of time organization were incorporated into various fields of Ottoman military life. Furthermore, I argued that the incorporation of these practices had gradually increased awareness to the way time was "spent," and by the last third of the nineteenth century, time was already conceived as a resource to be used efficiently. These practices and concepts, I wish to argue, were imprinted in the minds of the individuals who served in the Ottoman army during the last decades of the Ottoman Empire.

By the early twentieth century, the army was by far the largest organization in the Ottoman state, with a peacetime strength of over a quarter of a million soldiers. In time of war the ranks swelled, and during World War I, over 2,850,000 men were conscripted.<sup>70</sup> To some extent, all these men were subjected to military discipline and to the relatively strict practices of time organization common in the army. We have already seen that not only the officers were concerned with time but the rank and file too. It is very hard, though, to estimate the lasting impact of military techniques of time organization on the soldiers. The recently published diary of İhsân Turjumân, a Muslim Arab of Jerusalemite origin, may serve to shed light on this issue. Turjumân joined the Ottoman army in November 1914 following the general draft which had been announced throughout the empire. He was assigned as an aide to the secretary of Ali Rüşen Bey, commander of logistics on the southern front, and served for a while near Hebron and then in Nablus. According to his diary, however, he spent most of his service "playing with his mustache" at the headquarters in Jerusalem.<sup>71</sup>

In his diary, Turjumân frequently indicated the exact time of his actions, often in terms of fractions of an hour. Such timekeeping is not evident in earlier personal narratives composed in Syria and Palestine, nor can it be found in other contemporary diaries from Jerusalem.<sup>72</sup> Although the diary of Khalîl al-Sakâkîni, for instance, does include references to time, the level of precision found in Turjumân's diary is unmatched.<sup>73</sup> Moreover, as Salim Tamari notes,

Turjmān tended to use the prevailing hour system in the military at that period, namely the European hour system, especially when writing about the army or when discussing his social interactions. On several occasions he specified both the European hour and the Ottoman hour, apparently to avoid confusion. Tamari concludes that it was the military methods and order to which Turjumān was subjected that raised his awareness of time. According to Tamari, this “new manner of controlling working pace” was later transferred to civilian life.<sup>74</sup> Although this last statement is not backed by sufficient evidence, the connection made between military service and Turjumān’s timekeeping habits seems reasonable.

If the relation between military service and timekeeping among the rank and file is hard to establish, it is much more plausible to look for such connection within the officer corps. As I have shown throughout this chapter, the planning and allocation of time, either when in camp or on campaign, was mainly the business of officers. This no doubt increased their awareness of time. Mehmed Fasih, a petty officer from Mersin who served with distinction in Gallipoli, certainly displayed such awareness. Fasih was a product of the Ottoman military education system. After completing his primary school, he entered a military middle school in Edirne and then moved to the Kuleli military high school in Istanbul. Upon graduation, he entered the War Academy, but the outbreak of the war interrupted his studies. He enlisted in active service in July 1914, and a few months later was sent to Gallipoli as a platoon commander.<sup>75</sup> Fasih left a diary documenting his Gallipoli experiences, in which he notes rigorously the time of his different actions. In fact, the whole diary is composed of entries organized according to exact hours. Take for example the rather sad entries from October 22, 1915:

24.00 hrs. Get up and set out to start work on trenches which need repairs.

Repairs are completed.

01.00 hrs. Machine guns and grenades are in action. Thank God, suffer no casualties. Rain now pours. If it continues at this rate, distress and misery will follow. Am very cold. Have some embers brought [for brazier]. Brew tea. But then don’t drink any as don’t feel like it anymore. Doze off.

03.00 hrs. Wake up. Still raining. Patrols return and report. Inspect trenches and reprimand some men [probably for being caught napping].

05.00 hrs. Prepare my report. No incidents. Calm prevails. We have as much light as during daytime. Our reconnaissance patrol returns to our lines.

05.30 hrs. Doze off.

06.30 hrs. Get up, brew and drink tea. 8th Company relieves us. Loneliness is hard to take. Need a comrade.<sup>76</sup>

This way of writing gives the whole diary the appearance of a timetable, as if through minute timekeeping it would be possible to impose a sense of order on the chaotic life in the trenches. But the content of this timetable counteracts its form; the unpredictability of the battlefield subverts the organizing and regularizing rationale of the chart. Furthermore, this military mode of time keeping seems somewhat incompatible with the personal character of a diary. Nowhere is it more noticeable than in the 06:30 entry, where even the loneliness of the narrator is subjected to the structure of the timetable, as if in the 07.00 hrs. slot, it would be gone. The fact that these techniques dominate the narrative in Fasih's personal diary is of course indicative of his adaptation to the military mode of time organization.

### *Drilling the Entire Nation*

Fasih was not alone. His colleagues too must have shared the same mindset. These young officers, who spent nine to eleven years in military schools and barracks, were distinguished from their peers in the civilian system by their uniform, esprit de corps, and rigid hierarchy, as well as their organized and disciplined lifestyle. The members of this cohesive group developed a strong sense of collective identity during the Hamidian period. They came to think of themselves as the most able, most suitable to lead the empire and modernize it.<sup>77</sup> Their acute time awareness, I would argue, became an important component of their modernizing vision.

The modernization vision that developed in officers' circles drew to a large extent on Goltz's concept of the "armed nation." According to Goltz, the age of limited wars had come to an end due to the massive scale of modern armies and the continuous arms race. In the future, he wrote in 1878, whole nations would have to march into the battlefields, as the limited armed struggles of the past would turn into total wars of annihilation. In order to survive under these circumstances, every nation must be able to mobilize its population and tap its resources with the utmost efficiency. Best equipped for such developments, the army should serve as a guide for the nation, infusing all sections of society with military values and directing its preparation for the conflicts of the future.

These ideas, a mix of romantic nationalism, militarism, and social Darwinism, were common in the writings of Ottoman officers in the early twentieth century. The implications of these ideas, by their very nature, were to be felt not

only within the army. Since military success rested on the qualities of the whole nation, Ottoman officers were often preoccupied with the values and capabilities of civilian society. These men came to think of the army as the best school for the nation and of themselves as the most suitable educators.<sup>78</sup> They were to march the Ottoman state forward, under strict discipline and order.

Order was of course a central feature in the Ottoman reform movement of the nineteenth century, as it was in contemporary Europe and throughout the world. It was especially important in the Young Turks' thought. Influenced by positivist thinkers such as August Comte, the Young Turks connected order with material progress and modernization. Ahmed Rıza, one of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) leaders, even suggested inscribing Comte's motto *Ordre et Progrès* on the Ottoman flag.<sup>79</sup> Positivist thinking did not create the techniques of time organization which governed the life of the schooled officers; these were born out of pragmatic needs. It did, however, provide a philosophical framework that endowed these techniques with significance which surpassed the practical military needs that brought them about. Order had become a purpose in itself. After the 1908 revolution, this group of *mektepli* officers, which constituted a prominent element in the CUP, acquired real power within the military. The young educated officers took the positions of many of the *alaylı* officers who were forced out of service by the new regime.<sup>80</sup> The *mektepli* officers were finally in position to realize their agenda of "progress through order."

The military journal *Asker* may be regarded as representative of this agenda. It was first published in August 1908, roughly a month after the revolution, and became the most important military periodical of the period.<sup>81</sup> In the first issue, in an article entitled "Çalışalım," editor Osman Senai called upon his fellow officers to work harder and to sacrifice whatever is necessary in order to secure the Constitution and bring about Ottoman progress. Attaining these goals, Senai argued, depended on the efficient use of time:

Our armed forces are the support of the motherland, the uniting center of our pure and holy hopes. Let the progress and promotion of this force always be our strongest hope, our eternal thought. In fact, in the present situation, we have little time. However, the true merit is to demonstrate work in times like these. Let us take the English proverb "time is money" as a guide to our conduct. Essentially, to use time well (*vakti hüsn-i isti'mal*) means to employ and apply all human qualities, one by one. Idleness is the grave of all good. Let us not have any relation with this source of evils. . . .

Before day breaks, when everybody is still in sweet sleep, when in the bar-

rack yards and army bases the sounds of harmonic music are heard with the inspiring gift of dawn, when the trumpets are being blown from every side, let our hearts beat with a feeling of patriotic pride. When in a single moment the surroundings of the barrack are filled with soldiers, let our eyes cast fire at this sight.<sup>82</sup>

In Senai's text, military practices of time organization are used to appeal to the officers' group solidarity and highlight the leading role of the military in the Ottoman march of progress. In order to demonstrate figuratively the desired industriousness and synchronicity of action, the author of "Çalışım" turns to the morning roll call, a typical scene taken from the daily military routine. No doubt every one of his readers would have been familiar with it. Yet the morning roll call as portrayed here is not merely another grey phase in the monotonous everyday chain of military tasks. It is detached from its original slot in the timetable and portrayed as an extraordinary experience. The reader can easily hear the sound of trumpets and see the immediate commotion in the barrack yard before the inspection starts. It all happens "in a single moment."

The routine morning roll call is here invested with nearly magical attributes which bring to mind a religious ritual rather than a military procedure. It is a ritual celebrating efficiency, haste, motion, and activity, and it all begins even before day breaks. This is of course contrasted with the "sweet sleep" of everybody else and emphasizes once again the strong sense of collective identity. Sociologists have already noted that adherence to a common and unique temporal order helps to delineate the boundaries of a social group and consolidate its inner solidarity.<sup>83</sup> In this case, the author clearly refers to the unique temporal order of the army in order to emphasize the difference between the army and the rest of society. We are awake and active, he says, while everybody else is asleep.

Senai was not interested merely in metaphors. For him it all had very practical implications: "saving time," he writes, "has attained such importance for us that we simply believe that without it, it will not be possible to form a complete army." The time already designated, argued Senai, was just not enough to fulfill all that was required. It was the time between the different tasks, the time set for recess, that needed to be put to good use. "An officer who grows accustomed to benefit from even the shortest break," he continued, "will no doubt be able to pick the fruit of his earlier efforts in a brilliant manner, when he attains higher ranks."<sup>84</sup> These sentences again disclose that in the author's mind, time is always framed, always put into the rubrics of a table, just as he would have learned to do throughout his military education.

Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Paşa, another prominent graduate of the military education system, expressed a very similar line of thought. In a treatise he published in 1910 he called for the replacement of the Ottoman fiscal (*mali*) calendar with a new solar calendar. Muhtar too emphasized the close relationship between order, individual effort, time thrift, and national progress. In order to secure progress, Muhtar argued, disorderly inherited practices, including practices of time organization, had to be abolished.<sup>85</sup>

Clearly, the *mektepli* officers thought that the concepts of efficiency and precision, along with the moral load they carried, did not apply only to the military; they were to be taught to the rest of the Ottoman nation. Colonel Petrev Demirhan, a prominent figure among the young officers, quotes in this context Marshal Helmuth von Moltke: “The military institution is a school which teaches them [the younger generation] order, ability to act in time, cleanliness, obedience, and fidelity.”<sup>86</sup>

Similar ideas were expressed in *The German Soldier: Military Life in Germany*, a pamphlet composed by yet another graduate of the military education system and published by the Ottoman-German Mutual Friendship Library in 1917, when the Ottomans were still fighting alongside the Germans.<sup>87</sup> The stated objective of the pamphlet was to learn from the example set by the Germans, whose military capabilities were said to be unmatched. The text was indeed a paean to the German nation, its militaristic spirit, and its military achievements. Within only a few decades, it was stated in several places, the young German nation managed to turn itself into a great power. The German army and the Prussian military tradition were given as the sole reason for this meteoric rise. As might have been expected, the Japanese too were mentioned in this context, although they were, “regrettably,” enemies of the Ottomans and the Germans.<sup>88</sup>

Among the qualities which made the German army what it was, order was praised above all. Military life in no other country, it was made clear, is as orderly (*muntazam*) and complete as German military life. Order, discipline, and the rest of the qualities which formed the basis of German power were to be found not only in the army but in German society at large. In fact, it was hard to draw boundaries between the army and the rest of society, since Germany, according to this pamphlet, was the ultimate “nation in arms”: all sectors of society were militarized; all subjects were in fact soldiers; schoolchildren were familiarized with military ideas from a very young age; women wanted to make their sons soldiers and give their daughters to officers.<sup>89</sup> Army and society in Germany were truly inseparable, and the army assumed a leading role in educating the peasants.

The explicit reference to the education of the peasants was not incidental, of course. The vast majority of conscripts in the Ottoman army were of rural background. Ottoman officers, though often of lower-middle-class origin, came to contrast the image of the peasant with their own self-image. The peasant was described as ignorant, wild, mentally deficient, and lacking any human sentiment. It was therefore the duty of officers to educate the peasants and turn them into better Muslims, better patriots, and better men. Education of the peasants became a recurring theme in the writings of Ottoman officers, and several books were written for the instruction of soldiers about such topics as loyalty, bravery, love of motherland, hygiene, and discipline.<sup>90</sup>

Thus, when the author of *The German Soldier* refers to the education of the peasant, it should be understood in an Ottoman context rather than a German one:

When a peasant becomes a soldier, he becomes a whole new being, a whole new person. He is educated and drilled. He eats and drinks, goes to sleep and wakes up in a regulated [fashion] (*muntazam yeyip ier, yatıp kalkar*). He becomes extremely active. For this reason, the army is the perfect school for Germany. Every German entering this school becomes “German” in the full sense of the word and [then] leaves.<sup>91</sup>

The text clearly alludes to the well-organized military schedules which break life up into its basic functions. If the German army was the school of the nation, then a highly regulated daily routine was one of the components of the curriculum. The military mode of time organization, it appears, was an integral part of the desired order, not only for the military, but for society as a whole:

All Germans, zealous and determined, act with one desire and one strong will, organized (*muntazam*) and coordinated like a mechanical clock. From the youngest individual to the oldest, they all have the same feeling, the same idea, the same will.<sup>92</sup>

This quote sends us right back to the beginning of the chapter, to the meticulous maneuvers of close-formation tactics. These were likened in the early nineteenth century to the working of a clock in their precision. By the early twentieth century, the unison of movement and perfect synchronization which the clock embodied was taken beyond the drill grounds to be used as an idealized metaphor for the desired social order. The petty officers taming their troops to march in unison have become rulers, drill masters of a whole society. They were supposedly more advanced, closer to (European) civilization, the end product

of historical progress. Like a vanguard that already knows what lies ahead and where the road is going, the officers came to see themselves as capable of leading the main body of the nation in that direction.

This chapter demonstrates that over the nineteenth century, military practices of time organization gradually became independent of the temporal patterns that prevailed beyond the boundaries of military schools and army compounds. The professional officers who were raised in this environment grew increasingly detached from indigenous temporal culture. This trend culminated in the army's adoption of the European mean-time hour system

As already noted, throughout the nineteenth century the Ottoman army, like all other state organs, relied on the prayer cycle and the *alaturka* hour system. However, the officers were familiar with mean time and were no doubt aware of the benefits it carried for the conduct of military affairs.<sup>93</sup> In May 1912, a decree issued by the Ministry of War ordered the exclusive use of mean time (*vasati saat*) and explained the basic principles of this system. Since the military and the bureaucracy were interrelated, it was necessary that the bureaucracy would also abandon the use of the old *alaturka* hours.<sup>94</sup> The Ministry of War continued to press for the universal application of mean time. As I detail in chapter 6, this was in fact as much an ideological step as it was a practical one.

The fact that the army was among the first governmental organs, and certainly the most powerful one, that switched to mean time suggests that time-tabled socialization and the conscious cultivation of punctuality, temporal regularity, and efficiency contributed to the formation of identities and world-views and eventually influenced political choices. Similar processes of socialization were also evident in Ottoman civilian schools, and it is therefore to the education system that we turn next.

## 4 } ON TIME FOR SCHOOL

There is no better way to open a chapter about time in Ottoman schools than with a short story about time in an early twentieth-century Ottoman school penned by one of its graduates. Written by Akil Fevzi, a graduate of the Feyziye School in Salonica (Thessaloniki), “The Clock Fight” (“Saat Kavgası”) was published in February 1905 in the children’s magazine *Çocuk Bahçesi* (Kindergarten).<sup>1</sup> The story takes place in a boarding school much like the Feyziye, on a Thursday afternoon. Having just finished their school day, the narrator and his close friend Durmuş decide to play for a while. At that point the headmaster calls Durmuş and tells him that he is free to leave the school precinct and spend the night at his aunt’s house. Durmuş therefore apologizes for not being able to stay and play with the narrator. He takes out his watch and says, “It is twenty-five minutes past ten [*alaturka*]. I should be going.” The narrator notes that looking at one’s watch is infectious, just like yawning, and draws out his own timepiece. “No,” he says, “it is [only] twenty past ten.”

Faced with a direct challenge to his clock, Durmuş seeks a higher authority of time-telling. He says that he set the clock by “the Saatli,” that is, by the clock tower of the Saatli mosque (lit. “the Mosque that has a clock”) in the Hacı İsmail quarter. To this the narrator replies that his watch “is set according to Mustafa Paşa,” referring to the *muvaakkithane* of the mosque of that name, which stood very close to the Saatli mosque, on the other side of the governor’s headquarters.<sup>2</sup> Having reached a draw as far as time-telling authorities go, the schoolboys then take aim at the quality of each other’s timepiece:

“Very well but your watch is broken.”

“What, is it broken? My watch? Actually it’s yours that is broken, you fool!”

Tauntingly, he said: “Ha, don’t worry about that! Mine wouldn’t break after ten years. It is a superb chronometer.”

“And what about mine? It would work for twenty years without breaking; it wouldn’t spin like a compass. No, it wouldn’t spin like that compass you have.”

“But they sure duped you! You should throw yours in the sea!”

“No, they duped you. . . . It appears you bought not a watch but a potato!”

When he heard the word “potato” he turned bright red in anger: “My potato,” he said, “would be better to buy than your fake watch!”

This was apparently too much for the narrator. His watch, we learn, was a gift from his mother, and is very dear to its owner. After a few more exchanges the narrator ends up walking away furious, only to find out a short while later that according to his watch it is still twenty minutes past ten. The comic angle on the highly emotional situation is thus maintained all the way to the end.

Clearly, the story is fictional and cannot be simply mined for facts. Yet fiction is never wholly fictional, just as archival documents are not entirely factual. The true difference between history and literature, Aristotle noted in his *Poetics*, is that “one relates what has happened, the other what may happen.”<sup>3</sup> For a cultural historian, the probable, the imaginable, and the reservoir of shared experiences, beliefs, and conventions that define the limits of the imaginable may be as telling what “actually happened.” While the plot of “The Clock Fight” may have been made up, the author and the readers were not. For them it was a story that could have happened, and this is how I propose to read it later in this chapter. The story could have happened because the little drama between the two fictional friends was anchored in a very real clock-bound temporal construct that was typical of late Ottoman schools.

State education in the Ottoman Empire began to develop in earnest only in last third of the nineteenth century and was closely connected to the project of state building. State-run schools had originally been built to supply the expanding state mechanism with professional elites, but by the Hamidian period the education system assumed additional roles, such as ideological indoctrination and large-scale mobilization of subjects.<sup>4</sup>

My main argument is that teaching “the value of time” was crucial for securing these goals. Late Ottoman schools inculcated in their students a worldview that identified time thrift, punctuality, and temporal regularity with notions of progress and modernity. The first part of the chapter shows that the creation of elaborate temporal constructs based on standardized time blocks allowed for increased levels of surveillance of students and staff, and facilitated a more efficient pedagogic process. The same temporal construct served as an implicit curriculum, imbuing students with the novel practices and norms of modern time consciousness.<sup>5</sup> By the time we return to the “Clock Fight” toward the end of this first section, it will be clear that the unique time regime of late Ottoman schools pervaded the inner world of young students and to some extent scripted not only their behaviors but their emotions as well.

In the second part of the chapter I show that time awareness was cultivated

not only through the submission of students to schedules of various kinds; it was directly taught to them in class. Analyzing textbooks used in various courses, I argue that the late Ottoman education system attached moral value to regularity, punctuality, and efficiency, and harnessed such traits to the ideological wagons of both the Hamidian and the Young Turk regimes. While punctuality and time thrift were taught to both boys and girls, boundaries between male and female, domestic and public were hardly blurred. If teaching time was designed to buttress the political order, it was equally intended to bolster the gendered social order.

### *Before Schedules*

Before the late eighteenth century, the Ottoman state was not directly concerned with the dissemination of education throughout its domains. Rather, all institutions were established by individuals and supported by religious foundations (sing. *vakıf*) set up for this purpose. Since there was no central supervising organ, it is difficult to regard the network of early modern educational institutions as a system in the full sense of the word. However, it is possible to speak of a certain hierarchy of institutions, from the primary, or Koran schools (sing. *sıbyan mektebi*), found in almost every Ottoman neighborhood, through the lower colleges (sing. *medrese*), and on to the higher colleges, which were located in the bigger cities. Instruction on all levels was conducted by *ulema* (members of the religious-legal-educational sector) and was based on a limited number of books, the list of which changed over time and from teacher to teacher.<sup>6</sup>

Both the *metkep* and the *medrese* were most commonly located in the vicinity of a mosque, sometimes forming part of the mosque complex (*külliye*). The *mektep* usually consisted of a single room in which students of different ages would normally be sitting cross-legged on cushions facing their teacher (*hoca*).<sup>7</sup> Other than the role it played in the social disciplining of young students, the main objective of the *mektep* was to inculcate basic religious knowledge, most notably to memorize Koran verses.<sup>8</sup> Instruction in the *mektep* was individual. The teacher dictated in turn a section of the text to each student, who wrote it on his personal wooden board (*yaz-boz tahtası*, or *lawḥa* in Arabic), and then returned to his place in order to memorize it. The room was thus filled at all times with the murmuring of students trying to commit bits of the Holy Scripture to memory. Once a student memorized his given section he would recite it to the *hoca* and then receive a new section to learn by heart.<sup>9</sup>

Like the pace of instruction and advancement, the temporal contours of the overall pedagogic process were also individually defined. A decree (*ferman*)

issued by Sultan Mahmud II in 1824 or 1825, which was aimed at spreading education through the *mekteps*, may serve to demonstrate this. The *ferman* did not set the age for entering the mosque school or for graduation. The length of instruction was likewise not fixed in years. Instead, students were expected to master certain materials before they reached puberty.<sup>10</sup> In other words, neither the duration of the pedagogic process nor the age it would begin were standardized; rather, both were defined with regard to the individual maturation process of each student.<sup>11</sup>

Certain collective temporal patterns were nevertheless imperative in order to ensure at least a minimum of regularity and synchronicity. Teaching in the *mektep* was conducted around the year with the exception of religious holidays. The children attended the *mektep* six days a week, but on Thursdays they were released at noon. Fridays were designated as the weekly holiday. Instruction normally started every day after the morning prayer and continued until noon, at which time the students would get up to one hour for resting and eating. Following the noon recess they would resume their studies until the afternoon prayer (*ikindi*).<sup>12</sup> Other than this very general time frame, there was hardly any time or space differentiation within school.

At whatever age, children who have completed their mosque school instruction could proceed on to the *medrese*, which served as a secondary school. Brinkley Messick argues that the sequential order of the pedagogic process was to a large extent governed by texts; the passage from the mosque school to the *medrese* represented the movement from the divine Koran as the main studied text to the earthly world of jurisprudence, or “from basic text to expansive commentary, from sacred to humanly constituted discourse.”<sup>13</sup>

Similar textual considerations structured the pedagogic process in the *medrese* itself. Instruction relied on texts, taught in a sequence which emanated from their perceived level of complexity. Students were expected to master certain texts before they could move on to the next level, but the duration in which to complete this task was not clearly defined. Fahri Unan notes that teaching depended on texts so much that courses were named after the specific books used for teaching them. Thus, for example, in the *tercid medresesi* of the lower level, the basic book was the *Harciye-i Tercid*. *Medreses* of the second level were named *Miftah*, after a book on rhetoric by the same name.<sup>14</sup> In fact, Unan forces the later concept of subjects onto the early modern educational mode. It may be more accurate to say that the teacher in the *medrese* taught a text rather than a course. Once the desired level has been reached, the student would receive a permission (*icazet*, *icazetname*) authorizing him to teach that specific text. The *icazet*, as Brinkley Messick has shown, was not a diploma testifying to the com-

pletion of a set curriculum. Rather, it was “a written text, giving evidence of a specific textual transmission, through a specific student-teacher link.”<sup>15</sup>

The student was thus climbing the hierarchy of knowledge as he progressed from the basic texts to the more advanced ones. Rather than defining the materials to be included in a specified period of studies, it was texts that governed the temporal dimension of instruction. Writing about the teaching mode in the Al-Azhar mosque in Cairo, Timothy Mitchell called the organizing logic of somewhat similar structuring patterns “the order of the text.”<sup>16</sup> It is worth noting that the temporal order of medieval European universities was similarly governed by the order of texts, although this started to change in the fourteenth century. Jewish education in Europe, by contrast, was governed by predefined durations from very early periods.<sup>17</sup>

Despite similarities in the principles governing the sequential structuring of instruction, on the day-to-day level Ottoman *medreses* differed from both al-Azhar and European universities. Although crude by modern standards, Ottoman *medreses*, like *mekteps*, had a distinct temporal order which regularized sequences, rates of recurrence, position in time, and durations.<sup>18</sup> In general, teaching was conducted throughout the year, except for the holy month of Ramadan and other religious festivities.<sup>19</sup> Tuesdays, Fridays, and in some cases Thursdays were left as free days. According to sources quoted by Cahid Baltacı, in fifteenth- and sixteenth-century Ottoman *medreses*, teaching started after the morning prayer and continued until noon. Within this time frame, between four and five sessions were to be given, but the duration of each session was not specified. According to other writers, sessions were also held following the afternoon prayer, and the time between sessions was devoted either to rest or to work in the mosque and the mosque’s library. It seems that these arrangements remained intact until the nineteenth century.<sup>20</sup>

These temporal patterns clearly indicate that everyday studying in the early-modern Ottoman *mektep* and *medrese*, just like the educational process in general, was not subject to standardized units of time. Textual considerations set the sequence of the pedagogic process. The completion of any given phase along that sequence was neither bound to a clearly defined time anchor, nor was it allocated a preset duration. Rather it was the ability of each student which determined his rate of progress. This “individual rhythm” stands in sharp contrast to the collective nature of modern educational models.

### *Timing Instruction*

Timetabled instruction, which was gradually applied in Ottoman schools during the second half of the nineteenth century, had originated in the scholarly

circles of fifteenth-century Europe. Historian Gerhard Dohrn-van Rossum argues that humanist scholars, who had to cope with growing volumes of knowledge, gradually started to regulate their studying by relying on standardized and preset durations.<sup>21</sup> Determining the materials to be studied according to preset time limits improved the efficiency and flexibility of the learning process. These practices quickly developed into a comprehensive system of time-bound instruction. By the late fifteenth century, students in German schools had already been divided into age and achievement groups, and classes were organized according to an hourly order. The system spread throughout Europe following the Reformation.

If Dohrn-van Rossum emphasized the efficiency facilitated by the new system, Foucault's analysis underlined its disciplinary dimension. Placing the modern school in the context of eighteenth-century "docility projects," Foucault pointed to the similarities between modern European schools and other "disciplinary" institutions, such as hospitals, prisons, and military barracks. In his famous discussion of disciplines, Foucault argued that during the eighteenth century, techniques such as enclosure, the cellular division of space, the creation of interchangeable space units, and the articulation of clearly defined sequences, were all incorporated into the pedagogic process.<sup>22</sup>

The modern school thus emerged as a distinct educational space, removed from the outside world, and spatially organized to ensure optimal conditions for the transmission of knowledge under strict surveillance. This educational space facilitated the replacement of individual tutoring by collective and simultaneous instruction and functioned like a "learning machine, but also as a machine for supervising, hierarchizing, rewarding." The temporal dimension was similarly divided and subjected to timetables made of equal and interchangeable time blocks. Audio signals such as bells signified the beginning and end of these prearranged durations and made simultaneous action possible. This spatial and temporal organization of daily instruction was in line with the principles which came to govern the overall pedagogic process too.<sup>23</sup> Such principles were almost universally applied as mass education gradually spread throughout Europe during the nineteenth century.

In the field of Middle Eastern history, Foucault's insights were employed by Timothy Mitchell and Brinkley Messick in their analyses of the implementation of modern instruction in nineteenth-century Egypt and Yemen, respectively. Both Mitchell and Messick tended to emphasize the dichotomies between modern educational and traditional models.<sup>24</sup> This perspective sat well with a whole body of knowledge which contrasted the allegedly secular nature of the new institutions and the essentially religious character of the old ones.<sup>25</sup>

More recent works on Ottoman education have warned against overemphasizing the dichotomy between traditional and modern methods. These works draw attention to similarities between instruction methods, cadres of teachers, and organizational modes, and showed that in reality, the transition from one model to the other was slow and gradual. They demonstrate that the boundaries were often blurred between the old institutions and the new ones, between religious and secular, modern and traditional, and even military and civilian courses of education.<sup>26</sup> The analysis offered below supports these qualifications. In contrast to what may be inferred from Mitchell's and Messick's accounts, European models such as the renowned Lancaster System were not imported wholesale and indiscriminately implemented in Ottoman schools. There were indeed significant changes between the old educational modes and the new models, but in reality, the slowness and gradualness of the transition wore away some of the differences and created a middle ground in which integration between old and new, foreign and indigenous, became possible.

In the first part of the chapter, which deals with the temporal construct of late Ottoman schools, I show that Ottoman administrators fully realized the benefits offered by standardized time organization and ceaselessly pushed the system towards rationalization. At the same time, however, they were forced to seek compromises between the standardized rationale of modern time organization methods and the nonstandard nature of the Ottoman hour system. The unique solutions devised in this process allowed for the creation of comprehensive temporal constructs that were not wholly incompatible with the temporal culture beyond the school walls. These trends were first evident in military schools.

### *Military Schools*

The first Ottoman institutions to depart from the educational practices of the *mektep* and the *medrese* were military schools, the earliest of which were established in the late eighteenth century.<sup>27</sup> Following the abolition of the Janissary corps in 1826, additional military schools were founded in order to meet the demands of the reformed army, founded by Sultan Mahmud II.<sup>28</sup> Soon it was obvious that the cadets entering these higher schools lacked preparatory education, and so most of the time was devoted to acquiring such basic skills as reading, arithmetic, Arabic, and military tactics.<sup>29</sup> In 1845 it was decided to establish military preparatory schools to educate candidates for the higher military schools. The system of preparatory schools developed slowly, and their number increased to sixteen over the following decades. In 1875 it was decided to establish a system of military elementary schools (*askeri rüşdiye*) to

train children for the requirements of the military secondary schools already in existence. Initially nine such schools were founded and by 1892 there were twenty-seven military elementary schools all over the empire.<sup>30</sup> Thus, within a few decades, a whole system of military education was constructed from the top down. By the late nineteenth century, a young boy entering the *askeri rüşdiye* at the age of ten could spend between nine and eleven years in the system before graduating from the War Academy (*Mektep-i Fünun-ı Harbiye*, or simply *Mektep-i Harbiye*).<sup>31</sup>

Daily routines in the new institutions seem to have been consciously set and codified from a very early stage, and yet they were still firmly embedded within earlier practices. Take for example the daily routine of the War Academy, included in an internal code issued in 1835 or 1836.<sup>32</sup> According to the code, cadets were to be awakened before the morning prayer, take their ablutions, and perform the prayer together. After the prayer they would rehearse their lessons until the school opened. The opening time was to be determined according to the length of the night and day. The first session was to last two hours, followed by a break, the duration of which was not defined.

The second session was to continue until the noon prayer, followed once again by a break. It was specified that the break was not to exceed one hour so that “time would not be lost on futile games” (*mel’abat-ı bihude ile izaa-ı evkat ettirilmeyerek*). The end of the next session was once again marked by the call for prayer, this time the afternoon prayer (*ikindi*). This prayer too was to be collectively performed and was followed by another hour and a half of studying. At ten thirty (*alaturka*, that is, one and a half hours before sunset), the cadets would get time off for eating and resting, and then rehearse their lessons from the end of the evening prayer until the night prayer. Needless to say, these prayers too were to be performed collectively. The beginning and ending of each lesson, as well as meal times throughout the day, were to be marked by a drum.

Although this code represented an attempt to place all daily activities within a clear time frame, the structure was still far from complete. To use Eviatar Zerubavel’s criteria, the sequence was indeed preset, but the durations and the location in time of some of the stages were omitted. This is the case, for example, with the unspecified duration of the first break. Furthermore, the reliance on the prayer cycle robbed the proposed structure of its stability and rendered it elastic in nature in relation to clock time. In the shorter days of the winter, for instance, the second class would necessarily have been shorter, as the noon prayer which marked the end of the lesson moved closer toward the morning prayer.

Codified daily routines grew increasingly more detailed throughout the

nineteenth century and increasingly relied on the *alaturka* hour system rather than on the prayer cycle. This elaboration of the temporal order was accompanied by a parallel tightening of time discipline through surveillance and punishment. A code issued by the War Academy in 1847 included very clear definitions of “being late” as well as detailed surveillance procedures and sanctions aimed at deterring those who violated the temporal order. Within the boundaries of the school, late arrival was defined with reference to the drum, which marked the beginning of each lesson. The drum, in turn, was to be beaten according to the times specified in the daily schedule (*cetvel*). All cadets were expected to report to their class within five minutes of the sounding of the drum. Those who failed to do so were to be reported and forced to spend their breaks in class.<sup>33</sup>

Cadets leaving the precinct of the academy on official vacations were expected to report back for a roll call conducted on a specific day and hour. Late arrivals were to be measured against that previously set time, which was to be defined in terms of *alaturka* hours. Those not present at the roll call were considered to have returned late, and if they could not provide a legitimate reason, they were liable to sanctions. In such cases it was the gatekeeper (*kapıcı*) who was supposed to report the names of the latecomers and to record the time they actually arrived.<sup>34</sup> This procedure demonstrates that the school walls marked not only the physical borders of the school’s space but also the boundaries of its distinctive temporal construct. The *kapıcı* was therefore charged not only with preventing trespassing, but also with reporting transgressions of this temporal construct.

Many of the procedures formulated in the 1847 code were valid for decades to come.<sup>35</sup> A case taken from a penalty logbook of one of the sections of the War Academy may serve as an indication that these procedures were actually implemented. According to an entry from April 24, 1871, a cadet from Damascus by the name of Mustafaoğlu Nuri Efendi Şam[i] did not report for the inspection held at eleven thirty (*alaturka*, or half an hour before sunset).<sup>36</sup> It was only at six at night (around midnight, mean time) that he returned, and for that he was denied permission to leave school for two weeks.<sup>37</sup>

The need to discipline large numbers of cadets, to keep them busy at all times, and to synchronize their activities, can explain the adoption and later elaboration of codified daily routines. It was one technique out of many, one component in a comprehensive system of control and surveillance. Examined from this angle, the modern school was not dissimilar to the barracks. The main characteristics of the temporal order of Ottoman military schools were indeed comparable to those found in Ottoman military units at the same period. In that

sense, they truly prepared the cadets for military service in a time-controlled environment. However, the disciplinary dimension alone cannot account for the gradual change in instructional programs and in pedagogical methods. Those changes had more to do with the need to transmit ever increasing volumes of knowledge. Subjecting the process of learning to temporal regulation allowed flexibility in the organization of studies and increased efficiency through the setting of time limits.<sup>38</sup>

This logic was partly adopted by the founders of the first modern military schools. Even in the late eighteenth century, programs in the earliest military education institutions defined the overall duration of instruction, broke this duration into years, and determined what subjects were to be taught each year.<sup>39</sup> Defining the sequence of subjects to be taught was still in line with the *medrese* tradition. But the definition of set durations was a marked innovation, since it set clear time limits to the instructional process and defined what was to be transmitted in any given period. However, in contrast to European models, the early Ottoman programs did not go beyond the most general definitions of durations.

Furthermore, it seems clear that at least in the early years of the new military schools founded or reopened after 1826, even these general programs were not implemented, and the new pedagogic model remained mainly on paper. Despite the apparent change in the structuring of the pedagogical process, actual teaching still followed the old manner. Rather than concurrently studying an assortment of courses, each allocated its time according to a set schedule, Ottoman cadets would normally learn only one subject, or more specifically one text, at any given time. It was only after completing one text that they could proceed to the next.<sup>40</sup>

Nonetheless, the growing complexity of the military profession during the nineteenth century required constant elaboration of the teaching programs in Ottoman military schools. The need to incorporate more and more subjects into the program necessitated a more refined organization of teaching time, and gradually the old mode of instruction was abandoned in favor of a multiple class system based on detailed instruction programs and minute allocation of instruction time. By the 1870s, programs specified how many lessons per week should be given in each subject.<sup>41</sup>

To conclude this section, it may be said that the founders of the first Ottoman military schools turned to new practices of time organization in order to achieve both higher levels of discipline and efficiency in instruction. The creation of detailed and codified daily routines was clearly an innovation when measured against the more lax practices in the *mektepe* and *medrese*. However, as

already noted in chapter 3, rather than introducing a whole new temporal construct, the first attempts were aimed at codifying the practices of the old system.

Although they were no doubt inspired by European models, both daily routines and instruction methods in the first military schools involved a blending of new educational models with the inherited mode of instruction common in the *mektep* and *medrese*. As years went by, a drifting away from these earlier practices became more and more apparent, and by the turn of the century, carefully drawn timetables had become not only an organizational tool, but something of an ideal too. By that time, similar tables have acquired a parallel status in the expanding civil education system as well.

### *Introducing the New Method*

The expansion of the state apparatus during the reign of Mahmud II (1808–1839) and the Tanzimat period (1839–1876) created a dire need for trained administrators. The first civil educational institutions intended to address that need were established in 1839. At roughly the same time, governing bodies were created in order to promote and supervise educational reform. The actual expansion of a school network, however, progressed slowly.<sup>42</sup> The first two model elementary schools (*rüşdiye*) were established in Istanbul in 1847, and five more were opened in the capital in the course of the following year. The first elementary schools in the provinces were founded at roughly the same time, and during the early 1850s, a more general policy for the dissemination of education in the provinces was formulated. In 1858 the first elementary school for girls was opened, a first step towards the creation of a network of such schools throughout the empire.<sup>43</sup>

Instruction in the new schools was to be conducted according to models borrowed from Europe, which were later adapted to Ottoman needs. The individual who is most commonly identified with the creation of the new model of instruction was Selim Sabit (1829–1910). After completing his *medrese* training, Sabit studied in the teacher's seminary for *rüşdiye* instructors and later continued his studies in Paris. Upon returning to Istanbul, he was nominated principal of the elite high school, the Mektep-i Sultani (or Galatasaray Lisesi), and later held a number of official positions in the Ministry of Education. Sabit published a few textbooks on various subjects but his most influential one was no doubt his *Rehnüma-ı Muallimin* (Guidebook for Teachers), published in 1870.<sup>44</sup>

Sabit's book has been discussed by several scholars, so here I shall only draw attention to some of the temporal aspects of Sabit's educational model, and to its innovativeness with regard to the old teaching methods of the *mektep* and the *medrese*.<sup>45</sup> The importance of Sabit's model is almost self-evident considering

the fact that it was officially accepted by the Ministry of Education as the basis for structuring the elementary schools (*ibtidai*), which were founded throughout the empire beginning in 1872.<sup>46</sup>

Criticizing some of the common teaching methods of the day, Sabit offered a system which would gain from the advantages of all, but avoid their shortcomings. Sabit referred to his model as “the new method” (*usul-i cedid*), a term previously used to designate the teaching of several subjects simultaneously, as opposed to the old method of the *mektep*.<sup>47</sup> It seems that after Sabit’s book was officially adopted, the term came to be more specifically connected with his system.

According to Sabit’s model, students were to be divided into classes according to educational years, and every class was to have its own classroom. The class in turn was to be divided into divisions (*şubeler*), according to the students’ age and ability. The students of each division were to be seated in the same row. This spatial organization was supposed to allow the collective instruction of large numbers of students without ignoring their individual abilities.<sup>48</sup> On the temporal level, the new model replaced the diachronicity of individual tutoring with the simultaneity of collective instruction. This was no doubt a dramatic break from earlier modes of instruction. Infamously identified to this day with the sound of the bell—or, in the Ottoman case, a whistle—this simultaneity was to become one of the most distinctive traits of the new model.

The temporal organization, like the spatial layout, was clearly intended to achieve the efficient transmission of knowledge. The overall duration of elementary education was set at four years, and the subjects were organized according to the years. More specifically, every day at school was organized according to timetables (using *alaturka* time) which were to hang in every classroom. Sabit did not go into detail with regard to the structure of the schedule. He did nonetheless recommend that in the first grade, it would not consist of more than two lessons, each between half an hour and three quarters of an hour long. In the higher grades of elementary school, the day was to consist of up to three lessons, each lasting at least three quarters of an hour. The rest of the day was to be devoted to rest and rehearsal of previously learned materials. The teacher was supposed to make sure that classes and breaks started at their appointed time. The students too were expected to arrive on time, according to the timetable. Students arriving to school more than two hours after the designated time were to be denied entrance for the whole day.<sup>49</sup>

Although in a rather crude fashion, Sabit’s model introduced some of the characteristics of modern time organization and was certainly very far from the traditional mode of temporal structuring. More than anything else, it was

the daily schedule which embodied the logic of the new organizing principle of educational time. Knowledge was to be divided into subjects, and each was allocated its duration and location in time. The pedagogical process was time framed, and instruction was timetabled.

Similar patterns are evident in contemporary regulatory documents. Internal codes of specific educational institutions which were established in the late 1860s and early 1870s usually adopted the modern mode of timetabled education and tried to fit it into the Ottoman hour system. For example, the code of the School of Industry (*Mektep-i Sanayi*), founded in 1868, stipulated that the students' meals, lights-out, and wake-up were each to be performed at an appointed time (*vakt-i muayyen*). On the other hand, times were not always clearly defined, and when they were, they usually bore the fluctuating nature of the prayer cycle. For example, the students would start their studies "early in the morning" and complete them "two hours before the noon prayer." The students would then be sent to their workplaces and remain there for six or seven hours, according to the season.<sup>50</sup>

This arrangement clearly does not fit the rationale of a program, which dictates a given number of lessons to be taught every week, according to a schedule. The changing duration between the morning prayer and the noon prayer throughout the year would have necessarily meant that the length of the morning lessons would change accordingly. The teaching programs and internal codes of the School of Civil Service and the Darüşşafaka boarding school also suggest that by the last decades of the Tanzimat, the more complex temporal order of the *usul-i cedid* was already accepted, at least in some institutions.<sup>51</sup> At that point, however, the transition to a system which was fully based on standardized durations was still far from complete. It seems that the varied nature of Ottoman efforts in the field of education during the Tanzimat era was manifested in heterogeneity of temporal constructs. The same blending of modern time organization practices with old Ottoman temporal patterns is evident also in the Internal Code for Public Rüşdiye Schools, issued in September 1870.<sup>52</sup> What is worthy of our attention here is that rather than governing time organization in a single institution, this code represented an early attempt to set a uniform temporal order for a whole network of schools.

### *The Hamidian Order and the Centralization of Teaching Time*

The effort to expand and centralize state education was directly related to the need felt in ruling circles to inculcate a sense of Ottoman collective identity in order to counter separatist inclinations of various populations throughout the empire. These inclinations were fueled in part by increasing foreign in-



FIGURE 7. Teaching time: A clock overlooking the internal court of the elite school Mektepe-i Sultani, 1880. Library of Congress.

volvement in the field of education. During the second half of the nineteenth century, missionary organizations doubled their efforts to establish educational institutions throughout the Ottoman domains. Thousands of Ottoman subjects attended these schools, which no doubt employed timetabled instruction based on the mean-time hour system.<sup>53</sup> It is noteworthy, for example, that as early as 1868 a mechanical clock was placed on the façade of Mektepe-i Sultani, established as a joint project of the Ottoman and French governments (see fig. 7). Unlike other civilian Ottoman schools, which at this point still relied on the prayer cycle and *alaturka* hours, the Mektepe-i Sultani kept *alafanga* time.<sup>54</sup>

Direct foreign involvement in the field of education was thus important for the spread of modern time organization practices in its own right. It was even more important considering the effect it had on Ottoman educational institutions. According to Benjamin Fortna, the Mektepe-i Sultani served as model for the entire system of the preparatory middle schools (*i'dadi*) during the

Hamidian era.<sup>55</sup> Betül Başaran has developed a similar argument with regard to the effect of American missionary schools on Ottoman educational reform in general.<sup>56</sup> It is thus not inconceivable that the rational practices of time organization of the foreign schools had their impact on the temporal order in Ottoman schools.

If the foreign schools were sometimes seen as exemplary models, they were more often considered a danger. The efforts made by missionaries of various nationalities to expand their educational networks were supported by their respective governments. In their attempt to win the hearts and minds of Ottoman subjects and to inculcate in them feelings of sympathy and admiration towards foreign countries, the missionaries were constantly undermining Ottoman efforts to legitimize their own rule over their Christian subjects. The missionary activity in the field of education was thus perceived by the Ottomans as a threat to the very existence of their empire. The Hamidian educational project was in many senses a response to that threat. In the words of Benjamin Fortna, it was an attempt to “fight fire with fire,” or to adopt European models (adapted to Ottoman needs) in order to ward off foreign encroachment. It was hoped that through universal education, a sense of collective Ottoman identity would be promoted to safeguard the unity of the empire.<sup>57</sup>

It is against this conflicted background that we must view late Ottoman educational reform and the related changes in the organization of teaching time. During his long reign, Sultan Abdülhamid II immensely expanded public education by creating a fully integrated, highly centralized school system.<sup>58</sup> A set of school regulations issued in 1892 demonstrates that the temporal construct devised for those schools facilitated their integration into that centralized system. Certainly, quite a few of the time organization practices which appeared in these regulations had already been included in earlier codes; the weaving of these elements into a comprehensive temporal construct was nevertheless new. Another marked innovation was that in these regulations, clearly drawn tables determined all dimensions of the time order, thus allowing unprecedented levels of temporal regularity. From the macro level of the pedagogic process, to the micro level of daily routines, sequential structures, durations, locations in time, and rates of recurrence were all defined with maximum precision. It is clock hours, rather than the prayer cycle, that form the basis of the program.

On the macro level, the overall duration of instruction was defined for each institution in terms of educational years, and all subjects were divided according to the years in which they were to be taught. Charts specified the number of weekly lessons, all of standardized duration, to be given in each subject.<sup>59</sup> A calendar for the educational year was set, defining its opening and closing dates

as well as the dates of all vacations. Rates of recurrence were set for certain procedures, such as examinations and filing periodic reports of various kinds.<sup>60</sup> At the micro level of daily routines, the change is even more apparent. If only a few decades earlier, daily routines were organized as narratives, by the early 1890s, the temporal construct in Ottoman schools was mostly defined by timetables.<sup>61</sup> Let us examine, for example, the structure of a school day as it was sanctioned in the code of the *i'dadi* boarding schools:<sup>62</sup>

MINUTE	HOUR	
	2	Rehearsal of previous lessons (dressing and washing are included in this time). In short days, one hour and a half.
30	0	Recess . . . (the day students will be gathered and inspected during this break).
	1	First Lesson
30	0	Recess
	1	Second Lesson
30	1	Prayer, meal and recess

The table went on, breaking the daily routine into its components, determining the sequence and duration of each activity with utmost clarity. All classes were of standard length and were thus compatible with the tables arranging the yearly and weekly distribution of lessons. However, while the timetable organized sequence and duration, it did not specify beginning and ending times in terms of clock hours. Refraining from setting hours was directly related to the nature of the *alaturka* hour system.<sup>63</sup> Since this system counted two cycles of twelve hours from sunset to sunset, and sunset time varies according to the season, it offers a rather shaky basis for clock-based temporal constructs that are designed to facilitate regularity. Temporal constructs that were nevertheless based on this system defined different working hours for different seasons.<sup>64</sup>

The timetable cited above was an attempt to offer a different solution to that difficulty. As already noted, the table itself does not specify its location in time, or in other words, the beginning time of the daily routine. The “time anchor” of the schedule is defined in two sentences written above the table. The students, it says, shall be awakened five or six hours before noon, according to the season. Footnotes below the table explain that the duration of the morning inspection and of the breaks can be stretched or cut shorter depending on the season.<sup>65</sup>

Rather than relying on the *alaturka* hour system directly, the temporal construct outlined here referred to midday as its time anchor. When compared with sunset time, midday time varies to a much lesser degree between days and thus

offers a more stable reference point. Thus, although the *alaturka* hour system remained the general temporal framework, daily schedules were being defined in terms of such and such number of clock hours before or after midday.<sup>66</sup> The implication of this arrangement in real life was that the standard length of the lessons was maintained at all times, and the fluctuations in the length of daylight time were absorbed in other time slots. This way, the standard duration of all lessons was kept, and the daily timetable remained compatible with the general teaching programs, which defined the number of weekly hours to be allocated to each subject.

The organization of the page in which the timetable appeared is indicative of the tension between the rationale of modern temporal constructs and the Ottoman hour system. The rigid slots of the timetable, representing standardized durations, simply could not accommodate all the information concerning the application of the timetable in different seasons. Some of this information was thus pushed into the text lines above and below the neatly drawn rubrics of the table. These text lines were in fact instructions explaining how to bend the strait lines of the timetable so as to render it compatible with the fluctuating basis of the Ottoman hour system. Rather than abolishing earlier practices altogether and instilling a completely alien model in their stead, this arrangement represents a typical Ottoman attempt to reconcile old and new, foreign and indigenous.

### *Time-Disciplined Students*

Despite their seemingly floating nature, timetables in late Ottoman schools did not remain on some elusive level. Regulatory codes often specified in detail just how the abstract order of the timetable was to materialize in the schools' daily routines. The lines between the slots of the timetable, for example, were clearly marked by sensible signals such as whistles or drums. Furthermore, moving between time and space slots was often accompanied by brief rituals of order. For example, upon entering the clearly delineated space and distinct temporal construct of their *i'dadi* school, students would go through an inspection, just before entering classes.<sup>67</sup> In order to enter the classroom at the beginning of every lesson and leave at break time, students would line up in pairs and do it in an "orderly" fashion.<sup>68</sup> Such practices would have made the virtual slots of the timetable very much felt in real life.

Writing about their schooling experience in various locations and on different levels of the Ottoman education system, graduates quite often refer to these practices. Lessons and breaks of standardized durations and the audio signals (whistles, bells, drums) marking their beginning and end are often mentioned.

Describing the “modern” nature of the elementary school he attended in Beşiktaş on the shores of the Bosphorus, the famous historian of art Celal Esat Arseven (1876–1972) notes that classes were “divided into hours, and a quarter of an hour break time was inserted between them.” Break times, he adds, were announced by a whistle.<sup>69</sup>

Some authors explicitly connect this scheduled temporal order with the strict discipline typical of late Ottoman schools.<sup>70</sup> İsmayıl Hakkı Baltacıoğlu (1889–1978), a leading pedagogue and writer, offers a rather gloomy description of his middle school years. Soon after he completed his elementary education in 1899, Baltacıoğlu enrolled at the Vefa İdadisi in Istanbul. Criticizing the monolithic and dull nature of the school, he writes: “We enter classes with [the sound of] a drum. We listen to the same negative attitude, memorize and answer with the same boredom, and take tests saying it’s a matter of luck. . . . All along there is a sense of deep indifference.”<sup>71</sup> The goal of the *ıdadî* schools, he goes on to explain, was not to raise people for the Turkish nation but rather to raise *efendis* for Abdülhamid. It was enough to see the outfit of the students to understand how people were perceived within the school compound. This uniform, Baltacıoğlu continues, belonged to an era that valued discipline, sameness of attire, and the uniformity of rote memorization, all in temporal simultaneity (*saat birliğinde*).<sup>72</sup>

It was no doubt the threat of penalty which made the boundaries of time slots impossible to ignore. A timetabled temporal construct requires time discipline, and that rests on the application of sanctions. Therefore, the codes of the late nineteenth century included not only the structuring of a temporal order, but the measures to be taken against all violators of that order. Students were repeatedly instructed to abide by the sanctioned times and threatened with punishment in case they failed to do so. All late arrivals were to be reported and recorded in a notebook kept specifically for that purpose.<sup>73</sup>

One of the most common penalties was to deprive the offenders of what was designated as “free time.” The lists of offences included in these codes normally specified the price to be paid for every offence in terms of free time. By way of illustration, reporting late to the morning inspection in the *rüşdiye* schools was classified as a “detention” (*tevkif*) offence, along with a number of other transgressions, and was punished by denying recess time the following day.<sup>74</sup> Thus, the perceived severity of offences was also converted to standardized time units, which could then be deprived. Students could be absolved in return for a given number of citations they had accumulated, based on a set “price list.”<sup>75</sup>

In *Falaka* (Bastinado), his memoir of his school years, Ahmed Rasim (1865–1932), one of the most prominent writers of the post-Tanzimat period, vividly

describes his life as a student in the famous boarding school, the Darüßsafaka, founded in 1873. Rasim entered the school, known for its strict discipline, at some point around 1878, when he was about twelve.<sup>76</sup> Both the spatial and the temporal organization of the school were imprinted in the young boy's mind. Life at the school, he writes, was spent in rooms that were each allocated to one human activity, such as eating, talking and meeting, working, studying, worshipping, and sleeping. He also notes that life was divided into ordered intervals, and then specifies the daily routine: waking up just before the morning prayer, taking the ablutions, praying, eating breakfast, rehearsing previously learned lessons, studying. "In short, meal, rehearsal, lesson, prayer, recess break—like I said, [everything] was in timely and ordered intervals." Rasim was clearly experiencing a kind of a culture shock. "This school," he writes, "did not resemble any other place beyond its walls. One whistle would make all students leave the rooms, enter the rooms, make them eat and drink, go to sleep or wake up. I was [living under] primitive discipline."<sup>77</sup> Rasim's description emphasizes the strangeness of life under a fully timetabled temporal regime which divides the stream of life into its most basic components and allocates each activity its own time and space slot. Locked away from the outside world in this seemingly unnatural system, the young boy found it hard to adapt. Indeed, the time regime in late Ottoman schools clearly affected every aspect of the students' lives, including their emotional lives.<sup>78</sup>

### *Recess: On Time and Emotions*

At the center of the story at the beginning of this chapter is a dispute over a five-minute disagreement between two timepieces. As noted in previous chapters, a five-minute gap between clocks was not at all rare in the early twentieth century, and yet in this case the discrepancy develops into a fight over the quality of the watches, and by extension, of their owners. At first glance this is a silly fight, but a deeper look reveals that beneath the arguments actually made, there was a deeper level of emotion that was not explicitly expressed. Placing the incident within the school's temporal construct reveals that in fact, those five minutes were merely a pretext for a fight that was really about something else altogether.

The author carefully places the incident on a Thursday afternoon, at a time when most students would be released to go home for their weekly day off. This practice in turn was shaped by one of the basic conventions of Ottoman temporal culture, namely, that Friday was the culmination of the weekly cycle. Narrating what are no doubt memories of his own oppressive school, author Falih Rıfki (1894-1971) writes that at the age of twelve, between each two Fridays

there lay a child's week that stretched not six but sixty days.<sup>79</sup> Judging by the memoirs quoted above, many children shared this experience and impatiently awaited the weekend, when they finally had the chance to go home. If only they had a home to go to. Durmuş, as we learn toward the end of the story, has lost his mother, and the emotional response of the narrator to the insults flung at the watch given to him by his mother suggests that she too was either dead or far away. What is clear is that the two boys usually spent their Thursday nights at school.

This does not entirely explain why Durmuş is in such a hurry to leave school after receiving the headmaster's permission. He cites the hour—twenty-five minutes past ten—as the reason for his rush, assuming that his friend (and the readers) would understand this. But what was self-explanatory then may not be as clear today. Twenty-five minutes past ten meant about an hour and a half before sunset. It is worth noting that this time of the day had a special significance in Ottoman temporal culture. In contrast to artificially lit societies, in which sunset often goes unnoticed, in the Ottoman Empire daytime and nighttime were clearly distinguished from each other on a number of levels which seem to have reinforced each other. Sunset marked the end of the daily cycle of religious worship, of another round of clock hours, and of the calendar day. The nineteenth century had witnessed many changes in urban space and time, and yet for shopkeepers in the bazaar, boarding school students, government officials, and many others, sunset still marked the end of the day.<sup>80</sup> Especially for women and children, sunset was a time to be inside, to be home.<sup>81</sup> Falih Rıfki remembers how he used to rush home at this time, just before the evening call for prayer would blend with “the sounds of children, women and trays coming from dining rooms lit with dim lights in the lower floors of Muslim homes.”<sup>82</sup>

Staying at school when the rest of the children get to go home must have felt lonely, and indeed, once offered the opportunity to leave, Durmuş immediately seizes it. With even his Thursday night ally bailing out on him, the narrator is left all by himself. The nearing sunset only exacerbates the feeling of loneliness. Thus, the anger the narrator feels toward his friend does not stem merely from the disagreement of their timepieces but from his feelings of abandonment and betrayal. The analysis demonstrates not only the way temporal constructs may shape daily routines but also that widely held temporal conventions are associated with specific emotional scripts.<sup>83</sup> Since at sunset most people go home, those left behind might enact a script that causes them to experience pain and a sense of being abandoned. They may have been just as alone all day long but it is now, at sunset, that loneliness is felt more acutely. It is on such widely held scripts that the author relies when building his little clock-bound drama.

### *Time-Disciplined Teachers*

It was not just students who were bound by the all-encompassing temporal construct of late Ottoman schools; teachers were also expected to abide by those carefully drafted schedules. For instance, the code of the *rüşdiye* schools in Istanbul obliged teachers to be in class at the appointed times and never leave before the lesson's time ended. Moreover, teachers arriving ten minutes after the designated hour were deemed not to have arrived at all. Pay for that lesson would then be deducted from their salary. Teachers whose tardiness had become a habit (*evkat-i muayyenesinden sonra gelmeyi itiyat eden muallimler*) were to be reported by the schoolmaster to the administrative body of the *rüşdiye* schools.<sup>84</sup>

If the temporal construct was dictated by timetables of the type discussed above, its content was governed by charts of teaching hours included in instruction programs. Actual transmission of the content outlined in these programs was to be done based on officially approved textbooks only.<sup>85</sup> As already explained, each subject was allocated a specific number of lessons per week. The code of the *i'dadi* schools also included detailed instructions for the organization of a weekly schedule. It was stipulated, for example, that with the exception of French and Turkish, there should be one day or two days at the most between two weekly classes in the same subject. Turkish and French could be taught on consecutive days or even consecutive hours, but never more than two hours daily.<sup>86</sup>

Since the duration of lessons was by now fully standardized, the words "lessons" and "hours" were often used interchangeably in these charts.<sup>87</sup> That was not merely a matter of semantics. Whereas the old sundial-based temporal hours changed across seasons and latitudes, the clock hour represented a uniform duration, a standard "block of time."<sup>88</sup> Just like bricks of standard size render building easier, these blocks of time facilitated the construction of rational temporal constructs. Just like bricks, it was possible to change the structure at will, simply by adding and subtracting time blocks, or by interchanging their temporal locations. This was indeed the practice used in the curricular reforms of the Hamidian Era.<sup>89</sup> The ability to define for each subject an overall duration of standard and interchangeable units, and then to distribute these units at will across the year, offered both accuracy and flexibility in the construction of instruction programs.

But this system offered another quality, no less crucial for the modernizing Ottoman state mechanism: an unprecedented level of control over the growing education system. Through charts of instruction hours, the ideological and moral prioritization of the Hamidian regime was translated into standard time

units. In sharp contradiction to the textual order of early modern institutions, during the Hamidian era the perceived importance of a subject was manifested through the number of hours devoted to it. Religious instruction, for example, was clearly deemed more important than geography for elementary school girls, as in the first three grades it was allocated four to eight weekly hours, whereas geography was assigned two weekly hours at the most.<sup>90</sup>

The use of instructional hour charts and timetables not only allowed for the setting of the educational agenda with utmost accuracy; it also facilitated the strict imposition of that agenda. The teachers were warned time and again not to deviate from the prescribed program and threatened with sanctions if they failed to comply.<sup>91</sup> Breaking down the educational agenda and boxing all its components in clearly delineated time slots rendered deviations from the prescribed program easy to spot. The case of Midhat Bey, a history teacher at the School of Civil Service may serve to illustrate this point. In mid-April 1890, the secretariat of the Yıldız palace issued a directive following complaints raised against the teacher.<sup>92</sup> What concerns us here is that Midhat Bey was allegedly not using the history textbook which had been previously adopted by the school and was further “wasting time” during classes with “unworthy words.” Teachers were thus warned not to waste time on unnecessary topics which were not included in the textbooks.

The decree clearly referred to time as a resource which was to be appropriately spent. It was the official instruction program and the officially approved textbooks which defined what was appropriate and worthy of instruction time. Wondering off the clearly marked path of the official program was considered to be a waste of time and was therefore prohibited. The decree clearly demonstrates the intimate connection between the new temporal construct and state control of the pedagogical process. Just as students seated in their straight lines were exposed at all times to the inspecting eye of the teacher, so were teachers and schoolmasters constrained within the slots of timetables and charts of instruction hours. Just as students were not allowed to leave their seat without permission, neither could teachers deviate from the dictate of the charts. In other words, they could change neither the structure of the temporal order nor its content, both of which were dictated by the central government. Indeed, for students and teachers alike, when in class or during breaks, there was no escaping the timetable.

This strict time discipline was complemented by educational content that presented temporal order as essential for individual and national progress. Through its standardized textbooks, the late Ottoman education system repeatedly emphasized such values as time thrift, punctuality, and temporal order,

and harnessed them to the ideological wagon of the Hamidian and Young Turk regimes.

### *The “Value of Time” in Ottoman Textbooks*

The average Ottoman student would have encountered time as a topic while studying a number of subjects and in a variety of contexts. Both boys and girls in Ottoman schools began to learn about time already in their first grades.<sup>93</sup> The textbooks used in these classes shed light on the way time was perceived and conveyed to young students. The Hamidian education system greatly relied on standardized textbooks. Conceived as an indigenous response to threats posed by foreign powers, textbooks were considered by the Hamidian regime to be extremely important for the educational process. Thus the government closely monitored the contents of textbooks, which therefore can certainly be seen as representative of the Hamidian agenda.<sup>94</sup> In accordance with the two main currents within this agenda, textbooks were intended to instill positive utilitarian knowledge alongside authoritarian values.<sup>95</sup>

To begin with the more utilitarian aspect of “teaching time,” textbooks used in the lower grades provided basic information concerning the topic. One book, for example, familiarized the students with the division of time into standardized durations such as hours and minutes, and explained how to tell time using mechanical clocks. In addition, it provided details concerning the working principles of sundials and pointed out where in Istanbul such dials could be found. Further information was given about longer durations such as weeks and months, and about the different calendars then in use in the Ottoman Empire.<sup>96</sup>

Naturally, books written for higher grades were more detailed and offered more substantial information. A book composed for girls in the sixth grade, for instance, included a section about the differences between Ottoman and European hour systems and about various calendars and clocks, including a rather detailed description of the apparatus of mechanical clocks.<sup>97</sup>

I would like to focus, however, on a short text entitled “The Value of Time” which immediately followed this informational material. Both the title and the content of the essay were clearly influenced by the discourse of productivity and time thrift which began to develop during the late 1860s and 1870s, especially in Young Ottoman circles. Ebüziyya Tevfik, for example, used the same title, “The Value of Time (and the Price of Sloth),” for his translation of Benjamin Franklin’s *The Way to Wealth* (1758). As shown in chapter 6, the dichotomist moral view which is implied in Tevfik’s title—and related ideas about the desired approach toward time—first appeared in pages of novels, newspapers, and journals in the 1870s. By the 1890s, this discourse was fully adopted by the

ruling elite and incorporated into the official educational agenda. As such, “the value of time” was force-fed to tens of thousands of students enrolled in schools throughout the empire. Inculcation of the interrelated ideologies of progress and time thrift, it is readily understood, was thus closely linked with reading, which was in itself presented as means to attain personal and societal advancement.<sup>98</sup>

The sixth graders’ essay about the value of time argued that one must strive to perform all duties “on time” and to waste as little time as possible. The author explained that if one makes a habit of doing everything within the appropriate time and using time well, she attains complete order in her life. If a student grows accustomed to performing all her duties on time, she will progress and achieve her goals in life.<sup>99</sup> The rest of the essay was devoted to the importance of time thrift. Quoting what he claimed to be an English proverb, “time is money” (*vakit nakittir*), the author explained that “either in the field, at school, or in the house, wasting time unnecessarily is very harmful.” The essay demonstrates how the highly regulated temporal order of the school and the educational content it conveyed mutually reinforced each other. The text referred to the strict schedule by which students had to abide in order to illustrate a more general lesson, namely, the importance of “doing everything on time.” In so doing, the text also justified the school’s strict temporal order and spurred the students to live up to its standards and internalize its rationale.<sup>100</sup>

The emphasis on industry and individual effort stemmed from a new perception of national power and material progress as the sum of the concentrated endeavors of the entire population. Thus, it was necessary to encourage productivity in order to raise accumulated wealth. Similarly it was crucial to inculcate a sense of order and discipline that would ensure that all workers remain compliant in the places allocated to them, and to promote awareness of the importance of thrift in terms of both money and time.

This trend is evident not only in books on “useful knowledge” but in other fields as well. Many of the textbooks used in classes on ethics (*ahlak*) included a section entitled *Sai* (effort or hard work), which normally stressed the importance and benefit of hard work on the one hand and the dangers of indolence on the other.<sup>101</sup> Typically constructed along this dichotomist axis, the texts identified hard work with a long list of virtues and promised that the industrious individual is rewarded by various material, physical, and mental benefits.<sup>102</sup> Laziness (*tenbellik, kesalet*), by contrast, was linked to every possible vice. One author, for instance, emphasized that it is only through hard work that progress is possible, and supported his words with the well-known verse from the Koran

(Najm 39): “A person has nothing but what he has endeavored for” (*Wa’an laysa li-l-insān illā mā sa‘ā*).<sup>103</sup>

Another book written for the early grades of the *rüşdiyye* and *i‘dadiye* schools, using the traditional form of questions and answers, explained that when one keeps busy with work, time passes faster and hours seem like minutes. During times of inactivity, on the other hand, minutes may seem as long as days and even years.<sup>104</sup> Addressing another question, the teacher explained that order exists when all our things are in place and when we complete all our duties on time.<sup>105</sup> While the weight assigned to time awareness was without precedent, the warning against idleness was not entirely new.<sup>106</sup> Indeed, idleness was long considered a threat to social order, and in this respect the textbooks on ethics represented a continuity with the past that went beyond references to religious sources or preferences of format.

The importance of hard work, however, was explained in different terms than in earlier periods. Working hard was now presented not only as personally rewarding but as a social and even patriotic obligation, within a more general discourse that emphasized such values as loyalty, respect for authority, and duty. This discourse was intended to buttress the neo-patrimonial order of the Hamidian state.<sup>107</sup> In Hamidian textbooks, everyone had their place in society, which carried with it a host of duties. Men, women, children, students, were all to work as hard as possible to perform their duties within their clearly defined boundaries for the good of the Ottoman state. “Effort and work,” said one book, “affect order and public security (*intizam ve asayiş*) in the state.” Industrious people (*ashab-ı mesai*) are the servants of the state and of its order and progress, whereas indolent people (*ashab-ı atalet*) are those who destroy this “edifice of perfection and happiness.” In the context of this discourse on duties, the author states that one of the praiseworthy qualities of state officials is to always be at work on time. He further stresses that there is no point in arriving on time if time at the workplace is wasted idly.<sup>108</sup> This was clearly an attempt to deal with the chronic violation of office hours in the Ottoman bureaucracy. Thus, punctuality and efficiency, qualities which were hardly meaningful a century earlier, were now celebrated as praiseworthy virtues, and the violation of office hours was deemed immoral and unpatriotic.

### *Hygiene and Time Thrift*

Late Ottoman textbooks on hygiene were similarly preoccupied with time, although the reasoning differed from the ethical discourse discussed above. From its inception in Europe, hygienic discourse was concerned with

much more than health. Being predominantly of middle-class background, hygienists took upon themselves to disseminate middle-class lifestyles and values among the lower classes. In their writings, bourgeois values and “scientific” medical knowledge were interwoven, creating a synthetic ideological fabric which often identified the clean and healthy with the moral.<sup>109</sup>

Hygienic discourse must further be understood within the national and colonial context in which it evolved. As European states were trying to forge a new collective identity along national lines and to compete with one another for oversea domains, the domicile was increasingly seen as the basis of national power. After all, it was in the home that the future generation was raised. For the sake of nation and empire, then, the home had to be penetrated and domestic behaviors reformed. Thus, child rearing, proper motherhood, home economics and hygiene became issues of national importance.<sup>110</sup>

While the Ottoman Empire was never directly colonized by any European power, its domestic practices and familial life were very much influenced by European concepts. In parallel with processes in contemporary Europe, the new sense of collective identity which was being promoted at least since the Tanzimat went hand in hand with a new emphasis on the importance of children as the future of the empire.<sup>111</sup> Hence the increasing attention to child rearing and to the conditions in which this process was to take place. Ottoman hygienic literature should thus be read as an attempt by the ruling class to modernize society by fundamentally reshaping domestic practices. The magnitude of the project may explain the comprehensiveness of this literature.<sup>112</sup> Books on hygiene covered a wide range of subjects, from proper housing and the quality of foodstuffs, through clothing, to the prevention of diseases. Our interest here, however, is mainly with the nature of the desired daily routine promoted by hygienists.

Hygienic literature generally divided daily life into its components and discussed each of them separately. Sleeping, eating, drinking, and exercising were all to be given attention and performed in “the right manner,” that is, in accordance with the manner described in hygiene books. Like their European counterparts, Ottoman hygienists endorsed a highly ordered lifestyle which was to be founded on adherence to a rather strict timetable. Unlike the timetables discussed thus far, this timetable was not created by any governmental or commercial body. Rather, it was a self-imposed one.

Dr. Mustafa Münif, for instance, recommended dividing the day into three parts, with working, resting, and sleeping to be allocated eight hours each. Sleeping time could vary between seven and nine hours but it was better to prolong sleep by one hour than to cut it one hour shorter. The extra hours should

not be considered as wasted time, emphasized the doctor, since it would improve the quality of work on the following day. Mealtimes and bedtime were to be set in fixed intervals so as to leave enough time for digestion. The duration required for digestion, like the duration for sleep, was fixed according to age.<sup>113</sup>

This minute attention to time covered all other parts of the day too. Even the most spontaneous of activities was to be regulated and routinized. Since digested food might poison the body if it remains in the intestines for too long, Doctor Münif recommended,

Even if you do not feel any need, go to the toilet every day at the same hour, preferably after having breakfast. If a few light grunts do not produce any results, the next day, defecate once again at the same hour. Insisting on this matter will make it a habit and thus, it will easily go out at the designated times.<sup>114</sup>

School textbooks on hygiene endorsed the same type of orderly life, based on careful allocation of time to each activity.<sup>115</sup> Time budgeting was considered imperative not only for maintaining physical health, but for leading a complete and rewarding life. Minute time allocation was necessary if one were to squeeze all desired activities into the day. Idleness, on the other hand, was considered the enemy of the body and the source of many diseases.<sup>116</sup> Thus, schoolbooks on hygiene reaffirmed the emphasis on activity and industriousness we have already encountered in the books on ethics. Being active, the students were taught, was not only morally beneficial but healthier too. But despite the reference to individual benefits, it is worth noting once again that the focus on industriousness is best understood from a collective, imperial perspective. The ruling elite was bent on cultivating diligence and time thrift among the subjects as part of its effort to “close the gap” in the race for modernity. The combined efforts of industrious and time-minded subjects were supposed to ensure that.

### *Efficient, Patriot Mothers*

The emphasis placed on reforming domestic practices as means for modernizing society was closely related to the expansion of female education during the Hamidian and the Young Turk periods. Since women were entrusted with raising the future generations of the empire, they had to be taught how to transform the home into a healthy and orderly environment. The new discourse, which portrayed child rearing as a national mission, relied on and reaffirmed the gendered division of labor, in which the public sphere was dominated by men while women were confined to the domicile.

Several scholars have noted that the need to reaffirm gender roles during

the Hamidian period stemmed from a feeling that the old values upon which family life had been premised were being threatened by new concepts and behaviors. Although the number of women who actually adopted more liberal attitudes was relatively small, their very presence in the streets of Istanbul personified the perceived danger to the gendered social order.<sup>117</sup> Contemporary writers emphasized the spatial division between the inner, domestic sphere and the outside world of public interaction. Transgressions of the boundaries between the two realms were often condemned. Some writers, for example, targeted women who neglected their household duties in favor of entertainment outside the house, and warned against the perils of the streets. In the pages of women magazines, the streets of the city were identified with crime and depravity.<sup>118</sup> Thus, in the face of possible challenges to the traditional division of labor, a new discourse of domesticity was evolving, one that employed spatial boundaries between the home and the outside world to protect the patriarchal order. As shown below, temporal measures complemented this discursive tactic.

In Ottoman schoolbooks on home economics, an attempt was made to bring together all domestic duties and present them as a profession to be learned. The woman was often portrayed as manager of the house charged with overseeing the efficient and thorough performance of domestic tasks.<sup>119</sup> Such discussions were woven into the wider discourse of duties. Housework was discussed in the same terms of “hard work” and placed within the same web of familial, social, and patriotic obligations. Just as it was the official’s duty to be at work on time, so it was the woman’s duty to manage the house with utmost efficiency. One book, for example, mentioned among the many benefits of “the love of hard work” that a hard-working housewife is always healthy and never nervous, bored or weak. “Those who are always bored, and see life as oppressive (*hayati ađır görenler*), are all lazy [individuals], and [ones who] dislike work.” The author was quick to add that the lazy housewife hurts not only herself but fails to perform her duties towards her family too.<sup>120</sup>

After 1908, patriotic reasoning became especially pronounced within the old discourse of duties. Child rearing was taken by some to be a political duty, and the family was increasingly identified with the nation.<sup>121</sup> Now women were expected to endeavor not only for themselves and their families but for the progress of the Ottoman nation too. The following paragraph is taken from one of these post-1908 books, typically entitled *Family Duties (Vezaif-i Aile)*:

Industrious nations always go forward and are manifestations of perfect felicity. Let us work for obtaining the best of education, let us never fall short of putting [all] our effort into carrying out our human duties. The ones who

use time badly should be reproached for not benefiting from the biggest fortune of happiness (*sermaye-i saadet*). Time passed for nothing seems long and worrying; laziness is the source of regret. Let us work. The well-being and progress of our beloved motherland, of our honorable nation, depends on this.<sup>122</sup>

The rhetoric of this text, including the reference to the use of time, is strikingly similar to the slightly earlier post-1908 article published under the title “Çalışalım,” (Let Us Work) in the most important military publication of the time.<sup>123</sup> The same title and contents is found repeatedly in contemporary children’s periodicals.<sup>124</sup> Like the author of “Çalışalım,” the author of *Family Duties* presents industriousness and the efficient use of time as crucial to the progress of the Ottoman nation. Time thrift on the quotidian level is thus merged with the linear understanding of historical time. Here we have once again the idea that if the energy and efforts of all citizens, including women, were combined, with unnecessary waste of time eliminated, the Ottoman nation would leap forward. Productivity and time thrift are thus patriotic duties. However, despite the revolutionary rhetoric, the role reserved for women in post-1908 school textbooks remained practically the same as it had been in the Hamidian era. Women were still largely confined to the domestic domain, and it was mainly in their capacity as educated wives, mothers, and housewives that they were expected to contribute to the progress of the nation.

As part of their domestic vocation, young girls were taught that running a house properly meant running it economically. Saving both time and money was promoted not only in textbooks but in contemporary women’s magazines as well.<sup>125</sup> This emphasis on economy, and the very notion that time and money were interchangeable, necessitated paying considerable attention to time. One textbook, for instance, emphasized that the most important quality in a housewife is order. Under the title “The Good Use of Time,” the author explained that work has to be organized so that time would not be lost. Since “time is money,” it has to be spent appropriately.<sup>126</sup>

The book thus recommended organizing time just like a budget. It advised setting both weekly and daily schedules so as to attain maximum efficiency in the performance of domestic tasks. Thus, laundry was to be allocated one day, the cleaning of cupboards another. The daily timetable set the sequence of duties, defining the hour and by implication the duration for every task. Even the last slot of the timetable (10:00–10:30 p.m. mean time) does not bring with it relief. After everybody retires to their beds, the wife, or the “head of the family” (*aile reisesi*) as she is referred to here, has to write down the day’s

expenses, take a look at the next day's to-do list, and make sure all doors and windows are closed.<sup>127</sup> The professional housewife, devoted to her family and motherland, was to be so busy that wandering outside in search of entertainment would simply be impossible. Some authors were apparently concerned that better-off women would leave the schedule with their servants and go out, rendering the schedule ineffective as a domesticating technique. They thus repeatedly emphasized that the "manager of the house" has to be present even if she has servants in order to oversee housework.<sup>128</sup> Wandering outside the house was therefore unprofessional, unfeminine, unmotherly, and unpatriotic, all at the same time.<sup>129</sup>

This type of schedule also demonstrates just how the rationalization of time organization in various institutions necessitated a similar process in the home as well. The very fact that both the children and the elders had to leave every morning at specific times in order to be on time required the adjustment of domestic routine. In this sense, the separation between the domicile and the outside world was far from complete.

In short, the regularity espoused by Ottoman schoolbooks on home economics was supposed to allow for increased efficiency in the performance of domestic duties and to provide the conditions for a healthy lifestyle. Thus, on the surface it seems that women were granted the tools to organize their own time. If the power to allocate one's time is indicative of authority, the housewives of the early twentieth century may seem to have been empowered by the new order. This was clearly only an illusion. Women could manage time only within the confines of their house, and only with regard to tasks which were decided for them by men. The utilitarian and rational, even scientific attire of the time organization techniques concealed an ideological agenda.

Like their male counterparts, female students were taught the importance of punctuality and time thrift for Ottoman advancement. They were given the tools to share the temporality of their men folk, and were expected to participate in their project of progress and order, on both the quotidian and conceptual levels. But never as equals. The female students were not meant to become "fully modern"; they were to serve the nation without leaving the domestic sphere, mostly in their capacity as future housewives and mothers.<sup>130</sup> By "teaching time," the late Ottoman education system sought to empower the female students and then to enlist them for the elite's project of modernity, while constantly reaffirming their inferiority.

In summation, during the Hamidian era, thousands of Ottoman boys and girls learned that minute time organization, punctuality, productivity, and efficiency were means to attain progress and a standard by which to measure it. The

lesson was well taken. At least among the politically aware circles of officers, bureaucrats, and urban professionals who formed the backbone of the opposition to Sultan Abdülhamid, the regime was often measured against this yardstick of temporal order and was found to be inefficient, disorganized, wasteful, and therefore “backward.” After the overthrow of the Hamidian order, this worldview was translated into concrete measures in virtually every aspect of life. The new regime sought to integrate the multiple temporal constructs of schools, military compounds, bureaus, private companies, transportation systems, and telegraph lines into a comprehensive time web that would span entire cities. It is to the weaving of this web that we now turn.

The discussion in this chapter takes to the streets. It shows that as railways, telegraphs, and ferry lines wove together hitherto loosely connected localities into well-integrated systems, growing parts of the city were gradually subjected to a clock-based temporal order which dramatically rearranged daily and nightly routines. The Ottoman government and the classes best situated to manipulate its power played a decisive role in forming this new order in line with their practical and ideological needs. Yet common city dwellers were not passive spectators. Rather, they actively interfered in the sphere of time organization, seeking to secure their own interests within the emerging temporal order. It is thus shown that time is not some vague entity that hangs over the city like fog. Urban temporal arrangements were the product of specific power structures and social relations, and were grounded in the hardware of newly assembled infrastructures.

If this is the answer I propose in this chapter, here is a story that will help clarify the questions. On a Wednesday night in early September 1913, Major Şevki Bey sat in a nightclub (*gazino*) in the southern Anatolian city of Adana along with two other individuals. Major Şevki, the commander of the local gendarmerie (*jandarma*) base, was dressed in civilian clothes, and one of his drinking buddies, Lieutenant Tevfik, was in uniform. It was the first night of the Festival of Sacrifice (*Bayram*), and the police report from which we learn about the incident that ensued conveys a rather lively ambiance.<sup>1</sup> A band was playing, some actors were performing (*tiyatro*), and the major was drinking his head off. The police report noted that selling alcohol and playing music after two o'clock (*alaturka*, that is, two hours after sunset) was forbidden, and that the club owners and patrons generally abided by the prohibition. However, when a policeman reminded the owners that the selling of alcohol was no longer allowed, Major Şevki called him over and protested the impropriety of the prohibition. The policeman told him that he would nevertheless have to carry out his orders, but the major simply ignored him, ordered yet another bottle of *rakı*, and went on drinking.<sup>2</sup>

He was still engaged in the same activity at four o'clock (*alaturka*), when the police commissioner and his deputy arrived at the premises, probably accompanied by more of their men. Major Şevki did not seem to care. Relying on

“military regulations,” he argued that the commissioner had no right to carry a sword in public and told him rather unambiguously to “get lost” (*defol, buradan git*). According to the report, the police officers insisted that, in keeping with the decree of the government and in order to uphold the honor of the police, the music and the stage play must be stopped at once. That was too much for the major. Like a Broadway producer, he declared, “We will not allow stopping the show at any time. The show will go on!” He then addressed the other patrons at the nightclub asking: “Do you want the music to go on?” Some of them replied enthusiastically, while cheering and clapping their hands: “Yes we do! Long live the commander bey!” (*İsteriz! Yaşasın kumandan bey!*).

Encouraged by the response of the crowd, Şevki Bey ordered the musicians and actors to play on. He used his position as the commander of the gendarmerie and sent for reinforcements from the gendarmerie base. Still furious, he told his subordinates, “I will drink until the morning. Who will stop me?” and added a few more “inappropriate words” about the policemen. It is not entirely clear from the report what happened next, but the band was definitely disbanded, an act that was apparently accompanied by violence. What is clear is that in the process, one of the performers was injured. Major Şevki returned to the gendarmerie base and, “affected by the injury” of the performer, unleashed his fury on two anonymous people, possibly detainees who were unfortunate enough to have been brought in, of all nights, just when the commander bey was both drunk and frustrated.

In this incident, clock hours clearly emerge as a mechanism of state control which, like laws and regulations, are supposed to be universally binding on all, including law enforcement personnel. It may be argued that the conflict between Şevki Bey and the police vividly demonstrates how the modern state uses both time and violence to regulate urban life, or urban night life in this case. However, even more than it demonstrates the working of an impersonal law enforcement mechanism, the incident exposes the gap between late Ottoman ideals of state order and power and contemporary social realities. On the surface, the incident appears to be a conflict between representatives of two thoroughly “modern” arms of the government, namely the police and the gendarmerie. In fact, Şevki Bey’s actions and manner of speech can more easily be explained in the context of the *kabadayı* (strongman) tradition, which was often common to criminals and law enforcement officials alike.<sup>3</sup> The police officers too, while evoking the honor of the organization they served, were clearly concerned about establishing their own personal and institutional authority.

The incident exposes a complex reality in which personal and state authority interact and clash, and yet the one thing that all actors seem to have taken for

granted was the status of clock time. As if caught in the same invisible time web, nobody doubted the hour nor questioned the authority of the clock to separate the lawful from the lawless. This was not some “temporal frontier,” the boundaries of which were flexible and ambiguous, but a clearly drawn time border which was not to be trespassed. Major Şevki did not overstep that border unknowingly; he defied the lawfulness of the regulation that defined its temporal location and, moreover, thought that his rank would allow him to openly violate the line. “I will drink until the morning,” he said, as if challenging the time-border policemen. “Who will stop me?” The deeper he went into the forbidden temporal zone, the more severe the blow to the “honor of the police” and its men, who were shown to be incapable of guarding the border.

This general acceptance of the clock as an arbiter of time in urban spaces is all the more surprising considering that only a few decades earlier, it was still the daily prayer cycle that regulated daily routines beyond “state spaces” such as schools, barracks, and bureaus. Over the second half of the nineteenth century this situation changed significantly. A new clock-based temporal order gradually cast its invisible web over entire urban centers, bringing state-sanctioned clock hours even to obscure provincial nightclubs late at night. The following pages follow the weaving of these time webs and demonstrate how they affected urban rhythms. By so doing I hope to draw attention to the often neglected temporal aspect of city life and to suggest that urban modernity cannot be fully comprehended without a sense of its unique rhythms.

### *Framing the Discussion: Technology, Time, and the City*

While the study of time in the Ottoman Empire is still in its infancy, the transformation of Ottoman urban space over the nineteenth century has received significant scholarly attention over the last two decades and has yielded deep insights.<sup>4</sup> These will serve to set the current discussion on track. For a long time, urban reform in the Ottoman Empire was largely understood as the result of European interference. More recent research has drawn attention to the role played by Istanbul in the remaking Ottoman cities and has shown that the effort to “master” and order urban space through registering, regulating, and policing it, and by laying modern communication networks, was an integral part of the late Ottoman project of state building.<sup>5</sup> While acknowledging the influence of European actors and the role played by Istanbul, some scholars have emphasized the agency of provincial urban groups in reshaping late nineteenth century Ottoman cities.<sup>6</sup>

Jens Hanssen and Zeynep Çelik further note that the imposing of a new ideal of order was not limited to the spatial dimension. As urban space was being

transformed, urban time too was being regulated, regularized, and subjected to the authority of the center, as is so clearly evident in the clock tower boom of the Hamidian era. Here too, however, local participation in funding and styling was significant.<sup>7</sup> Although both Çelik and Hanssen focus almost exclusively on urban space, their studies are important in the context of the current discussion as they suggest that the remaking of Ottoman urban time was entangled with modern technology, and that the Ottoman government was not the only actor in the process.

Despite the headway made, we are still a long way from understanding the highly complex interaction between human actors, modern technology, and the remaking of Ottoman urban time. At first glance, there is nothing new in arguing that technology played a role in the spread of modern practices of time organization in the Ottoman Empire. Prominent scholars have stated that railways “transformed Ottoman concepts of time and space,” or that the railway “brought the timetable to the Middle East.”<sup>8</sup> While railways and timetables were clearly interrelated, such “technologically deterministic” statements oversimplify a rather complicated process by depicting technology as an almost autonomous actor capable of reshaping societies.<sup>9</sup>

Indeed, machines do not make history single-handedly; rather, technologies and human societies reshape or “co-construct” each other.<sup>10</sup> Timothy Mitchell’s “techno-political” history of modern Egypt even questions the possibility of sustaining a sharp dichotomy between human society and the unanimated world. In his analysis, dam technology and mosquitoes, artificial nitrates, peasants, irrigation canals, and government officials all partake in a single historical ecology, an ecology that knows no clear boundaries between human and non-human actors.<sup>11</sup>

Drawing on these perspectives, I would like to examine the weaving of urban time webs as the result of a complex interaction between humans and machines in specific urban settings, but also as part of wider processes that unfold on the imperial and global levels. It will be seen that technological infrastructures cannot be reduced to mere tools in the hands of European, Istanbul-based, or provincial reformers, as these systems were in themselves complex ensembles of humans and hardware that were affected by the physical and social environment at least as much as they affected it.

### *The Blueprint: Calibrating Humans and Machines*

Within less than a century, the vast territories of the Ottoman Empire were crisscrossed by several networks of transportation and communication.<sup>12</sup> In the imperial capital, too, traveling modes underwent significant changes. The

introduction of steam technology gave further impetus to efforts begun in the first half of the century to tie together the different parts of Istanbul by modern means of transportation.<sup>13</sup> Out of these newly established urban networks, my focus here is on the ferry lines which were operated by the government-owned corporation, the Beneficent Company (*Şirket-i Hayriye*), established in 1851 to serve government officials.<sup>14</sup> Within a few decades the Beneficent Company developed into a public transportation system in the full sense of the term.<sup>15</sup> By 1895, when the population of Istanbul was nearing one million, the company had 46 ferries running, carrying 9,872,177 passengers per year. By 1908, the annual passenger count reached 12,028,405.<sup>16</sup>

As in most modern organizations, the temporal construct devised for the Beneficent Company was explicitly spelled out in a detailed code (*nizamname*) intended to cover all aspects of structure, operations, and management.<sup>17</sup> Issued in 1888, the code bound together steam engines and ticket vendors, coal boilers and their operators, cabin cleaners, conductors, piers and ropes, creating a system which was intended to facilitate maritime transport with maximum efficiency and with as few humanly caused delays as possible. If the ship was built according to a mechanical plan and operated according to a technical manual, its non-technological dimensions were to be structured and managed according to the regulations. The *nizamname* provided both the blueprint and the manual for the working of humans.

The code was supposed to facilitate the highest possible levels of synchronicity between personnel and hardware. This necessitated an elaborate temporal construct which, like most equivalent structures, relied on strict surveillance and punitive measures.<sup>18</sup> Such measures were meant to ensure that all workers carried out their job like cogs in a machine according to the blueprint, despite their undeniable human traits. All pier employees, for example, were to report to work a quarter of an hour before the arrival of the first ferry, and were not to leave before the last ferry has departed. Before going home, they all had to sign their names in a notebook designated for that purpose. The senior official in every pier was supposed to send the directorate daily reports which were to include the actual working hours of all workers and the arrival hours of all ferries.<sup>19</sup>

Departure times were the reference points which calibrated the entire system. Captains were instructed to be on board an hour before departure, and to perform an inspection round ten minutes before that time. Pier officials were to make sure tickets were for sale at least a quarter of an hour before departure. Five minutes before that time a whistle was to be sounded, and from that point on the Captain had to be on the bridge. Tickets could be sold until the very

minute of departure and the vendors were to be closed one minute “or two at the most” after the preset departure time.<sup>20</sup>

Departure times, in turn, were to be specified in timetables. Since all tasks performed by the company’s personnel, on board and on the piers, were defined with reference to these departure times, schedules became the single most important instrument for regulating and synchronizing the multifaceted working of the system. From the actual traffic of ferries, through employees’ working hours, and on to working procedures of various kinds, timetables governed nearly every aspect of the company’s activity. The subjugation of the company’s personnel to timetables was not left ambiguous. It was strictly forbidden, for example, to depart either before or after the preset hours, and captains were explicitly denied the right to change these hours, except for the sake of preventing collision. Inspectors were to make sure that the preset hours were observed.<sup>21</sup>

Despite the crucial role assigned to them in the 1888 code, it was only after the Beneficent Company established its own technical bureau of traffic (*seyr ü sefer kalemi*) in 1902 that schedules were actually compiled for the first time. Up until that time, planned departure times were shown in notices posted in every quay, but arrival times were not specified, and there was no methodical ordering of ferry traffic. The newly established bureau systematically measured distances between quays and set for every ferry its estimated cruising time in minutes, based on its average speed. This work provided the necessary information for the rational ordering of ferry traffic, which took into account a host of technical, spatial, and temporal considerations.<sup>22</sup>

The timetable is, as Anthony Giddens has aptly characterized it, a “time-space ordering device.” It recombined abstracted time with abstracted space, indicating both when and where trains (or ferries) arrive.<sup>23</sup> The timetable, it may be added, represents an attempt to govern from above the flow of traffic through space, by the minute organization of time. With ferry traffic thus regulated, an assortment of loosely connected localities was turned into a fully integrated time-space network. The appearance of timetables in the Beneficent Company was thus indicative of a relatively advanced level of organizational modernization that can be associated with the synoptic view of the modern state.<sup>24</sup>

The considerations according to which schedules were to be drawn were also specified in the *nizamname*. They included the season, the speed and power of each ferry, the amount of coal which would be consumed, and the annual, monthly, and daily statistics of passenger traffic of each pier.<sup>25</sup> These considerations reveal once again the intense interaction between the technological and the human, between metal, coal, and flesh. At the same time, however, these

perfectly rational calculations hide behind the neat lines of the carefully drawn schedules considerations of a very different nature.

Timetables, just like any other practice of time organization, are a product of a specific social order, and may sometimes work to reinforce that order. The schedules of the Beneficent Company reflected the privileged status of state officials. Although by the early twentieth century the company was already carrying millions of passengers every year, ferry schedules were still designed to serve needs of state officials before everybody else. In the eyes of officials, the company remained little more than a shuttle service of the central administration.

### *Maintenance and Calibration of Temporal Constructs*

The continuous attempts to attain higher levels of regularity in the conduct of government affairs through elaborate techniques of time organization were analyzed in detail in chapter 2. Starting around the mid-nineteenth century, these measures were accompanied by efforts to ensure regularity of transportation to and from government bureaus.<sup>26</sup> In the first half of the century, with Galata and Pera rising as the new hub of economic and diplomatic activity, many bureaucrats moved out of their houses in the old city and settled in areas like Harbiye, Şişli, Nişantaşı and along the Bospurus.<sup>27</sup> Since the center of government remained in the old city, commuting became an integral part of their life.

Built on both sides of the Bospurus and divided by the Golden Horn, Istanbul has always been dependent on seaborne transportation. Until the middle of the nineteenth century, it was rowboats of various kinds (*kayık*, *pereme* and *mavna*) that fulfilled transportation functions along the Bospurus. These vessels were all relatively small and were greatly affected by winds and currents. Needless to say, they were also relatively slow. Using the north-south current, it took about one and a half hours to get from Büyükdere, one of the northern villages along the European shores of the Bospurus, to Istanbul, and another two hours to return.<sup>28</sup> Under these conditions regularity and predictability were out of the question and daily commuting was impossible. Thus, prior to the nineteenth century contact between the various parts of the city was relatively loose, and daily life was very much localized.<sup>29</sup> With commercial life intensifying and Istanbul spreading more widely, seaborne traffic became increasingly heavy. The number of *kayıks* on the Bospurus rose from about four thousand in 1802 to nineteen thousand in 1844. A need for new transportation solutions was felt.<sup>30</sup>

Identifying that need, two foreigners started operating two steamboats on the Bospurus in 1850. In the spring of 1851, the Ottoman government as-

signed one of the ships of the Imperial Shipyards to provide regular transportation along the Bosphorus. However, the departure hours of the vessel did not meet the needs of government officials, and this discrepancy was one of the reasons for establishing the Beneficent Company. It was hoped that the operation of additional ferries would solve the problem.<sup>31</sup> The issue, however, was not resolved. In February 1853, the Office of the Grand Vizier (*Sadaret Mektûbi Kalemi*) ordered the adjustment of departure times according to office hours in the bureaus. Since the prompt handling of government affairs depended on the full presence of all officials, the decree read, it was imperative that the departure hours of the “special shift” ferry (*nöbet-i mahsus*) be changed, so as to allow the officials living along the Bosphorus to arrive on time at their offices. It was ordered that the ferry would be at the Galata Bridge before five (*alaturka*), so that the officials could report to their offices at five. The ferry was not to leave the platform before eleven, in order to allow the bureaucrats who finished work at a quarter to eleven to board.<sup>32</sup>

Since office hours, which also relied on the *alaturka* system, changed according to the season (*hasab al-mawsim*, or *mevsime göre* in bureaucratic lingo), departure times had to be reset every few months. Furthermore, during the summer many government officials who resided in Istanbul throughout the year moved to their summer houses along the Bosphorus. This pattern resulted in heavier traffic and the company had to make the necessary adjustments.<sup>33</sup> The exceptionally short working hours during the holy month of Ramadan required additional changes in the schedule. Maintaining agreement between office hours and ferries’ departure times thus demanded the constant attention of the government, and indeed countless documents concerning the matter were issued over the years.<sup>34</sup> In order to bring the schedule of the Beneficent Company into accord with that of the bureaus, the company adopted the “standard time” of the central administration, as set by the *muvaqqit* of the Yeni Cami mosque in Eminönü. It was according to the clocks in that *muvaqqithane* that all timepieces, both in the central administration and in the company, were to be set.<sup>35</sup>

By constantly calibrating the schedules of the Beneficent Company with official working hours, the Ottoman government became directly involved in regulating urban rhythms outside its bureaus. This involvement sometimes necessitated the reorganization of urban space as well. Nil Birol has shown that already in the early 1850s, the government began to promote the construction of a special quay for the exclusive use of government employees in Yalıköşkü on the Golden Horn. The quay, which was finally constructed in 1859, was intended to facilitate the timely arrival of officials from the ferries to their bureaus.<sup>36</sup> It was

a similar rationale of eliminating spatial barriers that guided several major projects of urban planning in Istanbul during the nineteenth century. The bridging of the Golden Horn, the digging of the Tünel underground, and the widening of main arteries in order to accommodate tram traffic, were all intended to alleviate physical impediments to the free flow of traffic, impediments that resulted in the “loss of time” along the route and inevitable discrepancies between schedules and reality.<sup>37</sup>

Such discrepancies were of limited importance to the government as long as punctuality standards in the bureaus remained low. This, however, changed significantly following the Young Turk Revolution, as the new regime placed unprecedented emphasis on temporal order, efficiency and regularity. Clear time boundaries were now drawn in the interface of different systems which had been previously more like time frontiers, porous and elastic in nature. This process had been evolving in confined “state space” for some time now. The teacher, the supervisor, and the officer, who before the reforms had enjoyed relative autonomy in determining the routine of their subalterns, were gradually subjected to timetables drafted for them by their superiors. But as time frontiers were gradually turned into time borders, the flux and flexibility that had characterized these areas of interface were lost, creating a dire need for more rigorous coordination. Discrepancies between schedules and the needs of the administration now became a constant source of friction between the Beneficent Company and various governmental organs.

In late October, 1909, the Council of Ministers (*Meclis-i Vükelâ*) reset office hours in all bureaus of the central and provincial administration. The decision also defined strict sanctions against tardy officials, including fines.<sup>38</sup> Following the directive of the council, the Ministry of the Interior (*Dahiliye*) informed both the Beneficent Company and the İdare-i Mahsusa (the company that ran ferries to the Bosphorus islands and to Kadıköy) that all officials were to work from three hours before noon until four and a half hours after noontime, and requested the adjustment of schedules accordingly.<sup>39</sup>

While this realignment of ferry schedules with office hours was a standard procedure by the early twentieth century, the Dahiliye memo demonstrates just how complicated the calibration of schedules had become. In order to be at work at the designated hour (*vakt-i muayyende*), the memo read, many officials were rushing (*tehacim eylemekte*) to the quays at the same time, which resulted in overcrowding of the ferries. Furthermore, since ferries from different places all arrived at the Galata Bridge at the same time, there was a greater risk of accidents. Hence, there was a need to reschedule departure times. The ferries departing from Haydarpaşa, the document continued, were subject to the railway



FIGURE 8. A public clock (lower right) on the Galata Bridge, circa 1900, at the intersection of several important roads and transportation networks. Library of Congress.

schedule (*şimendifer programına tabi bulunduğundan*), and therefore, presumably, their departure times could not be changed. Thus, the Dahiliye instructed the company to have two ferries leave Kadıköy, with a gap of ten minutes between them, at a time that would allow them to reach the Galata Bridge twenty minutes or half an hour before the time designated by the government as the beginning of the workday.<sup>40</sup>

This document represented an attempt to calibrate the schedules of two different systems, that of the central administration and that of the Beneficent Company. But it also had to consider two other complex systems, the Anatolian railway network, the end terminal of which was in Haydarpaşa, and the İdare-i Mashusa, whose vessels plied the same waters as the Beneficent Company. Changing the schedule in any one of these four systems may have had implications for the timetables of all the others.<sup>41</sup> It has to be remembered that by governing departure times, schedules regulated almost every aspect of the daily operation of each of these systems. Changing departure times would thus affect the whole temporal construct. Pier officials, conductors, cleaners and mechanics would now have to remake their daily routine so as to maintain regularity.

Needless to say, the change of schedules would affect the passengers' routine as well.

The instructions of the Dahiliye demonstrate the new ideal of urban temporal order. The city, viewed from above, is to become a fully synchronized system which channels people to specific routes of traffic at specific times. The reality, however, remained far from this ideal. The above-mentioned 1909 resolution of the Council of Ministers to impose working hours in all governmental bureaus provoked a barrage of petitions from officials in various governmental bureaus, all complaining that departure times were not really coordinated with working hours. In early November, 1909, soon after the directive was dispatched, a petition was sent to the Ministry of the Interior in the name of all officials residing along the Bosphorus. The Beneficent Company, said the petition, claimed to have amended its schedules according to the officials' working hours. In fact, argued the petitioners, not a single change had been made. Since government officials were now threatened with penalties for late arrival, it was the government's responsibility to do whatever it could in order to save the time and secure the comfort of its employees (*temin-i vakit ve rahatı için*). The petition requested that the company's schedules be changed every month according to official working hours.<sup>42</sup>

What is important here is that passengers were becoming far more involved than ever before in the process of temporal calibration. This involvement was clearly the result of stricter imposition of office hours in the post-1908 central administration. The new regime forced thousands of officials out of the system and undermined the Hamidian patronage system.<sup>43</sup> Threatened with sanctions and deprived of protection, the remaining government officials could no longer be oblivious or indifferent to office hours, as they seem to have been throughout the nineteenth century.<sup>44</sup> Once office hours were more rigorously enforced, it became the bureaucrats' business to make sure they could arrive to work on time. If throughout most of the nineteenth century officials entered an elaborate clock-based temporal construct only upon arriving at the bureau, around the turn of that century commuting too became increasingly regulated by clocks and timetables.

### *The Ideology of Punctuality*

Even if schedules were brought to accord with one another in a perfect manner, this did not mean that in reality harmony was maintained. Indeed, many of the complaints filed following the Meclis resolution referred not only to the need to calibrate schedules, but also demanded that those schedules actually be observed. Clearly, discrepancies between schedules and their implemen-

tation did not begin in 1908; even before the revolution, the government intervened from time to time in order to smooth things out.<sup>45</sup> During the Young Turk era, however, the problem of delays received unprecedented attention.

Exactly one week after the petition mentioned above had been presented, a very similar appeal was submitted to the minister of war by officials in his ministry. They complained that because ferries were up to one hour late, they could not report at their bureaus on time and were thus exposed to the risk of penalties. They therefore requested that money deducted from their paychecks for arriving late be reimbursed by the Beneficent Company. The complaints of the bureaucrats, wrote the minister of war to the Ministry of the Interior, were examined and found true. It was “unjust” that officials were required to pay for delays caused by the company, the minister wrote; he requested that the Ministry of the Interior intervene in order to force the company to adhere to its own timetables.<sup>46</sup>

One day later the undersecretary of the Ministry of Justice wrote in the name of the minister to the Ministry of the Interior and similarly complained about significant delays. Rather than allowing the directorate of the company to ruin the “civilized culture of the country” (*terbiye-i medeniye-i memleket*), he wrote, its “disorders” (*intizamsızlıklar*) must be corrected, as would befit this “merry era of ours” (*ahit-i hazır-ı mesudumuzla münasib surette*).<sup>47</sup> The wording of this last document is a reminder of the political and cultural atmosphere in which the calibration efforts were taking place. The memo clearly identified this calibration, and the punctuality upon which it depended, with being a “civilized country.” Similar formulations repeated themselves in other complaints.<sup>48</sup>

In the minds of contemporary functionaries, punctuality and regularity were increasingly connected with ideals of order, so central in the Young Turks’ thought.<sup>49</sup> In fact, order had become a purpose in its own right, and it had to be manifested not only in the spatial configuration of the city, but in its temporal organization too. Delays were injurious to that temporal order and to the image of progress it was meant to convey. The attempts made by leading post-1908 statesmen and functionaries to correct such temporal disorders were thus spurred not only by practical, pragmatic needs, but also by ideological ones.<sup>50</sup>

Meanwhile, back at the Ministry of Justice, things just would not calm down. Following yet another complaint by his employees, the minister himself found it necessary to intervene. The ferry that was supposed to pass through Ortaköy at 3:35 (*alaturka*) that Sunday morning, he wrote directly to the minister of the interior, was once again late, and the passengers, officials and ordinary people (*ahali*), had to wait fifty-five minutes. As long as transport companies such as the Beneficent Company do not regulate their activity, continued the minister,




FIGURE 9. *On time: the Beneficent Company's ferry İnzibat (Order). Reliable timetables became integral to the image of "order and progress" which the Hamidian regime and later the Young Turks sought to project. Reprinted from Servet-i Fünun 121 (22 Mayıs 1311/ 3 June 1895).*




FIGURE 10. *Not quite on time: cartoon featuring Karagöz, hero of the traditional Ottoman shadow theater, as he tries to get a Beneficent Company ferry to move. "Don't worry, old rower. . . . It cannot be controlled. . . . Whatever I do is in vain. . . . The passengers will once again remain for you." Reprinted from Karagöz 63 (19 Şubat 1324/4 March 1909).*

one cannot expect regularity in the work of officials.<sup>51</sup> It is worth noting that the minister of justice, like the other ministers, intervened on behalf of his workers almost immediately. The memo quoted above was sent on the very same day the complaints were received. The Ministry of the Interior was just as quick in forwarding all complaints to the Ministry of Commerce and Public Works, which was in charge of the Beneficent Company.<sup>52</sup> The fact that the issue reached the level of ministers, and the urgency with which all ministers responded to the complaints of their subordinates, demonstrates just how seriously the matter was being taken.

All correspondence discussed thus far focused, first and foremost, on the interests and comfort of government employees. Occasionally though, references were also made to the needs of the rest of the population. One of the petitions made it clear that just like state officials, artisans and merchants had to hurry to their working places, so as to be there at a specific time. These people too, it was said, complained about the Beneficent Company.<sup>53</sup> If the frustration of officials was translated into petitions, popular discontent took a more direct course of action. According to Murat Koraltürk, in late 1909, more or less concurrently with the petition campaign, crowds demonstrated in several quays along the Golden Horn, protesting the bad condition of the Yemiş quay, and what is more relevant to this discussion, the “disorder” in ferry traffic.<sup>54</sup> It is clear, then, that by the end of the first decade of the new century, delays were injurious not only to government officials; “normal people” too expected regularity in the working of their transportation system and took action when that regularity was not maintained.

The directorate of the company, however, refused to acknowledge any systemic problem. In a rather lengthy response it sent to the Ministry of the Interior, it addressed every complaint separately and blamed delays on the harbor administration and its limited space, on the opening hours of the Galata Bridge, and on various technical problems.<sup>55</sup> What is significant here is that the company specifically emphasized that more ferries were added around the beginning and end of the workday in order to allow state officials to get to their workplaces on time and return quickly to their homes.<sup>56</sup> With dozens of vessels trying to make their way to the piers within a short period of time, delays were bound to happen.

The reply of the Beneficent Company further illuminates the connection between temporal regularity and the production of urban space. The imposition of official working hours had created a deadline for the arrival of officials to their bureaus, and modern transportation networks channeled them on the same routes at the same times every day. It was the combined working of these

two systems that explains the sudden rush on the quays noted above. As the Beneficent Company adjusted its schedule in response to these pressures, ferry traffic became extremely heavy around the beginning and end of the official workday.<sup>57</sup> The harbor was apparently too narrow for the volume of traffic it now had to accommodate. It may be said that the overcrowded quays and daily traffic jams heralded the birth of the modern rush hour in Istanbul. It is to some of the typical characteristics of this newly-born rush hour that we now turn. This time, I would like to examine the emerging temporal order, or rather disorder, as it would have been experienced by the commuters themselves.

### *Haste, Wait, and Late*

At the turn of the twentieth century, new transportation technologies promised unprecedented speed and comfort. The possibility of traversing great distances in a short time captured the minds of contemporaries. All over the world, railway corporations, steamship companies, and automobile manufacturers competed with one another in breaking speed records, and received significant press coverage whenever successful. European and American engineers, industrialists, managers, journalists, artists, and authors, were all preoccupied with the blessings and curses of mechanical speed.<sup>58</sup> Jules Verne's heroes, who completed their tour around the globe in only eighty days by taking advantage of almost every mode of modern transportation then in existence, reflected that fascination with speed. Their adventures certainly sparked the imagination of Ottomans too. Verne's book, originally published in 1873, was translated into Ottoman Turkish in 1888.<sup>59</sup> Although the post-1908 satirical press remained more skeptical, the more serious Ottoman journals often joined the world in celebrating speed as the hallmark of the new era.<sup>60</sup>

The increasing speed of contemporary machines was coupled by the human experience of haste. As machines became ever faster, humans had to hurry in order to keep up. The common sight of passengers chasing an accelerating train in an attempt to "catch it" captured the essence of the mutual relation between mechanical and human speed. It was probably the familiarity of the sight, and of the feeling of "running late" which it evoked, that turned the image into a cliché used by countless authors and, later, cinematographers. Ottoman writers, too, often described the bustle on the quays and people rushing to board the ferry just before it left.<sup>61</sup>

That sense of haste was simply one of the most conspicuous results of the emerging temporal order forming around the new transportation systems. Locked within highly regimented, clock-based temporal constructs that were increasingly interconnected, people now had countless deadlines to meet every

day. In order to avoid sanctions, a bureaucrat had to be in the office at, say, 3:30 (*alaturka*), which meant that he had to catch the 2:40 ferry from Haydarpaşa and the train to Haydarpaşa at 2:00. This would determine the time he would wake up in the morning and possibly the time he would go to sleep. Indeed, the life of our exemplary clerk was increasingly regulated by mechanical clocks, and he was not alone in this respect. In order to allow our official to report at his office on time, all railway and steamer personnel had to be in their positions and complete their tasks before the hour set for them in the regulations and schedules had lapsed. All these people now had to hurry so as not to be late. If Jules Verne's novel was representative of the modern cult of speed, it was probably Lewis Carroll's ever-running-late rabbit that personified that modern haste. In this respect, too, Istanbul was joining the growing and not-so-exclusive club of modern metropolises.

But speed and haste are not the only characteristics of modern modes of travel. Curiously, commuting is identified just as much with the standstill of the traffic jam. As already noted, once the smooth movement along the routes of transportation was obstructed at any point of the network, the result would be violation of preset schedules, which in modern urban societies are dependent on one another. As the company's reply quoted above demonstrates, obstruction may be caused by the blocking of a route, by the route being too narrow for the volume of traffic it has to accommodate, by humans failing to complete their sanctioned tasks, or by technical problems of all sorts. In fact, it is very hard to make the distinction between problems caused by humans and problems caused by machines. When all is said and done, all machines have to be operated by humans, and even what is usually defined as a technical problem may be the direct result of bad maintenance or human error.<sup>62</sup> Just as it is the interaction between humans and machines that gets transport systems to work, so it is defects in that interaction that might bring them to a standstill.

The contrast between the smooth, regular, and speedy movement promised by technology and the delays or disruptions which often characterize the actual working of such systems is the reason for some of the frustrations so familiar to members of modern urban societies. That the people of Istanbul early in the twentieth century experienced such frustrations is evident not only from the petitions presented thus far, but also from contemporary publications. Palmira Brummett has shown that the post-1908 satirical press frequently lampooned modern modes of transportation in Istanbul for their inefficiency and slow pace. These gazettes often ran caricatures presenting crippled modern vehicles: a tramway pulled by a turtle, a stalled ferry passed by rowboats, or a car pulled by a horse. Such images served to ridicule the unreliability of modern modes

of transportation and suggested their inferiority to old ones.<sup>63</sup> It was that very contrast between the promise of speed and comfort, and the actual slow and chaotic Istanbul transport system, that such satire emanated from.

If the speed of machines is coupled with the human experience of haste, disturbances to the working of these machines are experienced on the human level as waiting. In order to reduce operational costs and ensure sufficient levels of regularity, punctuality, and predictability, vehicles of mass transportation keep their passengers waiting for them. The old stagecoaches and rowboats, by contrast, would wait for their passengers, and one could hop on and be on her way immediately. On the other hand, if there were no available vehicle, there would be no knowing how long the waiting would last. What was uniquely modern about the type of waiting dealt with here is that it was fully “boxed” in terms of both time and space. It was once again the timetable which set the boundaries of waiting time, and it was the waiting hall that delineated its space.

Indeed, timetables defined not only departure and arrival times, but also by implication the expected duration of waiting. Since waiting for a ferry or a train was considered, as today, to be a nuisance, a mere “waste of time,” passengers naturally wished to reduce it to minimum by optimizing the calibration of schedules. This was precisely one of the repeated requests made in many of the petitions. The government responded to these demands and made continuous efforts to coordinate the schedules of the various transport systems with one another and with the working hours in the bureaus.

The other recurring issue in these petitions was the delays. Being premised on the promise of regularity and predictability, timetables generated expectations. As long as commuters knew just how long they would have to wait, they would normally accept it as inescapable. However, once the boundaries of the expected duration were breached, commuters’ waiting might become impatient and angry. This was of course very different from the common European image of Orientals’ indifference to time and their disregard for schedules. Lucy Garnett, for example, who authored several books on everyday life in the Ottoman Empire, wrote that over there,

few people require to catch trains or steamboats; time-tables as well are as often ignored as consulted; and punctuality is not a virtue cultivated by the Oriental. On the majority of Turkish railways there is but one train a day, up or down the line, and intending passengers will arrive at the station when they may happen to be ready, and, seated on their baggage, patiently wait for the next train. *Inshallah* (Allah permitting), he will ultimately arrive at his destination.”<sup>64</sup>

It is very easy to dismiss such observations as being “Orientalist,” but it clearly contained more than a grain of truth. Whether in the Ottoman administration or in any of the indigenous transportation systems, schedules were not strictly observed.<sup>65</sup> But Garnett’s interpretation of these observations missed the point. Ignoring timetables was not embedded in the “Oriental mind.” In fact, the sight of peasants waiting on the platforms for hours, regardless of the schedule, was known in other contemporary societies as well.<sup>66</sup> As long as arriving late did not entail any sanctions, the lax temporal conventions of the past continued to guide time-related behaviors. This was probably the state of affairs in the countryside, but in early twentieth-century Istanbul, commuters were by no means indifferent to time. They expected schedules to be observed.

It seems that the very concept of arriving “on time” was changing. If in the early nineteenth century, pre-fixed hours were usually understood to have relatively wide margins, by the beginning of the twentieth century, these margins had been narrowed significantly, at least in some sectors. Clearly, the margins of a pre-fixed time may change according to social context and power relations even within the same social group.<sup>67</sup> The complaints may help to assess what was considered an acceptable delay within one social group, namely, government officials, in the specific context of urban commuting.

Within the course of one month in late 1909, six complaints were filed regarding delays and disorder in the working of the Beneficent Company. Their wording makes it clear that delays were even more common than may be inferred from the number of complaints actually filed.<sup>68</sup> Reading these complaints, it seems that delays of minutes were probably considered acceptable. All complaints which were actually filed reported delays of between twenty-five and fifty-five minutes. These apparently crossed the invisible line between the acceptably late and the “too late.” As already explained, the timing of this rain of complaints had to do with the new measures taken by the administration against latecomers. One may thus argue that the margins were in fact defined by the new sanctions introduced in the bureaus of the central administration. However, the same rough correlation between schedule and reality was expected when no penalties were involved.<sup>69</sup>

Since friction within and between temporal constructs is impossible to eliminate, most modern transport systems allocate spaces for waiting. Waiting rooms represent the designation of space for temporal irregularity or the transmission of temporal discordance to the spatial dimension. Waiting rooms are built to make the inescapable waiting somewhat more manageable. The founders of the ferry company were well aware of the need to secure favorable waiting conditions for future passengers. A document they composed in November 1850,

shortly before the company began to operate its first ferries, referred directly to the matter. Passengers on quays along the route of the ferry, the document said, were forced to wait for the ferry either exposed to bad weather conditions or in a nearby coffeehouse. Instead of waiting, many of them preferred to use the services of the good old rowboats (*kayıks*). Thus, the document recommended the building of “covered places” on quays along the Bosphorus.<sup>70</sup> This awareness did not necessarily mean that roofed waiting areas were indeed built. One of the post-1908 satirical publications, the *Ton Ton Risalesi*, criticized state officials for failing to build a waiting room for passengers going to the Princess Islands, in the Sea of Marmara, despite promises made.<sup>71</sup> In the meantime, the passengers continued to wait for their ferries, and for their waiting room, outside.

### *Temporal Regularity and Its Anxieties*

Even if punctuality standards of public transportation in late nineteenth-century Istanbul were far from what they are today, they still allowed for unprecedented levels of regularity and predictability in urban life. These new features of urban life had a significant effect on social interaction and related emotional scripts. As commuting became more routinized, every breach of the schedule could cause anxiety and therefore necessitated explanations. Such anxieties and explanations are reflected in contemporary novels. On a spring day, Ali Bey, the young protagonist of Namık Kemal’s, *Awakening (İntibah*, 1876), spends long hours in Çamlıca Park, waiting for his beloved to appear. When he arrives home around sunset, later than he usually returns, he has to come up with an excuse that would calm his mother down. “We had a lot of work in the office,” he says, “I could not make it to the ferry.” He quickly adds that it might happen again tomorrow and asks his mother not to worry.<sup>72</sup>

Subhi Bey, the protagonist of Nabizade Nazım’s *Zehra* (1896), uses a similar excuse to cover up his own love affair. He telegraphs his (second) wife Sırrıçemal, informing her that he will not be able to get home that night due to his heavy workload. The telegram arrives at its destination toward midnight and calms Sırrıçemal’s suspicions, at least for the moment. Toward the following evening, waiting for her beloved husband’s return once again, she becomes anxious. Subhi, we are told, usually arrives with the 11:30 (*alaturka*) train, and the whistle gets Sırrıçemal’s heart racing. She imagines Subhi as he makes his way home. “[Just now] he left the station. . . . He passed the house of Mehmet Bey on the corner. He passed Nikoli’s house too.” According to her calculation, the door bell should ring right now. But it does not. As the minutes pass Sırrıçemal’s angst increases, yet she forces herself to calm down and wait for the last train. But Subhi never shows up.

It is the regularity and predictability of the new transportation systems that allow Sırrıcemal to imagine her beloved coming closer to her “minute by minute,” as it is described. When she realizes he is not going to show up, she hopes that he would at least send another message that would explain the breach of the routine. Still no word from Subhi. Sırrıcemal cannot escape the conclusion that he is spending the night with his first wife (in fact, he is with Ürani, a high-end prostitute). Her worst fears have become reality. She collapses on the couch, sobbing.<sup>73</sup>

Underlying this highly emotional scene, then, are cold and heartless technological infrastructures. The regularity provided by these systems creates expectations, and when these are not met and irregularities not explained, fear, anxiety, and doubt appear. Networked time restructures emotional scripts of waiting. Yet the fact that both Ali Bey and Subhi Bey are expected to be at home before sunset (even if they fail to do so), suggests that—as shown also in previous chapters—the distinction between day life and night life was still socially meaningful. However, this distinction too was changing.

### *Ordering the Dark Streets*

As various infrastructures of communication began to connect different localities and institutions to one another, the need to create a more fully integrated system of time became more apparent. Clearly associating temporal order and regularity with notions of progress and modernity, the Ottoman government made an effort to coordinate temporal constructs, thus bringing the main traffic arteries under the sway of a new, clock-based temporal order. As I show next, this attempt to impose temporal order was not confined to specific areas; neither was it limited to specific times of the day. Serving the interests of very specific urban groups, the reforming Ottoman state now sought to take control over the entire city during all hours of the day and the night.

The changing of Ottoman nighttime realities is usually attributed to artificial lighting. In fact, systematic illumination of streets was only one of the measures adopted by the Ottoman authorities to impose a new type of order during nighttime. All these measures, including street lighting, were in response to an intensification of nocturnal movement, rather than the reason for this intensification. By utilizing new ordering devices, the Ottoman state and the classes best situated to utilize its power colonized the night, that is, they occupied an already inhabited temporal domain and used it for their own needs.<sup>74</sup>

Partly relying on Michael Igantieff’s concepts, Christopher Dandeker observes with regards to urbanizing Europe in the nineteenth century that the forming of a “society of strangers” undercut the traditional basis of law and

order, which was premised on face to face interaction and communal coercion. Under these conditions, a new system of rationalized law enforcement had to be created.<sup>75</sup> Although the Ottoman Empire never underwent large-scale industrialization, some of the challenges brought about by urbanization were not dissimilar. With villagers, refugees, freed slaves, and European travelers and merchants of all kinds flocking to the large urban centers, the old communal mechanisms of surveillance and control were losing their efficiency. Singling out strangers is clearly more difficult in a society of strangers.<sup>76</sup> This is not to say that old mechanisms of control, such as personal surety and “neighborhood pressure” (*mahalle baskısı*) were abandoned all together, but rather that they had to be complemented by new ones.<sup>77</sup>

Such trends were clearly evident in the government’s efforts to remake nocturnal order following the signing of the British-Ottoman commercial treaties of 1838. These treaties, which forced open the doors of Ottoman markets to the globalizing economy, contributed to the already growing maritime commerce between the ports of the Ottoman Empire and those of Europe.<sup>78</sup> The rising demand for boatmen and pilots drew to Istanbul thousands of foreigners, especially of Ionian and Maltese origin. The migrants overcrowded the working-class neighborhoods around the wharfs in Galata, long known for its large European community, and notorious for its licentious nightlife.<sup>79</sup> Hundreds of Ionian and Maltese migrants, many of whom were engaged in criminal activity, took advantage of the British stewardship of their homelands and registered as British protégés. British protection supplied them with near-immunity from Ottoman law enforcement. Other European embassies pursued much the same policy and sheltered their own protégés, including those known as habitual criminals.<sup>80</sup>

Not surprisingly, the largely unmarried population that inhabited the lower areas of Galata soon swelled the brothels and bars that mushroomed all around. Here too the 1838 treaties came into play. According to British interpretation, the treaties allowed British-protected individuals to engage in all kinds of retail trade on equal terms with Ottoman subjects, but without being subject to Ottoman regulation. Under British protection, then, many of the Maltese and Ionian migrants entered the lucrative business of alcohol retail, and the number of unauthorized alcohol vendors rose sharply. By 1850 there were 125 such establishments in Galata alone. All these businesses operated in defiance of the regulation that gave the members of the guild of Ottoman tavern owners a monopoly over the selling of spirits “by the glass.”<sup>81</sup> The combination of this European interference, rapid in-migration, and the unrestrained flow of alcohol, resulted in extremely high crime rates, especially around the area of Galata.<sup>82</sup>

Under these conditions, it is quite natural that like their predecessors, the

leaders of the early Tanzimat viewed nocturnal traffic mainly as a threat. Yet the measures they took in order to cope with this perceived threat gradually drifted away from the old ways, demonstrating a more ambitious wish to impose order directly on the entire urban space during all times of the day, and night. The most obvious manifestation of this ambition was the establishment and gradual institutionalization of modern police forces in Istanbul and throughout the Ottoman domains.<sup>83</sup> It was in this context of policing, that clocks were first employed to control nocturnal traffic.

### *Clock-Regulated Nights*

In 1845, the main legislative body of the period, the Supreme Council of Judicial Ordinances (*Meclis-i Vâlâ-ı Ahkâm-ı Adliye*) drafted new police regulations in an attempt to cope with the soaring crime rates. In what concerns this discussion, the regulations stipulated that being out in the streets without a lantern was only allowed until half an hour after sunset. In summer, being outside with a lantern was allowed until four o'clock, and in winter, until five (*alaturka* time, i.e., four or five hours after sunset). After these hours, even those with lanterns were to be arrested. In a decree issued later that year, Galata, Beyoğlu, Tarabya, and Büyük Dere were excepted from this definition of hours since they were "places of foreigners." In Galata and Beyoğlu, walking without lanterns was allowed until two hours after sunset and walking with lanterns until one hour after midnight (real solar time). After the sanctioned hours, everyone caught in the streets, with or without a lantern, of whatever confession, was to be arrested by the police for acting "in contrary to the order of the country."<sup>84</sup>

The new orders created much confusion and the matter was finally brought to the cabinet (*Meclis-i Hass-i Vükelâ*), which decided against the distinction between "foreigners' areas" and the rest of the city. In a resolution sent for the approval of the sultan it was explained that the former limitations on movement were too restrictive and that the exception of the foreigners' districts caused resentment among the (mostly indigenous) inhabitants of other areas. In addition, it was noted that at the time these instructions had been first drafted, crime was peaking, hence, apparently, the need for the stricter measures. Since the situation had improved, it was said, such restrictive measures were no longer needed. Most relevant to this discussion, the cabinet noted that the command of order and security in the sultan's domains should be "absolute," and therefore, no exceptions should be made. In his response to the council's decision, the sultan adopted this reasoning and affirmed the recommendation to apply the curfew hours originally defined for the foreigners neighborhoods to all areas of Istanbul.<sup>85</sup>

The new police regulations and the deliberations that followed disclose the rationale that guided the government in coping with nighttime crime. Rather than forbidding nocturnal traffic altogether, regulations and clocks were used to control it. Regulations drew new temporal boundaries, not between day and night, but deep within the dark hours. Clocks were to be the arbiters of these boundaries, separating the lawful from the forbidden. Just like the new regulations that gradually came to govern nearly every aspect of life in the Ottoman Empire, clock hours were supposed to apply universally and equally.

In this sense, the emerging clock-based temporal constructs conveyed the same legal-rational “objectiveness” that the Tanzimat state sought to project through its intensive codification efforts.<sup>86</sup> The policemen, the representatives of the new codified system and the related temporal order, were to always act in compliance with regulations, and carry a timepiece at all times.<sup>87</sup> Under this emerging legal-rational order, everybody was supposedly equal before the clock. However, behind the façade of equality and rationality there lay power relations that were far from equal. In this case, it was most probably the ability of European delegates to except “European areas” from the rule.<sup>88</sup> All the Ottoman authorities could do was to except all other areas from the same rule, in order to maintain some measure of integrity. Yet, Ottoman attempts to impose these curfew hours on European protégés in following years were often met with direct and sometimes violent resistance of European protégés and uncooperative European representatives, who tended to protect their nationals regardless of their deeds.<sup>89</sup>

Another aspect of the Ottoman effort to impose nocturnal order was the temporal regulation of alcohol consumption. For the authorities, nighttime drinking remained inseparable from the violence and moral depravity of the “dangerous classes,” especially in the European areas. In the face of the surging crime of the 1840s, and especially during the Crimean War, Ottoman authorities made continuous efforts to shut down all alcohol-serving businesses in Istanbul at sunset every day.<sup>90</sup> By the early years of the Hamidian era, alcohol vending regulation had been somewhat relaxed, but it is quite clear that, as in the case of curfew hours, regulation was falling behind the intensification of nocturnal sociability. A set of petitions filed by bar and wine shop owners starting in the early 1880s demonstrates both the thrust toward more extensive use of the night and government attempts to contain that thrust.

In late 1882, the guild of tavern owners petitioned the authorities requesting that they be allowed to keep their business running until five o’clock (*alaturka*, i.e., five hours after sunset). This was far more than the authorities were willing

to consider. Following inter-ministerial correspondence, the cabinet finally rejected the appeal in December 1882 and decreed that for the sake of public security, all alcohol selling institutions would shut down at one thirty (*alaturka*).<sup>91</sup> Yet the matter did not die down. In a number of additional petitions, different groups of bar owners tried to gain government approval for keeping their businesses running later at night. These petitions reflect a rather lively scene of nightlife, with hundreds of alcohol retailers operating under different designations all around greater Istanbul.<sup>92</sup>

The details and numbers presented in the petitions show that while the authorities were quite clearly focused on the criminal aspects of nightly drinking around Galata, drinking establishments were not limited to this area, and it wasn't only criminals who enjoyed a few nightcaps. Indeed, as Roger A. Deas amply demonstrates in his work on late Ottoman Istanbul, bars and coffee-houses drew a diverse crowd of outlaws and thugs, but also vagrants and unskilled workers, craftsmen, fishermen, soldiers, foreign and local sailors, and even white-collar professionals, including government officials.<sup>93</sup> All these groups participated, although not equally, in the rather wide and lively nightlife scene that thrived away from the street lights which were gradually being installed in the more prosperous areas of town. Alcohol retailers, the main beneficiaries of this widening scene, actively pushed for prolonging the lawful operating hours of their businesses.

These trends were not limited to the capital city. In late December 1909, a group of shop owners from Macva, a small town in the province of Yanya, today in northwestern Greece, petitioned the Ministry of the Interior. They complained that although the province was perfectly calm and safe, the local administrator (*kaymakam*) forced them to close their businesses at one o'clock (*alaturka*), without any reason. The reply from the provincial administration alleged that gambling activity was taking place in the establishments, hence the limitation on operating hours. Another example of the enforcement of such limitations in provincial towns is the case of Şevki Bey, the gendarmerie officer who openly defied the drinking hours regulations in Adana.

By the late nineteenth century, then, the use of clocks as tools of control was no longer limited to clearly delineated state spaces such as military compounds, schools, and bureaus, or even to major routes of transportation. The entire urban fabric was gradually subjected. Clock hours had become an obvious, taken-for-granted part of urban life. The bar owners, on their part, were constantly trying to push these boundaries farther into the night. What is clear here is that the government was not the only actor in the transformation of

Ottoman temporal culture. In this case, as with the coordination and enforcement of ferry schedules, the Ottoman government in fact responded to pressures coming from different sectors of the population.

While curfew and drinking hours were being imposed on the dark streets, a new, radical solution to the threat of nocturnal disorder was gradually being implemented in some of the main streets of Istanbul, and later in other cities. Discussion of street lighting is beyond the scope of this chapter. It is worth noting, however, that like the comprehensive temporal regulation of the night, the effort to light up whole streets, and ultimately entire cities, reflected a shift in the perspective of the reforming Ottoman state. If the early modern state “saw” through the eyes of its inhabitants, and often acted through proxies such as neighborhood imams and *kabadayıs*, street lighting reflected the ambition of the state to “see” synoptically and to control the streets directly.<sup>94</sup>

### *Clocks in the Streets*

As clock-based temporal constructs were gradually being interconnected, clock time was spreading out of the hitherto limited state spaces onto the main traffic arteries. Over the second half of the nineteenth century, more and more public clocks were being placed on the façades of government buildings, hospitals, schools, and even fountains.<sup>95</sup> Late Ottoman clock towers should be seen as part of this wider phenomenon. In a sense, they were stone manifestations of the interrelations between clock time and urban order. Most of the late-nineteenth-century clock towers were placed in busy commercial hubs, in governmental centers, sometimes on top of police stations. At least some clock towers were artificially lit during nighttime.<sup>96</sup> Towering above all other buildings and seen from every direction at all times, the artificially-lit public clock reflected the subjugation of the city to a new, comprehensive temporal order that spanned the entire urban fabric, during all hours of the day and night. At the same time, the public clock tower was crucial for the functionality of that order. While the symbolic significance of the late Ottoman clock towers has been noted by scholars time and again, their most basic function as time-tellers has often been downplayed.

Yet for contemporaries clock towers had a very important role, as they allowed one to participate in the new clock-based temporal order. In fact, the functional and symbolic levels were intertwined, since it was the state that gave these clocks their authoritative status and turned them into “certified” tellers of time, according to which all timepieces in the city were to be set. The inscription on the clock tower in Adana, where Şevki Bey was enjoying his *rakı*, explicitly conveys this connection between the building itself, time regulation, and



FIGURE 11. *Time and Authority: the clock tower in Jerusalem, completed in 1907.*  
*Courtesy of Yehuda Levanony, the Yehuda Levanony Collection, Rishon Lezion, Israel.*

the power of the state. “It is such a great work that it has no equal,” the caption reads. “It seems like a clock striking but in fact it is the government calling.”<sup>97</sup>

The prominence and authority of the Ottoman clock tower in Jerusalem is implied in ‘Ārif al-‘Ārif’s history of the city. The tower, writes ‘Ārif, could be seen from every neighborhood in the city and was known simply as “the clock” (see fig. 11). Ya‘akov Yehoshu‘a, a Sephardic Jew who grew up in late Ottoman Jerusalem, remembers that the clock was “trusted by all townspeople, and nobody dared to ‘question’ the accuracy of its hands.”<sup>98</sup> In other words, the clock tower set the standard local time for the entire city.

If the new temporal order can be seen as an attempt to replace temporal frontiers with clear-cut time borders, the public clocks emerged as the ultimate arbiter of these borders. At the same time, they were the symbol of the rationale behind the new order, and of the power that imposed it. Urban order, state power, and the drawing of spatial and temporal borders became inseparable. By the early twentieth century, the ambiguity that had characterized the old temporal frontiers would be perceived as disorder, and therefore as uncivilized and injurious to the project of Ottoman modernity.

To conclude, through the intense interaction between hardware and humans within the new socio-technical systems, and between these systems and the

larger urban environment, time-related conventions, concepts, and behaviors were being reshaped. In other words, the laying of the technological infrastructure amounted to more than a new temporal order; the most fundamental components of Ottoman temporal culture were undergoing significant changes. Regular commuting was becoming an integral part of urban life, along with related experiences of making haste and running late; the relations between diurnal and nocturnal life were being reformulated, and new conventions of punctuality and time thrift were emerging.

The very same networks that tied together different parts of various Ottoman cities facilitated the integration of the large territories still ruled over by the Ottomans, and brought their empire into intensive interaction with the world beyond its borders. In the next chapter, I examine the weaving of an empire-wide time web and show that this technical process was inseparable from intensive discussions of self-identity, progress, and modernity.

## 6 } NO TIME TO LOSE

When the International Meridian Conference convened in Washington D.C. in 1884 to promote the standardization of time worldwide, the sultan's delegate stated that in the Ottoman Empire there would always be two times, *l'heure à la franque et l'heure à la turque*.<sup>1</sup> He could not have been more accurate. *Alafranga* time, that is, mean time, had entered the Ottoman Empire around the middle of the nineteenth century and was increasingly used in various governmental agencies alongside the *alaturka saat*. The use of mean time increased considerably following the 1908 Young Turk Revolution, but it did not fully supersede the Ottoman system until after the fall of the empire. It was only in early 1926, after a new political order had been established on the ruins of the Ottoman Empire, that the old hour system was finally outlawed and universally replaced by mean time.<sup>2</sup>

In the previous chapters I have shown how a patchwork of organizational measures taken by various Ottoman institutions over the nineteenth century in order to improve regularity, efficiency, and predictability gradually led to the formation of a more comprehensive mindset that identified time thrift, regularity, and punctuality with notions of progress and civilization. This chapter looks at the same process from another angle. It seeks to show how the widening arena of letters shaped the worldview of the reading public and ultimately affected political processes, which in turn had a tremendous effect on Ottoman temporal culture.

So far, the scholarship that has touched on the transition to mean time has focused mainly on bureaucratic aspects of the process and sought to explain, in a somewhat teleological manner, the eventual triumph of the foreign system.<sup>3</sup> While certainly relying on these earlier studies, my purpose here is to place the bureaucratic process within a wider context, and to show how the attitudes toward the *alaturka* hour system were molded by prevalent cultural trends.

I argue that the concurrent use of the *alaturka* and *alafranga* hours down to the end of the Hamidian era was emblematic of the effort made by the palace and many of the leading intellectuals of the time to patch together foreign and indigenous elements in search of a distinctly Ottoman path of progress. While the use of the European system was deemed necessary for interacting with the outside world, the abolition of the indigenous hour system, associated with old

traditions, was not seriously considered. New time-related values such as punctuality, productivity, and efficiency, which were considered crucial for making this progress, were cultivated relying on the *alaturka saat*.

The political opposition to the Hamidian order, generally known as the Young Turks, inherited the ideology of progress and the related emphasis on time thrift and punctuality. However, they were much more impatient. They sought “progress now” and were less willing to compromise with religious, social, and bureaucratic traditions. These groups developed a dichotomist discourse of “modern” and “backward” and, in the name of progress, endorsed the urgent eradication of all things old. Especially within the circles of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), the more radical group among the Young Turks, history was perceived as a race between nations. In order to progress, in order to win the race, they had to break the chains of tradition and lose the burden of the past. It was in this context that they sought to do away with the old hour system. The CUP-dominated regime of the Second Constitutional Era (1908–1918) translated this agenda into concrete measures. The transition to mean time, in short, was not some natural bureaucratic process of evolution, but rather the outcome sought by the new ruling elite. But the advent of mean time dialectically created its opposition, and the abolition of the *alaturka* system emerged as a thoroughly political question.

### *Introducing Mean Time*

In contrast to the Ottoman hour system, which counted clock hours from sunset to sunset, in most parts of Europe it was high noon that served as baseline. Quite similar to the Ottoman practice, however, clocks in Europe before the eighteenth century were subjected to real solar time, as measured by sundials. Since the earth’s axis is tilted, and because its orbit around the sun is not circular but rather elliptic, the rotation rate of the earth is not uniform. Real solar time, which is measured by the movement of the sun across the sky, therefore varies with the season. Mean time is the annual average of this non-uniform movement. While mechanical clocks were unfit to show the old “seasonal hours” that varied in length, they were fully compatible with mean-time hours.<sup>4</sup> As mechanical clocks became more accurate and available during the seventeenth century, the use of mean time spread across Europe. And yet throughout the early modern period, real solar time maintained its supremacy. It was only in the late eighteenth century that European cities began to keep mean time in preference to real solar time.<sup>5</sup>

Regardless of changes in the reckoning of hours, however, time remained a very local thing and every community kept its own hours.<sup>6</sup> Due to the slow-

ness of transportation and communication, synchronization of these local hours was both impossible and unnecessary. Starting in the 1840s, telegraph systems began weaving remote localities into huge networks of instant communication, and the multitude of times was increasingly perceived as a problem. The huge number of local times created great difficulties in the operation of railway systems too. Time has become a matter of money—big money. In a globalizing economy, the flow of capital was dependent on the regular and predictable flow of goods, information, and people. In order to facilitate this flow, the newly assembled networks of transportation and communication needed a standard time system. This, in a nutshell, was the background for convening the 1884 Prime Meridian conference. Most relevant to this discussion, the conference defined the longitude of the Greenwich Observatory as the prime meridian from which longitudes were to be counted; it set the beginning of the Universal Day at midnight Greenwich Mean Time, and decided that counting the hours of the day would run from zero to twenty-four.<sup>7</sup>

Although these recommendations were adopted almost unanimously by the representatives present at the conference, they were implemented slowly by the respective governments. Japan applied the system in 1888, Italy and Germany in 1893, Spain in 1901, and France not until 1911. Things were even more complicated for the Ottomans, since the unification of time in their empire involved not merely the adoption of a new standard time, but the replacement of the *alaturka* hours with a completely different system. Back in 1884, this was not on the agenda.<sup>8</sup>

Indeed, the concurrent use of the two hour systems in the Ottoman Empire continued well into the twentieth century. While the state apparatus still relied on the Ottoman hour system, mean time served most foreign establishments operating in the empire, from embassies to railway companies.<sup>9</sup> The constant increase of activity in these foreign establishments during the second half of the nineteenth century contributed to the spread of mean time. This trend was intensified by the gradual connection of local transportation and communication lines to foreign ones. As Ottoman railway stations and telegraph offices became nodes in evolving international networks, they had to conform, to a certain extent, with the standards of these systems. That is why the Ottoman telegraph and post services were among the first organs within the government apparatus to familiarize themselves with the mean-time system. The same was true for government agencies handling the affairs of foreign enterprises, such as railway and shipping companies, or scientific institutions such as the Imperial Observatory (*Rasathane-i Amire*).<sup>10</sup> It was mostly through these organs and through military channels that mean time entered Ottoman official parlance.



FIGURE 12. *Alaturka and alafanga*: A Markwick-Markham double-dialed watch made for the Ottoman market, late nineteenth century. Topkapı Palace Collection, courtesy of Şule Gürbüz of the Dolma Bahçe Clock Museum.

The concurrent use of two hour systems was a constant source of confusion for foreigners and locals alike. Most contemporary travel guide books found it necessary to explain the Ottoman hour system to their readers.<sup>11</sup> Europeans writing about contemporary Turkey frequently commented on the peculiarity of the *alaturka* system, sometimes adding an exotic “Oriental” scent to the description.<sup>12</sup> For the Ottomans too, the duality of hour systems was often problematic, and solutions were devised in order to allow efficient calibration of the two systems. The Imperial Observatory included in its yearbooks conversion tables showing the exact *alaturka* and *alafanga* hours at high noon time, and similar information was published in the local press. Clocks could then be set to the sound of a gun which was fired at the Imperial Arsenal (*Tophane-i Amire*) every day at high noon.<sup>13</sup> Double-faced clocks showing *alaturka* and *alafanga* hours were put in public places, often in proximity to international facilities such as postal and telegraph services (see fig. 13).<sup>14</sup> Pocket watches showing both times were marketed throughout the Ottoman domains (see fig. 12).<sup>15</sup>

However, even as mean time became more widespread, the indigenous hour system retained its supremacy in most governmental systems, despite the problems it presented. In other words, the complexities of the Ottoman system alone cannot explain its later marginalization and the process should not be understood in terms of some “natural” evolutionary process. Hour systems, like fashions, technologies, tastes, and ideas, do not travel on their own. They



FIGURE 13.  
*Alaturka and  
alafranga: the  
clock tower in  
Beirut, completed  
in 1898. Courtesy  
of Yehuda  
Levanony, the  
Yehuda Levanony  
Collection, Rishon  
Lezion, Israel.*

are disseminated through specific routes, spread by specific human actors who seek to advance particular agendas. Placing the process within the political and cultural context of the late nineteenth century will serve to elucidate how the parallel use of both hour systems reflected and was affected by the hegemonic cultural currents of the Hamidian era. Central to these currents was the notion of progress.

### *The Path to Progress: Alaturka and Alafranga*

The notion of progress (*terakki*) began to spread in the Ottoman Empire around the mid-nineteenth century, more or less concurrently with the use

of mean time. The importance of this notion in late Ottoman thought has been discussed by several scholars, but the fundamental change in ideas and images of time that this notion represents has been largely overlooked.<sup>16</sup>

The term “progress” as it was used in Europe since the eighteenth century was tied to an understanding of historical time as a linear, empty entity that flows ceaselessly towards the future. The notion of progress translated Europe’s economic, military, and political superiority to temporal terms by placing it at the most anterior edge of a supposedly universal timeline. Civilization now had a temporal location, and differences between races, nations, and social groups were increasingly formulated in similar terms of temporal distance. From their self-proclaimed position at the tip of history, European elites looked “back” at non-European peoples and arranged them in terms of temporal difference, that is, by assessing how far they were “behind” Europe. Johannes Fabian has argued that this “denial of co-evalness” served as “an ideologically constructed instrument of power” in the hands of the “advanced” European nations, as they colonized “backward” or “stagnant” peoples, ostensibly seeking to lead them forward, into the modern era.<sup>17</sup>

As Europe grew in power and influence, European notions of progress spread among colonized and semi-colonized peoples. Different indigenous groups around the world, especially those of middle-class background, began to gauge the condition of their respective societies in temporal terms and to assess how far they were “behind” Europe. The Ottomans were no exception. Cemil Aydın has noted that by the first half of the nineteenth century, Ottoman elites had already begun to conceive of European military, economic, and political superiority within grand narratives of civilization and progress that gradually replaced earlier Khaldunian notions. For the earliest generations of Ottoman reformists, the conclusion was that by implementing a series of “civilizing” reforms they would eventually be able to join the “civilized world.”<sup>18</sup>

Underlying this whole construct was the understanding of historical time as a universal timeline. Consider, for example, the closing passage of an article written by the leading intellectual Namık Kemal (1840–1888) under the title “Progress.” The article, published in 1872, was an idealized description of contemporary London which, according to Kemal, embodied every aspect of progress:

As Europe has got into this condition of progress in two centuries, and they had to discover the means of progress, whereas we find those means ready to our hands, if the work be properly taken in hand, there is no doubt that

in two centuries, at any rate, we shall be able to get into a condition to be counted one of the most civilized nations. And as regards two centuries, are they more than a twinkling of an eye in the life of a community?<sup>19</sup>

Kemal conveys European superiority in very clear terms of temporal distance. He imagines a collective “we,” a community that moves forward through historical time, following in the footsteps of the Europeans. He is clearly aware that “catching up” might take a long time but he consoles his readers that two hundred years are not significant in “the life of a community.”

Before the nineteenth century, notions of historical time were rich with cyclic images of spheres and planetary orbits.<sup>20</sup> As in Europe, these images were closely related to ideas about the rise and fall of dynasties, which like their European parallels had their origins in antiquity. Considering this world of cyclic images of time, and the related schema of the rise and fall of dynasties, it is much easier to understand the past-orientated rhetoric used to promote reform projects before the nineteenth century. The general acceptance of the notion of linear historical time thus represents a significant break with inherited conventions. This break is crucial to our understanding of the new, future-oriented trajectory which the Ottoman reform project gradually assumed in the second half of the nineteenth century.<sup>21</sup>

Yet the seeming continuity in the usage of the term “progress” from the mid-nineteenth century onward masks the differences in the way it was perceived by different groups and at different times.<sup>22</sup> While the Ottoman elite gradually appropriated the notion of progress, the means to attain it were constantly being debated. The debate focused on the desired path to progress, or in other words, to what extent the Ottomans should follow European models. This question in turn was embedded in the seemingly clear-cut distinction between the world *alaturka* and the world *alafranga*. These terms, best translated as “Ottoman style” and “European style,” became widely used during the second half of the nineteenth century, as European commodities, tastes, and fashions were disseminated through Ottoman urban centers on an unprecedented scale.<sup>23</sup> By the end of the nineteenth century the term *alafranga* could denote anything from European style furniture, to clothing and haircuts, and on to table manners and etiquette.

Writing about the *alaturka/alafranga* distinction, some scholars have drawn a dichotomous picture of a culturally “bifurcated,” “polarized,” or even “schizoid” society that could hardly reconcile the conflicting orientations within it.<sup>24</sup> Often projecting post-Kemalist dichotomies onto the Ottoman past, some of these accounts tended to identify the embrace of European cultural forms with

the secular, reform-oriented groups within Ottoman society. The rejection of the foreign was connected with the traditional or religious.<sup>25</sup> At first sight, the *alafranga/alaturka* differentiation seems to validate such analyses. The conceptual dichotomy it represents might lead us to conclude that there were very clear boundaries separating the indigenous from the foreign, boundaries which forced contemporaries to “choose a side.”

In reality, however, things were much more complex. It was often not mere duality or the coexistence of indigenous and European cultural forms that characterized late nineteenth-century Ottoman society; rather, it was hybridization, the fusion of local and foreign elements, and the creation of new, modern forms that were distinctly Ottoman.<sup>26</sup> Sometimes, an innovation which was dubbed “foreign” at the time it was introduced was assimilated to the extent that one or two generations later, it was considered native and even traditional.<sup>27</sup>

The Ottoman ability to digest imported novelties should not surprise us. The idea that theirs was a closed society, fanatically guarding itself against change has been sufficiently refuted, even if it is not yet extinct.<sup>28</sup> In fact, the Ottomans have been appropriating foreign ideas, tastes, and technologies for centuries.<sup>29</sup> What was new about the adoption of imported cultural forms in the period here under discussion was its scope. If earlier interest in Europe was limited to groups within the elite, towards the turn of the nineteenth century, European products, fashions and manners began to diffuse down the social ladder. By the early twentieth century, even the lower classes, at least in the larger cities, would have felt their impact.<sup>30</sup>

The second half of the nineteenth century was characterized not only by the extent to which these forms were diffused, but also by the unfavorable political context in which this process was taking place. By then, European powers with undeniable military, technological, and economic superiority were preying on Ottoman borders and competing for influence within Ottoman domains. Very much aware of their weakness, many Ottomans were living with a constant sense of threat. Recent works have shown just to what extent that sense of threat informed Ottoman policy, especially during the Hamidian period (1876–1908) and the Second Constitutional Era (1908–1918).<sup>31</sup> In this context, the term *alafranga* signified not merely the foreign origin of an object, or a new cultural form; it came to express reservation, or even a sense of threat that these innovations posed to local culture.<sup>32</sup> Şerif Mardin, who has offered a rather detailed analysis of the social origins of opposition to “super-westernization,” has shown that this opposition was established in popular culture as well, and that it served as a mechanism of social control against those transgressing established norms.<sup>33</sup>

Thus, while the use of hybrid cultural forms continued on the ground, on the discursive level attempts were made to draw clearer lines between the local and the foreign, between self and other. Such clear-cut distinctions were of course ideological simplifications of a much more conflicted social reality. The projection of a supposedly cohesive self in contradistinction to an equally monolithic other served the ideological ends of such groups as the Young Ottomans in their opposition to the leadership of the Tanzimat reforms. During the Hamidian era, similar distinctions served the ruling elite in its efforts to cultivate a sense of collective Ottoman identity that would galvanize the loyalty of the subjects to the state and facilitate their mobilization.<sup>34</sup> In an attempt to reconcile this project with the desire to benefit from interaction with European countries, the Hamidian political and intellectual elite largely advocated selective borrowing from Europe.

Sultan Abdülhamid II himself held the view that European civilization consisted of “technique” and “idea.” While the introduction of technique was beneficial for the Ottomans, the adoption of European ideas was dangerous, as the masses were still not educated enough to absorb them.<sup>35</sup> Writers like Ahmed Midhat (d. 1912) made a similar distinction between “material progress” and “moral progress,” suggesting that the two were not equivalent and similarly endorsing selective application of European innovations.<sup>36</sup> Such discursive tactics are comparable to contemporary anticolonial discourses in other parts of the world. According to Partha Chatterjee, anticolonial nationalism demarcated its own “domain of sovereignty,” an inner, spiritual realm which was separated from the material world, and into which foreigners were not allowed.<sup>37</sup>

In fact, the boundaries were porous, often blurred, always changing. Several scholars have shown that the lines between the foreign and the “authentic” were constantly being debated and negotiated in the widening stream of newspapers, periodicals, novels, plays, and short stories.<sup>38</sup> It must further be remembered that these publications were in themselves appropriated formats that had been assimilated to the point they were no longer considered *alafranga*. This complexity should warn us against portraying late Ottoman cultural life solely in the black and white colors of polemic discourses.<sup>39</sup>

Outside the world of discursive duels and heated discussions, things were even more blurred. In their real lives, people moved between the allegedly contrasted worlds of *alaturka* and *alafranga* quite easily. They could attend a *kara-göz* (shadow theatre) play on one evening and a European-style theatre on the next without necessarily feeling schizophrenic.<sup>40</sup> In other words, I argue that the *alaturka/alafranga* distinction was not a reflection of “schizoid society” torn between two conflicting and mutually excluding orientations, but quite

the opposite. It was indicative of the multiplicity of valid cultural alternatives available, and more importantly, of the fluidity of the boundaries between those alternatives. There was no need to draw lines between the local and the foreign as long as the local was the only feasible option. After all, identity normally becomes an issue when it is no longer taken for granted. The dissemination of foreign cultural forms and their hybridization with native forms, the collage of customs, tastes, manners and styles, brought about the need to create a sense of order by classifying and defining what was “ours” and what was not.

As already noted, these attempts to delineate what was “ours” were inseparable from the effort to form an “us,” that is, an Ottoman collective identity. This was often done by contrasting what was considered to be native with what was deemed an outside threat.<sup>41</sup> Indeed, the adoption of foreign cultural forms remained entangled with a sense of danger to indigenous identity, which was in turn bound to a much more readily perceived threat to the territorial cohesion of the Empire.<sup>42</sup> And yet, the leading writers and intellectuals of the late nineteenth century did not reject the West entirely. Rather, they tried to appropriate whatever they could fit with the type of progress they envisioned and integrate it into the indigenous culture.<sup>43</sup> It was in this context that they promoted newly appropriated time-related values. In order to secure Ottoman progress, they preached, the people must be taught “the value of time.”

### *The Path to Progress and the Value of Time*

The notion that time could be either saved or wasted was neither new nor foreign. One can find expressions of such ideas long before the late nineteenth century. By way of illustration, a couplet from a poem by Erzurumlu İbrahim Hakkı (1703–1780) reads as follows: “If the people sleep, they waste their time (*tazyi-i evkat edip*) / So that you do not waste [your time], be awake, sleep not.”<sup>44</sup> Epigraphs placed in *muvaakkithanes* often advertised similar messages. Yet despite first appearance, these expressions had little to do with the late Ottoman discourse about the value of time. While earlier on the notion of “wasting time” usually related to the individual and his spiritual obligations, the new discourse sought social transformation and was embedded in the material.

Among the influential group of intellectuals known as the Young Ottomans, industriousness and productivity were considered to be among the pillars of Western civilization.<sup>45</sup> In their writings, they often echoed European and American discourses that tied material progress to economic behavior on the level of households and individuals.<sup>46</sup> Benjamin Franklin’s *The Way to Wealth* stands out as particularly influential in this respect. For decades, Franklin had been using his own periodical, *Poor Richard’s Almanac*, to emphasize the im-

portance of hard work, frugality and time thrift as means for achieving material progress on both the individual and societal levels.<sup>47</sup>

Portions of *The Way to Wealth* were translated into Ottoman-Turkish and published in late 1880 by Ebüziyya Tevfik (d. 1913), a leading journalist and publisher.<sup>48</sup> In the following decades proverbs popularized by Franklin, most notably, “time is money,” would often be quoted by Ottoman authors. More important than proverbial expressions, Franklin’s ideas were thoroughly absorbed and echoed repeatedly in late Ottoman literature and journalism. By way of illustration, an article titled *Sai* (effort or hard work), which was published in Ebüziyya Tevfik’s periodical in late 1880, warned that life without work is distressful, tasteless, and boring. The author explained that “a minute passed idly seems longer than an hour.” He emphasized that, although life is extremely short when measured against eternity, it is long enough for living, if only time is properly used.<sup>49</sup>

Ahmed Midhat, Tevfik’s colleague and the most prolific writer of the time, was the first to turn this ideology into literature. By creating antagonistic pairs of characters, Midhat sought to demonstrate the dangers of a wasteful and idle lifestyle on the one hand, and the benefits of hard work and thrift on the other. The economic agenda he was trying to promote through this literary practice has long been noted.<sup>50</sup> I would like to focus on the way Midhat and other Ottoman novelists of the Hamidian period used their literary characters to embody “positive” and “negative” time-related behaviors and values.

The first literary pairing of such prototypical protagonists appeared in Midhat’s first novel-like work, *Felatun Bey and Rakım Efendi* (1875).<sup>51</sup> Felatun Bey is the son of a high official who leads what he perceives to be a European life-style. Felatun Bey is thus raised *alafranga*, which is supposed to explain his complete detachment from his own culture. He lives wastefully in terms of both money and time. He hardly ever comes to the governmental bureau in which he is supposed to work, and spends his entire week either in leisure activities of various kinds or resting from these activities.<sup>52</sup> Enticed by his beloved, a European actress, he spends all the funds he inherited on pleasures, gambling, and expensive goods. Eventually, he hits rock bottom and is forced to leave town and take on a government position in a provincial town.

As Şerif Mardin has shown, the bitter criticism of the *paşazadeler*, or the sons of high officials, which was evident in the proliferation of the Felatun types in early Ottoman novels, was grounded in the contemporary realities of office-holding. The rise of a “bureaucratic aristocracy” during the Tanzimat era created downward pressure on individuals who were not associated with the bureaucrat-statesmen of the day. This inequality of opportunity was one of the

major reasons for the animosity towards the elite of the Tanzimat. Contemporary intellectuals translated this animosity into criticism which targeted the Tanzimat statesmen and accused them, among other things, of blind and superficial imitation of Europe.<sup>53</sup>

The *mirasyedi* (spendthrift) type was created in order to criticize this “super-westernizing” elite. The lifestyle of this type was thus presented not only as corrupt, foolish, and dangerous, but also as foreign to the Ottoman way of life. The preoccupation of contemporary intellectuals with young *alafranga* fops who indulged in extravagance and conspicuous consumption should also be seen in the context of the economic crisis of the empire. The chronic state of indebtedness that plagued the empire in the second half of the nineteenth century was often explained by the overspending of the palace and the ruling elite, which was in turn connected to the negative influence of foreigners. Just as the *mirasyedi* types frittered away the fortunes of their parents, the elite of the Tanzimat was criticized for wasting the wealth accumulated by their ancestors.<sup>54</sup>

The *mirasyedi* type could be used as a ready-made mold that gave a more concrete shape to an agenda that would otherwise be very abstract. By way of illustration, the article *Sai*, quoted above, used the *mirasyedi* type to exemplify the futility of life without work and the need to make good of every single minute:

We know so many spendthrifts (*mirasyedi*) who are thought to be completely immersed in pleasures if looked at from a distance. However, even if [one of these] unfortunate[s] spends his entire life in search of a single pleasure, he would still be unable to enjoy any of the world’s delights. . . . Enjoyment without work is like food without salt. A person must live by his own work, so that he knows the value of his time and can be sated with the taste of his life.<sup>55</sup>

With Felatun Bey, the personification of sloth was taken one step further. The general type of the *mirasyedi* finally had a name. Felatun Bey was a walking warning sign, an embodiment of the folly and dangers of an idle and wasteful lifestyle. The message that the character of Felatun Bey was built to convey is emphasized throughout the book with frequent comparisons to the character and habits of his antagonist, Rakım Bey.<sup>56</sup> As his name implies, Rakım Efendi is the role model of calculation and thrift.<sup>57</sup> Once again, this thrift applies to the way he manages his funds and the way he organizes his time. Succinctly put, Rakım Bey saves whatever money he can and never wastes a minute on unproductive activities.

Rakım’s commitment to self-improvement through independent study is

matched only by his devotion to his work in the governmental bureau. The reader learns that Rakım Efendi works and studies seventeen hours a day and is even given his schedule in terms of clock hours. He is not only industrious and efficient, but punctual as well. “He pays attention to his time as if he were an Englishman,” and arrives to the private lessons he gives a few minutes before the designated hour, so that he can start exactly on time. The contrast between Rakım Efendi and Felatun Bey emerges very clearly when they are both invited to the house of Mr. Ziklas, an Englishman who resides in Istanbul with his family. While Rakım makes haste so as not to be late, Felatun Bey seems undisturbed when he is late, and simply makes excuses to explain his tardiness. Mr. Ziklas can barely control the impulse to reproach Felatun Bey for keeping everybody waiting for ten minutes.<sup>58</sup>

Clearly the literary personification of the author, Rakım Efendi’s character is supposed to serve as a role model for a modern self-made man, the ideal Ottoman gentleman.<sup>59</sup> It is thus significant that Midhat made regularity, punctuality, and efficiency important traits of his protagonist. If Rakım Efendi was “the first *homo economicus* of Turkish literature,” he was its first clock-minded protagonist too.<sup>60</sup> However, the standard against which Midhat measured the punctuality of his ideal Ottoman gentleman was a foreign one. The choice of Mr. Ziklas’s nationality and the supposedly “English” punctuality of Rakım Efendi were not incidental. Midhat held Englishmen in the highest esteem for being hard-working and productive. “The slogan of this nation,” he wrote elsewhere, “is ‘time is money.’”<sup>61</sup> The identification of English people with punctuality and productivity seems to have been quite common. At least some Ottoman writers actually thought that the proverb quoted by Midhat was an English one.<sup>62</sup>

While Midhat identifies acute clock-awareness with the European, he has his protagonist successfully and quite naturally adopt it. Rakım Efendi is no less punctual than the English standard against which he is measured, and what is more, he is punctual using his own indigenous hour system.<sup>63</sup> Indeed, Rakım’s character is structured to criticize the exaggerated *alafranga* type, but he himself is not simply *alaturka*, but rather a more complex fusion. In all his choices, Rakım combines East and West; from his clothes and the furniture in his house to his self-imposed curriculum and his friends. When comparing Rakım with Felatun Bey, the reader is supposed to learn how the Ottomans may actually benefit from European knowledge without giving up their identity.<sup>64</sup>

The criticism of the upper classes’ conspicuous consumption of both time and money is clearly conveyed through a comparison between the ways Rakım Efendi and Felatun Bey spend a day out in the park. The picnic Rakım organizes for his household members and the piano teacher, Ms. Yozefino, is intended to

maximize the pleasure of the outdoors, and toward that end, Rakim has it all planned and executed, quite literally, by the clock. He chooses Wednesday for the outing, when the park is known to be almost empty, and has the boatman who is to take them to the park wake everybody up long before sunrise. When the boatman knocks on the door, Rakim wakes up and immediately checks the clock, which shows ten (*alaturka* of course). “Right on time,” (*tamam vaktidir*) he says, and proceeds to wake the others. From that early hour until their return “exactly a quarter of an hour after the evening *ezan*,” the whole day is described with frequent references to clock hours. Their early rise and return before nightfall is contrasted with European modes of leisure, and is clearly presented as a morally acceptable and decent form of pastime.<sup>65</sup>

Rakim’s ideal picnic is contrasted with Felatun’s outing to the same park, accompanied by his European beloved. The two go to the park on a Sunday when the park is known to be crowded, especially with Europeans and local Christians enjoying their day off. Felatun’s only concern is to be seen and to show off his money. Typically, Midhat intervenes directly between these two contrasting descriptions with a lecture of his own, so as to ensure that the reader would not miss the lesson. This lecture brings together the notion of time thrift and the criticism of conspicuous consumption in a very clear way. “It is true,” he writes in this didactic intermission, “that a watch is a necessary device for a person. But what is the chain needed for?” He explains that a simple cord is sufficient for securing the watch and concludes that the purpose of an expansive chain is to display the wealth of the watch owner. This demonstration of riches is what drives the affluent out to the popular parks and promenades precisely when they are most crowded. More than they want to see the open meadows and flowers, they want to see the people, “or put more accurately, to be seen.”<sup>66</sup>

That is exactly the setting in which Rezaizade Ekrem places Bihruz Bey, the ultimate *alafranga* fop of Ottoman literature, right in the beginning of his novel, *Carriage Passion* (*Araba Sevdası*, 1896).<sup>67</sup> Bihruz Bey makes his first appearance in the novel as he is sitting in a café in Çamlıca Park, a popular excursion site. Every few minutes he takes out his expensive watch, which is tied to his vest by a gilded silk ribbon. He looks at it and then jumps out of his chair and walks about impatiently for a while, before returning to his seat. Onlookers might mistake him for a busy young man who is anxious about his time, but Bihruz Bey turns out to be of different stock. Just as he wastes all the funds he inherited on luxuries, he idly wastes his time on carriage rides, parties, and futile hunts for his beloved. The gap between showing off the watch and actually using it adds to the characterization of Bihruz as a fraud, a European wannabe.<sup>68</sup>

If Bihruz Bey is modeled after Felatun Bey, then Mansur Bey, the protago-

nist of Mizancı Murad's *Turfanda mı Yoksa Turfa mı* (Avant-Garde or Peculiar?, 1891) is closer to the model set by Rakım Efendi. Like Rakım before him, Mansur is clearly supposed to serve as a prototype of the self-made man who tries to put every minute to good use. Mansur Bey takes on a position in one of the governmental bureaus, where he is appalled by the utter waste of time and resources. After he learns that he cannot change the situation, he resolves to bring a book to the office, so as not to waste his time.<sup>69</sup> Like Rakım, he leaves the bureaucracy early in the story and finally goes to the provinces to educate the peasants, committed as ever to the service of the fatherland.

In short, the notion of progress and the related emphasis on time thrift and productivity were closely related to the imagined Ottoman community that leading intellectuals were trying to forge. In order for that community to “progress,” each individual—now a member of that community—had to work hard and economize on time, as if it were possible to combine the minutes conserved in efficient work and strike them off the accumulated temporal distance that had opened between the Europeans and the Ottomans.

The interrelated discourses of progress and time thrift were also disseminated through another new medium that became extremely popular during the final decades of the nineteenth century, the almanac (*takvim, nevsal*).<sup>70</sup> Before the nineteenth century, official Ottoman calendars were produced by the chief astrologer/astronomer of the palace, and their distribution was largely limited to circles of high officials.<sup>71</sup> It was the establishment of private presses in the 1860s and rising literacy rates that allowed for the popularization of almanacs, which were, in fact, much more than calendars. Late Ottoman almanacs, which came in different formats and sizes, usually included an introduction by the author followed by a section which featured various calendars side by side, and then tables of prayer times, meteorological data, advice on topics such as health and agriculture, tables for converting *alaturka* and *alafranga* hours, astrological information, chronologies, biographies, and educational anecdotes.

The authors of these works belonged to the growing urban intelligentsia and were usually graduates of the newly established schools. As they often stated in their introductions, their goal was to entertain but also educate their readers.<sup>72</sup> Like contemporary novels and periodicals, then, almanacs served the Hamidian intellectual elite in disseminating the compound type of modernity they sought to popularize. Often it was the same individuals who published both periodicals and almanacs. The most obvious example is Ebüziya Tevfik, the translator of *Poor Richard's Almanac*. In 1873 Tevfik began publishing the first privately edited almanac, the *Salname-i Hadike*, and a few years later, the extremely popular *Takvim-i Ebüziyya* (Ebüziyya's Almanac).

Tevfik's almanac was in itself a materialization of its author's ideas about time and a conscious attempt to promote these ideas. First, through the various chronologies which generally followed the calendars proper, Tevfik envisioned an Ottoman collective progressing along several different timelines. Alongside chronologies which tied the Ottomans to a universal history organized as a march towards civilization, other chronologies placed the Ottoman Empire firmly within a distinct Islamic history.<sup>73</sup> Furthermore, Tevfik did not support forsaking everything indigenous in the name of material progress. For example, he argued that the while the *Hijri* calendar should be used for all religious purposes, it would be wrong to use it in the civil domain.<sup>74</sup>

The almanac quite literally brought these abstract timelines into the home and wove them into an array of practical data meant for individual, everyday use. Here too we find a pragmatic hybridism coupled with an effort to increase time awareness among readers, and to enhance their ability to plan the use of their time. In addition to facilitating much-needed time and date conversions, almanacs usually left blank space for users to plan and record significant events.<sup>75</sup> The almanacs, in short, turned the ideological, abstract agenda of the authors into a very real and usable device, effectively compounding historical and quotidian time. Moreover, through usage, the almanacs enmeshed personal time within that of the collective and raised awareness of the value of time on both the individual and imperial levels.

The inscribing of time thrift into the hybridized almanacs and literary ideals, the taken-for-granted status of the *alaturka* hour system, and its pragmatic use alongside the *alafranga* system (despite the alleged cultural bifurcation), were all emblematic of the type of fusion sought by the Hamidian regime and many leading intellectuals of the time. This very effort to synthesize, along with the concurrent use of the two hour systems, would soon be discredited, at least by the more radical among the Young Turks.

Before turning to all that, however, I would like to examine this rift between the generation of the Young Ottomans and that of the Young Turks, not in terms of structural and social terms (which were surely of crucial importance), but by looking at the change in prevalent modes of textual expression. In other words, the focus now shifts from the time-related ideas which the leading intellectuals of the day sought to convey to the genres and formats they used in order to popularize these ideas.

### *Novel Times*

As Benedict Anderson notes, both journalistic and novelistic writing contributed to the spread of a notion of simultaneity that was crucial for the

formation of modern imagined communities. Modern newspapers, which bring together otherwise unrelated events and organize them according to calendrical dates, raise awareness of simultaneity through empty homogenous time; as these “one-day best-sellers” are consumed at more or less regular times by thousands of people throughout the city, they reaffirm the notion of community that shares a common temporality. The novel, argues Anderson, allows readers to follow simultaneous actions performed by various figures that may not be aware of each other, but are nevertheless connected to each other as members of the same society. This idea of “a sociological organism moving calendrically through homogenous, empty time,” continues Anderson, “is a precise analogue of the idea of the nation, which also is conceived as a solid community moving steadily down (or up) history.”<sup>76</sup>

*Divan* poetry and the world of practice that was related to it served to distinguish the literate ruling elite from the masses, and lacked a clear sense of temporal directionality. The new genres, by contrast, raised awareness of the temporal common ground of the imagined Ottoman community. Even if the early novels focused predominantly on elites and the upper middle class, they nevertheless allowed others in. Servants, artisans, peasants, and even slaves were given their (marginalized) place on the Ottoman wagon, as it moved forward on its linear track of historical time.

As Ottoman novelists and journalists began to spread these new genres, along with the related social and temporal notions, poetry gradually lost its privileged status. The demise of poetry is actually reflected in some of the early novels already mentioned. The clownish protagonist of *Carriage Passion*, for example, searches *divans* of classical poetry for a poem that would fit in the love letter he is trying very hard to write. However, he is unable to understand the poetry, and eventually picks a poem randomly and misinterprets its first hemistich completely. The parody intensifies when he arrives at his office in a governmental bureau, for the first time in the story, only to consult his colleagues about the meaning of that hemistich. Then, for more than two hours, all the officials leave their paperwork aside and try to make sense of the line, consulting dictionaries and arguing over alternative readings. It is significant that only one person in the bureau recognizes the poet to be Vasif (d. 1824) and interprets the line correctly.<sup>77</sup>

This scene is clearly one more chance to poke fun at the “super-westernized” types, but it also demonstrates the effort and time that reading classical Ottoman requires. This was clearly not only the problem of ill-educated fictional figures: Ziya Paşa, one of the leaders of the Young Ottomans, wrote about the difficulty of reading classical Ottoman prose works, saying that even “a person

versed in lexicology and well-read in Arabic letters cannot extract their meaning without having comprehensive Arabic and Persian dictionaries and without expending mental energies as if preparing a lesson.<sup>78</sup>

Indeed, reading classical Ottoman literature, and especially poetry, was a demanding task that relied on good command of Turkish, Arabic, and Persian, as well as mastery of this tradition's reservoir of images and conventions. The Ottoman poet endeavored to weave together various layers, purposely turning his verse into a complex fabric of meanings. Deciphering it required almost the same skills and knowledge. In material terms, writing and reading were time consuming; most works were handwritten and then copied, rendering the manuscript expensive and relatively inaccessible. All this changed during the second half of the nineteenth century.

To begin with, print technology developed tremendously and facilitated the mass production of cheap texts. With rising literacy brought about by state education, the market for these newly produced texts was constantly expanding.<sup>79</sup> The changes, however, were not limited to formats and technologies. Genres, preferences of style, and modes of expression were being transformed. The first generation of Ottoman journalists, led by the intellectual, writer, and publisher İbrahim Şinasi (1826–1871), strove to develop a simpler style of prose that would be more suitable for realistic descriptions and discussions of current issues, a language that would fit the needs of journalism.<sup>80</sup> This trend widened in the following decades. Searching for effective literary means to promote their reformist agenda, Ottoman novelists and journalists consciously tried to break away from the poetic tradition into which they had been born.<sup>81</sup> For some of the leaders of the Young Ottomans, the leisurely reading of poetry seemed a futile and wasteful aristocratic engagement. Seeing literature mainly as a didactic tool for the popularization of knowledge and the spread of ideas, reform-minded intellectuals of the 1860s and 1870s were uncomfortable with the ambiguity and complexity of the classical Ottoman style.<sup>82</sup>

The attacks on the style of *divan* poetry could at times be very direct and harsh, but the earliest literary reformers did not entirely sever the cord tying them to the poetic tradition of previous generations. The great innovator Şinasi, for example, composed a *divan* in the old style and wrote panegyrics for the leader of the early Tanzimat, Mustafa Reşid. His successor as editor of the *Tasvir-i Efkar*, Namık Kemal, could hardly shake off *divan*-style poetry even when he tried to write realistic prose. For Ahmed Midhat, too, *divan* poetry was an integral part of cultured life that was worth preserving. Recaizade Ekrem also wrote poetry that was closely connected to the classical tradition.<sup>83</sup> But as Ebüz-

ziya Tevfik has remarked, this generation would be the last to be able to read and understand *divan* poetry.<sup>84</sup>

Indeed, much owing to the efforts of the early novelists and journalists, new time-saving formats and language were quickly gaining popularity among the growing reading public. Thus, gradually, the younger literates were drifting away from the world of poetry, which was so important in reproducing hegemonic notions of time and in scripting time-related behaviors.<sup>85</sup> The cyclic images of time, the grounding of the social order in the cosmic one, and the Sufi notions of mundane and absolute times were all central in hegemonic temporal culture, at least until the mid-nineteenth century. The institutional and organizational reforms of the nineteenth century undermined the sources that fed this culture. The formats and language by which it had been created and maintained were also dying out.<sup>86</sup> Some would still find interest in the old genres, but an unmistakable shift had taken place. The linearity and simultaneity of the new genres, like the clock-oriented protagonists of the early novels, were both emblematic of this transformation and a force driving it forward. From the 1860s on, and increasingly over the following decades, it would be novels, short stories, plays, journalistic writing, and almanacs that would take the place of poetry and chronicles in shaping the temporal culture of the reading public.

### *The Path to Progress: Alaturka or Alafranga*

By the late nineteenth century, the intertwined discourses of progress and the value of time were no longer limited to the elite. Both at the center and in the provinces, these discourses were appropriated by emerging groups of middling background. Identifying themselves as “progressive,” these people sought to stress their break with the past. Longtime distinctions between past and present, old and new, were now ideologized and dichotomously phrased in terms of modern and traditional, civilized and primitive. Modes of life, practices, and ideas which were not compatible with this vision of modern civilization were branded as outdated remnants of a bygone past and thus denied their legitimate place in the present.<sup>87</sup>

Especially within circles of educated bureaucrats and officers, and among the urban professionals who formed the social backbone of the CUP, it was thought that ‘catching up’ with Europeans and becoming fully modern depended on turning their back on the past. In his study of the emerging middle class in early twentieth-century Aleppo, Keith Watenpaugh argues that by “being modern,” this group differentiated itself from the old Muslim oligarchy and from the rural masses and claimed for itself a leading role in public life.<sup>88</sup> The conceptualiza-

tion of history as a race forward was central to the worldview shared by members of this group, as evidenced by their writings, the titles they chose for their publications, and the speeches and lectures they gave in various middle class forums.<sup>89</sup>

As these groups came to the fore following the 1908 Young Turk Revolution, their discourse of progress through productivity and time thrift was disseminated by newly established journals. A good example is found in an article entitled “Calışalım” (Let’s Work), which was discussed in chapter 3. Published shortly after the revolution in *Asker*, one of the main venues for the ideas of the officer elite, “Calışalım” made a clear connection between the notion of progress and need to use time well. It urged officers to benefit even from time allocated for recess, and argued that without saving time, the development of the army would not be possible.<sup>90</sup>

Having fully internalized the idea of progress as movement along one possible route, politically involved officers visualized modernization as a race between different nations. After their victory over Russia in 1905, the Japanese were often cited as an example of a country that had managed to speed up progress. Thanks to the industriousness of its people, the Japanese were now breathing down the necks of the Europeans.<sup>91</sup> It is this “race outlook” that lies beneath contemporary writers’ sense of haste. “We don’t have much time,” writes the author of “Calışalım” in an attempt infect his readers with his feeling of urgency. Only industry and time thrift will secure progress on the imaginary timeline of history and allow the Ottomans to catch up with those nations already further down the track.

This extreme sense of urgency was clearly central to the worldview of the “new generation” (*nesil-i cedid*), as it was called by Sürur Cemal, one of the writers in the *Yevmi Servet-i Fünun*. In an article published shortly after the revolution he wrote that “every generation . . . makes its own step forward on the road of progress.” According to Cemal, the Hamidian era represented an attempt to hold progress back, and that is why the new generation must take two steps forward at once. “The road of progress is very long and we are far behind.”<sup>92</sup>

Temporal distance had become a way by which to gauge not only the difference between Europe and the Ottoman Empire, but between various regions and social groups within the empire itself. Ussama Makdisi has shown that the understanding of history as a continuous advance along a single universal timeline lay at the heart of a discourse he termed “Ottoman Orientalism.” In this discourse, Istanbul was perceived as the most “progressed” place, and the reform project it led was meant to march the “backward” people of the empire,

especially in the Arab provinces, forward into modernity. Eventually, argues Makdisi, these ideas were appropriated by elites in the Arab provinces who “absorbed, replicated, and hence validated the new temporal hierarchy of Ottoman Orientalism.”<sup>93</sup> This approach marked a fundamental change in the way the imperial elite viewed the diversity over which it ruled. Rather than acknowledging difference as natural and employing it for the advantage of the imperial center, the new ideal was to erase diversity and to create a homogenous body politic.<sup>94</sup>

It can be added that the temporalization of difference was closely connected to the discourse about the value of time, which was more concerned with time organization on the quotidian level.<sup>95</sup> Not only was the difference of marginal social groups defined in terms of “time lags”; these time lags were explained by the alleged indifference of these groups to time in their everyday life. İsmail Hakkı’s description of his hometown, Baghdad, may serve to illustrate this point. Hakkı, a former minister and member of the Ottoman Parliament, returned to Baghdad in November 1909, having been away for more than twenty years. In his *Letters from Iraq (Irak Mektubları)* he writes:

In this ancient city that used to be the home of knowledge and arts you cannot hear today any talk on crafts, or commerce, or literature. Because there is no commerce, no craft, and no knowledge. Because the population from its highest to its lowest member is idle and ignorant (*boş*). Because they have absolutely no idea of the value of what is called time.<sup>96</sup>

It is clear, then, that within circles of politically aware officers and bureaucrats in the early twentieth century, regularity, punctuality, and efficiency had become not only the means to attain progress, but a yardstick by which to measure it.<sup>97</sup> This yardstick was often used by these groups to discredit the Hamidian order, which they associated with inefficiency and sluggishness. Their proclaimed determination to uproot these “hindrances to progress” served to justify their claims for power.

As shown in the previous chapter, between the generation of the Young Ottomans and that of the Young Turks, the very experience of running late had become an integral part of urban life. Especially for CUP members and their supporters, civilization seemed less like a terminal they would reach at the end of a two-centuries-long journey, as envisioned by Namık Kemal; it was more like a train they had to catch, breathlessly. The over-embellished language of previous generations, the antipositivist world of Sufi knowledge, the scientifically unfounded traditional cosmology, and the old hour system were all just weights on their legs. They were impatient to cast them off and hop on board.

### *Deliberating Time*

This new mindset was clearly manifested in concrete measures. According to Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu and Feza Günergün, a committee was formed in the spring of 1913 in order to examine the benefits of adopting Greenwich Mean Time for all official matters.<sup>98</sup> In fact, a similar body had already been formed by the Ministry of Treasury upon the recommendation of the mathematician Salih Zeki Bey in late 1908 or early 1909, a few months after the revolution. In order to allow better handling of official affairs, the committee recommended reforming the *mali* calendar and adopting mean time instead of the Ottoman hour system.<sup>99</sup> As these recommendations were being discussed, a civil servant named Hasan Hamid called on the government to endorse them in an article he wrote for the professional journal *Mülkiye*. Hamid's article sheds light on the rationale of the adherents of mean time within the circles of reform-oriented professionals, and therefore, I would like to examine his arguments at some length.

Hamid directly tied the reform of both the calendar and the hour system to the “new era” which was inaugurated by the restoration of the constitution.<sup>100</sup> The concrete measures he espoused were thus placed on a historical timeline and assigned epochal significance. If Hamid mentioned in passing some of the internal problems caused by reliance on *alaturka* hours, he was clearly much more concerned about the incompatibility of the Ottoman system with the one common throughout Europe and in North America. Peoples and nations, he argued, need to have certain principles and practices in common in order to communicate, and in this sense, the calendar and the hour system are just like a shared language. It is essential to create a common ground with the “civilized West” (*garb-ı medeni*), Hamid maintained, so as to benefit from its wealth of knowledge and accomplishment. Steamships, railways, telegraphs and telephone lines, he continued, now connected East and West, and the incompatibility of the hour systems and calendars was injurious to that connection. Hamid thus proposed eliminating discrepancies by universally applying mean time, which had already been adopted in Europe, America and “even [in] significant parts of Africa and Asia.”<sup>101</sup>

Indeed, Hasan Hamid's aim was the simplification of Ottoman interaction with the world through standardization, and the removal of all barriers to the free flow of information, goods, and people. Often, such practical rhetoric was employed to mask the fact that standardization was in fact an ideological choice. Hamid made no such effort. He clearly expressed his hope that abolishing an hour system that “belonged to a different era” would bring the Ottoman Empire closer to the “civilized West.” By relegating the Ottoman hour system to a “different era,” Hamid sought to deny its undeniable existence in the present.

As if *alaturka* time prevented the Ottomans from joining on the same temporal plain with the Europeans, he proposed annulling it. This was not merely a matter of practicality; this was a declaration of cultural orientation. Moreover, it was an expression of a new political agenda.

Among the educated urbanites, Hasan Hamid probably had many sympathizers. In a story he wrote a decade after the revolution, author Falih Rifkî Atay (1894–1971) describes the enthusiasm he felt during those days as a middle-school student. It was in one of the new newspapers that came out after the lifting of censorship that he read about the expected adoption of the *alafranga* clock. “At last we are saved! (*nihayet kurtulduk!*),” he wanted to shout. The headmaster came into class one day and somewhat dramatically reset the wall clock that had been bought during the “age of despotism” to show *alafranga* time. “After the constitutional setting,” writes Rifkî, “it was as if the beat of that old clock [hung on the wall] in front of our rows had a younger sound.”<sup>102</sup> It should be noted that a few sentences later, the narrator notes, as if unconscious of the irony, that they used to leave school at around ten *alaturka*, showing just how ambivalent situation still was in 1918, when the story was written.

The generation and education gap between supporters of the new clock and the old one is represented in the story through the relations between the children and the old gatekeeper, about whom the narrator says, “1908 had skipped him, the way wind gusts over a stone. The new ideas that stirred our blood were nothing but a mind-numbing ring in his ears.” The children decide to make fun of the old man and so they ask him what time it is. He takes out his old Prior watch, the same brand that was offered by the coquettish clock boy in the poem that opened the first chapter of this study. “Ten to three,” he says, not quite realizing that he is being mocked. “What do you mean ten to three? Say, don’t you read the paper? The old clock was abolished.”<sup>103</sup>

Well, not quite. The Council of State (*Şura-ı Devlet*) finally decided to postpone the application of the recommendations to “an appropriate time.”<sup>104</sup> Hasan Hamid’s article was eventually published too late to affect the decision. Hamid noted bitterly that behind the rejection of the proposed reform was “the well-known concept of not upsetting the old order.”<sup>105</sup> Even a suggestion a few months later to have the Chamber of Deputies (*Meclis-i Meb’usan*) run by mean time was met with tremendous opposition.<sup>106</sup>

The opposition may have been the reason for the slightly different approach tried in March 1910 by the acting president of the Senate (*Meclis-i A’yan*), Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Paşa, who introduced a bill to establish appropriate conditions for the use of mean time throughout the Ottoman domains. Muhtar Paşa’s preference for the European system was in all likelihood connected to his military

background; he enrolled in a military school when he was twelve years old and spent most of his life in uniform.<sup>107</sup> Like many of his comrades, he was open to considering the application of European ideas and models in various fields, including time organization. Shortly after he brought the clock matter to the Senate, he tried to promote a reform of the calendar relying on a detailed report he had composed. The report, which was published as a booklet, discussed the history and the defects of the Ottoman *mali* (financial) calendar and called for its replacement with a revised solar one that would not suffer from the flaws of the *mali* calendar, and would be compatible with the European calendar.<sup>108</sup>

Muhtar's reasoning was firmly within the intertwined discourses of progress, temporal order, and time thrift. He argued that the advancement of individuals depends on their efforts (*sai*), and that every nation progresses in relation to the level of its love of order. The love of order, continued Muhtar, motivates progress, and progress brings the love of order. This can be seen not only in nations "that have made the most progress" but also in individuals who "allocate every passing hour of the day . . . to a duty and always act according to a program."<sup>109</sup> Muhtar argued that the *mali* calendar had to be abolished precisely because it was disorganized and therefore posed a hindrance to progress. He chose to end his treatise by emphasizing that the use of "our lunar calendar as a religious calendar" will continue, and will be inscribed alongside the new solar date on all official documents. This was no doubt an attempt to avoid opposition from religious circles.

The rationale of the "clocks bill" he introduced in the Senate was very similar. Rather than abolishing the *alaturka* system altogether, he proposed establishing a legal requirement that mean-time dials be placed alongside *alaturka* ones on all public clocks and in all *muvakkithanes*.<sup>110</sup> Since a standard mean-time hour was required to allow all users of the system to set their timepieces, Muhtar proposed renewing the practice of firing a cannon at high noon, a practice which had apparently been suspended for some thirty years. Muhtar further proposed requiring by law that mean time appear in all pocket calendars, alongside the *alaturka* hours.<sup>111</sup> At first the bill was met with general approval, but even in that initial discussion, the speaker noted that the time issue had already been debated in the lower house, and that some representatives had protested that the use of mean time ran counter to the teachings of Islam. According to Rıza Nur, who recorded these events in his memoirs, opposition came mainly from "turbaned" deputies who yelled that "to abolish our clock is to abolish the prayer."<sup>112</sup> It is important to note how the *alaturka* system was bound with religious practice and feelings, creating a time that was distinctly "ours." However, the speaker of the Senate dismissed the reservations raised in the lower house,



FIGURE 14.

*Alaturka or alafanga: a cartoon published in a satirical newspaper following the dispute about adopting the European hour system in the Parliament. As the alaturka-dressed deputy leaves the chamber, he says, "The time has passed, I am leaving"; the alafanga-dressed deputy goes in, saying, "Thank God, I made it." Reprinted from Kalem 40 (17 June 1909).*

arguing that the use of mean time had become a real necessity. Without further ado, then, Muhtar's proposition was sent to be further processed by a committee, before presenting the final bill to the Chamber.<sup>113</sup>

When the resulting bill was brought back to the Chamber for approval, however, things turned more complicated and a very long discussion ensued. In general, two different approaches were expressed. The first, represented by Muhtar Paşa and some other representatives, emphasized that the law would not force anybody to use mean time. "If the users of the *gurubi* [that is, *alaturka*] time want to use it for another thousand years, let them use [it]," Muhtar said.<sup>114</sup> The declared goal was rather to allow users of mean time equal conditions to those enjoyed by the users of the *alaturka* hours. Since the Parliament had already drawn the attention of the government to the importance of promoting the use of mean time and no measures had been taken, a law was deemed necessary.

The opposition to this line of argument was led by Topçu Feriki Ali Rıza Paşa, another former general who had graduated from military education system.<sup>115</sup> True to his background, Rıza Paşa agreed that mean time was a superior

system, but he argued that the transition could not be forced and that promotion of the use of mean time must be left to the government. Rıza Paşa believed that the process needed time, and that the more the country's economy "progresses" (*terraki ettikçe*), the more established mean time would become. Other delegates joined Rıza Paşa in arguing that the level of knowledge in the country had to be taken into account and that the people (*ahali*) were still not educated enough to accept the European hours.<sup>116</sup>

Discussion was finally nearing the crux of the matter. Indeed, underlying both the proposed bill and the opposition to it was the stubborn resistance to the European hour system that apparently prevailed among the masses. The fear was clearly that the law would be interpreted as an attempt to marginalize the indigenous system (which was clearly not far from the truth), and that this interpretation would be used by anti-constitutionalists to overthrow the regime. One senator explicitly said that "it's dangerous to touch the calendar and the clock." According to the record this comment drew laughter, but other speakers raised similar concerns. Referring to the most serious challenge to the constitutional order, one delegate reminded his friends, nearly panicking, that "[the anti-constitutionalist revolt of] Mart 31st was only yesterday." This concern came up time and again, and some senators advised that it be explained to the people that the proposed law would not force anyone to use mean time. To this Ali Rıza said only, "Go explain [this] in Konya," referring to the notably conservative city.<sup>117</sup> Another senator reasoned that in fact mean time was not contrary to Islam, since prayer times were not defined with reference to clock hours of any kind. However, he too opposed the law, arguing that people would need time to get used to the European system.

Other senators argued that it would be very difficult to enforce the law outside such big cities as Istanbul, Salonica, or Izmir, and noted that in these cities, mean time was being shown on public clocks anyway. As Ali Rıza put it in his rather direct style: "It's not only Istanbul and Salonica that make up the Ottoman lands, thank God. We have twenty-eight provinces. We have many villages. They [the villagers] certainly don't know mean time. Is it five o'clock, is it six o'clock, is it quarter to six? They just don't care."<sup>118</sup>

The discussion dragged on for several sessions, and the senators decided to summon the minister of education, responsible for the Imperial Observatory, and the minister of religious foundations (*Evkaf*), who was in charge of the *muvakkitanes* throughout the empire. In the meantime, an article supporting Muhtar's bill was published in the *Seda-ı Millet*, a gazette identified with the Liberal Party (Ahrar Fırkası), probably the most significant opposition to the CUP within reformist circles. Despite the dispute and rivalry between the two

parties, they both shared the European orientation.<sup>119</sup> The article, written by the editor of the gazette, Ahmed Samim, was significantly entitled “Let Us Know Our Time,” suggesting a connection between the need to promote the use of mean time and the requirements of a “new era.” Samim clearly expressed his frustration at the failing of attempts made in the previous year to reform the calendars and the hour system.<sup>120</sup> Echoing Muhtar’s arguments, he insisted that a law was needed in order to correct what he perceived as discrimination against users of *alafraŋga* time. He was probably disappointed when the Senate finally decided to content itself with once again drawing the attention of the government to the importance of promoting the use of mean time.<sup>121</sup>

Rıza Paşa and the many supporters of his viewpoint argued that there was no need for a law, since with time, the European system would “establish itself.” Well, time proved them wrong. Eventually, the *alaturka* system had to be outlawed, and even then the transition was not so smooth (see below). Indeed, what the deliberations in the upper house of the Ottoman Parliament show more than anything is just how far the transition to mean time was from some natural evolution that “simply happens.” It demonstrates the considerable efforts that were needed to promote the use of mean time in the face of significant opposition. The range of opinions expressed by the “elders” in the Senate reflected an attempt to compromise with that opposition. Far from the radical measures that were often espoused by the new generation, this type of compromise was more emblematic of the Hamidian era, during which most of the senators had matured and formulated their worldviews.

### *Marginalizing Alaturka Time*

As the idea of enacting a law was abandoned, the concurrent use of both hour systems continued, and so did the confusion.<sup>122</sup> In the military, such confusion could have grave consequences.<sup>123</sup> This was probably the immediate context for the decision by the Ministry of War in 1912 to switch to mean time and to press for the universal application of the foreign system throughout the state apparatus.<sup>124</sup> In line with the directive of the Ministry of War, the undersecretary of the Ministry of the Interior ordered the universal adoption of mean time in all bureaus of the civil service.<sup>125</sup>

Two international conferences held in Paris in 1912 and 1913 further promoted the use of mean time within the Ottoman state apparatus. The 1912 conference proposed establishing an International Time Committee that would oversee the unification of time signals, secure the use of GMT worldwide, and establish an international organization under the name of the Bureau International de l’Heure. This body was charged with coordinating results from various

observatories in order to reach the highest possible level of exactitude in the setting of time.<sup>126</sup> Following the 1912 conference, the office of the grand vizier addressed several ministries asking whether or not it would be beneficial for the Ottoman state to adopt the new time order proposed in Paris. A committee formed in order to look into the matter recommended adoption, and the Ottoman cabinet decided to participate in the 1913 conference, which was to ratify the recommendations made in the previous conference.<sup>127</sup>

Following the 1913 conference, the radio-telegraph center in Istanbul began to receive the international time signal sent from Paris, allowing the calibration of Istanbul time with the international time system. Starting in May 1915, the signal was transmitted to the Galata tower, on which a “time-ball” was installed.<sup>128</sup> Every day at exactly twelve o’clock mean time, upon receiving an electric signal, the time-ball was automatically lowered along its pole, allowing both residents of the city and mariners in the Golden Horn and Sea of Marmara to set their timepieces.<sup>129</sup> This was certainly a landmark in the transition to mean time. Through a global network of instant communication, a time set in Greenwich was communicated through Paris to the center of Istanbul and displayed from the top of the tallest building around. This was probably the most visible indication that a new comprehensive temporal order was taking over the heart of the Ottoman Empire.

By late 1916, the conduct of official business in the center of old Istanbul (Dersaadet) came to rely on mean time. According to a memo issued by the cabinet in December that year, the Municipality of Istanbul wanted the whole city to switch to mean time, with Istanbul time communicated to all towns and townships. The cabinet ordered that the matter be examined in a committee that would be formed by the Ministry of the Interior. It is not clear how much work was actually done to promote the matter.<sup>130</sup> What is beyond doubt is that at least within the state apparatus, the *alaturka* hour system was losing ground rapidly.

However, the old system was hardly abandoned. As evidence from the 1910s indicates, the transition to mean time was far from complete. Some government officials continued to inscribe the old *alaturka* hours on official documents, while others had to be reminded over and over again that noon and midnight replaced sunset and sunrise as the main dividing lines of the day. These changes remained a source of confusion down to the last years of the empire.<sup>131</sup> Sources from the early years of the republican era reveal that even following the official abolition of the *alaturka* system, the actual transition to mean time was not at all smooth. Mehmet B. Uluengin notes that the central government may have been concerned that individuals who resented the exclusive adoption of mean

time would hamper the process.<sup>132</sup> Away from the governmental apparatus, the use of the *alaturka* hours no doubt lasted much longer.

In light of the strong thrust toward the abolition of the *alaturka* system, how can its durability be explained? The *alaturka* system was in many ways the axis of Ottoman temporal culture. Its strength stemmed from the sense of inner logic and coherence created by its compatibility with the natural day, the calendar day, the daily cycle of ritual, and the cycle of social life.<sup>133</sup> The European hour system was alien, indeed disruptive to that order. For most people, sunset, the evening *ezan*, and the beginning of the new calendar day were always at the same hour. People were so used to setting their clocks to twelve every day at sunset that they could simply not understand how the sun could set at a different time every day. Newspapers thus had to answer readers' questions regarding the matter, and to explain the principles of the mean time system in some detail.<sup>134</sup> To some extent, then, the use of the *alaturka* system continued out of inertia. In other words, the transition to mean time was slow and gradual simply because old habits die hard.

There were other reasons, however. The attempts to abolish the *alaturka* system were part of the Europeanized vision held by the more radical wing of the CUP. Threatened by this vision, opposition groups rallied around the *alaturka* system, turning it into a focal point of a self-conscious Ottoman-Muslim identity. The "struggle" between the *alaturka* and *alafranga* systems should be understood in this context of identity formation under the shadow of European military, political, economic, and cultural hegemony.

### *"Enlivening the Hearts of Muslims"*

In order to fully understand the struggle, however, we must go deeper than the level of politics and reason. Indeed, most proponents of mean time presented the issue in rational, pragmatic terms, which were contrasted with the supposedly blind fury of their adversaries. Writing about one of the many parliamentary debates concerning the use of mean time, Hüseyin Cahid Yalçın (d. 1957), a CUP supporter, wrote in his newspaper *Tanin* that no previous discussion had raised so much clamor, and noted that things almost ended in a fistfight. He mocked those who opposed the use of mean time and advised them to focus on more "serious" things.<sup>135</sup> Cahid titled his piece "The Clock Fight" (*Saat Kavgası*), the very same title used by the author of the 1905 short story discussed in chapter 4, about a quarrel between two schoolchildren over the quality of their watches.

Indeed, Cahid tried to present the parliamentary debate—like the childish fight in the story—as silly. If we follow his line of argument, we too might dis-

miss the responses of the adversaries of mean time as merely “emotional” and end our discussion here. However, just as in the case of the short story, a deeper look reveals that beneath the arguments, there was a level of emotions that was not explicitly expressed. Rather than dismissing these emotions, I propose to take them seriously, even when considering political struggles such as the one waged around the preferred hour system.

These emotions were expressed and given meaning in the press and often associated with a sense of an indigenous collective identity. Palmira Brummett has written about political aspects of the imported hour system as reflected in post-1908 satirical publications. Along with the newly imported technologies of transportation and communication which disrupted the sense of time, the European hour system was looked upon with skepticism. It was presented as a strange system, foreign to Ottoman practices, one that was forced on Ottoman society rather than integrated into it. It was European time representing European hegemony.<sup>136</sup>

The *alaturka* hour system served as a focal point of an authentic identity, and not only in the sphere of cartoons. It was inscribed onto the physical space of the city in the shape of clock towers. I have already remarked on the civilizing mission of these buildings. I would now like to focus on to the role clock towers sometimes played in the contest for identity as played out in the urban space. Mehmet B. Uluengin has noted that Ottoman clock towers carried “complex and seemingly contradictory layering of meanings” that were context dependent.<sup>137</sup> I would add that not only the clock towers themselves, but the significance attached to the hours they showed, was heavily dependent on context.

Clock towers built before the second half of the nineteenth century all showed *alaturka* time, a clear expression of the obviousness of the indigenous, of its cultural monopoly.<sup>138</sup> At that time, there was no need to distinguish between *alaturka* and *alafranga* simply because the latter did not exist as a valid cultural option. However, as the use of mean time spread, more and more public clocks began to show mean time, often alongside the old *alaturka* hours.

Sultan Abdülhamid II did not oppose this trend; quite the contrary. In a document he composed at some point during the 1890s concerning the future of the Ottoman territories in present-day Libya, the sultan called for the construction of a clock tower that would show mean time. This was, according to Selim Deringil, an attempt to project an image of Ottoman authority and modernity in the province.<sup>139</sup> But there were practical motives as well. The double-faced public clocks allowed conversion between the two hour systems and thus filled a much-needed function, especially in the larger cities.<sup>140</sup>

When it came to such practical needs, the Islamist sultan and his adminis-

tration were often pragmatic. They obviously did not think that mean time was inherently anti-Islamic, at least as long as it did not replace the indigenous system. In fact, the sultan erected a clock tower showing both mean and *alaturka* time right next to the mosque that bore his name in the compound of the Yıldız palace.<sup>141</sup> According to his own memoirs, he even wanted to adopt the Gregorian calendar.<sup>142</sup> Furthermore, Abdülhamid granted clockmaker Johann Meyer (d. 1920) a medal for designing a self-regulating clock that kept *alaturka* time alongside *alafranga* hours.<sup>143</sup> Meyer's clock offered a technical solution to most significant problem of the *alaturka* system, the need to reset all clocks on a daily basis.

The double-faced public clocks were visible expressions of the validity and relevance of both hour systems. It was a very clear manifestation of the pragmatic effort to combine and fuse the foreign and indigenous that, as argued above, characterized the Hamidian era. It was the increasing European activity within the Empire, and later, the attacks of mean-time advocates against the ambivalence of the older arrangements, that dialectically created opposition to the new time system. Whereas Ahmed Samim, whose article was quoted above, felt that users of *alafranga* hours were discriminated against, others felt that the local hour system was being pushed away from the public sphere by a foreign one. This was exactly the concern of the governor of Beirut when he appealed for permission to build a clock tower in his provincial capital. Many foreign establishments, he wrote to the palace in September 1897, have constructed clocks, "all of which show and sound the Western hour" (*saat-i garbiyi irae ve ilan etmekte*). Since there was no public clock showing Muslim hours, the Muslim population and even government officials were forced to set their watches according to *alafranga* hours. Thus, there was a need to build a clock tower that would indicate Muslim religious times.<sup>144</sup>

Ten years later, the governor of the province of Jerusalem, Ali Ekrem Bey, notified the palace that a clock tower had been constructed in honor of the sultan. The motive for this rather expensive project was strikingly similar to the motive mentioned by the governor in Beirut. "Although there were clock towers showing *alafranga* hours in every corner of the town of Jerusalem," wrote Ali Ekrem Bey, "there were none showing *ezani* hours [i.e., *alaturka* hours]."<sup>145</sup> This, explained the governor, was unreasonable and inappropriate from a religious point of view. Thus a clock tower was constructed on the city walls. The inauguration was celebrated on the anniversary of the sultan's accession to the throne and ever since that "blissful day," the ringing sound of the *ezani* clock "has been enlivening (*tenşit*) the hearts of the Muslims."<sup>146</sup>

It is worth noting that both governors referred not only to the visual effect

of the clock towers but to the auidial dimension too. In the face of increased foreign activity and a sense of threat to Muslim hegemony, native time had to be both seen and heard. The attention to the sound of bells was clearly connected to the call of the muezzin, so typical of Muslim cities and so central to Ottoman temporal culture. Indeed, just a few years after the construction of the clock tower in Jerusalem, the same sensitivity to Muslim hegemony within the urban cacophony created an incredibly long correspondence concerning the bells of the clock tower at the German Dormition church, on Mount Zion, just outside Jerusalem's city walls. Here the concern that the sound of the bells would mute the call of the muezzin from the nearby mosque at King David's tomb was explicitly expressed.<sup>147</sup>

Indeed, in the face of a tremendous cultural shift, the *alaturka* system represented for many Ottomans a way of life, a set of values and beliefs, an identity they sought to preserve. It is clear then that the cultural load attached to both hour systems, a load which I have tried to unpack and present in these last pages, was not merely a matter of academic interest. It actually guided the political choices made by some of the contemporaries and kept the *alaturka* system alive until the radically different political and cultural climate of the early republican era facilitated its final elimination. Examined from this perspective, the matter here under discussion no longer looks like a struggle between enlightened reformers perusing progress and ignorant fanatics who oppose it. Rather, the whole issue appears as another focal point around which different social elements with contesting cultural and political agendas clashed. It was one more front in the struggle over the future orientation of the Ottoman Empire and who would lead it toward that future.

## CONCLUSION }

### READING CLOCKS *Alafranga*

Despite its vastness and longevity, the Ottoman world of temporality has hardly been investigated. This book is a first step towards reconstructing this world and tracing its transformation over the nineteenth century. It was first shown that early modern Ottoman temporal culture served to stabilize and perpetuate the social and political order of the *ancien regime*. In an attempt to examine the relations between time and power, I sought the mechanisms by which urban temporal order was produced and sustained. The inquiry thus moved between the world of texts that reflected and informed the perceptions of literary elites, and a host of social institutions that “radiated” the imperial temporal order and structured everyday life in line with it. The examination revealed a rather meticulous ensemble of practices, concepts, and images that retained close connection to celestial rhythms and a significant degree of inner coherence. Underlying the system, however, were the very worldly Ottoman power structure and the values of Ottoman-Muslim urban society.

Hardly the lowest point of Ottoman decline, the eighteenth century emerges here as a rather dynamic period that witnessed some significant changes in urban temporal order. I pointed to the spread of clocks and *muvaqqithanes*, noted the parallel increase in reference to clock hours, and discussed the ways clocks were assimilated and “naturalized.” The discussion is far from conclusive and more research is clearly needed. Even this preliminary picture is significant, however, since it joins a growing body of literature that is slowly revising our perception of the eighteenth century. Far from being stagnant, the Ottoman Empire during that period was undergoing far-reaching processes of change, including increasing economic, diplomatic, and cultural interaction with the outside world, the formation of a more centralized and efficient state mechanism, the blurring of boundaries between elites and the tax-paying classes, wider participation in the political sphere, changes in urban landscapes, and new trends in literary production and historical writing.<sup>1</sup> The temporal culture of the eighteenth century should thus be viewed not merely as some ahistorical example of the premodern but rather as the product of a dynamic reality. It was part of an early phase of indigenous modernization.

Clearly, this overview leaves many questions open. The most obvious is that

of the temporal subcultures of religious minorities, of geographic areas, and of specific social classes and vocational groups. How did the Jewish community of Istanbul, for example, organize the social time of its members? To what extent did these temporal arrangements serve to draw identity boundaries between the Jews and their Muslim and Christian neighbors? In what ways were the Jewish temporal practices related to those of the Muslim majority? Such questions and similar ones remain for future research.

The rest of this study was dedicated to the transformation of the patterns discussed in the first chapter, throughout the long nineteenth century. As I tried to show, various organs of the reforming Ottoman state began to experiment with new temporal arrangements, which were then analyzed along with their immediate context and consequences. My intention was to expose the reasons that had driven reformers to adopt new techniques of time organization and to follow the implementation of these new measures. At the same time, I tried to draw attention to the difficulties that accompanied the process and its implications for the daily life of people, be they state officials, soldiers, students, or ferry passengers.

Looking at the processes that took place in the various systems together, certain commonalities emerge. First, in all governmental agencies, changes in temporal arrangements were born out of specific, practical needs, rather than from a transformation in the way time was conceived. The existing temporal arrangements were inadequate for the expanding bureaucracy that was handling ever-growing volumes of paperwork; they were equally too crude for the needs of the post-1826 army, which consisted of regular standing units supposed to be capable of conducting modern, highly coordinated warfare. Similarly, the temporal arrangements that governed teaching time in the *mektep* and *medrese* could hardly serve as the basis for a centralized and effective empire-wide educational system.

The new challenges called for the creation of new temporal constructs. At first, the leaders of all three systems relied on existing arrangements and modified them to address the new demands. Even in Mahmud II's new army, the substitution of old military traditions with European models and professional knowledge did not mean wholesale importation and transplantation of alien temporal arrangements. Rather, what we see in the military is the fusion of imported techniques of time organization with indigenous practices common throughout Ottoman society. Thus, for example, in the first decades following the establishment of the new army in 1826, preset daily camp routines were constructed on the basis of the prayer cycle and were gradually elaborated and refined using clock-based time indications. A similar process of refining tempo-

ral constructs was evident in the administrative and educational systems. Over the second half of the nineteenth century, temporal constructs as spelled out in regulatory texts were constantly being elaborated, creating an ever-denser time grid that allowed for higher levels of centralization through increased surveillance capacities. A parallel elaboration was evident in corrective regulations, which were meant to deter individuals from breaching the temporal construct.

If changes in the organization of time began with practical needs, they did not remain limited to that level. Under the Tanzimat state, and even more so during the Hamidian era, time became both a tool and an object of reform, serving the bureaucratic elite as an ordering device and as a symbol of the desired order. It was shown, for example, how pragmatic needs, new visions of urban order, and considerations of public image interacted with the new urban infrastructure to remake urban time. By tying together temporal constructs of schools, bureaus, and army bases which were hitherto localized, the new systems brought larger parts of the urban fabric, and larger numbers of people, under the sway of modern temporal constructs. These networks gradually turned an amalgamation of localities and times into an integrated fabric of space and time. In this sense, modern urban infrastructure facilitated the shift in the way the Ottoman state “saw,” to use James C. Scott’s term once again. No longer relying on the eyes and fists of middlemen for surveillance and coercion, the Ottoman state now sought to watch over society “from above,” and to directly control every part of the city, in every hour of the day and night.

The Ottoman case demonstrates that modern time consciousness could and did develop independently from industrialization or direct colonization. The transformation of Ottoman temporal culture, especially in its earlier phases, was first and foremost the result of the modern state-building process. It is certainly true that the reshaping of time organization was prompted by the growing complexity of urban life, but it seems that here too, the reforming Ottoman state played an important role. Major infrastructure systems such as water and gas utilities and some of the transportation networks were operated by state-owned companies, and the temporal constructs they developed certainly affected the lives of their employees and users. Nonetheless, in the realm of infrastructure, as in the economic sphere at large, the state was only one actor out of many. Private companies, most of which were foreign, built and operated infrastructure networks throughout the Ottoman domains, from shipping and railway lines, to banks, and on to postal and urban transportation services. All these enterprises created their own temporal constructs, which relied on European practices of time organization.

In this sense, the rise of a capitalist economy and its expansion to non-European areas clearly affected temporal culture in the Ottoman Empire. However, it remains for future research to establish the ways in which the private sector participated in the introduction and dissemination of new time-related practices, behaviors, and ideas. It can still be argued that none of these multiple and relatively small actors could affect local temporal culture to the extent the Ottoman state did.

By showing that in the Ottoman Empire, modern modes of time organization and consciousness appeared in the absence of industrialization, I certainly do not mean to argue that industrial capitalism was insignificant in the history of time. This study, along with several other works, simply reintroduces the state into this history. Industrial capitalism, it seems to me, was crucial not in the concepts and practices it allegedly created, but rather in its ability to erode previous modes of production and related power structures, and to subject millions to new forms of disciplinary power. With production still mainly based on agriculture by the time of the empire's collapse, elaborate temporal constructs and most specifically the strict application of time discipline remained limited to state organs and a relatively small number of private enterprises. This may explain why Ottoman temporal culture, despite being thoroughly transformed during the long nineteenth century, did not change beyond recognition. As many of the early modern economic, social, and political structures survived into the twentieth century, the temporal practices and conventions connected to them retained their validity.

It is clear then that the emergence of highly regimented clock-based temporal constructs did not affect all areas and all social groups equally. The current research does not allow drawing conclusions regarding the extent to which various temporal subcultures were affected by the process here surveyed. It is nevertheless possible to offer a preliminary hypothesis. If it was the state along with some private enterprises that drove change, we can assume that the further away from these engines, the lesser their impact was felt.

Since reform of the state apparatus was originally initiated and promoted by the ruling elite in Istanbul, change was felt at the center more than it was in the provinces. Since cities all around the empire were both hubs of economic activity and nodes of the Ottoman power system, they were more influenced than the countryside. Clearly, even within one and the same city, significant changes existed between different sectors. The new approaches towards time were clearly more apparent in the discourse and behavior of members of the elite than it was among the lower social classes.

When looking at the mid-nineteenth century from this perspective, it seems

that the group that was most affected by the process surveyed in this study was the urban, office-holding, mainly male, elite. These people, more identified with the reforms of the Tanzimat state than any other social group, stood to gain the most from a successful transformation of time organization and its reconceptualization in the empire. Urban communities of religious minorities were also among the groups most significant for the transformation here discussed. These groups, which maintained close contact with European countries or with their various diplomatic, commercial, and missionary proxies in the empire, were more open to absorbing new time-related behaviors and concepts than many other urban groups.

As we have seen, throughout the second half of the nineteenth century, more and more people of middle- and lower-middle-class background were exposed to various aspects of the emerging temporal culture in schools, bureaus, and barracks. These young men, who lived their entire lives within comprehensive temporal constructs and subjected to strict time discipline, came to associate punctuality, efficiency, and regularity with the concepts of progress and civilization. By the early twentieth century, awareness of the importance of time organization came to form an integral part of the worldview of educated army officers and state officials. Armed with this outlook, they set out to challenge the existing order, which they perceived to be inefficient, sluggish, and “backward.” It was further shown that even before 1908, change was felt beyond the social circles of state-trained professionals. As localized temporal constructs were gradually integrated into networks, it became increasingly difficult to evade their grip. City dwellers had to align themselves with these structures when attending governmental bureaus, when riding the ferries of the state-owned steamer company, or when drinking *raki* at their favorite tavern.

By then, the emerging temporal culture had diffused through gender boundaries as well. As the city became increasingly clock regulated, women had to familiarize themselves with the emerging matrix of temporal constructs, just like their menfolk. With the expansion of education and the press, growing numbers of urban women were also exposed to the evolving discourse about the value of time. As the home was increasingly perceived as one of the sources of imperial power, young women were taught that domestic management, just like state affairs, was to be conducted in an efficient and punctual manner. Yet while the intertwined discourses of progress and the value of time certainly targeted women, they did not undermine the patriarchal social order; quite the contrary. The writers behind this discourse sought to enlist more educated women to the Ottoman project of modernity, while constantly reaffirming the gendered division of labor.

With the reform agenda spreading beyond the state apparatus in the second half of the nineteenth century, the discourse of the value of time diffused down the social ladder and was enthusiastically adopted by the urban middle class. In various publications, punctuality, time thrift, and temporal regularity were presented as imperative for progress and as an index by which to measure that progress. The more radical elements among the Young Turks eventually turned against the indigenous hour system which formed the core of Ottoman temporal culture. Only the elimination of inherited practices and knowledge about time, they thought, would facilitate the Ottoman effort to progress and “catch up” with the Europeans.

This analysis emphasized the importance of the Young Turk era, despite its short duration, as a transitional period between the pragmatic eclecticism of the Ottomans and the more monolithic European orientation of the republicans. While the Ottoman political and intellectual elite throughout the period under discussion largely shared the notion of progress and visualized modernity as a temporal location at the tip of the historical timeline, the nature of modernity and the possible ways to reach it were constantly debated. It is therefore very difficult to generalize, and yet it seems possible to say that the dominant trend during the Hamidian era was characterized by conscious efforts to seek a synthesis between foreign and indigenous, between old and new, in an attempt to pave a distinctly Ottoman path to modernity.

Following the Young Turk Revolution, this agenda was on the defensive, as a more radical group of reformers gained political power. In their effort to place the empire on the same temporal plane with Europe, several bodies, including most notably the army, pushed for the elimination of the old *alaturka* hours. In contrast to earlier generations, the new regime was less inclined to gradually reform the indigenous temporal culture, and sought to eliminate or at least marginalize it. My explanation of this break with the past emphasized the different, largely middling background of the CUP and its core supporters. Even more important than the social origin of this group, however, was the socialization process of its members and the ways they defined their collective identity and expressed their cultural and political agenda. It is here, in the frontier zone between the social and the cultural, that I tried to locate the move against the *alaturka* system, and more generally against the indigenous temporal culture.

Raised away from the mosque complexes and the *medreses* and bred on a new textual diet, the graduates of the Hamidian educational institutions were removed from the traditions that had shaped the temporal conceptualizations and scripted the time-related behaviors of earlier generations. Detached from

the *divan* tradition and its cosmology, the new generation was alien to the world of cyclic images of time and auspicious hours. For them, time was no longer synonymous with fate, an uncontrollable entity that subdues all humans; rather it was one more object of reform, another frontier to be conquered and ordered, measured, and put to good use. And the time to do all that, so they felt, was running out. If their grandparents may have said that “haste is from the devil and patience from the merciful,” for them it was all about haste.

Given that the focal point of this study was Istanbul, and most of its sources were in Ottoman-Turkish, it is necessary to be cautious when drawing connecting lines between the capital and other Ottoman cities. It does seem clear, however, that throughout the region, new time-related concepts, behaviors, and values were a significant component of the lifestyle and collective identity of educated urban groups. The very notion of being “modern” or “advanced” was premised on a new understanding of historical time, an understanding that was different from earlier conceptions. Being modern, in turn, entailed a certain approach toward time that set the “moderns” apart from the “retarded” and the “primitives.” In a nutshell, the moderns were punctual, efficient, productive, and orderly.

The significance of time organization in the ideological baggage of the rising professional elites was manifested immediately after the 1908 Young Turk Revolution. A series of measures taken by the new regime demonstrated its preoccupation with time. The leaders of the new administration redefined working hours and attempted to standardize them throughout the empire. They fixed in regulation new sanctions against habitual late comers and interfered with the timetables of the imperial ferry company in order to ensure the regular and timely traffic of ferries. They put together two committees in order to reform Ottoman calendars and the hour system, and took significant steps towards joining the emerging worldwide time network.

Indeed, as important as these internal processes may have been, the transformation of Ottoman temporal culture, and particularly the attempts to marginalize the hour system that served as its axis, cannot be understood outside its global context. With railways and steamships, telegraph and telephone lines spanning huge territories and forming a fully integrated system that was becoming ever denser and ever more compelling, the Ottoman leadership, like other political elites around the world, found their space of maneuver increasingly limited. While cultivating connections with newly forming global networks, the Hamidian political and intellectual leaders were comfortable with maintaining a level of friction at the points of interface between the Ottoman

and the European. The CUP elite, by contrast, sought to purge society of elements that seemed to be incompatible with the emerging world system.

And yet, despite all innovations, the Young Turk era did not represent a break from the temporal culture of the Hamidian period, but was rather another phase, if one of accelerated change, in a continuous evolution. As much as the radicals among the CUP hoped to break with the past, they had to compromise with it over and over again. Their attempts to abolish the *alaturka* system were met with effective opposition, and the matter remained unresolved down to the dissolution of the empire.

Although years would pass before it would finally die out, the *alaturka* system was already being mourned by some in the early 1920s, even before its formal abolition in 1926. The most famous requiem was written by Ahmed Haşim (d. 1933), one of the most prominent writers of the period:

The most surreptitious yet most powerful of innovations was the introduction of foreign time, not in terms of the clocks as such, but the time system itself. Just as in the past we had our own lifestyles, attitudes, modes of dress, and tastes deriving from our religion, our race and tradition, so we had our own hours and days to suit this lifestyle. The Muslim used to judge the beginning of the day by the glint of dawn, and its end by the last light of dusk. The hands of those old innocent watches hidden beneath strong metal lids would stumble like the legs of a tired insect across the numerals around the dial, in a pattern which corresponded more or less with the movement of the sun across the sky, and keep their owners informed, with acceptable accuracy, of the time. Time was an infinite garden, and the hours were colourful flowers lit by the sun which bloomed there, inclining sometimes to the left, sometimes to the right. Until we became accustomed to foreign time, the twenty-four-hour “day” with each end lost in the darkness of night . . . was unknown. Instead we had our own real day, which began with the light and ended with the light, a short, undemanding, easily lived day of just twelve hours. . . . Admittedly, according to astronomical calculations this time was primitive and inaccurate. But it was venerable and sacred. . . . Those old hours marked the death of our fathers, the wedding days of our mothers, our own births, the departure of caravans and the conquest of enemy cities. The foreign hours which replaced them upset our lives, resetting them according to an unknown code of laws, and making them unrecognizable to our spirits. . . . Now the clocks in the houses of Muslims seem to show the times of another world, where the hours which are night for us are day, and those

which are day take on the colour of night. Like wayfarers who have lost their way in the desert, we are lost in time.<sup>2</sup>

Haşim's text builds on many of the emotional scripts discussed throughout this analysis. It makes explicit connections between specific times of the day and various social practices and individual experiences. If the *alartuka* system and the temporal culture of which it was part were shown to be a conceptual cage that reflected and served the power structures that created it, for many people it was a home they were reluctant to leave. It was a system that underpinned a way of life, and abandoning it raised profound anxieties. At times rationalized and expressed in well-organized arguments, at times erupting in angry exchanges (as in the parliamentary discussions cited in chapter 6), the anxieties and emotions that were bound up with the *alaturka* system were significant in the struggles that were waged around it in the early twentieth century.

The establishment of the Turkish Republic following the War of Independence marked a fundamental shift in power. Under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal, the European-oriented forces were now able to disregard opposition and finally break with the past, eliminate it by law, and leap into modernity supposedly free from the weight of tradition. The rhetoric of a "new era" that was used following the 1908 constitutional revolution now reappeared, ten times stronger, accompanied by concrete measures aimed at uprooting the remnants of the old. The sultanate, the caliphate, the capital, the alphabet, the official uniform, all had to go. The *alaturka* system, so deeply associated with the Ottoman past, was doomed.

The *alaturka* system and the *Hijri* calendar were finally invalidated by an act of the newly established Turkish Parliament in late 1925. On the last day of that year, newspapers announced to their readers that the old hour system was to be abolished the following day, and instructed their readers how to use mean time.<sup>3</sup> Only fifty years earlier, Member of Parliament Ahmed Efendi, with whom I opened this study, declared defiantly that he did not know the *alafiranga* system. His grandchildren were left with no choice. It would take a few more years before the system would finally die out but the decisive blow has been landed. From now on there was only one correct way of using clocks, only one right path to progress. Reading clocks *alaturka* would soon be a thing of the past.



## NOTES

### INTRODUCTION

1. Hakkı Tarık Us, *Meclis-i Meb'usan Zabıt Ceridesi 1293=1877*, vol. 2 (Istanbul: Vakıf, 1954), 40. The original Italian terms *alla franga* and *alla turka* were widely used in the late Ottoman Empire. Throughout the book they are given in their Turkish form (*alafranga* and *alaturka*), in order to emphasize that their use and the meanings they conveyed were embedded in late Ottoman realities, rather than in early-modern Italian ones. The terms and their significance are discussed in chapter 6.
2. John Foster Fraser, *Pictures from the Balkans* (London: Cassell, 1912), 119–20; Lucy M. J. Garnett, *The Turkish People: Their Social Life, Religious Beliefs and Institutions and Domestic Life* (1909; repr., Whitefish, MT: Kessinger Publishing, 2004), 23; Lawrence J. L. Dundas, *On the Outskirts of Empire in Asia* (London: William Blackwood and Sons, 1904), 31–32.
3. Otto Kurz, *European Clocks and Watches in the Near East* (Leiden: Brill, 1975); Kemal Özdemir, *Ottoman Clocks and Watches* (Istanbul: Creative Yayıncılık, 1993); Fanny Davis, “The Clocks and Watches of the Topkapı Palace Museum,” *Journal of Turkish Studies* 8 (1984): 41–51; Acar Şinasi, “Eski Saatler ve Osmanlı Koyun Saatleri,” *Yapı* 248 (July 2002): 94–102; Şule Gürbüz, “Osmanlı Saatçileri,” in *Zamanın Görünen Yüzü: Saatler*, ed. Selahattin Özpabalıyıklar and Şennur Şenturk (Istanbul: Yapı-kredi, 2009), 105–13; Atilla Bir and Mustafa Kaçar, “Güneş Saatlerinin Tarihçesi ve Türleri,” in Özpabalıyıklar and Şenturk, *Zamanın Görünen Yüzü*, 33–55; Nusret Çam, “Osmanlı Güneş Saatlerinin Türleri ve İşleyiş Esasları,” in *Osmanlı Dünyasında Bilim ve Eğitim: Milletlerarası Kongresi Tebliğleri, İstanbul 12–15 Nisan 1999*, ed. Hidayet Yavuz Nuhoğlu (Istanbul: IRCICA, 2001), 363–74; Atilla Bir and Mahmut Kayral, “Bir Onsekizinci Asır Silindirik Osmanlı Saati,” in Nuhoğlu, *Osmanlı Dünyasında*, 347–63; Atilla Bir, “Zamanı Belirlemeye Yarayan Aletler,” in *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Doruğu: 16. Yüzyıl Teknolojisi*, ed. Kâzım Geçen (Istanbul: Omas Ofset A.Ş., 1999), 233. On clock towers, see Mehmet Bengü Uluengin, “Secularizing Anatolia Tick by Tick: Clock Towers in the Ottoman Empire and in the Turkish Republic,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 42, no. 1 (2010): 17–36; Liubomir Mikov, “Cultural and Historical Profile of Clock Towers in the Bulgarian Lands (17th–19th Centuries),” *Études Balcaniques*, 46, no. 1–2 (2010): 104–26; Klaus Kreiser, “Ottoman Clock Towers: A Preliminary Survey and Some General Remarks on Construction Dates, Sponsors, Locations and Functions,” in *Essays in Honour of Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu*, ed. Mustafa Kaçar and Zeynep Durukal, vol. 1 (Istanbul: IRCICA, 2006), 543–56; Sabrı Yetkin, *Kentsel bir Sembolün Doğuşu—İzmir Saat Kulesi* (Izmir: İzmir Büyükşehir Belediyesi, 2001); Şule Gürbüz, “Saat Kulelerinin Varlığı ve Yokluğu Üzerine,” in Özpabalıyıklar and Şenturk, *Zamanın Görünen Yüzü*, 133–47; Hakkı

- Acun, "Anatolia Clock Towers," in *The Great Ottoman-Turkish Civilisation*, ed. Kemal Çiçek, vol. 4 (Ankara: Yeni Türkiye, 2000), 374-79. On *muvaakkits*, see Süheyl Ünver, "Osmanlı Türkleri İlim Tarihinde Muvakkithaneler," in *Atatürk Konferansları V, 1971-1972* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1975), 217-57; Salim Aydüz, "İstanbul'da Zamanın Nabzını Tutan Mekanlar: Muvakkithaneler," *İstanbul* 51 (2004): 92-97; Aydüz, "Osmanlı Devleti'nde Müneccimbaşılık," in *Osmanlı Bilimi Araştırmaları*, ed. Feza Günergun, vol. 1 (İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi, 1995), 188-90; Server Dayıoğlu, "Muvakkithaneler," in *Özpalabıyıklar and Şenturk, Zamanın Görünen Yüzü*, 123-31.
4. Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu and Feza Günergun, "Osmanlı Türkiyesinde 'Alaturka Saat'ten 'Alafranga Saat'e Geçiş," in *X Ulusal Astronomi Kongresi, 2-6 Eylül 1996* (İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi Fen Fakültesi, Astronomi ve Uzay Bilimler Bölümü, 1996), 334-41; Doğan Gündüz, "Alaturka Saatten Alafranga Saate Geçiş: Osmanlı'nın Mekanik Saatle Buluşması," *İstanbul* 51 (2004): 120-26; Gündüz, "Galata Kulesi'ndeki Saatleri Ayarlama Küresi," *Toplumsal Tarih* 126 (2004): 1-4; Uğur Tanyeli, "The Emergence of Modern Time Consciousness in the Islamic World and the Problematics of Spatial Perception," in *Anytime*, ed. Cynthia C. Davidson (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999), 159-67; Şule Gürbüz, "Alaturka Saat, Alaturka Zaman," in *Özpalabıyıklar and Şenturk, Zamanın Görünen Yüzü*, 57-66; Karen Barkey, "In Different Times: Scheduling and Social Control in the Ottoman Empire, 1550-1650," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 38, no. 3 (1996): 460-83; Zeynep Çelik, *Empire, Architecture, and the City: French-Ottoman Encounters, 1830-1914* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2008), 146-51; Jens Hanssen, *Fin de Siècle Beirut: The Making of an Ottoman Provincial Capital* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005), 243-47; Nil Birol, "Managing the Time of the Bureaucrat in the Late Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Administration" (master's thesis, Boğaziçi University, 2005), 50-57. A recently published volume focuses exclusively on time in the Ottoman Empire; see *Les Ottomans et le temps*, ed. François Georgeon and Frédéric Hitzel (Leiden: Brill, 2012).
5. Jason Goodwin, *Lords of the Horizons: A History of the Ottoman Empire* (London: Vintage, 1999), 149-58. For an example of a somewhat nostalgic treatment of the very same "Turkish time," see Gürbüz, "Alaturka Saat." See also Touraj Atabaki, "Time, Labour-Discipline and Modernization in Turkey and Iran: Some Comparative Remarks," in *The State and the Subalterns: Modernization, Society and the State in Turkey and Iran*, ed. Touraj Atabaki (London: I.B. Tauris, 2007), 1-16; İhsanoğlu and Günergun, "Osmanlı Türkiyesinde"; Gündüz, "Alaturka Saatten"; Uluengin, "Secularizing Anatolia." See also my critique of Uluengin's article: Avner Wishnitzer, "A Comment on Mehmet Bengü Uluengin's 'Secularizing Anatolia Tick by Tick: Clock Towers in the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic,'" *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 42, no. 4 (2010): 537-45. Uğur Tanyeli has made the most significant attempt to understand the Ottoman use of clocks in its context, but even he characterized Ottoman temporality merely as "religious." Tanyeli, "Emergence," 162.
6. Fatma Müge Göçek, *East Encounters West: France and the Ottoman Empire in the*

- Eighteenth-Century* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 105–6; Uğur Tanyeli, “Norms of Domestic Comfort and Luxury in Ottoman Metropolises: Sixteenth to Eighteenth Centuries,” in *The Illuminated Table, The Prosperous House: Food and Shelter in Ottoman Material Culture*, ed. Suraiya Faroqhi and Christoph K. Neumann (Würzburg: Ergon Verlag, 2003), 315; Özdemir, *Ottoman Clocks*, 144–45.
7. In fact, the use of clocks in eighteenth-century Europe and North America was much more diversified than is often supposed. See Peter E. Laurent, *Recollections of a Journey through Various Parts of Greece Turkey and Italy Made in the Years 1818 and 1819* (London: G and W. B. Whittaker, 1821), 165; Michael J. Sauter, “Clockwatchers and Stargazers: Time Discipline in Early Modern Berlin,” *American Historical Review* 112, no. 3 (2007): 685–709; Mark M. Smith, *Mastered by the Clock: Time, Slavery, and Freedom in the American South* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997).
  8. E. P. Thompson, “Time, Work-Discipline, and Industrial Capitalism,” *Past and Present* 38 (1967): 56–97.
  9. Karl Marx, *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy*, trans. Ben Fowkes, vol. 1 (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1990), esp. 340–416, 655–67, 683–92; Friedrich Engels, *The Condition of the Working Class in England*, trans. W. O. Henderson & W. H. Chaloner (Oxford: B. Blackwell, 1958), 200–204.
  10. Thompson, “Time,” 71–78.
  11. Nigel Thrift, “The Making of a Capitalist Time Consciousness,” in *The Sociology of Time*, ed. John Hassard (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990), 108; Anthony Giddens, *A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism*, vol. 1, *Power, Property and the State* (London: Macmillan, 1981), 34–37; Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990), 17–21.
  12. Emile Durkheim, *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life* (New York: Free Press, 1995), 8–18.
  13. Martin P. Nilsson, *Primitive Time-Reckoning: A Study in the Origins and First Development of the Art of Counting Time Among the Primitive and Early Culture Peoples* (Lund: C.W.K. Gleerup, 1920); E. E. Evans Pritchard, *The Nuer: A Description of the Modes of Livelihood and Political Institutions of a Nilotic People* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1940), esp. 94–104; Edmund R. Leach, *Rethinking Anthropology* (London: University of London, Athlone Press, 1961), 124–36. There is a whole tradition that nevertheless emphasized the existence of experienced time alongside clock time in the West as well; see John Hassard, “Introduction: The Sociological Study of Time,” in *The Sociology of Time*, ed. John Hassard (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990), esp. 6–13.
  14. Mark Harrison, “The Ordering of Urban Environment: Time, Work, and the Occurrences of Crowds, 1790–1835,” *Past and Present* 110 (1986): 134–68; Nigel Thrift, “Vivos Voco: Ringing the Changes in the Historical Geography of Time Consciousness,” in *The Rhythms of Society*, ed. Michael Young and Tom Schuller (Routledge: London, 1988), 53–94; Gerhard Dohrn-van Rossum, *History of the Hour: Clocks and Modern Temporal Orders* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), esp. 8–10,

- 398; Thomas C. Smith, "Peasant Time and Factory Time in Japan," *Past and Present* 111 (1986): 165–97; Henrik Årgen, "Time and Communication: A Preindustrial Modernisation of the Awareness of Time," *Scandinavian Economic History Review* 49, no. 2 (2001): 55–77; Michael O'Malley, "Time, Work and Task Orientation: A Critique of American Historiography," *Time and Society* 1, no. 3 (1992): 348–54; Paul Glennie and Nigel Thrift, "Reworking E. P. Thompson's 'Time, Work-Discipline and Industrial Capitalism,'" *Time and Society* 5, no. 3 (1996): 283. For a survey of the debate concerning Thompson's work in British historiography of the industrial revolution, see Hans-Joachim Voth, *Time and Work in England, 1750–1830* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000), 7–16.
15. Barbara Adam, *Timewatch: The Social Analysis of Time* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), 12–42.
  16. The connection between the idea of progress and the understanding of time as an empty and homogenous entity was made earlier by Walter Benjamin in his "Theses on the Philosophy of History," in *Illuminations*, ed. Hannah Arendt (New York: Schocken Books, 1969), 260–63. See also Johannes Fabian, *Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes its Object* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983); Reinhart Koselleck, *Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time* (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1985); Edward Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage Books, 1978); Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (1980, rep. London: Verso, 1993), esp. 23–36; Maurice Bloch, "The Past and the Present in the Present," *MAN* (new series) 12, no. 2 (1977): 278–92; Alfred Gell, *The Anthropology of Time: Cultural Constructions of Temporal Maps and Images* (New York: Berg, 1992); Nancy D. Munn, "The Cultural Anthropology of Time: A Critical Essay," *Annual Review of Anthropology* 21 (1992): 101. On feminist discourse and the temporality of modernity, see Rita Felsky, *The Gender of Modernity* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), 145–73.
  17. On such dichotomist discourse promoted by English colonial officials, see Keletso E. Atkins, "'Kafir Time': Preindustrial Temporal Concepts and Labour Discipline in Nineteenth-Century Colonial Natal," *Journal of African History* 29 (1988): 229–44; Frederick Cooper, "Colonizing Time: Work Rhythms and Labor Conflict in Colonial Mombasa," in *Colonialism and Culture*, ed. Nicholas B. Dirks (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1992), esp. 237–40. On similar discursive tactics directed against the lower classes in nineteenth-century England, see Maureen Perkins, *The Reform of Time: Magic and Modernity* (London: Pluto Press, 2001).
  18. Christopher A. Bayly, *The Birth of the Modern World, 1780–1914: Global Connections and Comparisons* (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell Publishers, 2003), 12–19.
  19. Bayly, *Birth*, 17. See also Stefan Tanaka, *New Times in Modern Japan* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 5–17; Prathama Banerjee, *Politics of Time: 'Primitives' and History-Writing in a Colonial Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); On Barak, *On Time: Technology and Temporality in Modern Egypt, 1830–1930* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013).
  20. Tanaka, *New Times*; Banerjee, *Politics of Time*; Barak, *On Time*. Attempts to integrate

- the conceptual and the quotidian are not entirely new, of course; see Stephan Kern, *The Culture of Time and Space, 1880–1918* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1983).
21. By “temporal constructs” I mean a multitude of time-related practices that are woven together to form a matrix that regulates the temporal organization of systems. The temporal construct of a university, for example, is outlined in countless regulations that define the academic calendar, fix times and durations of lectures and breaks, set deadlines for academic and administrative tasks, specify sanctions against violators of these deadlines, etc.
  22. Thrift, “Vivos Voco,” 55.
  23. P. A. Sorokin and R. K. Merton, “Social Time: A Methodological and Functional Analysis,” *The American Journal of Sociology* 42, no. 5 (1937): 615–29. See also Lewis Mumford, *Technics and Civilization* (London: Routledge, 1946), esp. 9–18; Thompson, “Time,” 58–60.
  24. Norbert Elias, *Time: An Essay* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), esp. xv–xvi, 104–17; Barbara Adam, “Social Versus Natural Time: A Traditional Distinction Re-Examined,” in *The Rhythms of Society*, ed. Michael Young and Tom Schuller (London: Routledge, 1988), 214–19; Barak, *On Time*.
  25. Such claims were made regarding the antebellum American South, and in a different way, about the Ottoman Empire. See O’Malley, “Time, Work, and Task Orientation,” 352–53; Smith, *Mastered by the Clock*, esp. 9–14, 39–92; Tanyeli, “Emergence,” 162.
  26. Walter G. Andrews, “Ottoman Love: Preface to a Theory of Emotional Ecology,” in *A History of the Emotions*, ed. Jonas Liliequist (London: Pickering and Chatto, 2012), 21–47.
  27. For some of the more comprehensive works, see Carter V. Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire: The Sublime Porte, 1789–1922* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980); Zeynep Çelik, *The Remaking of Istanbul: Portrait of an Ottoman City in the Nineteenth Century* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986); Çelik, *Empire*; Fatma Müge Göçek, *Rise of the Bourgeoisie, Demise of Empire* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996); Virginia H. Aksan, *Ottoman Wars, 1700–1870: An Empire Besieged* (Harlow: Pearson, 2007), 180–258; Ehud R. Toledano, *The Ottoman Slave Trade and its Suppression, 1840–1890* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982); Avi Rubin, *Ottoman Nizamiye Courts: Law and Modernity* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011); Selim Deringil, *The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire, 1876–1909* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1999); Benjamin C. Fortna, *Imperial Classroom: Islam, the State, and Education in the Late Ottoman Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). On the Ottoman economy in the age of European dominance, see Reşat Kasaba, *The Ottoman Empire and the World Economy: the Nineteenth Century* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1988); Donald Quataert, “The Age of Reforms, 1812–1914,” in *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire*, ed. Halil İnalcık and Donald Quataert, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 759–944; Roger Owen, *The Middle East in World Economy, 1800–1914* (London: Methuen, 1981).
  28. Hanssen, *Fin de Siècle Beirut*; Keith D. Watenpaugh, *Being Modern in the Middle*

- East: Revolution, Nationalism, Colonialism, and the Arab Middle Class* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006); Stefan Weber, *Damascus: Ottoman Modernity and Urban Transformation, 1808–1918* (Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, 2009); Michelle Campos, *Ottoman Brothers: Muslims, Christians, and Jews in Early Twentieth-Century Palestine* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011).
29. Stefan Weber, “Images of Imagined Worlds: Self-Image and Worldview in Late Ottoman Wall Paintings of Damascus,” in *The Empire in the City: Arab Provincial Capitals in the Late Ottoman Empire*, ed. Jens Hanssen, Thomas Philip, and Stefan Weber (Würzburg: Ergon Verlag in Kommission, 2002), 151–52.
  30. Göçek’s *Rise of the Bourgeoisie* (esp. 37–42) was groundbreaking in this respect. See also Hanssen, *Fin de Siècle Beirut*; Watenpaugh, *Being Modern*; Campos, *Ottoman Brothers*; Feroz Ahmad, *The Young Turks: The Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish Politics, 1908–1914* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969), 15–18; Albert Hourani, *A History of the Arab Peoples* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1991), 302–8.
  31. Keith Watenpaugh develops this perspective in *Being Modern*. For Egypt, see, most recently, Lucie Ryzova, *The Age of the Efendiyya: Passages to Modernity in National-Colonial Egypt* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014); Barak, *On Time*.
  32. Egypt, as a cultural and political outlier, will not be covered here. Although Egypt was Ottoman in many senses into the second half of the nineteenth century, the rapid and far-reaching reforms of Mehmet Ali Paşa and his successors, as well as the British occupation, created a reality in Egypt which was significantly different from other provinces of the Ottoman Empire. For an examination of the temporal aspects of this reality, see Barak, *On Time*.
  33. Bernard Lory and Hervé Georgelin, “Les temps entrelacés de deux villes pluricommunautaires: Smyrne et Monastir,” in Georgeon and Hitzel, *Les Ottomans*, 173–201.
  34. The various hour systems used by the Ottomans and the gradual shift to equal hours are discussed in the following chapters.
  35. The Muslim cycle of prayer and its place in Ottoman temporal culture is discussed in chapter 1.
  36. At this time of the year, the difference between temporal and equal hours is greatest. In late December, daylight in Istanbul lasts about nine hours and fifteen minutes. One temporal hour in Istanbul is thus approximately 46 minutes.
  37. İhsanoğlu and Günergun, “Osmanlı Türkiyesinde,” 434–41. The spread of mean time is discussed at length in chapter 6.
  38. Us, *Meclis-i Meb’usan*, 41.

#### CHAPTER 1

1. As explained below, the poem is loaded with puns and intentional ambivalence. My translation here moves rather freely between several possible readings in an attempt to convey a little of all of them. The poem can be found in Ottoman script in Refi-i Kalayi, *Divan-ı Refi-i Kalayi* (Istanbul: Fatih Matbaası: 1867), 122–123. For a tran-

- scription and some general comments, see İ. Hakkı Aksoyak, “Şerh Kitapları George Prior’u Tanır Mı?” *Turkish Studies (Türkoloji Araştırmaları)* 4, no. 6 (2009): 13–21. For a short biography of the poet, see Murat A. Karavelioğlu, “Refîî Kalayî,” in *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi* (hereafter cited as *TDVİA*), vol. 34 (Istanbul: TDV Yayınları, 2007), 526. For an analysis of his work, see Bilal Alpaydın, “Refîî-i Kâlâyî Divânî (inceleme-metin)” (master’s thesis, İstanbul Üniversitesi, 2007), 3–25.
2. Fernand Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*, vol. 1 (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), 246–75.
  3. The literature does not always differentiate between calendars as intentionally created devices of time organization and yearly cycles of various kinds. For discussions of different yearly cycles in the Ottoman world, see Raphaela Lewis, *Everyday Life in Ottoman Turkey* (London: B. T. Batsford, 1971), 120–40; Nicolas Vatin, “L’homme d’état Ottoman, Maître du temps: La crise de 1566,” in Georgeon and Hitzel, *Les Ottomans*, 83–92; Amy Singer, *Charity in Islamic Societies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 72–81. On official calendars, see B. van Dalen et al., “Ta’rîkh (a.),” in *The Encyclopedia of Islam*, 2nd ed. (hereafter cited as *EI2*), vol. 10 (Leiden: Brill, 1998), 257–71; Cumhure Üçer, “İstanbul’da Zaman ve Takvimler,” *İstanbul* 51 (2004): 76–80; Richard B. Rose, “The Ottoman Fiscal Calendar,” *Middle East Studies Association Bulletin* 25, no. 2 (1991): 157–68; S. M. Zwemer, “The Clock, the Calendar and the Koran,” *The Moslem World* 3 (1913): 262–74; Stephen Blake, *Time in Early Modern Islam: Calendar, Ceremony, and Chronology in the Safavid, Mughal, and Ottoman Empires* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), esp. 66–75.
  4. Dalen et al., “Ta’rîkh,” 258–59; G. S. P. Freeman-Grenville, *The Islamic and Christian Calendars* (Reading: Garnet Publishing, 1995), 1–3; Zwemer, “The Clock,” 262–63.
  5. Dalen et al., “Ta’rîkh,” 259–61; Dana Sadji, “Peripheral Visions: The Worlds and Worldviews of Commoner Chroniclers in the 18th-Century Levant” (PhD diss., Columbia University, 2002), 390–91.
  6. Lory and Georgelin, “Les temps entrelacés,” 179–89.
  7. Sociologists and anthropologists have long noticed that calendars are much more than mechanisms of time reckoning; see Durkheim, *Elementary Forms*, 11; Henri Hubert, *Essay on Time*, trans. Robert Parkin and Jacqueline Redding (Oxford, Durkheim Press, 1999); Clifford Geertz, “Person, Time, and Conduct in Bali,” in *The Interpretation of Cultures* (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 391–98; Gell, *Anthropology of Time*, 294–313; Eviatar Zerubavel, *Hidden Rhythms: Schedules and Calendars in Social Life* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), 70–100. For more recent historical discussions of the subject, see Tanaka, *New Times*, 5–17; Perkins, *Reform of Time*, 25–33; Barak, *On Time*.
  8. Aydüz, “Osmanlı Devleti’nde,” 169.
  9. On the practice of *göç* in the eighteenth century, see Tülay Artan, “Architecture as a Theatre of Life: Profile of the Eighteenth Century Bosphorus” (PhD diss., MIT, 1989), esp. 29–72. On the effect of these patterns on nineteenth- and early twentieth-century transportation and working routines, see chapter 5.
  10. R. Levy and C. E. Bosworth, “Nawrüz,” in *EI2*, vol. 7, 1047; Agah Sırrı Levend, *Divan*

- Edebiyatı: Kelimeler ve Remizler Mazmunlar ve Mefhumlar* (Istanbul: Enderun Kitabevi, 1984), 571-78; Özge Öztekin, *XVIII Yüzyıl Divan Şiirinde Toplumsal Hayatın İzleri: Divanlardan Yansıyan Görüntüler* (Ankara: Ürün Yayınları, 2006), 351-81.
11. For the use of terms and the general scheme, see Eviatar Zerubavel, *The Seven Day Circle: The History and Meaning of the Week* (New York: Free Press, 1985), 12-20. For Ottoman terms and usage, see Atilla Şentürk, "Osmanlı Edebiyatında Felekler, Seyyâre ve Sâbiteler (Burçlar)," *Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları*, 90 (1994), 152-73; Levend, *Divan Edebiyatı*, 199-209. It is important to note that the usage of spherical terms changed over time and between eras and poets; see Walter Z. Feldman, "The Celestial Sphere, the Wheel of Fortune and Fate in the Gazels of Naili and Baki," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 28, no. 2 (1996): 193-215.
  12. Seyyed Nasr, *An Introduction to Islamic Cosmological Doctrines* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1964), 75-84, 132-50, 236-62. See also Şentürk, "Divan Edebiyatında," 135-37, 159-62, 173-74; Gülçin T. Koç, "An Ottoman Astrologer at Work: Sadullah el-Ankarâvi and the Everyday Practice of *İlm-ı Nücüm*," in Georgeon and Hitzel, *Les Ottomans*, 47-49.
  13. That human fate is determined by the heavens is a very common theme in *divan* poetry. See İskender Pala, *Ansiklopedik Divan Şiiri Sözlüğü* (Istanbul: Ötügen Yayınları, 1999), 136; Levend, *Divan Edebiyatı*, 149. On the *devir* or *devr*, see also Deniz B. Çalış, "Ideal and Real Spaces of Ottoman Imagination: Continuity and Change in Ottoman Rituals of Poetry (Istanbul, 1453-1730)" (PhD diss., Middle East Technical University, 2004), 100-101, 117, 269-73.
  14. Levend, *Divan Edebiyatı*, 204.
  15. Şentürk, "Divan Edebiyatında," 177.
  16. For skeptical sultans and a skeptical astrologer, see Aydüz, "Osmanlı Devleti'nde," esp. 175-82; Koç, "Ottoman Astrologer," 39-59; Levend, *Divan Edebiyatı*, 197. For "auspicious hours" in early modern calendars in England, see Perkins, *The Reform*, 26-27; Thrift, "Making of a Capitalist Time Consciousness," 107.
  17. Moishe Postone, *Time, Labor, and Social Domination: A Reinterpretation of Marx's Critical Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 202-16; Thompson, "Time," 56-97; Giddens, *Contemporary Critique*, 133-35; Nancy D. Munn, "The Cultural Anthropology of Time: A Critical Essay," *Annual Review of Anthropology* 21 (1992): 96-98.
  18. Pitirim A. Sorokin, *Sociocultural Causality, Space, Time* (New York: Russell & Russell, 1964), esp. 171-97; Hubert, *Essay on Time*; Zerubavel, *Hidden Rhythms*, 59-64, 101-37.
  19. Çalış, *Ideal and Real Spaces*, 267-74; Ahmet E. Uysal, "Edebiyat Açısından Doğu ve Batı Mistisizminde Zaman Düşüncesi," *Ankara Üniversitesi Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakültesi Dergisi*, 122, nos. 1 and 2 (1964): esp. 71-81. Sufi sheikhs were reputed to have the ability to perform time leaps (*tayy-ı zaman*), that is, to transcend mundane time. See Mehmet Kaplan, "Yeni Aydın Tipi," in *Türk Edebiyatı Üzerinde Araştırmalar*, ed. Mehmet Kaplan, vol. 3, *Tip Tahlilleri* (Istanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 1985), 167.

20. Koselleck, *Futures Past*, 9–57.
21. Gottfried Hagen, “Legitimacy and World Order,” in *Legitimizing the Order: The Ottoman Rhetoric of State Power*, ed. Hakan T. Karateke and Maurus Reinkowski (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 62. Hagen argues (at 81) that during the eighteenth century, the concept lost its appeal.
22. On the relation between the world order and the circle of equity, see Hagen, “Legitimacy,” 64–66; Cornell Fleischer, “Royal Authority, Dynastic Cyclism and ‘Ibn Khaldunism’ in Sixteenth-Century Ottoman Letters,” *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 18, nos. 3 and 4 (1983): 201–3. On the gradual demise of this notion in the eighteenth century, see Virginia H. Aksan, “Ottoman Political Writing, 1768–1808,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 25, no. 1 (1993): 53–69; Gottfried Hagen, “Afterword: Ottoman Understandings of the World in the Seventeenth Century,” in Robert Dankoff, *An Ottoman Mentality: The World of Evliya Çelebi* (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 233–43. On the notion of order and its dissolution in Ottoman political writing, see Bernard Lewis, “Ottoman Observers of Ottoman Decline,” in *Islam in History: Ideas People and Events in the Middle East* (Illinois: Open Court Publishing, 1993), 217; Douglas A. Howard, “Genre and Myth in the Ottoman Advice for Kings Literature,” in *The Early Modern Ottomans: Remapping the Empire*, ed. Virginia H. Aksan and Daniel Goffman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 161–64; İlhan Kutluer, “Nizam,” *TDVİA*, vol. 33, 173–75.
23. The cycle of equity continued to appear in Ottoman political texts well into the eighteenth century, and projects of past-oriented reforms were suggested by several officials to Selim III as late as 1792. See Aksan, “Ottoman Political Writing,” 56, 62–3; Lewis, “Ottoman Observers,” 222. Mehmet A. Kılıçbay argues that even for the Tanzimat leaders, the goal was to reinstate the *nizam-i alem* rather than to create a new order; see Kılıçbay, “Tanzimat Neyi Tanzim Etti,” in *Benim Polemiklerim* (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 1995), 97–107.
24. Karen Barkey, *Empire of Difference: The Ottomans in Comparative Perspective* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 23.
25. Nikos Sigalas has recently demonstrated that Ottoman chronicles of the first half of the eighteenth century mark a gradual shift from a circular understanding of historical time. Nikos Sigalas, “Des histoires des sultans a l’histoire de l’état: une enquête sur le temps du pouvoir Ottoman (XVIe–XVIIe siècles),” in Georgeon and Hitzel, *Les Ottomans*, 99–127.
26. Goodwin, *Lords of the Horizons*, 151. In contrast to Goodwin’s exceptionalist approach, sociologist Eviatar Zerubavel notes that both “progressive” and “circular” visions of time are among the most common structures used by social groups to “emplot” their past; Zerubavel, *Time Maps: Collective Memory and the Social Shape of the Past* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 23–24.
27. The very same works that stressed cyclic dynamism often discussed the rise and fall of dynasties in biological terms of birth, growth, stasis, decline, and death; see Lewis, “Ottoman Observers,” 217–20. Ottoman writers, however, did not pursue this model

- to its logical conclusion and did not explicitly say that the Ottoman dynasty too was destined to vanish. Hagen, "Afterword," 242-43. On different understandings of time in Ottoman poetry, see Ahmet E. Uysal, "Edebiyat Açısından," esp. 71-81.
28. There were variations in closing times between different markets and probably between different guilds in the same markets. Nevertheless, all predefined closing times referred either to the afternoon or to the evening prayer. See Esad Bey, "Siroz'da Esnaf Teşkilâtı ve Cemaat Hayatı," in Osman Nuri Ergin, *Mecelle-i Umûr-ı Belediye*, vol. 2 (Istanbul: İstanbul Büyükşehir Belediyesi Kültür İşleri Daire Başkanlığı, 1995), 671; Charles White, *Three Years in Constantinople; or, The Domestic Manners of the Turks in 1844*, vol. 1 (London: Henry Colburn, 1846), 3-7.
  29. İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Devletinin Merkez ve Bahriye Teşkilatı* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1948), 136-38; Ali Akyıldız, *Tanzimat Dönemi Osmanlı Merkez Teşkilâtında Reform (1836-1856)* (Istanbul: Eren, 1993), 26; Avner Wishnitzer, "The Transformation of Ottoman Temporal Culture in the Long Nineteenth Century" (PhD diss., Tel Aviv University, 2010), 99-104; Birol, "Managing," 26-40; Cahid Baltacı, *XV-XVI. Asırlar Osmanlı Medreseleri: Teşkilât, Tarih* (Istanbul: İrfan Matbaası, 1976), 44; Mehmet İpşirli, "Medrese: Osmanlı Dönemi," in *TDVİA*, vol. 28, 331.
  30. *Hizmet-i Dahiliye ve Nizam ve İntizam-ı Askeriye* (n.d., n.p.), Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Hüsrev Paşa Koleksiyonu, 807/15.
  31. For example, see Sadjı, "Peripheral Visions," 2-14, 37-44; Ergin, *Mecelle*, vol. 1, 1183-227.
  32. Ergin, *Mecelle*, vol. 1, 1192.
  33. Kemal Çiçek, "Tanzimat ve Şeriat: Namaz Kılmayanlar ve İçki İçenler Takip ve Cezalandırılması Hakkında Kıbrıs Muhassılı Mehmet Tal'at Efendi'nin İki Buyruldu," in *Kıbrıs'tan Kafkasya'ya Osmanlı Dünyasında Siyaset, Adalet ve Raiyyet*, ed. Kemal Çiçek and Abdullah Saydam (Trabzon: Derya Kitabevi, 1998), 241-54; Ergin, *Mecelle*, vol. 1, 326-27.
  34. Walter Andrews and Mehmet Kalpaklı, *The Age of Beloveds: Love and the Beloved in Early-Modern Ottoman and European Culture and Society* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005), 223.
  35. Madeline Zilfi, *The Politics of Piety: The Ottoman Ulema in the Postclassical Age, 1600-1800* (Minneapolis: Bibliotheca Islamica, 1988), 193.
  36. Ünver, "Osmanlı Türkleri," 217-57; Özdemir, *Ottoman Clocks*, 29-33. On the institution of the *muvaqqit* as an inheritance from earlier Islamic dynasties, see David King, *Astronomy in the Service of Islam* (London: Variorum, 1993), 250-51; King, *In Synchrony with the Heavens: Studies in Astronomical Timekeeping and Instrumentation in Medieval Islamic Civilization*, vol. 1 (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 201-2, 633-34, 654-59; Zwemer, "The Clock," 272.
  37. The phrase comes from the title of David King's collected works; see previous note.
  38. Aydüz, "Osmanlı Devleti'nde," 188-90; Ünver, "Osmanlı Türkleri," 234-54.
  39. Singer, *Charity in Islamic Societies*, esp. 105-6; Shirine Hamadeh, *The City's Pleasures: Istanbul in the 18th Century* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2007), 76-109.

40. D. A. King, "Miqât," in *EL2*, vol. 7, 26–32; Reşâd, *Letâif-i İnşâ veyahut Muharrerât-ı Nâdire-i Reşâd*, quoted in Aksoyak, "Şerh Kitapları," 18–19.
41. Ünver, "Osmanlı Türkleri," 234–54.
42. Poetry was considered the highest form of literary expressions deep into the nineteenth century, and was extremely important in the social life of the office-holding elite; see Ahmed Evin, *Origins and Development of the Turkish Novel* (Minneapolis: Bibliotheca Islamica, 1983), 26; Andrews and Kalpaklı, *Age of Beloveds*, 85–90.
43. Hamadeh, *The City's Pleasures*, 171–89; Ünver, "Osmanlı Türkleri," 229–31, 235, 248, 253.
44. Keçecizade İzzet Molla, *Divan-i İzzet* (Cairo: Bulaq, 1255/1840), 31.
45. Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar, *19. Asır Türk Edebiyat Tarihi* (Istanbul: Çağlayan Kitabevi, 1982), 5; Kemal Silay, *Nedim and the Poetics of the Ottoman Court: Medieval Inheritance and the Need of Change* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), 45.
46. Rifa'at Ali Abou-el-Haj, "The Ottoman Vizier and Paşa Households 1683–1703: A Preliminary Report," *Journal of American Oriental Society* 94, no. 4 (1974): 438–47; Göçek, *Rise of the Bourgeoisie*, 60–65; Metin Kunt, *The Sultan's Servants: The Transformation of Ottoman Provincial Government, 1550–1650* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), 31–56; Jane Hathaway, *The Politics of Households in Ottoman Egypt: The Rise of the Qazdağlıs* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Dina R. Khoury, *State and Provincial Society in the Ottoman Empire: Mosul, 1540–1834* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), esp. 111–55, 188–212; Ehud R. Toledano, "The Emergence of Ottoman-Local Elites (1700–1900): A Framework for Research," in *Middle Eastern Politics and Ideas: A History from Within*, ed. Ilan Pappé and Moshe Ma'oz (London: Tauris Academic Studies, 1997), 145–62.
47. Ünver, "Osmanlı Türkleri," 237. On the *tarih* as a genre in the context of eighteenth-century Istanbul, see Hamadeh, *The City's Pleasures*, 171–75.
48. Kalayi, *Divan-ı Refi-i Kalayi*, 41. A fetva is an opinion given by an Islamic jurist.
49. Bernard Lewis, *The Political Language of Islam* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 11–13. For the importance of these notions in the spatial organization of the imperial palace, see Leslie P. Peirce, *The Imperial Harem: Women and Sovereignty in the Ottoman Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 9–12.
50. The image of planets revolving around a beloved or a patron is a conventional theme in Ottoman *gazels* and *kasides*; see Şentürk, "Divan Edebiyatında," 136–37.
51. Ottoman poets usually identified themselves with the *rind* type of Sufism, which conventionally represented the tradition's disregard for literal conventions, and rarely missed an opportunity to express their contempt towards the *sofu* (or *zahid*) type, which represented the strict religious precisians who are ignorant of the spiritual dimension. See Levend, *Divan Edebiyatı*, 558–62.
52. Daniel Stolz, "Positioning the Watch-Hand: 'Ulama' and the Practice of Mechanical Timekeeping in Cairo, 1737–1874" (unpublished manuscript); Aydüz, "Osmanlı Devleti'nde," 189; Ünver, "Osmanlı Türkleri," 254–57.
53. *Meclis-i A'yanın Zabıt Ceridesi*, Session 45 (9 Mart 1325/22 March 1909), 156.

54. Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar, *Saatleri Ayarlama Enstitüsü* (1954; repr., Istanbul: Dergâh Yayınları, 2008), 24. This English translation is taken from Özdemir, *Ottoman Clocks*, 145. On the way time is treated in the novel, see Walter Z. Feldman, "Time, Memory and Autobiography in *The Clock-Setting Institute* of Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar," *Edebiyat: Journal of Middle Eastern Literatures* 8, no. 1 (1998): esp. 43-47.
55. Francesca Rochberg, *In the Path of the Moon: Babylonian Celestial Divination and Its Legacy* (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 167-88.
56. King, *In Synchrony*, vol. 1, 590-96; Dohrn-van Rossum, *History of the Hour*, 19; Bir, "Zamanı Belirlemeye Yarayan Aletleri," 231-35.
57. Equinoctial hours were of course known in antiquity and were used in tables of prayer time before the Ottoman era. The Ottoman innovation was the counting of equal hours from sunset. See King, *In Synchrony*, vol. 1, 201-8.
58. King, "Astronomical Time Keeping," 246-52; King, *In Synchrony*, vol. 1, 207-8, 553.
59. Kurz, *European Clocks*, 20-46, 55-60; Özdemir, *Ottoman Clocks*, 145; Fanny Davis, "The Clocks and Watches of the Topkapı Palace Museum," *Journal of Turkish Studies* 8 (1984): 41-51; Göçek, *East Encounters West*, 104-7; Özdemir, *Ottoman Clocks*, 111-25.
60. Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, "Some Remarks on Ottoman Science and Its Relation with European Science and Technology," in *Science, Technology and Learning in the Ottoman Empire*, ed. Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu (Hampshire: Variorum, 2004), 57; Kurz, *European Clocks*, 71-88; Göçek, *Rise of the Bourgeoisie*, 103-6; Tanyeli, "Norms," 314-15; Tsameret Levi-Dafni, "A Social History of Diyarbakır in the Eighteenth Century" (PhD diss., Tel Aviv University, in progress).
61. A. Süheyl Ünver lists a total of sixty-nine *muvakkithanes* in Istanbul, but only thirty-nine can be dated with some certainty. (It must be remembered that many *muvakkithanes* were built long after the mosques they served had been completed.) Of these thirty-nine, only five were built between the fifteenth and the seventeenth centuries. The eighteenth century alone boasts seven *muvakkithanes*, and the nineteenth century, twenty-seven. See Ünver, "Osmanlı Türkleri," 234-54. Even if we take into consideration that the more recent buildings are disproportionately represented, as they are easier to date, the increase in the number of *muvakkithane* is still impressive. During the eighteenth century, there was a significant increase in the building of clock towers in the Balkans. Liyubomir Mikov lists more than fifteen such buildings in Bulgaria alone. Mikov sees this trend as a local Bulgarian phenomenon, but at the same time he argues that most towers were built by members of the Ottoman Muslim elite or converts to Islam; see Mikov, "Cultural and Historical Profile," 106-7, 110-12, 124. During the late eighteenth century, clock towers began to spread into Anatolia, with the first instance of this trend being the clock tower built in 1796 in Safranbolu on the Anatolian coast of the Black Sea.
62. Thomas Thornton, *The Present State of Turkey*, vol. 1 (London: Joseph Newman, 1809), 72-73; White, *Three Years in Constantinople*, vol. 1, 31; Zwemer, "The Clock," 272.

63. This may be why some contemporary European observers argue that the hours of the day were counted from sunrise. See, for example, Fraser, *Pictures from the Balkans*, 119.
64. References to hours in the fire descriptions compiled by Ergin are significantly more frequent in the second half of the eighteenth century compared to the previous century; see Ergin, *Mecelle*, vol. 1, 1183–227; Wishnitzer, “Transformation,” 60–62. On the increasing use of *alaturka* hours in eighteenth-century Cairo, see Daniel Stolz, “Positioning the Watch-Hand.”
65. Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi (hereafter BOA), İ.DH 84/4191. (Sources from the Ottoman Archives of the Prime Minister’s Office will be cited by collection and folio; a list of abbreviations for the archive’s collections can be found at the beginning of the bibliography. In cases where folios contain multiple documents, the date of the specific document cited will be included.) See also BOA, C.ZB 556; BOA, C.ZB 315; BOA, İ.DH 38/1802, 8; BOA, İ.DH 26/1232, 9. On the *havadis jurnalları*, see Cengiz Kırılı, “Coffeehouses: Public Opinion in the Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Empire,” in *Public Islam and the Common Good*, ed. Armando Salvatore and Dale F. Eickelman (Leiden: Brill, 2006), 75–80.
66. Turgut Karacan, *Divân, Bosnalı Alaeddin Sâbit* (Sivas: Cumhuriyet Üniversitesi, 1991), 366, with a short biography of Sabit at 1–9. The analysis here draws partly on Ahmet A. Şentürk’s notes; see Şentürk, *Osmanlı Şiiri Antolojisi*, 583–84.
67. Davis, “The Clocks,” 41–51; Kurz, *European Clocks*, 22–27, 30–44.
68. In Ottoman poetry, the lover-poet assumes the role of a slave serving his master; see Walter Andrews, *Poetry’s Voice, Society’s Song: Ottoman Lyric Poetry* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1985), 89–108.
69. *Ibid.*, 162–63.
70. *Ibid.*, esp. 91–93; Andrews and Kalpaklı, *Age of Beloveds*, 229.
71. Kurz, *European Clocks*, 78–79.
72. Aksoyak, “Şerh Kitapları,” 16.
73. *Ibid.*
74. For other examples of very real timepieces and clock-related practices in eighteenth century poems, see Sünbül-Zâde Vehbî, *Divân*, ed. Ahmet Yenikale (Ankara: Ukde Kitaplığı, 2011), 374–75; A. I. Aypay, *Lâle Devri Şairi İzzet Ali Paşa: Hayatı-Eserleri-Edebi Kişiliği* (Istanbul: 1998), 92; Enderunlu Hasan Yâver, *Divan: İnceleme, Metin, Çeviri, Dizin*, ed. Kaplan Üstüner, (Ankara: Birleşik, 2010), 169; Gülây Durmaz, “Zamana Yolculuk: Divan Şiirinde Saat ve Saat Çeşitleri,” *Turkish Studies: International Periodical For the Languages, Literature and History of Turkish or Turkic* 7, no. 2 (2012): 392–99.
75. Charles MacFarlane, *Turkey and Its Destiny: The Result of Journeys Made in 1847 and 1848 to Examine into the State of That Country*, vol. 2 (Philadelphia: Lea and Blanchard, 1850), 90–91.
76. Zerubavel, *Hidden Rhythm*, 138–66.
77. Göçek, *Rise of the Bourgeoisie*, 23, 26–28, 32.

78. On Jezzar, see Amnon Cohen, *Palestine in the 18th Century: Patterns of Government and Administration* (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1973).
79. Haim Gerber, "A New Look at the Tanzimat: The Case of the Province of Jerusalem," in *Palestine in the Late Ottoman Period: Political, Social and Economic Transformation*, ed. David Kushner (Jerusalem: Yad Izhak Ben Zvi, 1986), 36.
80. Max Weber, "Bureaucracy," in *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, ed. and trans. Hans Heinrich Gerth (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1948), 196–244.
81. Şerif Mardin, "Power, Civil Society and Culture in the Ottoman Empire," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 11 (1969): 272; Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform*, 36–38.
82. Andrews and Kalpaklı, *Age of Beloveds*, 241–42.
83. Ehud R. Toledano, *State and Society in Mid-Nineteenth-Century Egypt* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 100.
84. *Ibid.*
85. Adolphus Slade, *Records of Travels in Turkey, Greece, etc., and of a Cruise in the Black Sea* (London: Saunders and Otley, 1854), 462–63; Sigfried Kapper, *A Visit to Belgrade*, trans. James Whittle (London: Chapman & Hall, 1854), 68–71; Francis Schroeder, *Shores of the Mediterranean*, vol. 2 (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1846), 253–55; E. D. Clarke, *Travels in Various Countries of Europe, Asia and Africa*, 4th ed., vol. 4 (London: Codell & W. Davies, 1817), 85.
86. Intentional delays are still used in different political and administrative contexts; see Leonid Bershideky, "Even the Pope Waits for Putin," *Bloomberg View*, November 26, 2013, <http://www.bloombergview.com>; Abdelah Hammoudi, *A Season in Mecca* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2006), 22.
87. Elliott, *Travels*, vol. 1, 47; Slade, *Records of Travels*, 438, 463.
88. John Monatgue, *A Voyage Performed by the Late Earl of Sandwich Round the Mediterranean in the Years 1738 and 1739* (London: T. Cadell Jun. & W. Davies, 1799), 167.
89. Cited in Barkey, *Empire of Difference*, 121. See also Marc Baer, "Honored by the Glory of Islam: The Ottoman State, Non-Muslims, and Conversion to Islam in Late Seventeenth-Century Istanbul and Rumelia" (PhD diss., University of Chicago, 2001), 153–54.
90. Antepî Aynî, *Antepî Aynî Divânı*, ed. Mehmet Arslan (Istanbul: Kitabevi, 2004), 114–15.
91. Andrews, *Poetry's Voice*.
92. Arslan, *Antepî Aynî Divânı*, 1–9; Şener Demirel, "Antepî Aynî Divânı'daki Tarih Manzumeleri Üzerine Bir İnceleme," *Turkish Studies: International Periodical for the Language, Literature and History of Turkish or Turkic* 3, no. 4 (2008), 375–78.
93. Andrews, *Poetry's Voice*, 62–88.
94. Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar, *19. Asır*, 5–9; Andrews and Kalpaklı, *Age of Beloveds*, 229–32; Andrews, *Poetry's Voice*, esp. 89–108.
95. Andrews and Kalpaklı, *Age of Beloveds*, 56.
96. Tanpınar, *19. Asır*, 6; Andrews, *Poetry's Voice*, esp. 91–93; Andrews and Kalpaklı, *Age of Beloveds*, 229.

97. Şeyh Galip, *Hüsn ü Aşk*, ed. Victoria R. Holbrook (New York: Modern Language Association, 2005), 149. The translation is mine.
98. Andrews and Kalpaklı, *Age of Beloveds*, 325–28; Tanpınar, *19. Asır*, 6; Andrews, *Poetry's Voice*, 162–63.
99. For additional examples of clocks measuring distressed waiting, see Durmaz, *Zamana Yolculuk*, 390–91.

## CHAPTER 2

1. Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform*; Ali Akyıldız, *Tanzimat Dönmei*.
2. Rifa'at Ali Abou-El-Haj, *Formation of the Modern State: The Ottoman Empire, Sixteenth to Eighteenth Centuries* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1991), 65–67; Virginia H. Aksan, *An Ottoman Statesman in War and Peace: Ahmed Resmi Efendi, 1700–1783* (Leiden: Brill, 1995), esp. 12–23; Metin Heper and M. Selçuk Sancar, “Is Legal-Rational Bureaucracy a Prerequisite for a Rational-Productive Bureaucracy? The Case of Turkey,” *Administration and Society* 30 (1990): 147. Patrimonial patterns not only survived the reforms, but were sometimes reinforced and buttressed by regulatory action. Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform*, 220, 227–37; Findley, *Ottoman Civil Officialdom: A Social History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 291–92.
3. Raşid Efendi, *Tarih-i Raşid*, vol. 5 (Istanbul: Matbaa-ı Amire, 1865), 293; Ignatius Mouradgea D'Ohsson, *Tableau Général de l'Empire Ottoman*, vol. 6 (1787; repr., Istanbul: Isis, 2001), 231. Evliyâ Çelebi, probably relying on a sixteenth-century code, has written that preparations for the four weekly imperial councils of Sultan Süleyman (1520–1566) began at dawn. “Evliyâ Çelebi'nin Zikrettiği Kanunnâme-i Âyin-i Kava'id-i Tertib-i Sultân Süleymânî,” in Ahmed Akgündüz, *Osmanlı Kanunnameleri ve Hukuki Tahlilleri: Kanuni Sultan Süleyman Devri Kanunnameleri*, vol. 4 (Istanbul: FEY Vakfı, 1992), 552–53.
4. Tevfik Temelkuran, “Divan-ı Hümâyün Mühimme Kalemi,” *İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Tarih Enstitüsü Dergisi* 6 (1975): 132; İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Devletinin Merkez ve Bahriye Teşkilatı* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1948), 136–38; Ali Akyıldız, *Tanzimat Dönmei*, 26; Stanford Shaw, “The Central Legislative Councils in the Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Reform Movement before 1876,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 1 (1970): 67.
5. Akyıldız, *Tanzimat Dönemi*, 53. This mode of time reckoning is still very much alive in the memoir of the Ottoman bureaucrat Aşçı İbrahim Dede; see *Aşçı Dede'nin Hatırları*, ed. Mustafa Koç and Eyyüp Tanrıverdi, vol. 1 (Istanbul: Kitabevi, 2006), 187, 189, 190, 196. For a discussion of Aşçı Dede as an Ottoman official and Sufi, see Findley, *Ottoman Civil Officialdom*, 179–87.
6. Temelkuran, “Divan-ı Hümâyün,” 138–39; Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform*, 98–99, 193.
7. Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform*, 116.
8. While Ottoman scientists were long aware of the heliocentric theory, they mostly treated it with caution, as they believed the practical astronomical knowledge they possessed surpassed that of the West; see Osman Bakar, “Muslim Intellectual Re-

- sponses to Modern Western Science and Technology: Between Westernization and Post-Colonial Islamization,” in *The Islamic World and the West*, ed. Christoph Marcinkowski (Zürich: Lit, 2009), 144–45.
9. Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform*, 194.
  10. BOA, C.DH 4027, 8 Ra 1201 (28 December 1786). As explained in chapter 1, according to the *alaturka* system, two sets of twelve clock hours were counted from sunset, which was reckoned as twelve o’clock.
  11. Betül Başaran, “Remaking the Gate of Felicity: Policing, Social Control, and Migration in Istanbul at the End of the Eighteenth Century, 1789–1793” (PhD diss., University of Chicago, 2006), 110, 118, 161.
  12. *Ibid.*, 51–70, 88–112.
  13. BOA, C.DH 4027, 8 Ra 1201 (28 December 1786); BOA, C.DH 2331, 7 C 1227 (18 May 1812); BOA, C.DH 3421, 3 Ca 1230 (12 April 1815); BOA, C.DH 2332, 3 C 1234 (29 March 1819).
  14. Birol, “Managing,” 37–38.
  15. BOA, C.DH 3759, 29 § 1234 (22 June 1819).
  16. Charles White, *Three Years in Constantinople; or, The Domestic Manners of the Turks in 1844*, vol. 1 (London: Henry Colburn, 1846), 3–7; Ziya Kazıcı, *Osmanlı’da Eğitim-Öğretim* (Istanbul: Bilge Matbaası, 2004), 104, 164–65. On the importance of *ikindi*, see Birol, “Managing,” 36–37.
  17. BOA, C.DH 4027, 8 Ra 1201 (28 December 1786); BOA, C.DH 3421, 3 Ca 1230 (12 April 1815); BOA, C.DH 10598, 20 § 1247 (23 January 1832).
  18. Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform*, 24–30.
  19. Başaran, “Remaking,” 112–14.
  20. BOA, C.DH 3421, 3 Ca 1230 (12 April 1815). Similar vague definitions repeat themselves in many other decrees.
  21. BOA, C.DH 4027, 8 Ra 1201 (28 December 1786); BOA, C.DH 2331, 7 C 1227 (18 May 1812); BOA, C.DH 3421, 3 Ca 1230 (12 April 1815).
  22. See for example BOA, C.DH 3759, 29 § 1234 (22 June 1819); BOA, Buy. 3, p. 145, 1271 (1854); BOA, Buy. 3, pp. 103–4 1272 (1856).
  23. BOA, C.DH 3421, 3 Ca 1230 (12 April 1815); BOA, C.DH 10598, 20 § 1247 (23 January 1832). See also Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform*, 99, 145–46.
  24. See Wishnitzer, “Transformation,” 111, for a table specifying the working hours in the central administration based on thirty decrees issued throughout the nineteenth century.
  25. BOA, C.DH 3421, 3 Ca 1230 (12 April 1815); BOA, C.DH 2332, 3 C 1234 (29 March 1819). This arrangement was later to evolve into a more elaborate system, as shown below. Both Carter Findley and Nil Birol estimated that the sanctioned workday in the bureaus of the central administration at midcentury was around seven hours. Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform*, 192; Findley, *Ottoman Civil Officialdom*, 215; Birol, “Managing,” 27–32.
  26. Avner Wishnitzer, “Into the Dark: Power, Light and Nocturnal Life in 18th-Century Istanbul,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 46, no. 3 (2014): 513–31.

27. Ünver, "Osmanlı Türkleri," 253; Tanyeli, "Emergence," 162; Gülberk Bilecik, "Gözen Kaçan Bir Kültür Mirasımız: Yeni Cami Muvakkithanesi," *Atatürk Üniversitesi Güzel Sanatları Fakültesi Dergisi* 10 (2006): 43-54.
28. Gaston des Godins de Souhesmes, *Au Pays des Osmanlis*, 2nd ed. (Paris: V. Havard, 1894), 261-62. The Yeni Cami maintained its status into the twentieth century; see John Murray, *Handbook for Travelers in Constantinople, Brusa and the Troad* (London: John Murray, 1907), 9; Demetrius Coufopoulos, *A Guide to Constantinople* (London: Adam and Charles Black, 1910), 31. Both of these sources confuse the Yeni Cami with the Yeni Valide Camii in Üsküdar.
29. These numbers were unprecedented; see Ünver, "Osmanlı Türkleri, 225-54; Klaus Kreiser, "Ottoman Clock Towers," 552-55.
30. Akyıldız, *Tanzimat Dönemi*, 26-29, 65-88; Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform*, 125-47.
31. Mehmet İpşirli, "Babâli," *TDVİA*, vol. 4, 385; Akyıldız, *Tanzimat Dönemi*, 63-64; Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform*, 192.
32. Birol, "Managing," 41-49. An extensive discussion of the effect of modern transportation on time organization and the attempts to synchronize transportation with office hours is offered in chapter 5.
33. Akyıldız, *Tanzimat Dönemi*, 62.
34. BOA, C.DH 1762, B 1269 (April 1853); BOA, A.MKT.MHM 354/73, 16 Z 1282 (1 May 1866); BOA, DH.EUM.MEM 50/17, 25 Ş 1332 (19 July 1914).
35. BOA, C.DH 1518, 26 Ca 1261 (1 June 1845); Akyıldız, *Tanzimat Dönemi*, 62.
36. In conceptualizing the new temporal order in terms of clearly delineated borders, I am inspired by Reşat Kasaba's *A Moveable Empire: Ottoman Nomads, Migrants, and Refugees* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2009). Kasaba shows that during the nineteenth century, the Ottoman center grew increasingly more uncomfortable with the movement of populations across territories and the conceptual flux that accompanied that movement, and sought to limit mobility by various means, including demarcation of borders and tightening of border control.
37. Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform*, 98-99, 193.
38. Birol, "Managing," 60-62.
39. Timothy Mitchell, *Colonising Egypt* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 44-45. Mitchell's concept of "enframing" relies on Michel Foucault's concept of "distribution"; see Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* (London: Penguin Books, 1979), 141-49. For a critique of Mitchell's concept, see Khaled Fahmy, *All the Pasha's Men: Mehmed Ali, His Army and the Making of Modern Egypt* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 155-59.
40. Temelkuran, "Divan-ı Hümâyün," 138-47.
41. Birol notes that various councils formed during the *Tanzimat* developed such measures even further. Birol, "Managing," 62-69.
42. "Divan-ı Hümayun Dâiresi Kalemlerinin Vezâif ve Nizâmât-ı Dâhiliyeleri," in Temelkuran, "Divân-ı Hümâyün," 168. The 1838 state officials' penal code, by contrast, does not refer to breaches of time discipline at all. See "Ceza Kanunu," cited in Reşat Kaynar, *Mustafa Reşit Paşa ve Tanzimat* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1954),

- 295–301. For the time-framing of certain procedures, see Temelkuran, “Divan-ı Hümayun,” 144–45.
43. Wishnitzer, “Transformation,” 295–98. For more on telegraphy and time in contemporary Egypt, see Barak, *On Time*, 115–44.
  44. Roderic Davison, “Effect of the Electric Telegraph on the Conduct of Ottoman Foreign Relations,” in *Decision Making and Change in the Ottoman Empire*, ed. Caesar F. Farah (Kirksville, Missouri: Thomas Jefferson University Press, 1993), 53–56. On European diplomats experiencing similar difficulties, see Tom Standage, *The Victorian Internet: The Remarkable Story of the Telegraph and the Nineteenth Century’s On-Line Pioneers* (New York: Walker and Company, 1998), 158.
  45. BOA, Buy. 5, p. 60, 1279 (1863); BOA, Buy. 5, p. 87, 1280 (1864).
  46. BOA, C.DH 3421, 1230 (181–5).
  47. *Bogaziçi Sirket-i Hayriye: Tarihçe, Salname* (Istanbul: Ahmed İhsan ve Şürekası, 1330/1914), 2–3, n1.
  48. BOA, A.MKT.NZD 230/38, 4 Z 1273 (25 July 1857).
  49. Barak, *On Time*, 53–54.
  50. Prayers were to be performed within specified intervals, rather than at given times. The dividing lines between these intervals nevertheless had to be precisely determined and were the object of much scholarly discussion. Charles Pellat, “Layl and Nahār,” in *EL2*, vol. 5, 709. On the “obsession” of early modern Muslim scholars with “exactly pinpointing the moment,” see Blake, *Time in Early Modern Islam*, 73–74.
  51. It seems that even in the early twentieth century there remained a measure of ambiguity with regard to how the punctuality of a clock was defined. See “Al-sā‘āt al-maḍbūta,” *Al-Muqataf* 32 (January 1907), 78. On similarly measuring clocks against natural rhythms in Germany and the American South, see Michael J. Sauter, “Clock-watchers and Stargazers: Time Discipline in Early Modern Berlin,” *American Historical Review* 112, no. 3 (2007): 694; O’Malley, “Time, Work and Task Orientation,” 352–54.
  52. The discrepancies between timepieces were noted by many European observers; see *Forty Years in Constantinople: The Recollections of Sir Edwin Pears, 1873–1915* (New York: D. Appleton, 1916), 312–13; Theophile Gautier, *Constantinople*, trans. R. H. Gould, rev. ed. (New York: Henry Holt, 1875), 272; Annie Brassey, *Sunshine and Storm in the East; or, Cruises to Cyprus and Constantinople* (London: Longman, Green, 1880), 72. In fact, around the world and into the twentieth century, synchronicity between clocks was an ideal rather than a reality; see, for example, Alexis McCrossen, *Marking Modern Times: A History of Clocks, Watches and Other Time-keepers in American Life* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013), 114–15.
  53. Fraser, *Pictures from the Balkans*, 119–20. Ottoman writers also commented on the difficulties of the *alaturka* system; see Hasan Hamid, “Şemsi Tarih, Zevalî Saat,” *Mülkiye* 2 (1 Mart 1325/1909), 25–29; Ahmet Samim, “Vaktimizi Bilelim,” *Seda-ı Millet* 111 (21 March 1910): 1–5. Attempts to compromise between the old practice of temporal hours and the mechanical clock were characteristic of the early stages of the dissemination of clocks in Europe as well. Dohrn-van Rossum, *History of the Hour*, 113–17.

54. For examples, see BOA, C.DH 17210, 11 S 1257 (3 April 1841); BOA, HR.MKT 22/52, 1264 Z 5 (1 November 1848); BOA, A.MKT.NZD 177/45, 22 C 1272 (2 December 1855); BOA, A.MKT.MHM 354/73, 16 Z 1282 (2 May 1866); BOA, İ.DH 943/74683, 20 Ca 1302 (7 March 1885).
55. De Souhemes, *Au Pays*, 261–62.
56. Us, *Meclis-i Meb'usan*, 40.
57. Paul Dumont, "Said Bey: The Everyday Life of an Istanbul Townsman at the Beginning of the XXth Century," in *Osmanistische Studien zur Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte: In Memoriam Vančo Boškov*, ed. Hans Georg Majer (Wiesbaden: O. Harrassowitz, 1986), 3–5. Accounts of conditions in the offices of the central administration provided by foreign observers often refer to similar problems; see Charles MacFarlane, *Turkey and its Destiny*, vol. 2, 97–98; Roderic Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856–1876* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1963), 35–36.
58. Findley, *Ottoman Civil Officialdom*, 231–43.
59. This is the picture that arises also in contemporary novels; see for example Mehmed Murad, *Turfanda Mı, Turfa Mı* (Istanbul: Kültür Bakanlığı, 1980), 101; Rezaizade Mahmud Ekrem, *Araba Sevdası* (Istanbul: 'Alem Matbaası, 1314/1896), 83–91. The function assigned to novels by reformist Ottoman intellectuals is discussed in chapter 6.
60. Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform*, 100, 194; Findley, *Ottoman Civil Officialdom*, 301–11.
61. Şerif Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought: A Study in the Modernization of Turkish Political Ideas* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), 183.
62. This is clearly evident in contemporary writings; see, for example, Ahmed Cevdet, *Ma'rûzât*, vol. 2 (Istanbul: Çağrı Yayınları, 1980), 4–5.
63. Barak, *On Time*, 107–8; Mike Savage, "Discipline, Surveillance and the 'Career': Employment on the Great Western Railway, 1833–1914," in *Foucault, Management and Organization Theory: From Panopticon to Technologies of Self*, ed. Alan McKinlay and Ken Starkey (London: SAGE Publications, 1998), 65–92.
64. Mardin, *Genesis*, 121–24.
65. Osman Nuri, *Abdül Hamid-i Sani ve Devr-i Saltaneti: Hayat-ı Hususiye ve Siyasiyesi*, vol. 2 (Istanbul: Kitabhane-i İslam ve Askeri-İbrahim Hilmi, 1327/1909), 448–95.
66. BOA, Y.PRK.AZJ 15/31, 7 N 1306 (7 May 1889); Nuri, *Abdül Hamid*, vol. 2, 451.
67. Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform*, 227–39.
68. For example see *The Diaries of Theodor Herzl*, trans. Marvin Lowenthal (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1962), 144–67, 347–358; Allan Cunningham, *Eastern Questions in the Nineteenth Century*, ed. Edward Ingram (London: Frank Cass, 1993), 229.
69. Nuri, *Abdül Hamid*, vol. 2, 501, 505.
70. Abdurrahman Şeref, *İlm-i Ahlak* (Istanbul: Matbaa-ı Amire, 1316/1898), 110.
71. *Ibid.*, 111.
72. İsmail Subhi, "Kalem Hayatı ve Akibeti, Bir Nasihat" *Yevmi Servet-i Fünun*, 19 (31 Temmuz 1324/13 August 1908): 3.
73. On the reorganization measures of the bureaucracy during this period, see Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform*, 298–337.

74. BOA, DH.MUİ 3-2/65, 18 Ağustos 1325 (31 August 1909).
75. This curious definition of working hours was tried for the first time in the late 1860s; see Birol, "Managing," 39-40. See also BOA, Buy. 5, p. 114, 1293 (1876); BOA, İ.DH 943/74683, 1302 (1885). It seems that the arrangement was not universally kept and at times, working hours were still defined using the *alaturka* hours. BOA, İ.DH 943/74683, 20 Ca 1302 (7 March 1885); BOA, Buy. 5, p. 102 1288 (1871) BOA, Buy. 5, p. 117 1294 (1876).
76. BOA, DH.MUİ 3-2/65, 27 Ağustos 1325 (9 September 1909).
77. BOA, DH.MUİ 3-2/65, 27 Ağustos 1325 (27 September 1909); the relevant document is dated 13 March 1909.
78. BOA, DH.MUİ 106/69, 8 Temmuz 1326 (21 July 1910).
79. BOA, DH.MUİ 106/69, 19 Temmuz 1326 (1 August 1910).
80. BOA, DH.MUİ 106/69, 26 Temmuz 1326 (8 August 1910).
81. Findley, *Ottoman Civil Officialdom*, 249-51. The 1913 Provincial Law eventually reflected these trends. See Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform*, 310-13.
82. BOA, DH.MUİ 27-1/54, 12 Teşrin-i Evvel 1325 (25 November 1909).
83. For more examples of such resentment, see BOA, DH.MUİ 34-2/21, 25 Teşrin-i Evvel 1325 (2 November 1909); BOA, DH.MUİ 34-2/21, 9 Teşrin-i Sani 1325 (22 November 1909).
84. BOA, DH.MUİ 27-1/54, 14 Teşrin-i Evvel 1325 (27 October 1909); BOA, DH.MUİ 34-2/21, 2 Teşrin-i Sani 1325 (7 December 1909).
85. Haim Gerber, "A New Look at the Tanzimat: The Case of the Province of Jerusalem," in *Palestine in the Late Ottoman Period: Political, Social and Economic Transformation*, ed. David Kushner (Jerusalem: Yad Izhak Ben Zvi, 1986), 36; Corinne Blake, "Training Arab-Ottoman Bureaucrats: Syrian Graduates of the Mülkiye Mektebi, 1890-1920" (PhD diss., Princeton University, 1991), 6-7, 108; Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform*, 266-87.
86. BOA, DH.MUİ 3-2/65, 20 Ağustos 1325 (2 September 1909); BOA, DH.MUİ 34-2/21, 25 Teşrin-i Evvel 1325 (2 November 1909); BOA, DH.MUİ 3-2/65, 27 Ağustos 1325 (9 September 1909); BOA, DH.MUİ 34-2/21, 25 Teşrin-i Evvel 1325 (2 November 1909).
87. BOA, DH.MUİ 34-2/21, 25 Teşrin-i Evvel 1325 (2 November 1909).
88. BOA, DH.MUİ 3-2/65, 24 Ağustos 1325 (6 September 1909).
89. BOA, DH.MUİ 34-2/21, 25 Teşrin-i Evvel 1325 (2 November 1909); BOA, DH.MUİ 78/50, 14 Mart 1326 (27 March 1910), 22 Mart 1326 (4 April 1910).
90. BOA, DH.MUİ 103-2/23, 29 Mayıs 1326 (11 June 1910); BOA, MV, 140/103, 23 Mayıs 1326 (5 June 1910).
91. BOA, DH.MUİ 27-1/30, 11 Teşrin-i Evvel 1325 (24 October 1909); BOA, DH.MUİ 34-2/21, 25 Teşrin-i Evvel 1325 (2 November 1909); BOA, DH.MUİ 106/69, 6 Haziran 1326 (19 June 1910).
92. BOA, DH.MUİ 34-2/21, 25 Teşrin-i Evvel 1325 (2 November 1909).
93. BOA, HR.MTV 569/60, 23 October 1909; see also Birol, "Managing," 32-34.
94. BOA, DH.MUİ 34-2/21, 25 Teşrin-i Evvel 1325 (2 November 1909).

95. Findley makes a similar point, based on his analysis of Aşçı Dede İbrahim's memoirs, in *Ottoman Civil Officialdom*, at 129–30.
96. See for example BOA, DH.MUI 34-4/21, 9 Teşrin-i Sani 1325 (22 November 1909); BOA, DH.MUI 3-2/65, 14 Eylül 1325 (27 September 1909).
97. BOA, DH.MUI 106/69, 26 Temmuz 1326 (8 August 1910); BOA, DH.MUI 34-2/21, 5 Kanun-ı Evvel 1325 (19 December 1909). Although these documents mention printed forms, none are included.
98. BOA, DH.EUM.VRK 19/54 (1913?); BOA, DH.EUM.MEM 50/17, 25 Ş 1332 (19 July 1914); BOA, DH.UMVM 89/42, 25 Ra 1336 (8 January 1918).
99. James Beniger, *The Control Revolution: Technological and Economic Origins of the Information Society* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1986), 15–16.
100. BOA, MUI 3-2/65, 14 Eylül 1325 (27 September 1909); BOA, DH.MUI 34-4/21, 25 Teşrin-i Evvel 1325 (22 November 1909).
101. The matter was discussed time and again by the cabinet, which approved harsh measures against tardy officials; see “Evkât-i muayyenede işleri başında bulunmayan memurin ve müstahdemîn ve nöbetçi katibler hakkındaki usula dair irade-i seniye, 9.10.1911,” in *Düstur*, 2nd ed., vol. 3 (Istanbul: Matbaa-ı Osmaniye, 1330/1914), 753. The matter was obviously not resolved, and in May 1913 it was brought to the cabinet once again; see “Evkât-i muayyenede bila özür vazifeleri başında bulunmayan memurin ve ketebe haklarında itihaz olunacak muameleye dair irade-i seniye, 9.5.1913,” in *Düstur*, 2nd ed., vol. 5, 370.
102. Findley, *Ottoman Civil Officialdom*, 243.
103. Cevdet, “Tensikat—İslahat,” *Mülkiye* 4 (1 Mayıs 1325/14 May 1909), 14; Badi' Nuri, “Vazifelerimiz,” *Mülkiye* 8 (11 Eylül 1325/24 September 1909), 59.
104. Badi' Nuri, “Hükümet Kırtasiye” *Mülkiye* 8 (11 Eylül 1325/24 September 1909), 19–22.
105. Hamid, “Şemsî Tarih,” 26–27.
106. It was not until the second half of the nineteenth century, when new astronomical knowledge began to be taught in Ottoman educational institutions, that the old Ptolemaic model of Islamic astronomy began to lose ground. Bakar, “Muslim Intellectual Responses,” 144–45. On similar trends in contemporary Ottoman Egypt, see Daniel A. Stolz, “The Lighthouse and the Observatory: Islam, Authority and Cultures of Astronomy in Late Ottoman Egypt” (PhD diss., Princeton University, 2013). Gülçin Koç demonstrates that consulting astrologers on daily matters was still very common around the mid-nineteenth century, including among high state officials. Koç, “An Ottoman Astrologer,” 39–59.

### CHAPTER 3

1. “An Explanation of the Nizam-y-Gedid Institution and Some Curious Remarks Concerning It,” appendix 5 in William Wilkinson, *An Account of the Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia* (1820; repr., New York: Arno Press, 1971), iii–xiii, 239. On Çelebi Efendi and his text, see Virginia H. Aksan, “Ottoman Political Thought, 1768–1808,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 25, no. 1 (1993): 61–62.

2. Wilkinson, *Account*, 268–69.
3. Avigdor Levy, “The Officer Corps in Sultan Mahmud II’s New Ottoman Army, 1826–1839,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 2 (1971): 21.
4. David B. Ralston, *Importing the European Army: The Introduction of European Military Techniques and Institutions into the Extra-European World, 1600–1914* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 4–7.
5. Geoffrey Parker, *The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500–1800* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 18–20, 147–48.
6. William McNeill, *The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society since A.D. 1000* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 125–43; Parker, *Military Revolution*, 6–44; Ralston, *Importing*, 1–12. The military revolution theory has been critiqued by several scholars; see David A. Parrott, “Strategy and Tactics in the Thirty Years War: The ‘Military Revolution,’” in *The Military Revolution Debate*, ed. Clifford J. Rogers (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), 227–52; Jeremy Black, *A Military Revolution? Military Change and European Society* (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1991).
7. Some aspects of the military revolution theory have been questioned by prominent Ottomanists; see Gabor Agoston, “Disjointed Historiography and Islamic Military Technology: The European Military Revolution Debate and the Ottomans,” in *Essays in Honour of Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu*, ed. Mustafa Kaçar & Zeynep Durukal, vol. 1 (Istanbul: IRCICA, 2006), 567–82; Rhoades Murphey, *Ottoman Warfare, 1500–1700* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1999), 105–31; Virginia Aksan, “War and Peace,” in *The Cambridge History of Turkey*, ed. Suraiya N. Faroqhi, vol. 3, *The Later Ottoman Empire, 1603–1839* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 81–107; Aksan, “Breaking the Spell of the Baron de Tott: Reframing the Question of Military Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1760–1830,” *The International History Review* 24, no. 2 (2002): 263; Jonathan Grant, “Rethinking the Ottoman ‘Decline’: Military Technology Diffusion in the Ottoman Empire, Fifteenth to Eighteenth Centuries,” *Journal of World History* 10, no. 1 (1999): 179–201. For a different view, see Colin Imber, “Ibrahim Peçevi on War: A Note on the ‘European Military Revolution,’” in *Frontiers of Ottoman Studies: State, Province and the West*, ed. Colin Imber and Keiko Kiyotaki, vol. 2 (London: I.B. Tauris, 2005), 7–22.
8. Aksan, *Ottoman Wars*, esp. 180–258; Stanford Shaw, *Between Old and New: The Ottoman Empire under Sultan Selim III, 1789–1807* (Cambridge MA, 1971) esp. 71–85, 112–37; Enver Ziya Karal, *Selim III’ün Hat-tı Hümayunları: Nizam-ı Cedit, 1789–1807* (Ankara, 1946).
9. Aksan, “Breaking the Spell,” 275; Malcolm E. Yapp, “The Modernization of Middle Eastern Armies in the Nineteenth Century: A Comparative Study,” in *War, Technology and Society in the Middle East*, ed. V. J. Parry and M. E. Yapp (London: Oxford University Press, 1975), 346.
10. Max Weber, “The Meaning of Discipline,” in *From Max Weber*, 255–61.
11. Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 135–56, esp. 138.

12. Timothy Mitchell, *Colonising Egypt*, esp. 33, 63–94; Fahmy, *All the Pasha's Men*, 112–98.
13. On the barracks as a disciplinary “enclosure” in Europe, see Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 141–43.
14. Levy, “Officer Corps,” 21–24.
15. *Menazım-ı Askeriyeye dair Malumat Mütenevvia*, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Hüsrev Paşa Koleksyonu 807/6, 2–3. See also *Avci Talimi*, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Hüsrev Paşa koleksyonu 807/2, 1.
16. *Menazım-ı Askeriyeye*, 2. For similar stipulations, see *Avci Talimi*, 1.
17. *Menazım-ı Askeriyeye*, 2–4.
18. For another good example, see Safvet Paşa, trans., *Piyade Talimnamesi* (Istanbul, 1279/1862), 32–33.
19. Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 151–52.
20. Charles MacFarlane, *Constantinople in 1828: A Residence of Sixteen Months in the Turkish Capital and Provinces*, 2nd ed. (London: Saunders and Otley, 1829), 165, 169.
21. Charles MacFarlane, *Turkey and its Destiny*, vol. 2, 193.
22. Helmuth von Moltke, *The Russians in Bulgaria and Rumelia in 1828 and 1829: During the Campaigns of the Danube, the Sieges of Brailow, Varna, Silistria, Shumla, and the Passage of the Balkan by Marshall Diebitch* (London: J. Murray, 1854), 269; see also 12–13, 16–17. For an analysis of the German military missions to the Ottoman Empire, see Yehuda Vallach, *Anatomya shel siyu'a tsva'i* (Tel Aviv: Sifriyat Maariv, 1981); in Hebrew, translated from the German.
23. Helmuth von Moltke, *Briefe über Zustände und Begebenheiten in der Türkei aus den Jahren 1835 bis 1839* (Berlin: E.S Mittler, 1893), 486–87 n164.
24. Virginia H. Aksan, “Military Reform and its Limits in a Shrinking Ottoman World, 1800–1840,” in Aksan and Goffman, *Early Modern Ottomans*.
25. Fahmy, *All the Pasha's Men*, 160–69.
26. Levy, “Officer Corps,” 26.
27. *Asakir-i Nizamiye Nizamnamesi*, BOA, A.DVNSKNA.d 6, 3. See also Aksan, *Ottoman Wars*, 328–29.
28. *Asakir-i Nizamiye Nizamnamesi*, 3, 25–26.
29. Betül Başaran, “Remaking,” 66, 109–10, 160.
30. Virginia Aksan, “What Ever Happened to the Janissaries? Mobilization for the 1768–1774 Russo-Ottoman War,” *War in History* 5, no. 1 (1998): 24–30.
31. Shaw, *Between Old and New*, 133–34.
32. Aksan, *Ottoman Wars*, 328.
33. *Asakir-i Nizamiye Nizamnamesi*, 3, 25, 43, 65, 67.
34. *Ibid.*, 67. *Sabahleyin* can also be translated simply as “in the morning.”
35. *Ibid.*, 2, 4–5, 10, 25, 43.
36. On roll call as a surveillance technique, see Fahmy, *All the Pasha's Men*, 122–26.
37. *Asakir-i Nizamiye Nizamnamesi*, 26.
38. *Hizmet-i Dahiliye ve Nizam ve İntizam-ı Askeriye*, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Hüsrev

- Paşa Koleksyonu, 807/15. According to the catalog of Ottoman military literature published by IRCICA, the regulations were issued at some point in the thirteenth Hijri century. Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu et al., *Osmanlı Askerlik Literatürü Tarihi*, vol. 2 (Istanbul: IRCICA, 2004), 780. The content of the code and its location in the Hüsrev Paşa collection support dating this work to the second quarter of the nineteenth century.
39. *Hizmet-i Dahiliye*, 7-8.
  40. *Ibid.*, 8-12.
  41. See, for example, *Hizmet-i Seferiye-i Askeriye* (Istanbul, 1278/1861), 32-35.
  42. *Piyade-i Dahiliye Kanunname-i Hümayunu* (Istanbul: Ceride-i Askeriye Matbaası, 1291/1874), 14-15.
  43. Mitchell, *Colonising Egypt*, 44-45; Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 141-49; Fahmy, *All the Pasha's Men*, 155-59.
  44. Anthony Giddens, *The Nation State and Violence*, vol. 2 of *A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1985), 174.
  45. On task orientation and time orientation, see Thompson, "Time," 71-78.
  46. *Piyade-i Dahiliye Kanunname-i Hümayunu*, 176-79.
  47. *Kolordonun Tertibi ve Hatt-ı Harb Nizamı* (n.p., n.d.), Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Hüsrev Paşa Koleksyonu, 807/M1, 37.
  48. *Piyade-i Dahiliye Kanunname-i Hümayunu*, 219-20.
  49. *Piyade Talimnamesi* (Istanbul: Daire-i Askeriye Matbaası, 1310/1891), 12-13.
  50. Mustafa Hamdi, *Bir Ayda Acemi Nefer Yetiştirmek Usulü ve Hizmet-i Nizamiye Esnasında Talim ve Terbiye Görmemiş Redifin Talim Programı* (Istanbul, 1912), 4.
  51. On similar trends in contemporary Europe, see Anson Rabinbach, *The Human Motor: Energy, Fatigue, and the Origins of Modernity* (New York: Basic Books, 1990), 224-27.
  52. Merwin Albert Griffiths, "The Reorganization of the Ottoman Army under Abdul Hamid II, 1880-1897" (PhD diss., University of California, 1966), 93-117.
  53. Griffiths, "Reorganization," 98-99, 108-111.
  54. Ahmed Rifat, "Fransa Seferiye Nizamnamesinin Şerhi," *Mecmua-ı Fünun-ı Askeriye* 4 (Eylül 1299/September 1883): 22-28; Muhyiddin, "Maşi ve Hareket Tertibatı," *Mecmua-ı Fünun-ı Askeriye* 1 (Haziran 1298/June 1882); Ömer Kamil Bey, "Harb Oyunu," *Mecmua-ı Fünun-ı Askeriye* 3 (Nisan 1299/April 1883): 177-92.
  55. The concurrent use of the two systems in the military would only end following the army's adoption of mean time as its standard system in 1912. İhsanoğlu and Günergun, "Osmanlı Türkiyesinde," 437.
  56. Christopher Dandeker, *Surveillance, Power and Modernity: Bureaucracy and Discipline from 1700 to the Present Day* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990), 82-88.
  57. Handan Nezir-Akmeşe, *The Birth of Modern Turkey: The Ottoman Military and the March to World War I* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2005), 24-25.
  58. Edward J Erickson, *Defeat in Detail: The Ottoman Army in the Balkans, 1912-1913* (London: Praeger, 2003), 11-21; Nezir-Akmeşe, *Birth*, 19-33; Vallach, *Anatamoya*, 61-102, 176-80.

59. M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, *The Young Turks in Opposition* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 211.
60. Colmar Von Der Goltz, *The Nation in Arms: A Treatise on Modern Military Systems and the Conduct of War* (1878; repr., London, 1913), 163.
61. Erickson, *Defeat in Detail*, 6; Stanford Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 238–40.
62. Rifat, “Fransa Seferiye,” 22–24. For another article that describes in detail French methods of time organization within the context of large-scale maneuvers, see Mehmet Şevket, trans., “Fransa Erkan-ı Harbiyesinin Vezaif-i Seferiyesi,” *Mecmua-ı Fünun-ı Askeriye* 5 (Mart 1298/March 1882): 22–28.
63. Rifat, “Fransa Seferiye,” 21, 26–28.
64. Şevket, “Fransa,” 23; Hasan Bey, “Almanya Piyadesinin Ateşlerine dair Ta’biye,” *Mecmua-ı Fünun-ı Askeriye* 1 (Nisan 1298/April 1882): 83; Muhyiddin, “Maşi ve Hareket Tertibatı,” 276, 277; Rıza, “Atık ve Cedid Ordularda Maşi ve Hareket ve Cinnas-tığa dair Malumat,” *Mecmua-ı Fünun-ı Askeriye* 9 (Şubat 1302/February 1887): 469.
65. Muhyiddin, “Maşi ve Hareket Tertibatı,” 332.
66. Wallach, *Anatomya*, 184–86.
67. Yehuda Burla, *Beli kokhav* (Tel Aviv: ‘Am ‘Oved, 1988), 1, 11–12, 111.
68. *Ibid.*, 1–2.
69. *Ibid.*, 69.
70. Yücel Yanıkdağ, “Educating the Peasants: The Ottoman Army and Enlisted Men in Uniform,” *Middle Eastern Studies* 40, no. 6 (2004): 93–94.
71. Salim Tamari, introduction to *‘Ām al-jarād: al-ḥarb al-‘Uẓmā wa-maḥu al-māḍi al-uthmāni min Filāṣṭīn* (Beirut: Institute of Palestine Studies, 2008), 9.
72. Sajdi, “Peripheral Visions,” 388–401.
73. See Khalil Al-Sakākini, *Yawmiyyāt Khalīl al-Sakākini: yawmiyyāt, rasā’il wa-ta’am-mulāt*, ed. Akram Musallam, vol. 1 (Ramallah: Markaz Khalīl al-Sakākini al-Thaqāfi: Mu’assasat al-Dirāsāt al-Maqdisiyya, 2003).
74. Tamari, *‘Ām al-jarād*, 25.
75. Mehmed Fasih, *Lone Pine (Bloody Ridge): Diary of Lt. Mehmed Fasih, 5th Imperial Ottoman Army, Gallipoli 1915*, trans. Hasan B. Danışman (Istanbul: Denizler Kitabevi, 2001), 3. For another example of acute time awareness in the diary of an Ottoman officer who graduated from the War Academy in 1913, see Mehmed Arif Ölçen, *Vet-luga Memoir: A Turkish Prisoner of War in Russia, 1916–1918* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1995).
76. Fasih, *Lone Pine*, 28. Words in brackets added by the translator.
77. Nezir-Akmeşe, *Birth*, 7–9; M. Naim Turfan, *Rise of the Young Turks: Politics, the Military and Ottoman Collapse* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2000), 60–69.
78. Yanıkdağ, “Educating,” 92–108. Nezir-Akmeşe, *Birth*, 68–72.
79. Hanioğlu, *Young Turks*, 202–5. Erik J. Zürcher, on the other hand, argues that Rıza’s positivist ideas were not popular among CUP members. Indeed, not only were the Young Turks an ideologically divergent group, but the CUP was rather heteroge-

- neous in this respect. Erik J. Zürcher, *The Unionist Factor: The Role of the Committee of Union and Progress in the Turkish National Movement, 1905-1926* (Leiden: Brill, 1984), 15-17, 49.
80. Erik Zürcher, "The Ides of April: A Fundamentalist Uprising in Istanbul in 1909?," in *State and Islam*, ed. C. van Dijk and Alexander H. de Groot (Leiden: Research School CNWS, 1995), 71.
  81. Nezir-Akmeşe, *Birth*, 13.
  82. Osman Senai, "Çalışalım," *Asker* 1 (21 Ağustos 1326/3 September 1908): 8-9.
  83. Zerubavel, *Hidden Rhythms*, 64-69.
  84. Senai, "Çalışalım," 9, 10.
  85. Ahmed Muhtar, *Sene-i Maliye-i Hicri Sene-i Şemsiye ile İstibdalına Dair* (Istanbul: Matbaat-ı Ebüziyya, 1910).
  86. Nezir-Akmeşe, *Birth*, 70.
  87. Süleyman Mehmed Avan-Zade, *Alman Askeri ve Almanya'da Hayat-ı Askeriye* (Istanbul: Orhaniye Matbaası, 1335/1917), 4-6, 23-24. See also İhsanoğlu, *Osmanlı Askeri Literatürü Tarihi*, vol. 1, 458-59.
  88. Avan-Zade, *Alman Askeri*, 3-6, 23-24.
  89. *Ibid.*, 3, 5, 11-13, 15, 24.
  90. Yanıkdağ, "Educating," 92-101.
  91. Avan-Zade, *Alman Askeri*, 14.
  92. *Ibid.*, 22-23.
  93. The European hour system offered a rigid framework which could be more easily regulated by a mechanical clock. It was not affected by seasons and allowed better control over telegraphic communication and railway transportation. These benefits were discussed in official correspondence regarding the switch to mean time; see, for example, BOA, MV 178/37, 19 B 1331 (24 June 1913).
  94. İhsanoğlu and Günergun, "Osmanlı Türkiyesinde," 437.

#### CHAPTER 4

1. Akil Fevzi, "Saat Kavgaası," *Çocuk Bahçesi* 3 (27 Kanun-i Sani 1320/9 February 1905): 4-6.
2. The clock tower was added in the early 19th century to a mosque that had been built in the early 16th century. The mosque was burned in the great fire of 1917. Vasilis Dimitriadis, *Τοπογραφία της Θεσσαλονίκης κατά την εποχή της Τουρκοκρατίας, 1430-1912* [Topography of Thessaloniki during the Period of Turkish Rule, 1430-1912] (Thessaloniki: Society for Macedonian Studies, 1983), 115, 321-23. Falih Rıfkı Atay describes how he used to run to school and pass a nearby *muwakki-thane*, only then knowing whether or not he would make it on time to school. Atay, "Eski Saat," in *Eski Saat, 1917-1933* (Istanbul: Akşam Matbaası, 1933), 22-23.
3. Aristotle, *Poetics*, IX.
4. Göçek, *Rise of the Bourgeoisie*, 51, 68-73; Deringil, *Well-Protected Domains*, 93-94; Selçuk Akşın Somel, *The Modernization of Public Education in the Ottoman Empire*,

- 1839–1908 (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 5, 15; Benjamin C. Fortna, “Education and Autobiography at the End of the Ottoman Empire,” *Die Welt des Islam* 41, no. 1 (2001): 1–2.
5. On the nature of the temporal construct of modern education and the role it serves in the inculcation of time consciousness, see Barbara Adam, *Timewatch: The Social Analysis of Time* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), esp. 60–64.
  6. Kenan Yakuboğlu, *Osmanlı Medrese Eğitimi ve Felsefesi* (Istanbul: Gökkuşbuğu, 2006), 141–43; Özgönül Aksoy, *Osmanlı Devri İstanbul Sıbyân Mektepleri Üzerine Bir İnceleme* (Istanbul: İstanbul Teknik Üniversitesi, 1968), 13–15; Fahri Unan, “Medrese Education in the Ottoman Empire,” in Çiçek, *Great Ottoman-Turkish Civilisation*, vol. 2, 631–41.
  7. Osman Ergin, “Sübyan Mektepleri,” in *Mahalle/Sıbyan Mektepleri*, ed. İsmail Kara and Ali Birinci (Istanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 2005), 404; Abdülaziz Bey, “İstanbul’da Sıbyan Mektepleri Eğitimi,” in Kara and Birinci, *Mahalle/Sıbyan Mektepleri*, 425–26.
  8. Somel, *Modernization*, 17–19, 23–27; Brinkley Messick, *The Calligraphic State: Textual Domination and History in a Muslim Society* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 75–84.
  9. Benjamin C. Fortna, *Learning to Read in the Late Ottoman Empire and the Early Turkish Republic* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 123–27; Kazıcı, *Osmanlı’da Eğitim—Öğretim*, 103; Somel, *Modernization*, 18; Messick, *Calligraphic State*, 88, 92–94, 105.
  10. Somel, *Modernization*, 26.
  11. On biotemporal rhythms or “biological times,” see Zerubavel, *Hidden Rhythms*, 1–2; Sorokin, *Sociocultural Causality*, 159–64.
  12. Ergin, “Sübyan Mektepleri,” 395–96; Kazıcı, *Osmanlı’da Eğitim—Öğretim*, 104.
  13. Messick, *Calligraphic State*, 85.
  14. Unan, “Medrese Education,” 632–37.
  15. Messick, *Calligraphic State*, 93–94.
  16. Mitchell, *Colonising Egypt*, 80–85.
  17. Rossum, *History of the Hour*, 251–60.
  18. These are the parameters used by Eviatar Zerubavel to analyze the sociotemporal order “which regulates the structure and dynamics of social life.” Zerubavel, *Hidden Rhythms*, 1–12. Zerubavel’s analysis draws on Sorokin’s concept of “sociocultural time.” Sorokin, *Sociocultural Causality*, 171–75.
  19. According to some, the yearly holiday consisted of three months (Recep, Şaban, and Ramazan). See Ahmet Cihan, “Social Life in the Ottoman Medrese,” in Çiçek, *Great Ottoman-Turkish Civilisation*, vol. 2, 646.
  20. Baltacı, *XV–XVI. Asırlar*, 44; Cihan, “Social Life,” 646; Kazıcı, *Osmanlı’da Eğitim—Öğretim*, 163–65; İpşirli, “Medrese: Osmanlı Dönemi,” 331; Messick, *Calligraphic State*, 83.
  21. Dohrn-van Rossum, *History of the Hour*, 251–60.
  22. Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*.
  23. *Ibid.*, 147, 157–59.
  24. Mitchell, *Colonising Egypt*, 64–92; Messick, *Calligraphic State*, 75–114.

25. For a critique of the historiography of Ottoman education, see Fortna, "Education and Autobiography," 1–8.
26. Blake, "Training," 72–86; Randi Deguilhem, "A Revolution in Learning? The Islamic Contribution to the Ottoman State Schools: Examples from the Syrian Provinces," in *Proceedings of the International Congress on Learning and Education in the Ottoman World*, ed. Ali Çaksu (Istanbul: IRCICA, 2001), 285–95; Fortna, "Education and Autobiography," esp. 11–20.
27. Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, "Tanzimat Öncesi ve Tanzimat Dönemi Osmanlı Bilim ve Eğitim Anlayışı," in *150. Yılında Tanzimat*, ed. Hakkı Dursun Yıldız (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1992), 347–59; Mustafa Ergün and Tayyip Duman, "19. Yüzyılda Osmanlı Askeri Okullarının Ders Programları ve Ders Kitapları," *Yeni Türkiye* 7 (1996): 495–98; Kemal Beydili, *Türk Bilim ve Matbaacılık Tarihinde Mühendishâne, Mühendishâne Matbaası ve Kütüphânesi, 1776–1826* (Istanbul: Eren, 1995), esp. 59–68, 74–83.
28. Levy, "Officer Corps," 32–34; Nezir-Akmeşe, *Birth*, 4.
29. Ergün and Duman, "19. Yüzyılda," 507; Levy, "Officer Corps," 33–34.
30. *Osmanlı Askeri Teşkilat ve Kıyafetleri, 1876–1908* (Istanbul: Askeri Müze ve Kültür Sitesi Komutanlığı Yayınları, 1986), 21–24; Hülya Yazar, *Osmanlı Döneminde Askeri Okullarda Eğitim* (Ankara: Milli Savunma Bakanlığı, 2000), 21, 23.
31. Nezir-Akmeşe, *Birth*, 7.
32. *Mir'at-ı Mektep-i Harbiye* (Istanbul: Artin Asaduryan Şirket-i Mürettebiye Matbaası, 1310/1892–1893), 155–56.
33. *Ibid.*, 220.
34. *Ibid.*, 204, 211, 218.
35. *Ibid.*, 185.
36. According to the Ottoman hour system, clocks were set to show 12:00 every day at sunset, and so the inspection was held roughly half an hour before sunset. The hour 6:00 at night meant six hours after sunset. On the Ottoman hour system, see chapter 1.
37. Kara Harp Okulu Tarihi Arşivi (Military Academy Historical Archive), Ceza Defteri No. 2, 12 Nisan 1287.
38. Dohrn-van Rossum, *History of the Hour*, 251–60.
39. See, for example, the program for students in the fortification section of the Imperial School of Military Engineering in Ergün and Duman, "19. Yüzyılda," 497.
40. İhsanoğlu, "Tanzimat Öncesi," 350–52; Levy, "Officer Corps," 35–36; Ergün and Duman, "19. Yüzyılda," 501 n23.
41. Ergün and Duman, "19. Yüzyılda," 499–506.
42. Somel, *Modernization*, 20–54; Hasan Ali Koçer, *Türkiye'de Modern Eğitimin Doğuşu ve Gelişimi* (Istanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1991), 1–82.
43. Somel, *Modernization*, 30–64.
44. *Ibid.*, 170.
45. See, for example, Koçer, *Türkiye'de*, 97–101; Somel, *Modernization*, 168–72.

46. Somel, *Modernization*, 170.
47. Selim Sabit, *Rehnüma-ı Muallimin: Sıbyan Mekteplerine Mahsus Usul-i Tedrisiye* (n.p., n.d.), 7; Somel, *Modernization*, 170. For an earlier use of the term, see “Mektep-i Sanayi Nizamnamesidir,” *Düstur*, 1st ed., vol. 2 (Istanbul: Matbaa-ı Amire, 1289/1872–1873), 265.
48. Sabit, *Rehnüma-ı Muallimin*, 7–9.
49. *Ibid.*, 9, 27, 29.
50. “Mektep-i Sanayi Nizamnamesidir,” *Düstur*, 1st ed., vol. 2, 262–63, 265.
51. “Mektep-i Mülkiye Nizamnamesidir,” in *Mülkiye Târihi ve Mülkiyeler*, ed. Ali Çankaya (Ankara, 1954), 16–17; Mehmet İzzet et al., eds., *Darüşşafaka: Türkiye’de İlk Halk Mektebi* (Istanbul: Evkaf-ı İslamiye Matbaası, 1927), 11–16.
52. “Umum Mekatib-i Rüşdiyyenin Nizamname-i Dahilisidir,” *Düstur*, 1st ed., vol. 2, 249–57.
53. Mary Mills Patrick, *A Bosphorus Adventure: Istanbul (Constantinople) Woman’s College, 1871–1924* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1934), 7–8; Betül Başaran, “American Schools and the Development of Ottoman Educational Policies during the Hamidian Period: A Reinterpretation,” in Çaksu, *Proceedings*, 186; İlnur Polat Haydaroğlu, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda Yabancı Okullar* (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı, 1990); Findley, *Ottoman Civil Officialdom*, 139–43.
54. Gülsün Güvenli, “Le temps de l’école, le temps à l’école,” in Georgeon and Hitzel, *Les Ottomans*, 325.
55. Fortna, *Imperial Classroom*, 99–112; Adnan Şişman, “The Foundation of Galatasaray Mektep-i Sultanisi and the First Years of Instruction (1868–1871),” in *Transfer of Modern Science and Technology to the Muslim World: Proceedings of the International Symposium on Modern Sciences and the Muslim World*, ed. Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu (Istanbul, IRCICA, 1992), 317–44.
56. Başaran, “American Schools,” 194–97, 204–5.
57. Blake, “Training,” 67–69, 74–75; Deringil, *Well-Protected Domains*, 93–134; Başaran, “American Schools,” 185–205; Fortna, *Imperial Classroom*, 43–125; Somel, *Modernization*, 202–4; Hanssen, *Fin de Siècle Beirut*, 163–89.
58. Somel, *Modernization*, 54–73, 83–99; Fortna, *Imperial Classroom*, 112–13; Blake, “Training,” 64; Donald Quataert, *The Ottoman Empire, 1700–1922* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 169; Findley, *Ottoman Civil Officialdom*, 134.
59. See, for example, “Sınıf-ı İbtidaiye ve Rüşdiyeden Mürekkep ve Müddet-i Tahsil-yeleri Altı Seneden İbaret Olan İnas Rüşdiyelerine mahsus Ders Programı [ve] Mevvd-ı Tedrisiyenin Senelere Taksimi,” in Mahmud Cevad, *Maârif-i Umûmiye Nezâreti: Tarihçe-i Teşkilât ve İcrââtı* (1919; repr., Ankara: Millî Eğitim Bakanlığı Yayınları, 2002), 233.
60. “Taşra Mekâtib-i Rüşdiyesinin İdare-i Dahiliyelerine Mahsus Talimatı,” in Cevad, *Maârif-i Umumiye Nezâreti*, 299–300.
61. For a comprehensive discussion of the differences between “narrated” and time-tabled daily routines, see chapter 3.

62. "Umum Mekâtib-i İdadiye-i Mülkiyenin İdare-i Dahiliyelerine Mahsus Talimattır," in Cevad, *Maârif-i Umumiye Nezâreti*, 349. Only the first entries of the table are included here.
63. During the last decades of the 19th century, mean time was increasingly being used alongside the Ottoman system. İhsanoğlu and Günergun, "Osmanlı Türkiyesinde," 434-41. See also chapter 6, below.
64. This was the case in the administrative system and in the schedules of the imperial ferry company, the Şirket-i Hayriye, discussed in chapter 5.
65. "Umum Mekâtib-i İdadiye," in Cevad, *Maârif-i Umumiye Nezâreti*, 349.
66. For another example, see "Dersaadet Mekâtib-i İbtidaiyesi için Ta'limat-ı Mahsusadır," in Cevad, *Maârif-i Umumiye Nezâreti*, 272. For similar arrangements in the administrative system, see chapter 2, above.
67. "Dersaadet Mekâtib-i İbtidaiyesi," in Cevad, *Maârif-i Umumiye Nezâreti*, 308.
68. "Umum Mekâtib-i İdadiye," in Cevad, *Maârif-i Umumiye Nezâreti*, 324.
69. Celâl Esat Arseven, *Sanat ve Siyaset Hatıralarım* (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1993), 31. See also Tevfik Sağlam, *Nasıl Okudum?* (Istanbul, 1959), 12, 27; Mahir İz, *Yılların İzi* (Istanbul: Kitabevi, 1990), 31; İsmayıl Hakkı Baltacıoğlu, *Hayatım* (Istanbul, Dünya Yayınları, 1998), 54.
70. Blake, "Training," 86, 91-92; Fortna, *Imperial Classroom*, 150-63.
71. Baltacıoğlu, *Hayatım*, 54.
72. On discipline and time discipline, see also Hilmi Uran, *Hâtıralarım* (Ankara, 1959), 11-13.
73. See for example "Taşra Mekâtib," brought in Cevad, *Maârif-i Umumiye Nezâreti*, 301-2; "Umum Mekâtib-i İdadiye," in Cevad, *Maârif-i Umumiye Nezâreti*, p. 324.
74. "Taşra Mekâtib," in Cevad, *Maârif-i Umumiye Nezâreti*, 305; "Dersaadet Mekâtib-i Rüşdiyesinin İdare-i Dahiliyesine Mahsus Talimattır," in Cevad, *Maârif-i Umumiye Nezâreti*, pp. 311-13.
75. Falih Rıfki Atay offers a cynical description of this practice in "Eski Saat," 15.
76. Somel, *Modernization*, 265-66.
77. Ahmet Rasim, *Falaka* (Istanbul: Araba Yayınları, 1987), 128-29, 135, 139.
78. For examples, see Suat Aray, *Bir Galatasaraylının Hatıraları* (Istanbul, 1959), 3-7; Muḥammad 'Izzat Darwaza, *Mudhakirât*, vol. 1 (Beirut: Dâr al-Gharb al-Islamî, 1993), 148, 155; İz, *Yılların İzi*, 28-29; Hanssen, *Fin de Siècle Beirut*, 178-79. See also Sülün Bey's memoirs, quoted in Güvenli, "Le temps de l'école," 325.
79. Atay, "Eski Saat," 15.
80. Throughout the 19th century, the work day in governmental bureaus ended around one hour before sunset, and the departure times of ferries were fixed accordingly; see chapter 5.
81. Lewis, *Everyday Life*, 115.
82. Rıfki Atay, "Eski Saat," 22. This does not mean that social life came to a standstill with the evening *ezan* but that its nature changed dramatically. Wishnitzer, "Into the Dark."
83. The underlying assumption of the field known as the history of emotions is that emo-

- tions are socially constructed and that they are acted out according to historically and culturally determined schemas or scripts. Andrews, "Ottoman Love," 21-47.
84. "Dersaadet Mekâtib-i Rüşdiyesinin," in Cevad, *Maârif-i Umumiye Nezâreti*, 307-8. See also "Umum Mekâtib-i İdadiye," in Cevad, *Maârif-i Umumiye Nezâreti*, 343, 346.
  85. Fortna, *Imperial Classroom*, 220-35; Somel, *Modernization*, 187-202.
  86. "Umum Mekâtib-i İdadiye," in Cevad, *Maârif-i Umumiye Nezâreti*, 347.
  87. For examples see "Sınıf-ı İbtidaiye," in Cevad, *Maârif-i Umumiye Nezâreti*, 233-35.
  88. Zerubavel, *Hidden Rhythms*, 59-64.
  89. Fortna, *Imperial Classroom*, 215, 218.
  90. "Sınıf-ı İbtidaiye," in Cevad, *Maârif-i Umûmiye Nezâreti*, 233; Somel, *Modernization*, 179-85; Fortna, *Imperial Classroom*, 214-16.
  91. "Dersaadet mekâtib-i İbtidaiyesi," in Cevad, *Maârif-i Umumiye Nezâreti*, 274-75; "Taşra Mekâtib," in Cevad, *Maârif-i Umumiye Nezâreti*, 300.
  92. BOA, İ.DH 91851, 24 Ş 1307 (15 April 1890). See also Deringil, *Well-Protected Domains*, 95-95; Somel, *Modernization*, 182; Fortna, *Imperial Classroom*, 237.
  93. "Sınıf-ı İbtidaiye," in Cevad, *Maârif-i Umûmiye*, 234, 246.
  94. *Ibid.*, 220-24. See also Fortna, *Learning to Read*; Nuri Doğan, *İlk ve Orta Dereceli Okul Ders Kitapları ve Sosyalleşme, 1876-1918* (Istanbul: Bağlam, 1994).
  95. On the various conceptions of education that competed for hegemony within the Hamidian system, see Somel, *Modernization*, 173-79.
  96. Ali Nazıma, *Dürus-ı Şetta*, 1. kitap (Istanbul: Karabet Matbaası, 1309/1891-1892), 111-15. See also Ali Rıza, *Kızlara Mahsus Malumat-ı Nafia*, 3. sene, 2nd ed. (Istanbul, 1316/1898-1899), 4-16, 27-28.
  97. Nazıma, *Dürus-ı Şetta*, 126-29.
  98. Fortna, *Learning to Read*, 85, 95.
  99. Ali Rıza, *Kızlara Mahsus Malumat-ı Nafia*, 6. Sene (Istanbul: Karabet, 1316/1898-1899), 133.
  100. For a very similar example, see Ahmed Edib, *İktisad Beyti* (Istanbul: Kanaat Kütüphanesi ve Matbaası, 1331/1912-1913), 25.
  101. On the moral education of children as a reaction to the perceived threat of declining patriarchal authority, see Jale Parla, *Babalar ve Oğullar: Tanzimat Romanının Epistemolojik Temelleri* (Istanbul: İletişim, 1990), 45; Fortna, *Learning to Read*, 85.
  102. Ali Rıza, *İlm-i Ahlak* (Istanbul: Karabet Matbaası, 1318/1900-1901), 105-8; Abdurrahman Şeref, *İlm-i Ahlak* (Istanbul: Matbaa-ı Amire, 1316/1898), 78-80; Ali İrfan Eğribozu, *Çocuklara Talim-i Fezail-i Ahlak* (Istanbul: Mahmud Bey Matbaası, 1312/1894-1895), 16-20.
  103. Şeref, *İlm-i Ahlak*, 78-79.
  104. Eğribozu, *Çocuklara Talim-i Fezail-i Ahlak*, 16-17.
  105. *Ibid.*, 34-35.
  106. Wishnitzer, "Transformation," 177-79. The dangers of sloth to one's soul and the importance of using time well were common themes in epigraphs that were hung on the walls of *muvakkithanes*, or time-setter lodges. Süheyl Ünver, "Osmanlı Türkleri, 229-31.

107. Fortna, *Imperial Classroom*, 224–37.
108. Şeref, *İlm-i Ahlak*, 82, 110.
109. Ann F. La Berge, *Mission and Method: The Early Nineteenth-Century French Public Health Movement* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 2. Anthony S. Wohl, *Endangered Lives: Public Health in Victorian Britain* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1983), 6–8.
110. Omnia Sharky, “Schooled Mothers and Structured Play: Child Rearing in Turn-of-the-Century Egypt,” in *Remaking Women: Feminism and Modernity in the Middle East*, ed. Lila Abu-Lughod (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 126–70; Lisa Pollard, *Nurturing the Nation: The Family Politics of Modernizing, Colonizing, and Liberating Egypt, 1805–1923* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), esp. 1–14, 100–31.
111. Alan Duben and Cem Behar, *Istanbul Households: Marriage, Family and Fertility, 1880–1940* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 194–238.
112. The efforts to improve public health were not limited to the sphere of letters. The state now undertook to promote modern hygiene not only through education but also by improving sanitary services, introducing hygiene regulation, and applying quarantine measures; see Miri Shefer-Mossensohn, “Health as a Social Agent in Ottoman Patronage and Authority,” *New Perspectives on Turkey* 37 (2007): 147–75.
113. Mustafa Münif, *Yüz Sene Yaşamak İçin* (Istanbul: Adab Matbaası, 1331/1912–1913), 9–12, 38.
114. *Ibid.*, 27.
115. Ali Rıza, *Kızlara Mahsus Hıfzıssıhha*, vol. 2 (Istanbul: Karabet Matbaası, 1318/1900–1901), 29–39; Hüseyin Remzi, *Hıfzıssıhha al-Şübban* (Istanbul: Matbaa-ı Osmaniye, 1306/1888–1889), 79–80.
116. Besim Ömer, *Hıfzıssıhha* (n.p., 1330/1912–1913), 409–18.
117. Elizabeth B. Frierson, “Mirrors Out, Mirrors In: Domestication and Rejection of the Foreign in Late-Ottoman Women’s Magazines (1875–1908),” in *Women, Patronage, and Self-Representation in Islamic Societies*, ed. D. Fairchild Ruggles (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000), 194–99; Duben and Behar, *Istanbul Households*, 197–99; Suraiya Faroqhi, *Subjects of the Sultan: Culture and Daily Life in the Ottoman Empire* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1995), 256–57.
118. Frierson, “Mirrors Out, Mirrors In,” 194–97.
119. Ali Rıza, *Kızlara Mahsus İdare-i Beytiyye, 5. ve 6. kısım*, (Istanbul: Karabet Matbaası, 1315/1897–1898), 39; Edib, *İktisad Beyti*, 25; Fuad Ebülmuammer, *Vezaif-i Aile* (Istanbul: Keteon Bedrusyan Matbaası, 1328, 1910–1911), 99. On a similar discourse in contemporary Egypt, see Beth Baron, *The Women’s Awakening in Egypt: Culture, Society and the Press* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), 144–58.
120. Edib, *İktisad Beyti*, 24–25.
121. Duben and Behar, *Istanbul Households*, 231–32.
122. Ebülmuammer, *Vezaif-i Aile*, 21.
123. Senai’s “Çalışalım” is discussed in chapters 3 and 6.

124. Cemal al-Din, "Çalışalım," *Çocuk Bahçesi* 6 (27 Mart 1330/ 9 April 1914), 96; İsmail Hakki, "Çalışalım," *Çocuk Bahçesi* 13 (15 Mayıs 1330/ 28 May 1914), 197.
125. Frierson, "Mirrors Out," 190-92; Sharky, "Schooled Mothers," 141-43.
126. Edib, *İktisad Beyti*, 36-37.
127. Ibid., 45.
128. Ebülmuammer, *Vezaif-i Aile*, 99; Edib, *İktisad Beyti*, 36, 39, 41; Rıza, *Kızlara Mahsus İdare-i Beytiyye*, 36.
129. A very similar combination of religious, moral and utilitarian discourses characterized American works on home economics during the antebellum era. O'Malley, "Time, Work, and Task Orientation," 352-53.
130. Watenpugh, *Being Modern*, 91.

#### CHAPTER 5

1. BOA, DH.EUM.MTK 7/22, 21 L 1321 (23 September 1913).
2. While the Ottoman *jandarma* was responsible for law enforcement in the countryside and was under the Ministry of War, the bigger cities were under the jurisdiction of the police, subject to the Ministry of Police. Nadir Özbek, "Policing the Countryside: Gendarmes of the Late-Nineteenth Century Ottoman Empire (1876-1908)," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 40, no. 1 (2008): 47-67.
3. *Kabadays* were local strongmen who, by virtue of their physical strength and prowess, assumed responsibility for upholding order and public morality on the neighborhood level. Roger A. Deals, "Violent Crime in Hamidian Istanbul, 1876-1909" (PhD diss., University of Utah, 2006), 66-142.
4. Weber, *Damascus*; Murat Gül, *The Emergence of Modern Istanbul: Transformation and Modernisation of a City* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2009); Çelik, *Empire*; Çelik, *Remaking*; Hanssen, *Fin de Siècle Beirut*; esp. 84-112, 191-263; Thomas Kühn, "Ordering Urban Space in Ottoman Yemen, 1872-1914," in Hanssen, Philip, and Weber, *Empire in the City*, 329-48; Paul Dumont and François Georgeon, eds., *Villes ottomanes a la fin de l'empire* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1992).
5. Jens Hanssen, "Your Beirut Is on My Desk: Ottomanizing Beirut under Sultan Abdülhamid II (1876-1909)," in *Projecting Beirut: Episodes in the Construction and Reconstruction of a Modern City*, ed. Peter G. Rowe and Hashim Sarkis (Prestel: Munich, 1998), 41-67; Kühn, "Ordering Urban Space," 331; Çelik, *Empire*, 3-10.
6. Weber, *Damascus*; Hanssen. *Fin-de-siècle Beirut*.
7. Hanssen, "Your Beirut," 57-60; Çelik, *Empire*, 146-51.
8. Zafer Toprak, "Demiryolu, Devlet ve Modernite," in *Demiryol: Tren Çağı/Iron Track: Age of the Train*, ed. Şennur Şentürk, Zafer Toprak and Selahattin Özpallabıyıklar (Istanbul: Yapı Kredi, 2003), 12; Bernard Lewis, *What Went Wrong? Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002), 130.
9. Merritt R. Smith and Leo Marx, "Introduction," Merritt R. Smith, "Technological Determinism in American Culture," Michael L. Smith, "Recourse of Empire: Landscapes of Progress in Technological America," and Robert Heilbroner, "Do Machines

- Make History?” and “Technological Determinism Revisited,” in *Does Technology Drive History?*, ed. Merritt R. Smith and Leo Marx (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1994).
10. Thomas P. Hughes, “Technological Momentum,” in Smith and Marx, *Does Technology Drive History?*, 101–115; Thomas Misa et al., eds., *Modernity and Technology*. (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 2003).
  11. Timothy Mitchell, “Can the Mosquito Speak?,” in *Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2002), 19–53. See also On Barak, “Scraping the Surface: The Techno-Politics of Modern Streets in Turn-of-the-Twentieth-Century Alexandria,” *Mediterranean Historical Review* 24, no. 2 (2009): 187–205.
  12. Çelik, *Empire*, 24–59; Engin Vahdettin, *Rumeli Demiryolları* (Istanbul: Eren, 1993); Murat Özyüksel, *Anadolu Bağdat Demiryolları* (Istanbul: Arba Yayınları, 1988); Mustafa Kaçar, “Osmanlı Telgraf İşletmesi,” in *Çağmı yakalayan Osmanlı! Osmanlı Devleti’nde Modern Haberleşme ve Ulaştırma Teknikleri*, ed. Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu and Mustafa Kaçar (Istanbul: IRCICA, 1995), 45–49; Davison, “Advent of the Electric Telegraph,” 133–65; Eugene Rogan, “Instant Communication: The Impact of the Telegraph in Ottoman Syria,” in Philipp and Schaebler, *Syrian Land*, 113–28; Ercüment Kuran, “XIX. Yüzyılda Osmanlı Devleti’nde Deniz Ulaşımı: İdare-i Mahsusası’nın Kuruluşu ve Faaliyeti,” in İhsanoğlu ve Kaçar, *Çağmı Yakalayan Osmanlı*, 159–63; Çelik, *Remaking*, 82–103; Hanssen, *Fin de Siècle Beirut*, 99–104; Weber, *Damascus*, 106–8.
  13. Çelik, *Remaking*, 82–103; Sertaç R. Kayserioğlu, *Dersaadet’ten İstanbul’a Tramvay* (Istanbul: İETT Genel Müdürlüğü, 1998), 67–97. On earlier modes of transportation in Istanbul, see Kâzım Arısan, “Eski İstanbul’da Şehir İçi Ulaşım,” in İhsanoğlu and Kaçar, *Çağmı Yakalayan Osmanlı*, 1–10.
  14. The name Şirket-i Hayriye is sometimes translated as the Auspicious Company. This translation, however, fails to convey that, as the word *hayriye* clearly implies, the company was perceived at first as one more act of benevolence by the sultan (who held most of the shares in the company) to serve the needs of his subjects.
  15. Çelik, *Remaking*, 85.
  16. *Boğaziçi Şirket-i Hayriye: Tarihçe, Salname* (Istanbul: Ahmed İhsan ve Şürekası, 1330/1914), 22, 28; Kemal Karpert, *Ottoman Population, 1830–1914: Demographic and Social Characteristics* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985), 102–5. See also Eser Tutel, *Şirket-i Hayriye* (Istanbul: İletişim Yayıncılık, 1994); Ahmet Gülerüz ve Hande Yüce, *Şirket-i Hayriye’nin Boğaziçi Vapurları* (Istanbul: Denizler Kitabevi, 2002); Murat Koraltürk, *Şirket-i Hayriye, 1851–1945* (Istanbul: İDO Kültür Yayınları, 2007). On the earlier mode of seaborne traffic in Istanbul, see Salih Özbaran, “İstanbul’da kayıkçılık ve Kayık İşletmeciliği,” in *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Şehircilik ve Ulaşım üzerine Araştırmalar*, ed. Cengiz Orhonlu (Izmir: Ticaret Matbaacılık, 1984), 78–103.
  17. *Düstur*, 1st ed., vol. 4, 498–508. The 1888 *nizamname* analyzed here is a revised ver-

- sion of the second code of the company, dating from 1872. I could not find the first code. See *Boğaziçi Şirket-i Hayriye*, 12.
18. See Wishnitzer, “Transformation” (291–303), for a discussion of the temporal constructs that governed the work of the Ottoman telegraph system and the Hejaz railway.
  19. *Boğaziçi Şirket-i Hayriye*, 200, 205.
  20. *Ibid.*, 182, 196–97, 200–201, 204.
  21. *Ibid.*, 180, 182, 187–88.
  22. *Ibid.*, 24–25.
  23. Giddens, *Consequences of Modernity*, 19–20.
  24. James C. Scott, *Seeing like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998).
  25. *Boğaziçi Şirket-i Hayriye*, 187.
  26. Birol, “Managing,” 44–46.
  27. Edhem Eldem, “Istanbul: From Imperial to Peripheralized Capital,” in *The Ottoman City between East and West: Aleppo, Izmir, and Istanbul*, ed. Edhem Eldem, Daniel Goffman, and Bruce Masters (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 202.
  28. Özbaran, “İstanbul’da kayıkcılık,” 78–103.
  29. Cem Behar, *A Neighborhood in Ottoman Istanbul: Fruit Vendors and Civil Servants in the Kasap İlyas Mahalle* (Albany: SUNY Press, 2003), 1.
  30. Özbaran, “İstanbul’da kayıkcılık,” 100; *Boğaziçi Şirket-i Hayriye*, 1–2.
  31. *Boğaziçi Şirket-i Hayriye*, 5–6.
  32. BOA, A.MKT.NZD 29/79, 17 Ca 1267 (20 March 1851). These special ferries apparently operated for some time and then stopped. In 1855, the sultan ordered the reactivation of these “officials’ ferries.” BOA, İ.DH 20628, 8 Ş 1271 (27 April 1855), in Cevat Ekici, *Boğaziçinde Asırlık Seyahat Belgelerle Şirket-i Hayriye* (Istanbul: İdo Yayınları, 2007), 22.
  33. Çelik, *Remaking*, 85.
  34. For examples, see BOA, A.MKT.NZD 169/47, 22 S 1272 (8 November 1855); BOA, DH.MUİ 103-2/23, 28 Ş 1328 (28 August 1910); BOA, MV. 143/23, 22 Mayıs 1326 (5 June 1910); BOA, DH.İD 130/8, 2 Şubat 1330 (15 February 1915).
  35. Ünver, “Osmanlı Türkleri,” 253. The role played by the *muvakkithane* in the Yeni Cami in regulating the temporal order in the bureaus of the central administration is discussed in chapter 2, above.
  36. Birol, *Managing*, 44–46.
  37. Çelik, *Remaking*, 53–98.
  38. See chapter 2.
  39. Wishnitzer, “Transformation,” 128–29.
  40. BOA, DH.MUİ 27-1/30, 11 Teşrin-i Evvel 1325 (24 October 1909).
  41. For another example of the complexity of calibrating the schedules of different systems, see BOA, DH.İD, 130/8, 6 Kanun-ı Sani, 1326 (19 January 1911). See also the petition to the Ministry of Commerce and Public Works, bearing the same date. For

- another similar petition, see BOA, DH.İD, 130/8, 5 Teşrin-i Evvel, 1327 (18 October 1911).
42. BOA, DH.İD, 130/8, 26 Teşrin-i Evvel, 1325 (8 November 1909).
  43. Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform*, 296–98.
  44. See chapter 2.
  45. BOA, Y.MTV 188/71 1316 (1899), in Ekici, *Boğaziçinde Asırlık Seyahat*, 55.
  46. BOA, DH.İD, 130/8, 2 Teşrin-i Sani 1325 (15 November 1909).
  47. BOA, DH.İD 130/8, 3, Teşrin-i Sani 1325 (16 November 1909).
  48. See for example BOA, DH.İD, 130/8, 15 Teşrin-i Sani 1325 (28 November 1909).
  49. Hamioğlu, *Young Turks*, 202–5.
  50. See chapters 3 and 4.
  51. BOA, DH.İD, 130/8, 8 Teşrin-i Sani 1325 (21 November 1909).
  52. See for example BOA, DH.İD, 130/8, 28 Teşrin-i Evvel 1325 (10 November 1909); BOA, DH.İD, 130/8, 4 Teşrin-i Sani 1325 (17 November 1909); BOA, DH.İD, 130/8, 8 Teşrin-i Sani 1325 (21 November 1909); BOA, DH.İD, 130/8, 10 Teşrin-i Sani 1325 (23 November 1909).
  53. BOA, DH.İD, 130/8, 3 Teşrin-i Sani 1325 (16 November 1909). For another reference to the interests of ordinary people see BOA, DH.İD 130/8, 8 Teşrin-i Sani 1325 (21 November 1909).
  54. Murat Koraltürk, *Haliç'te Ulaşım ve Haliç Vapurları Şirketi, 1909–1941* (Istanbul: De-grade Ajans Reklamcılık ve Yayıncılık, 2005), 17.
  55. BOA, DH.İD, 130/8, 26 Kanun-ı Evvel 1325 (8 January 1910).
  56. BOA, DH.İD, 130/8, 17 Teşrin-i Sani 1325 (30 November 1909).
  57. For another example of government interference with the Imperial Company's schedules in order to ensure a sufficient number of ferries during rush hours, see DH.İD 197/23, 20 N 1332 (12 August 1914).
  58. Kern, *The Culture of Time and Space*, 109–31.
  59. Jules Verne, *Seksen Günde Devri Âlem*, trans. A. İ Tokgöz (Istanbul, 1306/1888).
  60. Palmira Brummett, “The Yeni and the Eski: Cultural Change and Envisioning the ‘Modern’ in Late Ottoman Cartoons,” in Çiçek, *Great Ottoman-Turkish Civilisation*, vol. 3, 134–40; Brummett, *Image and Imperialism in the Ottoman Revolutionary Press, 1908–1911* (Albany: SUNY Press, 2000), 289–308;
  61. Mehmet Rauf, *Eylül* (1901; repr., Istanbul: İnkılâp, 2003), 54–55; Halid Ziya Uşaklıgil, *Mai ve Siyah* (1897; repr., Istanbul: Özgür Yayınları, 2008), 153; Nabizade Nazım, *Zehra* (1896; repr., Istanbul: Özgür Yayınları, 2010), 82. See also Lory and Georgelin, “Les temps entrelacés,” 178–79.
  62. Edwards, “Infrastructures,” 190.
  63. Brummett, *Image and Imperialism*, 289–307.
  64. Garnett, *The Turkish People*, 23.
  65. A. J. B. Wavell, *A Modern Pilgrim in Mecca and a Siege in Sanaa* (London: Constable & Company Ltd., 1912), 55; Fred Burnaby, *On Horseback through Asia Minor* (London: S. Low, Marston, Searle, & Rivington, 1878), 14–15.
  66. Kern, *The Culture*, 15. On Barak argues that “Egyptian time,” supposedly substan-

- dard and inaccurate was in fact the result of the colonial encounter. Barak, *On Time*. This interpretation leaves open questions about the nature of indigenous temporality prior to colonization.
67. Wishnitzer, "Transformation," 120–22.
  68. For examples, see BOA, DH.İD 130/8, 8 Teşrin-i Sani 1325 (21 November 1909); BOA, DH.İD 130/8, 2 Teşrin-i Sani, 1325 (16.11.1909); BOA, DH.İD 130/8, 4 Teşrin-i Sani 1325 (17 November 1909); BOA, DH.İD 130/8, 15 Teşrin-i Sani 1325 (23 November 1909).
  69. BOA, DH.İD 130/8, 6 Kanun-ı Sani 1326 (19 November 1911). For another petition concerning departure times of ferries at the end of the workday, see BOA, DH.İD 130/8, 8 Teşrin-i Sani 1325 (21 November 1909).
  70. *Boğaziçi Şirket-i Hayriye*, 7.
  71. Brummett, *Image and Imperialism*, 302–3.
  72. Namık Kemal, *İntibah* (1876; repr., Istanbul: Özgür Yayınları, 2003), 42.
  73. Nazım, *Zehra*, 106–10.
  74. Craig Koslofsky, *Evening's Empire: A History of the Night in Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 158; Murray Melbin, *Night as Frontier: Colonizing the World After Dark* (New York: The Free Press, 1987).
  75. Christopher Dandeker, *Surveillance, Power and Modernity: Bureaucracy and Discipline from 1700 to the Present Day* (Cambridge: Polity, 1990), 58–60.
  76. According to the 1885 census, 55 percent of the inhabitants of Istanbul were born elsewhere. In Izmir there were around 150,000 inhabitants around the mid-nineteenth century, and 300,000 by the Great War. Beirut's population increased from around 10,000 in 1840 to around 120,000 in 1900. In Damascus, population rose from around 120,000 in 1850 to about 240,000 at by the end of Ottoman rule. Mersin, which consisted of a few huts in 1812, grew into a port town with some 9,000 people by 1891. Stanford J. Shaw "The Population of Istanbul in the Nineteenth Century," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 10 (1979), 270; Daniel Goffman, "Izmir: from Village to Colonial Port City," in Eldem, Goffman, and Masters, *Ottoman City*, 130; Bruce Masters, "Aleppo: the Ottoman Empire's Caravan City," in Eldem, Goffman, and Masters, *Ottoman City*, 72; Ralph Bodenstein, "Housing the Foreign: A European's Exotic Home in Late Nineteenth-Century Beirut," in Hansen, Philip, and Weber, *Empire in the City*, 106; Filiz Yenişehirlioğlu, "Mersin: The Formation of a Tanzimât City in Southern Turkey," in Hansen, Philip, and Weber, *Empire in the City*, 106, 256–57; Weber, *Damascus*, 94–95. The problem of migrants and vagrants was not new, but the methods of dealing with them were fundamentally different. See Başaran, "Remaking," esp. 62–71.
  77. Behar, *A Neighborhood*, esp. 121–30; Noémi Lévy, "Une institution en formation: la police ottomane à l'époque d'Abdülhamid II," *European Journal of Turkish Studies* 8 (2008), <http://ejts.revues.org/index2463.html>, par. 58.
  78. On the free trade treaties, see Şevket Pamuk, *The Ottoman Empire and European Capitalism, 1820–1913: Trade, Investment and Production* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010), 18–21; Kasaba, *Ottoman Empire*, 54–56.

79. The better-off foreign residents in fact lived predominantly in Pera, up the hill from the humbler neighborhoods around the port. Despite the European image of the district, these poor neighborhoods were in fact populated by an extremely heterogeneous population of which Muslims were nevertheless the majority. Eldem, "Istanbul," 151–52, 204.
80. Steven T. Rosenthal, *The Politics of Dependency: Urban Reform in Istanbul* (Westport Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1980), 15, 107–12. On 19th-century Galata, see Ebru Boyar and Kate Fleet, *A Social History of Ottoman Istanbul* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), esp. 321–27.
81. Rosenthal, *Politics*, 113–15. See also François Georgeon, "Ottoman and Drinkers: The Consumption of Alcohol in Istanbul in the Nineteenth Century," in *Outside In: On the Margins of the Middle East*, ed. Eugene Rogan (London: I. B. Tauris, 2002), 7–30; Sennur Sezer and Adnan Özyalçiner, *Bir Zamanların İstanbulu: Eski İstanbul Yaşayışı ve Folkloru* (Istanbul: İnkılâp, 2005), 300–5; Ali Rıza, *Bir Zamanlar İstanbul* (Istanbul: Tercüman, 1973), 287–97; İlber Ortaylı, *İstanbul'dan Sayfalar*, 2nd ed. (Istanbul: İletişim, 1999), 199–202.
82. Rosenthal, *Politics*, 3–7, 107–15.
83. Lévy, "Une institution," esp. par. 8–15, 33; Omri Paz, "Crime, Criminals, and the Ottoman State: Western Anatolia between the Late 1830s and Late 1860s" (PhD diss., Tel Aviv University, 2010), esp. 189–224.
84. BOA, İ.MSM 5/77, 1 Za 1261 (1 November 1845).
85. Ibid.
86. Rubin, *Ottoman Nizamiye Courts*, esp. 83–112.
87. George Young, *Corps de droit ottoman: recueil des codes, lois, règlements, ordonnances et actes les plus importants du droit intérieur, et d'études sur le droit coutumier de l'empire ottoman*, vol. 7 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1905), 291.
88. Rosenthal, *Politics*, esp. 101–40.
89. See for example, BOA, A.MKT 5/48, 25 Ş 1264 (26 July 1848); BOA, A.MKT 186/63, 6 Ca 1265 (31 March 1849). For a discussion of British protection of criminals of Maltese and Ionian background, see Rosenthal, *Politics*, 107–13.
90. Rosenthal, *Politics*, 15, 107–12; Gül, *Emergence*, 42. Bars in certain areas of Beirut were still shut down at sunset around the turn of the nineteenth century. See Hansen, *Fin-de-siècle Beirut*, 208.
91. BOA, DH.MKT 1615/120, 12 Ş 1306 (13 April 1889).
92. BOA, DH.MKT 1341/77, 12 Za 1300 (14 September 1883); BOA, ZB. 13/113, 25 Eylül 1299 (7 November 1883); BOA, DH.MKT 1615/120, 12 Ş 1306 (13 April 1889). The correspondence gives estimated numbers of authorized and unauthorized liquor vendors of various kinds (e.g. *limoncu*, *meykede*, *meyhane*, *gazino*), according to their geographic location.
93. Deals, *Violent Crime*, 79, 107–8, 110–19. Deals cites cases demonstrating the heterogeneity of the patrons of drinking establishments, but he makes clear that the majority were of humble economic standing.
94. On the state's gaze and public lighting, see Wishnitzer, "Transformation," 67–80;

- Scott, *Seeing Like a State*; Joachim Schlor, *Nights in the Big City: Paris, Berlin, London, 1840–1930* (London, Reaktion, 1998), 58; Wolfgang Schivelbusch, *Disenchanted Night: The Industrialization of Light in the Nineteenth Century*, trans. Angela Davies (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 81–97; Michel Foucault “The Eye of Power,” in *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972–1977*, trans. Colin Gordon, Leo Marshal, John Mepham and Kate Sober (New York: Pantheon, 1980), 153–54; Chris Otter, *The Victorian Eye: A Political History of Light and Vision in Britain, 1800–1910* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008), 3–5.
95. Özdemir, *Ottoman Clocks*, 161–64; Gürbüz, “Saat Kulelerinin Varlığı,” 144.
96. BOA, Y.MTV 206/127, 24 Ca 1318 (19 September 1900); BOA, I.DH 3/1318-S-1, 7 S 1318 (5 June 1900); Sabrı Yetkin, *Kentsel bir Sembolün Doğuşu—İzmir Saat Kulesi* (İzmir: İzmir Büyükşehir Belediyesi, 2001), 13.
97. Kreizer, “Ottoman Clock Towers,” 546. The translation is mine.
98. ‘Ārif al-‘Ārif, *Al-Mufaṣṣal fi tarih al-Quds* (Jerusalem: Maṭba‘at al-Ma‘ārif, 1961), 465; Ya‘akov Yehoshu‘a, *Yerushalayim Tmol Shilshom* (Jerusalem: Reuven Mas, 1977), 24–25.

## CHAPTER 6

1. Derek Howse, *Greenwich Time and the Discovery of the Longitude* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), 148.
2. “Günün Yirmi Dört Saatine Taksimine Dair (1925)” *Düstur*, 3rd ed., vol. 7, 317–8.
3. İhsanoğlu and Günergün, “Osmanlı Türkiyesinde,” 434–41; Gündüz, “Alaturka Saaten,” 120–26. From a very different perspective, both Uğur Tanyeli and Palmira Brummett have discussed cultural and political aspects of the Ottoman hour system without focusing on the transition process per se. See Tanyeli, “Emergence,” 159–67; Brummett, *Image and Imperialism*, 312–13.
4. On the use of seasonal hours in the Ottoman Empire, see chapter 1.
5. Howse, *Greenwich Time*, 37–38, 82; Dohrn-van Rossum, *History of the Hour*, 346–47.
6. Howse, *Greenwich Time*, 82.
7. *Ibid.*, 138–51. On the global time system see also Ian Bartky, *One Time Fits All: The Campaigns for Global Uniformity* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007); Alexis McCrossen, *Marking Modern Times: A History of Clocks, Watches, and Other Time-keepers in American Life* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013), 89–113; Eviatar Zerubavel, “The Standardization of Time: A Sociohistorical Perspective,” *American Journal of Sociology* 88, no. 1 (1982): 4–8; Vanessa Ogle, “Whose Time Is It? The Pluralization of Time and the Global Condition, 1870s–1940s,” *American Historical Review* 118, no. 5 (2013): 1376–402.
8. It should be noted that in comparison with the other countries mentioned here, railway development in the Ottoman Empire remained limited. To give a general idea, in 1884 there were more than 125,000 miles of track in the United States and 12,000 in India. In the Ottoman Empire, total mileage did not reach 4,000 until the early twentieth century. Rudolph Daniels, *Trains across the Continent: North American Railroad History* (Indiana University Press, 2000), 228; Romesh C. Dutt, *The Eco-*

- onomic History of India in the Victorian Age* (London: Taylor & Francis, 1950), 548; Quataert, *Ottoman Empire*, 123.
9. R. Cervati and N. C. Sargologo, *L'Indicateur Constantinopolitain: Guide Commercial* (Istanbul: Imprimerie G. B., 1868), 120–25; İhsanoğlu and Günergun, “Osmanlı Türkiyesinde,” 436–37.
  10. For examples, see BOA, Y.PRK.MF 3/60, 29 Z 1313 (11 June 1896); BOA, Y.MTV 157/106, 8 Mayıs 1313 (20 May 1897); BOA, Y.PRK.TKM 47/16, 7 C 1321 (21 August 1903).
  11. See, for example, John Murray, *Handbook for Travelers in Constantinople, Brusa and the Troad* (London: John Murray, 1907), 9–10; Demetrius Coufopoulos, *A Guide to Constantinople* (London: Adam and Charles Black, 1910), 31. The use of multiple time systems was not unique to the Ottomans. Throughout the non-European world multiple times continued to exist long into the twentieth century. Ogle, “Whose Time is It?”
  12. For examples see A. F. Townshend, *A Military Consul in Turkey: The Experiences and Impressions of a British Representative in Asia Minor* (London: Seeley, 1910), 139–40; Mary Mills Patrick, *Under Five Sultans* (London: William & Norgate, 1930), 170–71; Patrick, *A Bosphorus Adventure: Istanbul (Constantinople) Woman's College, 1871–1924* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1934), 7–8; William E. Curtis, *The Turk and his Lost Provinces: Greece, Bulgaria, Servia, Bosnia* (Chicago F. H. Revell Company, 1903), 53.
  13. İhsanoğlu and Günergun, “Osmanlı Türkiyesinde,” 437.
  14. See for example BOA, İ.DH 940/74403, 3 Ra 1302 (21 December 1884); BOA, Y.PRK. PT 8/11, 1 C 1310 (21 October 1892).
  15. Özdemir, *Ottoman Clocks*, 148.
  16. Mardin, *Genesis*, 350–52, 405–6; Orhan M. Okay, *Batı Medeniyeti Karşısında Ahmed Midhat Efendi* (Ankara: Milli Eğitim, Gençlik, ve Spor Bakanlığı, 1989), 7–31. Ussama Makdisi and Maurus Reinkowski, whose works represent an exception to this rule, are noted below.
  17. Fabian, *Time and the Other*. See also Koselleck, *Futures Past*, esp. 222–55; Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, esp. 23–36.
  18. Cemil Aydın, *The Politics of Anti-Westernism in Asia: Visions of World Order in Pan-Islamic and Pan-Asian Thought* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), esp. 18–24.
  19. Namık Kemal, “Progress,” *İbret*, 45 (November 1872), translated in in *The Modern Middle East: A Sourcebook for History*, ed. Cemron Michael Amin, Benjamin C. Fortna, and Elizabeth Brown Frierson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 407–10. See also Nazan Çiçek, *The Young Ottomans: Turkish Critics of the Eastern Question in the Late Nineteenth Century* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2010), 173–76.
  20. See chapter 1.
  21. Maurus Reinkowski notes a parallel change in the use of terms in contemporary bureaucratic correspondence. Reinkowski, “The State’s Security and the Subject’s Prosperity: Notions of Order in Ottoman Bureaucratic Correspondence (19th Cen-

- turey),” in *Legitimizing the Order: The Ottoman Rhetoric of State Power*, ed. Hakan T. Karateke and Maurus Reinkowski (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 206. See also Sigalas, *Des histoires des sultans*,” 99–127.
22. Regarding the discourse of the Hamidian era, see Renee Worringer, “The ‘Sick Man of Europe’ or ‘Japan of the Near East’?: Constructing Ottoman Modernity in the Hamidian and Young Turk Eras,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 36, no. 2 (2004): 210.
  23. Writing about the frequent use of the term *alafranga*, Ahmed Midhat wonders if “there is a single mouth left unvisited by this word over the last thirty or forty years?” See Ahmet Mithat, *Avrupa Âdâb-ı Muâşeretî Yahut Alafranga* (1894; repr., Ankara: Akçağ, 2001), 59. On the diffusion patterns of European products and manners in the nineteenth and eighteenth centuries, see Duben and Behar, *Istanbul Households*, 202–14; Göçek, *East Encounters West*.
  24. Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar, 19. *Asır*, esp. 106–10, 155–200; Carter V. Findley “An Ottoman Occidental in Europe: Ahmed Midhat Meets Madame Gülnar, 1889,” *American Historical Review* 103, no. 1 (1998): 25–26; Findley, *Ottoman Civil Officialdom*, 35–39.
  25. Jale Parla, *Babalar ve Oğullar*, 31; Fortna, *Imperial Classroom*, 13–14. While the two scholars share this view, Parla’s understating of the Tanzimat emphasizes continuity more than change, and argues that for Tanzimat intellectuals, hegemony of the Islamic was never a question.
  26. These patterns of integration are to be found in almost every aspect of life in the late Ottoman Empire. See Mardin, “Power”; Mardin, *Genesis*. See also Aydın, *Politics*, 18–24; Rubin, *Ottoman Nizamiye Courts*, esp. 55–81; Iris Agmon “Recording Procedures and Legal Culture in the Late Ottoman Shari’a Court of Jaffa, 1865–1890,” *Islamic Law and Society* 11, no. 3 (2004); Fortna, *Imperial Classroom*, esp. 87–129, 176; Findley, *Ottoman Civil Officialdom*, 213–15; Donald Quataert, “Clothing Laws, State, and Society in the Ottoman Empire, 1720–1829,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 29, no. 3 (1997), 420–21; Brummet, *Image and Imperialism*, 225.
  27. Selçuk Esenbel, “The Anguish of Civilized Behavior: The Use of Western Cultural Forms in the Everyday Lives of the Meiji Japanese and the Ottoman Turks during the Nineteenth Century,” *Japan Review* 5 (1994): 154–56.
  28. See for example Goodwin, *Lords of the Horizons*, 151.
  29. For a critique of the “Muslim conservatism” approach to borrowing military technologies, see Ágoston, “Disjointed Historiography,” 572–76; Virginia Aksan, “Breaking the Spell.” See also Göçek, *Rise of the Bourgeoisie*, esp. 37–42.
  30. Duben and Behar, *Istanbul Households*, 203; Göçek, *Rise of the Bourgeoisie*, 42.
  31. Deringil, *Well-Protected Domains*; Fortna, *Imperial Classroom*. On the intensive discussion of European hegemony in the post-1908 satirical press, see Brummett, *Image and Imperialism*, esp. 149–220.
  32. İsmail Doğan, introduction to Mithat, *Avrupa Âdâb-ı Muâşeretî*, 34.
  33. Şerif Mardin, “Super Westernization in Urban Life in the Ottoman Empire in the Last Quarter of the Nineteenth Century,” in *Turkey: Geographic and Social Perspec-*

- tives*, ed. Peter Benedict, Erol Tümertekin and Fatma Mansur (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1974), 403–46.
34. Mardin, *Genesis*, 326–32, 369–72; J. G. Rahme, “Namık Kemal’s Constitutional Ottomanism and non-Muslims,” *Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations* 10, no. 1 (1999): 23–39; Deringil, *Well-Protected Domains*, esp. 93–111; Hasan Kayalı, *Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism, and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire, 1908–1918* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 18–51.
  35. Orhan Okay, *Batı Medeniyeti*, 9.
  36. *Ibid.*, 6–10. Carter Findley argues that although Midhat explicitly advocated the distinction between the material and the moral, his work in fact transcended this binary. Findley, “Ottoman Occidentalism,” 23–24, 42–28. See also Evin, *Origins and Development*, 81–113.
  37. Quoted in Findley, “Ottoman Occidentalism,” 18.
  38. In her work on early Ottoman novels, Jale Parla also argues against overemphasizing the polarization of late-Ottoman society, but at the same time rejects the idea that the reforms can be conceived in terms of synthesis. Parla, *Babalar ve Oğullar*, 11–12. See also Okay, *Batı Medeniyeti*, 407. On negotiating the boundaries between the foreign and the “authentic,” see Frierson, “Mirrors Out, Mirrors In,” 177–84; Brummett, *Image and Imperialism*, 14, 189–258; Carel Bertram, *Imagining the Turkish House: Collective Visions of Home* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2008), esp. 126–34. For comparable trends in Egypt, see Ryzova, *Age of Efenddiya*.
  39. It should be remembered that the intellectuals of the Hamidian era were engaged in polemics not only with one another, but with Western scholars as well. See Parla, *Babalar ve Oğullar*, 35–41.
  40. For an example, see Paul Dumont, “Said Bey: The Everyday Life of an Istanbul Townsman at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century,” in *Osmanistische Studien zur Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte: In Memoriam Vančo Boškov*, ed. Hans Georg Majer (Wiesbaden: O. Harrassowitz, 1986), 1–7.
  41. Similar sets of dichotomous terms (new/old, traditional/modern, West/East) were being used in discussions about the path to civilization by Greek national writers in the Ottoman Empire. See Haris Exertzoglou, “Metaphors of Change: ‘Tradition’ and the East/West Discourse in the Late Ottoman Empire,” in *Ways to Modernity in Greece and Turkey*, ed. Anna Frangoudaki and Çağlar Keyder (London: I.B. Tauris, 2007), 43–59.
  42. Esenbel, “The Anguish,” 179.
  43. See for example Osman Hamdi Bey’s views on Ottoman progress as discussed in Makdisi, “Rethinking Ottoman Imperialism,” esp. 43–44.
  44. Erzurumlu İbrâhim Hakki, *Tıpkı Basım ve Yeni Harflerle Erzurumlu İbrahim Hakkı Divanı* (Istanbul: Sahhaflar Kitap Sarayı, 2008), 320–21. *Evkat* may also refer more specifically to the times of prayer. The poem clearly alludes to Rumi’s famous verses. See William C. Chittick, *The Sufi Path of Love: The Spiritual Teachings of Rumi* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1983), 156–57.
  45. Mardin, *Genesis*, 260.

46. Jan De Vries, "The Industrial Revolution and the Industrious Revolutions," *Journal of Economic History* 54, no. 2 (1994): 249-70.
47. Benjamin Franklin, *The Way to Wealth* (1758; repr., New York: Leavitt, Trow, 1848), esp. 2. Will Smiles's *Self Help* (1859) seems to have been equally influential, at least in the Arab provinces. See Ogle, "Whose Time Is It?," 1396-7.
48. Benjamin Franklin, "Tarik-i maaş, vaktin kıymeti ve tenbelliğin pahalılığı," trans. Ebüziyya Tevfik, pts. 1 and 2, *Mecmua-ı Ebüziyya* 8 (1 Muharrem 1298/3 December 1880): 241-46; 9 (15 Muharrem 1298/17 December 1880): 260-67.
49. Kemal, "Sai," *Mecmua-ı Ebüziyya* 9 (15 Muharrem 1298/17 December 1880): 268-69.
50. Okay, *Batı Medeniyeti*, 109-16; Evin, *Origins and Development*, 83-85, 89; Deniz T. Kılınçoğlu, "Protestan Ahlak, Gösterişli Tüketim ve 19. Yüzyıl Osmanlı İktisat Düşüncesi: Ahmet Mithat," in *Kapitalizm ve Türkiye I*, ed. Fuat Ercan and Yüksel Akkaya (Ankara: Dipnotlar Yayınları, 2005), 183-208.
51. The Felatun type in fact had its antecedents in *Meddah* and *Karagöz* stories and in *Orta Oyunu* performances. See Robert P. Finn, *The Early Turkish Novel, 1872-1900* (Istanbul: Isis Press, 1984), 66-67. Midhat used similar pairs of antagonistic characters when writing for children as well. See Fortna, *Learning to Read*, 83-84. On the ideological baggage of the novel, see also Aydın, *Politics*, 41-42.
52. Ahmet Midhat, *Felâton Bey ile Râkım Efendi* (1875; repr., Ankara: Akçağ, 1998), 5.
53. Mardin, *Genesis*, 121-26.
54. Ahmed Cevdet clearly expresses this view in his *Ma'rûzât* (Istanbul: Çağrı Yayınları, 1980), II, 6-11. See also Çiçek, *Young Ottomans*, 176-78; Finn, *Early Turkish Novel*, 69-70.
55. Kemal, "Sai," 269.
56. Mehmet Kaplan, "Felâton Bey'le Rakım Efendi," in *Türk Edebiyatı Üzerinde Araştırmalar*, vol. 2 (Istanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 1987), 101.
57. Finn, *Early Turkish Novel*, 20.
58. Mithat, *Felâton Bey*, 14-15, 47, 60-61.
59. Kaplan, "Felâton Bey'le," 94-95. Ahmed Midhat, like his protagonist Rakım Efendi, was extremely time-minded, as is evident in his European travel log, *Avrupa'da Bir Cevelan* (Istanbul: Tercüman-ı Hakikat, 1890).
60. Evin, *Origins and Development*, 89.
61. Quoted in Okay, *Batı Medeniyeti*, 110.
62. See for example Senai, "Çalışalım," 8-9; Rıza, *Kızlara Mahsus Malumat-ı Nafia*, 133-34. A similar discourse was evident in contemporary Arab publications. See Ogle, "Whose Time Is It?," 1394-400.
63. Loyal to his pragmatic concept of selective borrowing, Midhat later acknowledged the benefits of mean time. See Okay, *Batı Medeniyeti*, 110.
64. Elsewhere, Midhat explicitly criticizes Ottoman society for blindly imitating the "unnatural and undesired" aspects of European culture and neglecting its reasonable and commendable aspects. See Mithat, *Avrupa Âdâb-ı Muaşeretî*, 59.
65. Mithat, *Felatun Bey*, 119-29.
66. Ibid. Carel Bertram notes that while Rakım Efendi represents the introverted,

- morally superior nature of the Islamic civilization, Felatun Bey represents the extravagance of the West. See Bertram, *Imagining*, 131–32.
67. Rezaizade Mahmut Ekrem, *Araba Sevdası* (Istanbul: Alem Matbaası, 1314/1896).
  68. Ekrem, *Araba Sevdası*, 7. The opening of *Araba Sevdası* clearly alludes to Namık Kemal's *İntibah* (1876), which expresses a similar contempt toward the extravagance of the outing culture that developed in contemporary parks, particularly Çamlıca. But whereas Kemal's Ali Bey consults his watch while waiting for a real beloved, Bihruz Bey is merely putting on an act. See Kemal, *İntibah*, esp. 35–38, 80.
  69. Murad, *Turfanda Mı, Turfa Mı*, 101, 105.
  70. Özgür Türsay, "Le temps des almanachs Ottomans: usage des calendriers et temps de l'histoire (1873–1914)," in Georgeon and Hitzel, *Les Ottomans*, 129–57; Ceyda Karamursel, "Pocket Monuments of Historical Consciousness: Calendars and Almanacs in the Ottoman Empire and Turkish Republic," paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Middle East Studies Association, February 2011.
  71. See chapter 1.
  72. Türsay, "Le temps," 134 n13,138; Karamursel, "Pocket Monuments," 6.
  73. Türsay, "Les Temps," 146–55; Karamursel, "Pocket Monuments," 1–8.
  74. Türsay, "Les Temps," 144.
  75. Karamursel, "Pocket Monuments," 2–3, 11–12.
  76. Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 22–36.
  77. Ekrem, *Araba Sevdası*, 83–91. For an excellent discussion of the intensive interaction between the seemingly separate spheres of technology and letters in contemporary Egypt, see Barak, *On Time*, 131–41.
  78. Evin, *Origins and Development*, 28.
  79. Fortna, *Learning to Read*, 107, 154–74.
  80. Tanpınar, *19. Asır*, 191–92; Mardin, *Genesis*, 226–28, 256–68; Evin, *Origins and Development*, 48–49.
  81. The leaders of the Young Ottoman movement studied poetry with some of the leading figures of the *divan* tradition of their time, and were directly influenced by them. See Mardin, *Genesis*, 204.
  82. This didactic trend was to continue until the late 1880s, according to Evin, in *Origins and Development*, 175.
  83. Mehmet Kaplan, "Yeni Aydın Tipi," 167–76; Tanpınar, *19. Asır*, 192–98, 478–80; Mardin, *Genesis*, 253, 267; Evin, *Origins and Development*, 68–72. Ahmed Midhat's deep appreciation of *divan* poetry is clearly evident in the characters of Rakım Efendi and Felatun Bey. Whereas the idealized Ottoman gentleman, Rakım Efendi, is well versed in poetry and infects his young English students with his love for it, Felatun Bey shames himself by not being able to translate a simple couplet. See Mithat, *Felatun Bey*, esp. 61–62, 78–82, 141–44.
  84. Parla, *Babalar ve Oğullar*, 46–47.
  85. Evin, *Origins and Development*, 129–30; On the role of poetry in scripting time-related notions and behaviors, see chapter 1.
  86. Fortna, *Learning to Read*, 50, 186.

87. Comparable trends have been demonstrated elsewhere around the world. See Fel-sky, *Gender of Modernity*, 145–73; Tanaka, *New Times*; Banerjee, *Politics of Time*; Barak, *On Time*; Cooper, “Colonizing Time,” esp. 237–40; Perkins, *Reform of Time*.
88. Watenpaugh, *Being Modern*, 8.
89. *Ibid.*, 68, 74, 77, 86–87. See also Hanssen, *Fin-de-Siècle Beirut*, 13.
90. Senai, “Çalışalım,” 8–9; Nezir-Akmeşe, *Birth*, 13.
91. Senai, “Çalışalım,” 7. Ottoman interest in Japan began before the 1905 war. See Frier-son, *Mirrors Out*, 187–90; Worringer, “The Sick Man,” 207–30; Nezir-Akmeşe, *Birth*, 72–80.
92. Sürur Cemal, “Nesil-i Cedid,” *Yevmi Servet-i Fünun*, 15 (28 Temmuz 1324/10 August 1908), 4. See also Touraj Atabaki and Erik J. Zürcher, introduction to *Men of Order: Authoritarian Modernization under Atatürk and Reza Shah*, (London: I. B. Tauris, 2004), 3–4; Worringer, “Sick Man of Europe,” 215–17.
93. Ussama Makdisi, “Ottoman Orientalism,” *American Historical Review* 107, no. 3 (2002): 771.
94. On difference as a facet of Ottoman policy, see Barkey, *Empire of Difference*. On the new approaches toward the provinces and peripheral populations, see Derin-gil, “‘They Live in a Stage of Nomadism and Savagery’: The Late Ottoman Empire and the Post-Colonial Debate,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 45, no. 2 (2003): 311–42. See also Christoph Herzog, “Nineteenth-Century Baghdad through Ottoman Eyes,” in Hanssen, Philip, and Weber, *Empire in the City*, esp. 324–28; Kasaba, *Moveable Empire*.
95. On Barak, in *On Time*, has demonstrated a parallel discourse in contemporary Egypt.
96. Quoted in Herzog, “Nineteenth-Century Baghdad,” 320.
97. See also Tevfik, “*Terakki-i Akvamın Alameti*,” *Mülkiye* 1 (1 Şubat 1324/1909), 14–16; Avan-Zade, *Alman Askeri*, 19–22; Ebülmuammer, *Vezaif-i Aile*, 21.
98. İhsanoğlu and Günergün, “Osmanlı Türkiyesinde,” 438.
99. BOA, MV 124/66, 20 M 1327 (10 February 1909). See also François Georgeon, “Temps de la réforme, réforme du temps : Les avatars de l’heure et du calendrier à la fin de l’Empire Ottoman,” in Georgeon and Hitzel, *Les Ottomans*, 262. Ottoman cal-endars are discussed in chapter 1, below.
100. Hamid, “Şemsi Tarih,” 25.
101. *Ibid.*, 26–27.
102. Atay, “Eski Saat,” 18, 20.
103. *Ibid.*, 19.
104. BOA, MV 124/66, 20 M 1327 (10 February 1909).
105. Hamid, “Şemsi Tarih,” 28–29.
106. Hüseyin Cahid, “Saat Kavgası,” *Tanin* 280 (31 Mayıs 1325/13 June 1909), 1. Both the suggestion and the response seem like a replay of the discussion in the first Ottoman Parliament, with which I began this book. For comparable discussions in contempo-rary Bombay, see Ogle, “Whose Time is It?,” esp. 1383–90.
107. Rifat Uçarol, *Gazi Ahmet Muhtar Paşa: Bir Osmanlı Paşası ve Dönemi* (Istanbul: Milli-yet Yayınları, 1976), 18, 21. Uçarol argues that the education Muhtar received under

- strict military discipline had a profound influence on his later life. Muhtar was further influenced by his trip to Europe as a companion of the sultan. Time organization in the Ottoman army, including the use of mean time, is discussed in chapter 3, above.
108. Muhtar, *Sene-i Maliye-i Hicri*. The report was in fact based on a treatise Muhtar published in Cairo in 1889 under the title *İslah üttakvim*. Muhtar's interest in clocks began early on; as an instructor in the War Academy he published a treatise on sundials. See Uçarol, *Gazi Ahmet Muhtar Paşa*, 19, 309 n95.
  109. Muhtar, *Sene-i Maliye*, 3-4.
  110. *Muvakkithanes* were time-setter lodges usually located within the compounds of the larger mosques. See chapter 1.
  111. *Meclis-i A'yanın Zabıt Ceridesi*, vol. 2, session 40 (n.d.), 115; session 44 (4 Mart 1326/17 March 1910), 148-51; session 45 (9 Mart 1326/22 March 1910), 152-54; session 46 (16 Mart 1326/29 March 1910), 155-59.
  112. Rıza Nur, *Hayat ve Hatıratım*, vol. 1 (Istanbul: Altındağ, 1967), 281. See also Samim, "Vaktimizi Bilelim," 4.
  113. *Meclis-i A'yanın Zabıt Ceridesi*, vol. 2, session 40, 115.
  114. *Ibid.*, 149, 158.
  115. Mahmud K. İnal, *Osmanlı Devrinde Son Sadriazamlar*, 4th ed., part 14 (Istanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1957), 2105-17.
  116. *Meclis-i A'yanın Zabıt Ceridesi*, 149-50.
  117. *Ibid.*, 150-51, 157.
  118. *Ibid.*, 157.
  119. Ahmad, *Young Turks*, 40.
  120. Samim, "Vaktimizi Bilelim," 1-5.
  121. *Meclis-i A'yanın Zabıt Ceridesi*, 158-59.
  122. Palmira Brummett has shown that this confusion was sometimes an object of satire in the contemporary press. Brummett, *Image and Imperialism*, 312-13.
  123. See for example BOA, MB.HPS.M 4/9, 29 Nisan 1328 (12 May 1912).
  124. İhsanoğlu and Günergun, "Osmanlı Türkiyesinde," 437.
  125. BOA, MB.HPS.M 4/9, 29 Nisan 1328 (12 May 1912); BOA, DH.MB.HPS.M 2/5, 12 Mayıs 1328 (25 May 1912); BOA, DH.MB.HPS.M 2/5, 22 Mayıs 1328 (2 June 1912); BOA, DH.MB.HPS.M 7/28, 7 Teşrin-i Evvel 1328 (20 October 1912).
  126. Howse, *Greenwich Time*, 164-66.
  127. BOA, MV 178/37, 11 Haziran 1329 (24 June 1913). See also İhsanoğlu and Günergun, "Osmanlı Türkiyesinde," 438.
  128. On the first time-balls in nineteenth-century England, see Howse, *Greenwich Time*, 79-80, 96-99.
  129. İhsanoğlu and Günergun, "Osmanlı Türkiyesinde," 438-39; Gündüz, "Galata Kulesi'ndeki," 1-4.
  130. BOA, MV 204/86, 30 Teşrin-i Sani 1332 (13 December 1916).
  131. See for example BOA, DH.MB.HPS.M 17/39, 5 Teşrin-i Sani 1330 (16 November 1914); BOA, DH.EUM.MTK 60/26, 30 Teşrin-i Sani 1330 (13 December 1914); BOA,

- DH.EUM.MTK 76/49, 20 Nisan 1330 (3 May 1914); BOA, DH.EUM.MTK 80/30, 19 Nisan 1331 (2 May 1915).
132. Uluengin, "Secularizing Anatolia," 30.
  133. The inner coherence of early modern temporal culture and the role of the *alaturka* hour within it are discussed in chapter 1.
  134. See "Saatlerimiz İŖe Yaramayacak Diye Gam Yemeyiniz," *Cumhuriyet*, 31 Kanun-ı Evvel 1341 (31 December 1925), 1; "Al-sā'fa al-'arabiyya w-al-ifranjıyya," *Al-Muqtataf* 32 (December 1907), 1032-33; "Al-sā'āt al-maḍbūta"; "Al-sā'āt al-'arabiyya w-al-ifranjıyya," *Al-Muqtataf*, 52 (February 1918), 137.
  135. Cahid, "Saat Kavgası," 1.
  136. Brummett, *Image and Imperialism*, 308-14. For a comparable discourse in contemporary Bombay, see Ogle, "Whose Time is It?," 1383-90.
  137. Uluengin, "Secularizing Anatolia," 31-32.
  138. In contrast to widely held notions, quite a few clock towers were constructed in the Ottoman Empire before the mid-nineteenth century. See Mikov, "Cultural and Historical Profile," 106-7, 110-12, 124; Kreiser, "Ottoman Clock Towers," 552-55.
  139. Deringil, "They Live in a Stage," 320.
  140. For examples of double-faced public clocks placed for practical reasons, see BOA, LDH 940/74403, 3 Ra 1302 (21 December 1884); BOA, DH.MKT 1405/50, 22 C 1304 (17 March 1887); BOA, DH.MKT 1408/109, 6 R 1304 (31 March 1887); BOA, Y.PRK. PT 8/11, 1 C 1310 (21 October 1892); BOA, DH.MKT 1376/59, 9 S 1304 (3 May 1887).
  141. BOA, Y.MTV 49/84, 1 N 1308 (10 April 1891).
  142. François Georgeon, "Changes of Time: An Aspect of Ottoman Modernization," *New Perspectives on Turkey* 44 (2011): 183-84.
  143. Atilla Bir, Ŗinasi Acar, and Mustafa Kaçar, "The Clockmaker Family Meyer and Their Watch Keeping the *Alla Turca* Time," in *Science between Europe and Asia: Historical Studies on the Transmission, Adoption, and Adaptation of Knowledge*, ed. Feza Günergun and Dhruv Raina (Dordrecht: Springer, 2010), 124-36.
  144. BOA, Y.MTV 167/200, 8 Eylül 1313 (20 September 1897). See also Hanssen, *Fin de Siècle Beirut*, 243-47.
  145. BOA, Y.PRK.UM 80/69 15 TeŖrin-i Evvel 1323 (28 October 1907). See also Çelik, *Empire*, 146-51.
  146. BOA, Y.PRK.UM 80/69 15 TeŖrin-i Evvel 1323 (28 October 1907).
  147. BOA, DH.İD 30/123 7 Ca 1328 (16 May 1910).

## CONCLUSION

1. Revisionist research on the eighteenth century goes back to Roger Owen's "The Middle East in the Eighteenth Century—An 'Islamic' Society in Decline? A Critique of Gibb and Bowen's *Islamic Society and the West*," *Review of Middle East Studies* 1 (1975): 101-12. See also Ariel Salzman, "An Ancien Regime Revisited: 'Privatization' and Political Economy in the Eighteenth-Century Ottoman Empire," *Politics and Society* 21 (1993): 393-423; Khoury, *State and Provincial Society*; Edhem Eldem, "Urban Voices from Beyond: Identity, Status, and Social Strategies in Ottoman Mus-

- lim Funerary Epitaphs of Istanbul (1700–1850),” in Aksan and Goffman, *Early Modern Ottomans*, 231–32; Hamadeh, *The City’s Pleasures*; Silay, *Nedim and the Poetics*; Aksan, “Breaking the Spell”; Bařaran, “Remaking”; Abou-El-Haj, *Formation*; Reřat Kasaba, *Ottoman Empire*, 18–35; Gcek, *Rise of the Bourgeoisie*; Artan, “Architecture.”
2. Originally published 16 May 1921. Translated in zdemir, *Ottoman Clocks*, 149–52. For the text in Turkish, see Ahmet Hařim, “Mslman Saati,” in *Bize Gre/Gure-bhne-i Lakkalan/Frankfurt Seyahatnamesi*, ed. Mehmet Kaplan (Istanbul: Mill Eđitim Basımevi, 1969), 102–5.
  3. “Saatlerimiz İře Yaramayacak.”

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A.MKT.MHM - Sadaret/Mektubî Kalemi/Mühimme Kalemi Belgeleri  
A.MKT.NZD - Sadaret/Mektubî Kalemi Nezaret ve Devair Yazışmalarına Ait Belgeler  
A.MKT.UM - Sadaret/Mektubî Kalemi/Umum Vilayetler Evrakı  
A.TŞF - Sadaret/Teşrifat Kalemi  
BUY. - Buyuruldu Defterleri  
C.DH - Cevdet/Dahiliye  
C.ZB - Cevdet/Zabtiye  
DH.EUM.MEM - Dahiliye/Emniyet-i Umumiye Müdüriyeti/Memurin Kalemi  
DH.EUM.MH - Dahiliye/Emniyet-i Umumiye Müdüriyeti/Muhasebe Kalemi  
DH.EUM.MTK - Dahiliye/Muhaberat Ve Tensikat Müdüriyeti Belgeleri  
DH.EUM.VRK - Dahiliye/Emniyet-i Umumiye Müdüriyeti/Evrak Odası Belgeleri  
DH.İD - Dahiliye/İdare  
DH.MB.HPS.M - Dahiliye/Mebani-i Emiriye Ve Hapishâneler Müdüriyeti Belgeleri/  
Müteferrik  
DH.MKT - Dahiliye/Mektubî Kalemi  
DH.MUİ - Dahiliye/Muhaberat-ı Umumiye İdaresi  
DH.UMVM - Dahiliye/Umûr-ı Mahalliye-i Vilayat Müdüriyeti Belgeleri  
HAT - Hatt-ı Hümayun Tasnifi  
HR.MKT - Hariciye/Mektubî Kalemi  
HR.MTV - Hariciye/Mütenevvia Kısmı Belgeleri  
İ.DH - İrade/Dahiliye  
İ.HUS - İrade/Hususi  
İ.MVL - İrade/Meclis-i Vâlâ  
İ.ŞD - İrade/Şura-ı Devlet  
MB - Mabeyn-i Hümayun Evrakı  
MV - Meclis-i Vâlâ  
Y.MTV - Yıldız/Mütenevvi Maruzat Evrakı  
Y.PRK.AZJ - Yıldız/Perakende Evrakı Arzuhal Ve Journaller  
Y.PRK.MF - Yıldız/Perakende Evrakı/Maarif Nezareti Maruzatı  
Y.PRK.TKM - Yıldız/Perakende Evrakı/Tahrirat-ı Ecnebiye ve Mabeyn Mütercimliği

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